selinux: selinux_bprm_committed_creds() should wake up ->real_parent, not ->parent.

We shouldn't worry about the tracer if current is ptraced, exec() must not
succeed if the tracer has no rights to trace this task after cred changing.
But we should notify ->real_parent which is, well, real parent.

Also, we don't need _irq to take tasklist, and we don't need parent's
->siglock to wake_up_interruptible(real_parent->signal->wait_chldexit).
Since we hold tasklist, real_parent->signal must be stable. Otherwise
spin_lock(siglock) is not safe too and can't help anyway.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5a34511..39046dd 100644 (file)
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2371,10 +2371,8 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
        const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
        struct itimerval itimer;
-       struct sighand_struct *psig;
        u32 osid, sid;
        int rc, i;
-       unsigned long flags;
 
        osid = tsec->osid;
        sid = tsec->sid;
@@ -2405,12 +2403,9 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
        /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
         * wait permission to the new task SID. */
-       read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
-       psig = current->parent->sighand;
-       spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
-       wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
-       spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
-       read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+       read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+       wake_up_interruptible(&current->real_parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
+       read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
 }
 
 /* superblock security operations */