2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
160 * initialise the security for the init task
162 static void cred_init_security(void)
164 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
167 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
171 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
172 cred->security = tsec;
176 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
180 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
182 tsec = cred->security;
187 * get the security ID of a task
189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
194 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
200 * get the security ID of the current task
202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
204 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
213 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
214 u32 sid = current_sid();
216 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
220 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
221 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
223 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
224 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
225 isec->task_sid = sid;
226 inode->i_security = isec;
231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
233 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
234 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
236 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
237 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
238 list_del_init(&isec->list);
239 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
241 inode->i_security = NULL;
242 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
248 u32 sid = current_sid();
250 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
255 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
256 file->f_security = fsec;
261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
263 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
264 file->f_security = NULL;
268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
270 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
272 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
276 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
278 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
279 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
281 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
283 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
284 sb->s_security = sbsec;
289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
291 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
293 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
294 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
295 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
296 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
298 sb->s_security = NULL;
302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
304 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
306 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
310 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sk->sk_security = ssec;
314 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
321 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
323 sk->sk_security = NULL;
324 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
328 /* The security server must be initialized before
329 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
330 extern int ss_initialized;
332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
336 "uses transition SIDs",
338 "uses genfs_contexts",
339 "not configured for labeling",
340 "uses mountpoint labeling",
343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
347 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
358 static const match_table_t tokens = {
359 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
366 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
368 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
369 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
370 const struct cred *cred)
372 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
375 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
376 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
380 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
381 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
385 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
386 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
387 const struct cred *cred)
389 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
391 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
392 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
396 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
397 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
401 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
403 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
404 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
405 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
408 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
409 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
410 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
411 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
412 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
413 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
414 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
415 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
416 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
420 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
421 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
422 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
423 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
424 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
425 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
427 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
428 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
429 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
434 sbsec->initialized = 1;
436 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
437 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
438 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
440 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
441 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
442 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
444 /* Initialize the root inode. */
445 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
447 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
448 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
449 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
451 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
453 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
454 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
455 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
456 struct inode_security_struct, list);
457 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
458 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
459 inode = igrab(inode);
461 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
465 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
466 list_del_init(&isec->list);
469 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
475 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
476 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
477 * mount options, or whatever.
479 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
480 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
483 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
484 char *context = NULL;
488 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
490 if (!sbsec->initialized)
497 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
498 * settings this is going to need a mask
501 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
502 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
504 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
508 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
509 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
514 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
515 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
521 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
522 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
525 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
526 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
528 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
529 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
532 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
533 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
535 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
536 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
539 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
540 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
542 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
543 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
544 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
546 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
549 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
550 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
553 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
558 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
562 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
563 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
565 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
566 if (sbsec->initialized)
567 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
568 (old_sid != new_sid))
571 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
572 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
574 if (!sbsec->initialized)
575 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
581 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
582 * labeling information.
584 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
585 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
587 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
589 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
590 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
591 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
592 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
593 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
594 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
595 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
596 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
597 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
599 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
601 if (!ss_initialized) {
603 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
604 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
605 server is ready to handle calls. */
606 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
607 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
608 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
609 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
613 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
614 "before the security server is initialized\n");
619 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
620 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
621 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
622 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
624 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
625 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
626 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
627 * will be used for both mounts)
629 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
634 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
635 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
636 * than once with different security options.
638 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
640 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
641 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
643 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
644 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
645 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
652 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
654 goto out_double_mount;
656 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
663 goto out_double_mount;
665 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
667 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
668 rootcontext_sid = sid;
670 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
672 goto out_double_mount;
674 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
678 defcontext_sid = sid;
680 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
682 goto out_double_mount;
684 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
693 if (sbsec->initialized) {
694 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
695 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
696 goto out_double_mount;
701 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
704 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
705 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
707 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
708 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
712 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
714 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
718 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
722 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
723 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
724 * the superblock context if not already set.
727 if (!fscontext_sid) {
728 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
732 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
734 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
739 if (!rootcontext_sid)
740 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
742 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
743 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
746 if (rootcontext_sid) {
747 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
752 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
753 root_isec->initialized = 1;
756 if (defcontext_sid) {
757 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
759 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
760 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
764 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
765 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
771 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
774 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
776 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
780 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
781 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
785 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
786 struct super_block *newsb)
788 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
789 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
791 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
792 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
793 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
796 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
797 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
800 if (!ss_initialized) {
801 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
802 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
803 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
804 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
808 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
809 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
811 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
812 if (newsbsec->initialized)
815 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
817 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
819 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
820 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
821 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
824 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
828 if (!set_rootcontext) {
829 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
830 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
833 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
835 if (set_rootcontext) {
836 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
837 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
838 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
839 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
841 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
844 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
845 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
848 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
849 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
852 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
853 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
854 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
856 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
858 /* Standard string-based options. */
859 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
861 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
866 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
870 if (context || defcontext) {
872 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
875 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
885 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
888 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
895 case Opt_rootcontext:
898 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
901 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
909 if (context || defcontext) {
911 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
914 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
923 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
930 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
934 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
935 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
936 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
941 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
942 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
945 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
946 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
949 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
950 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
953 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
954 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
957 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
968 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
970 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
973 char *options = data;
974 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
976 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
981 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
983 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
988 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
991 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
995 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
996 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1001 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1002 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1004 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1006 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1009 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1011 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1012 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1014 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1015 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1020 /* we need a comma before each option */
1022 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1025 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1031 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1033 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1036 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1038 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1044 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1046 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1051 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1053 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1055 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1057 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1059 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1061 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1063 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1065 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1067 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1071 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1074 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1076 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1079 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1081 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1084 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1090 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1091 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1093 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1100 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1101 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1105 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1106 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1108 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1110 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1112 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1118 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1119 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1120 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1121 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1122 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1124 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1126 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1127 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1128 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1130 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1131 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1132 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1133 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1134 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1135 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1136 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1138 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1141 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1143 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1145 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1148 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1151 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1152 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1157 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1159 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1164 end = buffer+buflen;
1169 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1170 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1174 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1179 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1180 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1184 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1192 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1193 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1195 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1196 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1198 struct dentry *dentry;
1199 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1200 char *context = NULL;
1204 if (isec->initialized)
1207 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1208 if (isec->initialized)
1211 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1212 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1213 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1214 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1215 server is ready to handle calls. */
1216 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1217 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1218 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1219 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1223 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1224 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1225 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1226 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1230 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1231 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1233 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1234 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1236 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1237 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1240 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1241 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1246 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1247 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1253 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1255 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1256 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1257 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1265 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1271 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1277 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1278 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1279 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1280 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1284 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1285 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1288 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1292 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1293 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1294 __func__, context, -rc,
1295 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1297 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1305 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1306 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1308 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1309 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1310 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1312 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1313 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1314 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1322 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1323 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1326 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1327 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1329 if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1330 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1332 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1333 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1344 isec->initialized = 1;
1347 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1349 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1350 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1354 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1355 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1361 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1362 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1365 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1366 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1369 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1370 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1373 /* All other signals. */
1374 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1382 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1383 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1385 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1386 const struct cred *target,
1389 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1391 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1395 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1396 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1397 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1399 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1400 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1403 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1407 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1408 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1410 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1413 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1414 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1417 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1418 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1421 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1422 struct av_decision avd;
1424 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1425 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1428 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1432 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1434 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1437 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1441 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1445 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1446 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1447 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1451 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1452 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1455 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1457 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1458 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1461 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1462 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1463 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1464 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1465 struct inode *inode,
1467 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1469 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1470 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1473 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1476 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1477 isec = inode->i_security;
1481 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1482 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1485 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1488 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1489 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1490 pathname if needed. */
1491 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1492 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1493 struct dentry *dentry,
1496 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1497 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1499 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1500 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1501 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1502 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1505 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1506 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1507 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1508 check a particular permission to the file.
1509 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1510 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1511 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1512 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1513 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1517 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1518 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1519 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1520 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1523 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1524 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1526 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1527 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1535 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1538 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1544 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1545 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1546 struct dentry *dentry,
1549 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1550 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1551 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1552 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1554 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1557 dsec = dir->i_security;
1558 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1561 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1563 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1564 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1566 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1567 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1572 if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1573 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1578 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1582 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1583 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1584 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1587 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1588 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1589 struct task_struct *ctx)
1591 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1593 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1597 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1600 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1601 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1602 struct dentry *dentry,
1606 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1607 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1608 u32 sid = current_sid();
1612 dsec = dir->i_security;
1613 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1615 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1616 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1619 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1620 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1635 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1640 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1644 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1645 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1646 struct inode *new_dir,
1647 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1649 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1650 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1651 u32 sid = current_sid();
1653 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1656 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1657 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1658 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1659 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1661 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1663 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1664 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1665 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1668 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1669 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1672 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1673 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1674 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1679 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1680 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1681 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1682 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1683 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1686 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1687 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1688 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1689 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1691 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1699 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1700 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1701 struct super_block *sb,
1703 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1705 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1706 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1708 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1709 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1712 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1713 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1717 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1718 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1719 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1720 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1723 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1725 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1729 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1731 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1733 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1740 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1741 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1745 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1747 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1748 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1755 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1764 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1767 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1769 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1771 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1772 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1774 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1778 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1779 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1780 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1781 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1782 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1783 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1784 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1787 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1788 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1793 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1795 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1800 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1804 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1805 u32 sid = current_sid();
1806 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1807 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1810 return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1813 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1817 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1821 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1824 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1825 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1829 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1833 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1836 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1837 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1838 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1839 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1843 error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
1844 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1848 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1851 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
1855 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap, audit);
1859 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap, audit);
1862 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1865 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1868 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1873 end = buffer+buflen;
1879 const char *name = table->procname;
1880 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1881 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1885 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1888 table = table->parent;
1894 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1896 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1898 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1903 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1910 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1914 sid = current_sid();
1916 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1917 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1919 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1920 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1923 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1924 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1926 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1927 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1935 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1936 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1942 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1944 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1956 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1961 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1964 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1970 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1972 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1974 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1977 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1981 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1986 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1987 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1988 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1990 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1991 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1992 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1993 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1995 case 0: /* Close log */
1996 case 1: /* Open log */
1997 case 2: /* Read from log */
1998 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1999 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2001 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2008 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2009 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2010 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2012 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
2013 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
2014 * the capability is granted.
2016 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2017 * processes that allocate mappings.
2019 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2021 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2023 rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2027 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2030 /* binprm security operations */
2032 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2034 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2036 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
2040 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2043 bprm->security = bsec;
2047 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2049 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2050 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2051 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2052 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2054 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2057 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
2061 bsec = bprm->security;
2066 tsec = current_security();
2067 isec = inode->i_security;
2069 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2070 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
2072 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2073 tsec->create_sid = 0;
2074 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2075 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2077 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
2078 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
2079 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2082 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2083 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2084 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
2089 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2090 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2092 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2095 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2096 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2097 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2101 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2102 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2103 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2107 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2108 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2112 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2113 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2115 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2123 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2125 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2129 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2131 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2132 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2140 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2141 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2142 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2143 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2145 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2148 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2151 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2153 kfree(bprm->security);
2154 bprm->security = NULL;
2157 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2158 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2160 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2161 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2162 struct files_struct *files)
2164 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2165 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2166 struct tty_struct *tty;
2167 struct fdtable *fdt;
2171 tty = get_current_tty();
2174 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2175 struct inode *inode;
2177 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2178 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2179 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2180 file may belong to another process and we are only
2181 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2182 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2183 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2184 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2185 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2192 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2196 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2198 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2200 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2202 unsigned long set, i;
2207 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2208 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2210 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2213 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2214 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2219 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2221 file_to_av(file))) {
2223 fd = get_unused_fd();
2233 devnull = dentry_open(
2235 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2237 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2244 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2249 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2252 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2255 static int selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2257 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2258 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2263 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2267 new = prepare_creds();
2271 tsec = new->security;
2273 bsec = bprm->security;
2276 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2278 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2279 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2280 unchanged and kill. */
2281 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2282 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2283 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2290 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2291 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2292 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2293 struct task_struct *tracer;
2294 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2298 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2299 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2300 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2306 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2307 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2323 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2325 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2327 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2328 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2329 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2330 struct itimerval itimer;
2331 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2332 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2334 unsigned long flags;
2336 tsec = current_security();
2337 bsec = bprm->security;
2340 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2343 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2346 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2347 flush_unauthorized_files(cred, current->files);
2349 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2350 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2351 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2352 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2353 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2354 will be checked against the new SID. */
2355 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2356 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2358 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2359 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2360 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2361 flush_signals(current);
2362 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2363 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2364 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2365 recalc_sigpending();
2366 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2369 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2370 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2372 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2373 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2374 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2375 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2376 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2377 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2378 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2379 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2380 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2382 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2383 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2385 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2386 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2387 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2388 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2390 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2393 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2394 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2395 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2396 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2397 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2398 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2399 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2400 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2403 /* superblock security operations */
2405 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2407 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2410 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2412 superblock_free_security(sb);
2415 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2420 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2423 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2425 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2426 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2427 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2428 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2431 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2438 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2442 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2445 int current_size = 0;
2453 while (current_size < len) {
2463 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2465 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2466 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2467 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2473 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2481 in_save = in_end = orig;
2485 open_quote = !open_quote;
2486 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2488 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2490 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2491 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2493 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2495 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2497 } while (*in_end++);
2499 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2500 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2505 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2507 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2508 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2511 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2515 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2516 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2517 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2520 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2522 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2523 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2525 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2526 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2527 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2530 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2533 unsigned long flags,
2536 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2539 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2543 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2544 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2545 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2547 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2551 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2553 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2556 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2560 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2561 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2564 /* inode security operations */
2566 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2568 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2571 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2573 inode_free_security(inode);
2576 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2577 char **name, void **value,
2580 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2581 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2582 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2583 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2584 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2586 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2588 dsec = dir->i_security;
2589 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2592 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2594 if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2595 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2596 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2599 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2600 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2603 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2608 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2609 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2610 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2611 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2613 isec->initialized = 1;
2616 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2620 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2627 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2639 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2641 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2644 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2648 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2651 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2654 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2658 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2661 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2664 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2666 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2669 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2671 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2674 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2676 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2679 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2683 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2687 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2690 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2691 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2693 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2696 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2698 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2700 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2703 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2705 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2708 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2711 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2714 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2716 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2719 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2724 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2728 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2729 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2732 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2734 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2737 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2741 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2744 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2745 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2746 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2748 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2751 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2753 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2755 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2758 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2760 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2762 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2763 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2764 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2765 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2767 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2768 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2769 Restrict to administrator. */
2774 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2775 ordinary setattr permission. */
2776 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2779 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2780 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2782 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2783 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2784 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2785 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2786 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2789 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2790 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2792 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2793 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2796 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2799 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2800 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2802 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2803 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2807 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2808 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2809 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2811 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2816 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2817 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2821 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2826 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2828 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2829 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2833 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2834 const void *value, size_t size,
2837 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2838 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2842 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2843 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2847 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2849 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2850 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2851 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2859 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2861 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2863 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2866 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2868 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2870 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2873 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2875 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2876 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2878 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2879 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2884 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2886 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2888 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2892 char *context = NULL;
2893 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2895 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2899 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2900 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2901 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2902 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2903 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2904 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2905 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2907 error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2909 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2912 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2925 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2926 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2928 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2932 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2935 if (!value || !size)
2938 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2946 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2948 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2949 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2950 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2954 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2956 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2959 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2961 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2964 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2966 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2970 /* file security operations */
2972 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2974 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2976 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2979 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2983 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2984 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2987 rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2988 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2992 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2995 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2997 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2998 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2999 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3000 u32 sid = current_sid();
3003 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3007 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
3008 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3009 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
3011 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3014 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3016 return file_alloc_security(file);
3019 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3021 file_free_security(file);
3024 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3027 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3030 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
3032 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
3037 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3040 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3042 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3045 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3046 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3048 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3049 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3050 * This has an additional check.
3052 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3059 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3060 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3062 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3063 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3066 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3067 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3069 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3076 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3077 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3078 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3081 u32 sid = current_sid();
3083 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3084 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3085 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3086 if (rc || addr_only)
3089 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3092 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3093 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3096 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3097 unsigned long reqprot,
3100 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3103 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3107 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3110 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3111 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3113 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3114 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3115 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3116 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3117 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3118 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3119 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3120 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3122 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3123 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3124 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3125 * modified content. This typically should only
3126 * occur for text relocations.
3128 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3135 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3138 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3140 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3142 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3145 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3148 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3153 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3158 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3159 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3168 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3169 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3174 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3179 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3183 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3190 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3192 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3194 fsec = file->f_security;
3195 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3200 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3201 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3204 u32 sid = current_sid();
3206 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3208 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3209 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3211 fsec = file->f_security;
3214 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3216 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3218 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3219 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3222 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3224 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3226 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3229 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3231 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3232 struct inode *inode;
3233 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3235 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3236 fsec = file->f_security;
3237 isec = inode->i_security;
3239 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3240 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3241 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3242 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3243 * struct as its SID.
3245 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3246 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3248 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3249 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3250 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3251 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3252 * new inode label or new policy.
3253 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3255 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3258 /* task security operations */
3260 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3264 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3268 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3272 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3274 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3276 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3277 cred->security = NULL;
3282 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3284 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3287 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3288 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3290 old_tsec = old->security;
3292 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3296 new->security = tsec;
3301 * commit new credentials
3303 static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3305 secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
3308 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3310 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3311 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3312 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3313 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3314 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3319 static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3322 return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
3325 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3327 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3331 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3333 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3336 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3338 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3341 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3343 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3346 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3348 *secid = task_sid(p);
3351 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3353 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3357 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3361 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3365 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3368 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3372 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3376 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3379 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3381 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3384 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3386 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3389 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3393 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3394 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3395 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3396 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3397 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3398 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3403 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3407 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3411 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3414 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3416 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3419 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3421 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3424 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3430 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3435 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3437 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3439 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3440 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3442 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3446 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3452 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3453 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3454 the state of the current process. */
3455 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
3458 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3460 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3463 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3464 struct inode *inode)
3466 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3467 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3470 isec->initialized = 1;
3473 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3474 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3475 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3477 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3478 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3480 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3481 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3485 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3486 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3489 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3490 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3494 *proto = ih->protocol;
3496 switch (ih->protocol) {
3498 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3500 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3504 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3508 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3509 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3514 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3516 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3520 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3524 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3525 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3529 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3530 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3532 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3536 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3540 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3541 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3552 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3554 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3555 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3556 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3559 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3560 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3562 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3563 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3567 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3568 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3571 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3572 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3573 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3582 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3584 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3588 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3589 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3594 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3596 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3600 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3601 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3605 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3606 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3608 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3612 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3613 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3617 /* includes fragments */
3627 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3628 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3633 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3635 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3638 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3639 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3642 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3644 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3647 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3648 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3658 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3659 " unable to parse packet\n");
3669 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3671 * @family: protocol family
3672 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3675 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3676 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3677 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3678 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3679 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3683 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3690 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3691 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3693 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3694 if (unlikely(err)) {
3696 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3697 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3704 /* socket security operations */
3705 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3708 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3709 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3713 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3715 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3717 sid = task_sid(task);
3719 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3720 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3721 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3727 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3728 int protocol, int kern)
3730 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3731 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3740 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3742 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3743 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3749 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3750 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3752 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3753 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3754 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3755 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3760 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3762 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3765 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3771 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3772 isec->initialized = 1;
3775 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3776 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3777 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3778 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3784 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3785 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3786 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3788 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3793 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3798 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3799 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3800 * check the first address now.
3802 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3803 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3805 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3806 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3807 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3808 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3809 unsigned short snum;
3810 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3813 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3815 if (family == PF_INET) {
3816 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3817 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3818 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3820 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3821 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3822 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3828 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3830 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3831 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3835 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3836 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3837 ad.u.net.family = family;
3838 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3840 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3846 switch (isec->sclass) {
3847 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3848 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3851 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3852 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3855 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3856 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3860 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3864 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3868 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3869 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3870 ad.u.net.family = family;
3872 if (family == PF_INET)
3873 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3875 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3877 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3878 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3886 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3888 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3889 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3892 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3897 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3899 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3900 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3901 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3902 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3903 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3904 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3905 unsigned short snum;
3908 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3909 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3910 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3912 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3914 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3915 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3917 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3920 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3924 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3925 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3927 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3928 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3929 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3930 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3935 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3941 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3943 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3946 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3949 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3950 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3952 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3956 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3958 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3959 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3960 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3961 newisec->initialized = 1;
3966 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3971 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3975 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3978 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3979 int size, int flags)
3981 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3984 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3986 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3989 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3991 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3994 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3998 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4002 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4005 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4008 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4011 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4013 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4016 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
4017 struct socket *other,
4020 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4021 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4022 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4023 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4026 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
4030 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4031 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4033 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4034 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4036 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4038 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4042 /* connecting socket */
4043 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4044 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
4046 /* server child socket */
4047 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
4048 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
4049 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
4054 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4055 struct socket *other)
4057 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4058 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4059 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4062 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4063 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4065 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4066 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4068 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4069 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4076 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4078 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4084 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4087 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4088 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4092 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4095 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4096 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4099 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4100 struct sk_buff *skb,
4101 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4106 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4108 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4109 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4111 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4112 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4115 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4116 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4117 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4118 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4120 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4121 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4122 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4123 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4125 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4126 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4127 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4128 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4131 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4132 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4137 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4140 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4144 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4147 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4153 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4154 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4155 if (unlikely(err)) {
4157 "SELinux: failure in"
4158 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4159 " network port label not found\n");
4162 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4165 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4169 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4171 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4172 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4175 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4176 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4177 ad.u.net.family = family;
4178 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4182 if (selinux_compat_net)
4183 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4186 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4191 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4192 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4195 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4196 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4198 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4200 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4203 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4209 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4212 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4213 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4214 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4215 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4220 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4223 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4224 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4227 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4228 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4229 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4230 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4231 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4232 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4234 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4235 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4236 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4239 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4240 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4241 ad.u.net.family = family;
4242 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4246 if (peerlbl_active) {
4249 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4252 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4255 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4258 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4261 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4264 if (secmark_active) {
4265 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4274 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4275 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4280 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4281 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4282 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4284 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4286 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4287 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4288 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4289 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4291 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4296 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4301 if (scontext_len > len) {
4306 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4310 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4318 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4320 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4323 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4325 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4328 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4332 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4333 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4335 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4338 *secid = peer_secid;
4339 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4344 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4346 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4349 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4351 sk_free_security(sk);
4354 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4356 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4357 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4359 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4360 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4361 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4363 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4366 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4369 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4371 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4373 *secid = sksec->sid;
4377 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4379 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4380 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4382 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4383 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4384 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4385 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4388 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4389 struct request_sock *req)
4391 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4393 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4397 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4398 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4401 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4404 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4405 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4406 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4410 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4414 req->secid = newsid;
4415 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4419 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4420 const struct request_sock *req)
4422 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4424 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4425 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4426 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4427 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4428 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4429 time it will have been created and available. */
4431 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4432 * thread with access to newsksec */
4433 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4436 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4438 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4439 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4441 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4442 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4445 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4447 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4450 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4453 fl->secid = req->secid;
4456 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4460 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4461 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4462 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4464 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4468 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4470 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4472 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4473 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4474 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4475 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4476 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4477 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4487 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4492 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4494 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4500 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4505 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4508 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4509 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4510 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4511 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4514 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4517 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4518 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4519 ad.u.net.family = family;
4520 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4523 if (peerlbl_active) {
4524 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4527 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4533 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4534 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4538 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4539 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4540 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4542 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4548 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4549 struct sk_buff *skb,
4550 const struct net_device *in,
4551 const struct net_device *out,
4552 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4554 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4557 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4558 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4559 struct sk_buff *skb,
4560 const struct net_device *in,
4561 const struct net_device *out,
4562 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4564 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4568 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4573 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4576 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4577 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4578 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4580 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4583 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4584 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4590 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4591 struct sk_buff *skb,
4592 const struct net_device *in,
4593 const struct net_device *out,
4594 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4596 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4599 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4601 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4602 u16 family, char *addrp)
4605 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4607 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4608 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4610 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4611 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4614 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4615 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4616 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4617 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4619 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4620 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4621 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4622 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4624 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4625 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4626 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4627 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4630 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4631 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4636 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4639 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4642 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4645 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4652 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4653 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4654 if (unlikely(err)) {
4656 "SELinux: failure in"
4657 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4658 " network port label not found\n");
4661 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4664 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4668 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4669 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4670 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4676 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4678 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4679 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4680 ad.u.net.family = family;
4681 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4684 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4685 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4686 &ad, family, addrp))
4689 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4690 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4694 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4695 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4701 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4707 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4712 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4713 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4714 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4715 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4716 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4717 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4719 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4720 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4721 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4722 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4723 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4724 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4725 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4728 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4729 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4730 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4733 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4734 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4735 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4736 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4741 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4742 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4744 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4747 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4748 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4750 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4755 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4756 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4759 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4761 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4762 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4763 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4766 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4767 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4768 ad.u.net.family = family;
4769 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4773 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4774 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4777 if (peerlbl_active) {
4781 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4783 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4784 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4787 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4789 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4790 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4797 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4798 struct sk_buff *skb,
4799 const struct net_device *in,
4800 const struct net_device *out,
4801 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4803 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4806 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4807 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4808 struct sk_buff *skb,
4809 const struct net_device *in,
4810 const struct net_device *out,
4811 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4813 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4817 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4819 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4823 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4827 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4828 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4833 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4836 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4838 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4842 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4843 ad.u.cap = capability;
4845 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4846 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4849 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4850 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4853 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4856 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4860 sid = task_sid(task);
4861 isec->sclass = sclass;
4863 perm->security = isec;
4868 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4870 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4871 perm->security = NULL;
4875 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4877 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4879 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4883 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4884 msg->security = msec;
4889 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4891 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4893 msg->security = NULL;
4897 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4900 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4901 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4902 u32 sid = current_sid();
4904 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4906 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4907 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4909 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4912 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4914 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4917 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4919 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4922 /* message queue security operations */
4923 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4925 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4926 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4927 u32 sid = current_sid();
4930 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4934 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4936 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4937 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4939 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4942 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4948 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4950 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4953 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4955 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4956 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4957 u32 sid = current_sid();
4959 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4961 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4962 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4964 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4965 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4968 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4976 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4977 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4980 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4983 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4986 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4992 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4996 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4998 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4999 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5000 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5001 u32 sid = current_sid();
5004 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5005 msec = msg->security;
5008 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5010 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5012 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5013 * message queue this message will be stored in
5015 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5021 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5022 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5024 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5025 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5028 /* Can this process send the message */
5029 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5032 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5033 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5034 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5039 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5040 struct task_struct *target,
5041 long type, int mode)
5043 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5044 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5045 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5046 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5049 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5050 msec = msg->security;
5052 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5053 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5055 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5056 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5058 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5059 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5063 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5064 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5066 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5067 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5068 u32 sid = current_sid();
5071 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5075 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5077 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5078 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5080 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5083 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5089 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5091 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5094 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5096 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5097 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5098 u32 sid = current_sid();
5100 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5102 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5103 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5105 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5106 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5109 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5110 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5118 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5119 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5122 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5125 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5132 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5138 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5142 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5143 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5148 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5152 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5155 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5157 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5160 /* Semaphore security operations */
5161 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5163 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5164 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5165 u32 sid = current_sid();
5168 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5172 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5174 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5175 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5177 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5180 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5186 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5188 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5191 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5193 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5194 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5195 u32 sid = current_sid();
5197 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5199 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5200 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5202 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5203 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5206 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5207 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5215 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5216 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5220 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5231 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5234 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5238 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5244 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5248 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5249 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5254 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5258 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5261 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5267 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5269 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5274 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5277 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5279 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5283 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5286 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5289 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5290 char *name, char **value)
5292 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5298 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5304 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5306 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5308 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5310 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5311 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5312 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5313 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5314 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5315 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5316 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5317 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5325 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5335 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5336 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5338 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5339 struct task_struct *tracer;
5346 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5347 security attributes. */
5352 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5353 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5354 * above restriction is ever removed.
5356 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5357 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5358 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5359 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5360 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5361 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5362 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5363 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5364 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5365 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5371 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5372 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5373 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5377 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5378 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5379 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5381 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5388 new = prepare_creds();
5392 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5393 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5394 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5395 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5396 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5397 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5398 tsec = new->security;
5399 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5400 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5401 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5402 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5403 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5404 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5407 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5408 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5409 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5410 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5415 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5417 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5418 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5423 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5424 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5425 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5429 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5430 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5433 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5435 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5439 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5440 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5459 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5461 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5464 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5466 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5469 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5476 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5477 unsigned long flags)
5479 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5480 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5482 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5486 tsec = cred->security;
5487 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5488 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5490 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5496 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5498 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5504 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5505 const struct cred *cred,
5509 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5512 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5513 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5514 appear to be created. */
5518 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5520 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5521 ksec = key->security;
5523 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5526 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5528 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5529 char *context = NULL;
5533 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5542 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5545 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5546 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5547 .capget = selinux_capget,
5548 .capset = selinux_capset,
5549 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5550 .capable = selinux_capable,
5551 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5552 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5553 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5554 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5556 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5557 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5559 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5560 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5561 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5562 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5563 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5564 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5565 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5567 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5568 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5569 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5570 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5571 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5572 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5573 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5574 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5575 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5576 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5577 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5580 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5581 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5582 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5583 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5584 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5585 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5586 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5587 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5588 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5589 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5590 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5591 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5592 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5593 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5594 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5595 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5596 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5597 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5598 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5599 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5600 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5601 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5602 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5603 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5604 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5605 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5606 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5608 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5609 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5610 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5611 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5612 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5613 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5614 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5615 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5616 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5617 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5618 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5620 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5622 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5623 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5624 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5625 .cred_commit = selinux_cred_commit,
5626 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5627 .task_fix_setuid = selinux_task_fix_setuid,
5628 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5629 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5630 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5631 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5632 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5633 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5634 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5635 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5636 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5637 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5638 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5639 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5640 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5641 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5642 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5643 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5644 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5646 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5647 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5649 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5650 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5652 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5653 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5654 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5655 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5656 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5657 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5659 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5660 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5661 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5662 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5663 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5665 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5666 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5667 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5668 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5669 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5671 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5673 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5674 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5676 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5677 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5678 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5680 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5681 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5683 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5684 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5685 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5686 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5687 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5688 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5689 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5690 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5691 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5692 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5693 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5694 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5695 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5696 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5697 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5698 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5699 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5700 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5701 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5702 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5703 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5704 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5705 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5706 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5707 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5709 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5710 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5711 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5712 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5713 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5714 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5715 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5716 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5717 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5718 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5719 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5723 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5724 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5725 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5726 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5730 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5731 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5732 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5733 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5737 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5739 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5740 selinux_enabled = 0;
5744 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5745 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5749 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5751 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5752 cred_init_security();
5754 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5755 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5756 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5759 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5761 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5762 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5763 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5765 if (selinux_enforcing)
5766 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5768 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5773 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5775 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5777 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5778 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5779 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5780 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5782 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5783 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5784 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5785 struct superblock_security_struct,
5787 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5789 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5790 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5791 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5793 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5795 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5796 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5797 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5800 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5801 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5804 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5805 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5806 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5808 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5810 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5812 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5813 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5815 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5816 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5819 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5820 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5822 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5823 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5826 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5827 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5829 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5830 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5834 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5836 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5838 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5839 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5841 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5842 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5845 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5846 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5848 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5849 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5855 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5859 if (!selinux_enabled)
5862 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5864 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5866 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5868 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5869 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5871 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5878 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5880 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5881 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5883 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5885 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5886 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5887 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5892 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5894 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5895 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5898 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5900 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5901 static int selinux_disabled;
5903 int selinux_disable(void)
5905 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5907 if (ss_initialized) {
5908 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5912 if (selinux_disabled) {
5913 /* Only do this once. */
5917 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5919 selinux_disabled = 1;
5920 selinux_enabled = 0;
5922 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5923 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5925 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5926 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5928 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */