2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
160 * initialise the security for the init task
162 static void cred_init_security(void)
164 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
167 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
171 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
172 cred->security = tsec;
176 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
180 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
182 tsec = cred->security;
187 * get the objective security ID of a task
189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
194 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
200 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
204 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
213 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
214 u32 sid = current_sid();
216 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
220 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
221 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
223 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
224 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
225 isec->task_sid = sid;
226 inode->i_security = isec;
231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
233 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
234 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
236 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
237 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
238 list_del_init(&isec->list);
239 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
241 inode->i_security = NULL;
242 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
248 u32 sid = current_sid();
250 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
255 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
256 file->f_security = fsec;
261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
263 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
264 file->f_security = NULL;
268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
270 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
272 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
276 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
278 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
279 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
281 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
283 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
284 sb->s_security = sbsec;
289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
291 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
293 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
294 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
295 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
296 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
298 sb->s_security = NULL;
302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
304 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
306 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
310 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sk->sk_security = ssec;
314 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
321 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
323 sk->sk_security = NULL;
324 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
328 /* The security server must be initialized before
329 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
330 extern int ss_initialized;
332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
336 "uses transition SIDs",
338 "uses genfs_contexts",
339 "not configured for labeling",
340 "uses mountpoint labeling",
343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
347 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
356 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
359 static const match_table_t tokens = {
360 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
364 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
368 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
370 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
372 const struct cred *cred)
374 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
377 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
378 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
382 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
383 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
387 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
388 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
389 const struct cred *cred)
391 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
393 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
394 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
398 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
399 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
403 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
405 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
406 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
407 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
410 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
411 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
412 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
413 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
414 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
415 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
416 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
417 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
418 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
422 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
423 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
424 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
425 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
426 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
427 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
429 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
430 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
431 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
436 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
438 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
439 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
440 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
442 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
443 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
444 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
446 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
448 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
449 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
450 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
452 /* Initialize the root inode. */
453 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
455 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
456 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
457 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
459 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
461 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
462 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
463 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
464 struct inode_security_struct, list);
465 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
466 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
467 inode = igrab(inode);
469 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
473 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
474 list_del_init(&isec->list);
477 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
483 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
484 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
485 * mount options, or whatever.
487 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
488 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
491 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
492 char *context = NULL;
496 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
498 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
504 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
505 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
506 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
508 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
511 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
512 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
513 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
515 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
516 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
521 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
522 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
528 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
529 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
532 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
533 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
535 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
536 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
539 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
540 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
542 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
543 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
546 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
547 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
549 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
550 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
551 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
553 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
556 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
557 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
559 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
560 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
561 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
564 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
569 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
573 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
574 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
576 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
578 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
579 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
580 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
581 (old_sid != new_sid))
584 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
585 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
587 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
588 if (mnt_flags & flag)
594 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
595 * labeling information.
597 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
598 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
600 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
602 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
603 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
604 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
605 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
606 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
607 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
608 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
609 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
610 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
612 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
614 if (!ss_initialized) {
616 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
617 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
618 server is ready to handle calls. */
619 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
620 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
621 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
622 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
626 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
627 "before the security server is initialized\n");
632 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
633 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
634 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
635 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
637 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
638 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
639 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
640 * will be used for both mounts)
642 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
647 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
648 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
649 * than once with different security options.
651 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
654 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
656 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
657 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
659 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
660 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
661 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
668 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
670 goto out_double_mount;
672 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
677 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
679 goto out_double_mount;
681 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
683 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
684 rootcontext_sid = sid;
686 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
688 goto out_double_mount;
690 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
694 defcontext_sid = sid;
696 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
698 goto out_double_mount;
700 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
709 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
710 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
711 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
712 goto out_double_mount;
717 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
718 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
720 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
721 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
723 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
724 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
728 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
730 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
734 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
738 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
739 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
740 * the superblock context if not already set.
743 if (!fscontext_sid) {
744 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
748 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
750 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
755 if (!rootcontext_sid)
756 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
758 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
759 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
762 if (rootcontext_sid) {
763 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
768 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
769 root_isec->initialized = 1;
772 if (defcontext_sid) {
773 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
775 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
776 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
780 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
781 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
787 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
790 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
792 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
796 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
797 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
801 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
802 struct super_block *newsb)
804 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
805 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
807 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
808 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
809 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
812 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
813 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
816 if (!ss_initialized) {
817 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
818 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
819 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
820 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
824 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
825 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
827 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
828 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
831 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
833 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
835 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
836 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
837 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
840 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
844 if (!set_rootcontext) {
845 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
846 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
849 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
851 if (set_rootcontext) {
852 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
853 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
854 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
855 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
857 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
860 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
861 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
864 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
865 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
868 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
869 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
870 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
872 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
874 /* Standard string-based options. */
875 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
877 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
882 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
886 if (context || defcontext) {
888 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
891 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
901 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
904 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
911 case Opt_rootcontext:
914 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
917 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
925 if (context || defcontext) {
927 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
930 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
936 case Opt_labelsupport:
940 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
947 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
951 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
952 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
953 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
958 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
959 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
962 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
963 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
966 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
967 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
970 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
971 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
974 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
985 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
987 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
990 char *options = data;
991 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
993 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
998 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1000 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1005 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1008 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1012 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1013 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1018 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1021 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1022 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1026 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1028 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1031 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1033 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1034 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1036 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1037 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1039 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1041 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1046 /* we need a comma before each option */
1048 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1051 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1057 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1059 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1062 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1064 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1070 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1072 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1077 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1079 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1081 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1083 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1085 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1087 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1089 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1091 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1093 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1097 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1100 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1102 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1105 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1107 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1110 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1116 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1117 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1119 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1126 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1127 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1129 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1131 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1132 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1134 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1136 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1138 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1144 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1145 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1146 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1147 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1148 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1150 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1152 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1153 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1154 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1156 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1157 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1158 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1159 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1160 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1161 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1162 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1164 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1167 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1169 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1171 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1174 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1177 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1178 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1183 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1185 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1190 end = buffer+buflen;
1195 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1196 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1200 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1205 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1206 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1210 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1218 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1219 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1221 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1224 struct dentry *dentry;
1225 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1226 char *context = NULL;
1230 if (isec->initialized)
1233 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1234 if (isec->initialized)
1237 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1238 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1239 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1240 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1241 server is ready to handle calls. */
1242 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1243 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1244 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1245 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1249 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1250 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1251 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1252 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1256 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1257 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1259 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1260 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1262 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1263 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1266 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1267 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1272 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1273 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1279 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1281 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1282 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1283 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1291 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1297 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1303 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1304 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1305 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1306 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1310 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1311 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1314 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1318 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1319 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1321 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1322 if (printk_ratelimit())
1323 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1324 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1325 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1327 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1328 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1329 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1332 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1340 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1341 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1343 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1344 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1345 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1347 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1348 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1349 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1357 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1358 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1361 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1362 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1364 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1365 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1367 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1368 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1379 isec->initialized = 1;
1382 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1384 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1385 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1389 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1390 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1396 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1397 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1400 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1401 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1404 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1405 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1408 /* All other signals. */
1409 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1417 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1418 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1420 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1421 const struct cred *target,
1424 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1426 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1430 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1431 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1432 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1433 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1435 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1436 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1439 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1443 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1444 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1446 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1450 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1451 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1452 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1453 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1455 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1460 sid = current_sid();
1461 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1462 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1465 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1466 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1469 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1470 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1471 const struct cred *cred,
1474 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1475 struct av_decision avd;
1477 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1478 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1481 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1485 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1487 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1490 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1494 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1498 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1499 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1500 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1504 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1505 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1508 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1510 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1511 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1514 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1515 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1516 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1517 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1518 struct inode *inode,
1520 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1522 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1523 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1526 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1529 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1530 isec = inode->i_security;
1534 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1535 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1538 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1541 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1542 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1543 pathname if needed. */
1544 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1545 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1546 struct dentry *dentry,
1549 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1550 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1552 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1553 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1554 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1555 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1558 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1559 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1560 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1561 check a particular permission to the file.
1562 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1563 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1564 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1565 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1566 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1570 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1571 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1572 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1573 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1576 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1577 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1579 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1580 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1588 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1591 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1597 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1598 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1599 struct dentry *dentry,
1602 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1603 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1604 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1605 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1607 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1610 dsec = dir->i_security;
1611 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1614 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1616 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1617 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1619 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1620 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1625 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1626 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1631 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1635 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1636 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1637 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1640 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1641 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1642 struct task_struct *ctx)
1644 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1646 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1650 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1653 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1654 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1655 struct dentry *dentry,
1659 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1660 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1661 u32 sid = current_sid();
1665 dsec = dir->i_security;
1666 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1668 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1669 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1672 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1673 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1688 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1693 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1697 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1698 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1699 struct inode *new_dir,
1700 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1702 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1703 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1704 u32 sid = current_sid();
1706 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1709 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1710 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1711 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1712 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1714 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1716 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1717 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1718 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1721 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1722 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1725 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1726 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1727 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1732 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1733 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1734 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1735 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1736 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1739 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1740 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1741 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1742 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1744 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1752 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1753 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1754 struct super_block *sb,
1756 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1758 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1759 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1761 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1762 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1765 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1766 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1770 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1771 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1772 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1773 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1776 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1778 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1782 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1784 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1786 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1793 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1794 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1798 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1800 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1801 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1808 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1817 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1820 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1822 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1824 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1825 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1827 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1831 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1832 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1833 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1834 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1835 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1836 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1837 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1840 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1841 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1846 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1848 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1853 rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1857 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1858 u32 sid = current_sid();
1859 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1860 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1863 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1866 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1870 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1874 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1877 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1878 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1882 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1886 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1889 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1890 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1891 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1892 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1896 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1897 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1901 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1905 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1906 * which was removed).
1908 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1909 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1910 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1911 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1914 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1919 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1923 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1926 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1929 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1932 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1937 end = buffer+buflen;
1943 const char *name = table->procname;
1944 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1945 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1949 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1952 table = table->parent;
1958 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1960 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1962 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1967 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1974 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1978 sid = current_sid();
1980 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1981 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1983 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1984 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1987 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1988 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1990 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1991 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1999 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
2000 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
2006 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2008 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2020 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2025 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2028 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2034 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2036 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2038 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2041 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2045 rc = cap_syslog(type);
2050 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2051 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2052 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2054 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2055 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2056 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2057 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2059 case 0: /* Close log */
2060 case 1: /* Open log */
2061 case 2: /* Read from log */
2062 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2063 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2065 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2072 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2073 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2074 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2076 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2077 * processes that allocate mappings.
2079 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2081 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2083 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2084 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2088 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2091 /* binprm security operations */
2093 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2095 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2096 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2097 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2098 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2099 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2102 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2106 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2107 * the script interpreter */
2108 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2111 old_tsec = current_security();
2112 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2113 isec = inode->i_security;
2115 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2116 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2117 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2119 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2120 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2121 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2122 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2124 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2125 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2126 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2127 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2129 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2130 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2131 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2136 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2137 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2139 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2140 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2142 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2143 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2144 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2148 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2149 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2150 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2154 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2155 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2159 /* Check for shared state */
2160 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2161 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2162 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2168 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2169 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2171 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2172 struct task_struct *tracer;
2173 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2177 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2178 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2179 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2185 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2187 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2193 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2194 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2200 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2202 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2203 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2211 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2212 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2213 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2214 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2216 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2219 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2222 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2223 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2225 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2226 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2227 struct files_struct *files)
2229 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2230 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2231 struct tty_struct *tty;
2232 struct fdtable *fdt;
2236 tty = get_current_tty();
2239 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2240 struct inode *inode;
2242 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2243 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2244 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2245 file may belong to another process and we are only
2246 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2247 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2248 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2249 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2250 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2257 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2261 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2263 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2265 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2267 unsigned long set, i;
2272 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2273 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2275 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2278 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2279 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2284 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2286 file_to_av(file))) {
2288 fd = get_unused_fd();
2298 devnull = dentry_open(
2300 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2302 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2309 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2314 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2317 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2321 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2323 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2325 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2326 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2329 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2330 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2333 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2334 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2336 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2337 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2339 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2340 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2341 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2343 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2344 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2345 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2346 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2347 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2349 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2350 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2352 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2353 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2354 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2355 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2357 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2362 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2365 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2367 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2368 struct itimerval itimer;
2369 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2372 unsigned long flags;
2380 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2381 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2382 * flush and unblock signals.
2384 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2385 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2387 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2389 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2390 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2391 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2392 flush_signals(current);
2393 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2394 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2395 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2396 recalc_sigpending();
2397 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2400 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2401 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2402 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2403 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2404 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2405 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2406 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2407 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2410 /* superblock security operations */
2412 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2414 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2417 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2419 superblock_free_security(sb);
2422 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2427 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2430 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2432 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2433 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2434 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2435 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2436 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2439 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2446 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2450 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2453 int current_size = 0;
2461 while (current_size < len) {
2471 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2473 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2474 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2475 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2481 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2489 in_save = in_end = orig;
2493 open_quote = !open_quote;
2494 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2496 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2498 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2499 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2501 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2503 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2505 } while (*in_end++);
2507 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2508 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2513 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2515 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2516 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2519 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2523 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2524 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2527 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2528 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2529 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2532 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2534 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2535 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2537 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2538 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2539 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2542 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2545 unsigned long flags,
2548 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2550 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2551 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2552 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2554 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2558 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2560 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2562 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2563 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2566 /* inode security operations */
2568 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2570 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2573 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2575 inode_free_security(inode);
2578 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2579 char **name, void **value,
2582 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2583 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2584 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2585 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2586 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2588 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2590 dsec = dir->i_security;
2591 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2594 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2596 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2597 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2598 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2601 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2602 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2605 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2610 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2611 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2612 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2613 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2615 isec->initialized = 1;
2618 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2622 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2629 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2641 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2643 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2646 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2648 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2651 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2653 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2656 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2658 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2661 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2663 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2666 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2668 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2671 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2673 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2676 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2677 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2679 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2682 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2684 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2686 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2689 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2691 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2693 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2696 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2698 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2701 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2705 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2706 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2709 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2711 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2713 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2716 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2717 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2718 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2720 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2723 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2725 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2727 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2730 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2732 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2734 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2735 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2736 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2737 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2739 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2740 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2741 Restrict to administrator. */
2746 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2747 ordinary setattr permission. */
2748 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2751 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2752 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2754 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2755 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2756 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2757 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2758 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2761 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2762 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2764 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2765 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2768 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2771 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2772 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2774 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2775 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2779 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2780 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2781 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2783 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2788 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2789 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2793 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2798 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2800 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2801 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2805 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2806 const void *value, size_t size,
2809 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2810 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2814 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2815 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2819 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2821 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2822 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2823 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2831 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2833 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2835 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2838 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2840 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2842 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2845 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2847 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2848 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2850 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2851 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2856 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2858 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2860 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2864 char *context = NULL;
2865 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2867 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2871 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2872 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2873 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2874 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2875 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2876 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2877 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2879 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2880 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2882 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2885 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2898 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2899 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2901 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2905 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2908 if (!value || !size)
2911 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2919 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2921 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2922 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2923 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2927 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2929 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2933 /* file security operations */
2935 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2937 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2939 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2942 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2946 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2947 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2950 rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2951 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2955 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2958 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2960 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2961 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2962 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2963 u32 sid = current_sid();
2966 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2970 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2971 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2972 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2974 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2977 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2979 return file_alloc_security(file);
2982 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2984 file_free_security(file);
2987 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2990 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2993 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2995 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
3000 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3003 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3005 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3008 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3009 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3011 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3012 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3013 * This has an additional check.
3015 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3022 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3023 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3025 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3026 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3029 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3030 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3032 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3039 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3040 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3041 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3044 u32 sid = current_sid();
3046 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3047 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3048 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3049 if (rc || addr_only)
3052 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3055 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3056 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3059 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3060 unsigned long reqprot,
3063 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3065 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3068 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3069 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3071 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3072 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3073 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3074 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3075 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3076 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3077 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3078 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3080 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3081 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3082 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3083 * modified content. This typically should only
3084 * occur for text relocations.
3086 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3093 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3096 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3098 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3100 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3103 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3106 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3111 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3116 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3117 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3126 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3127 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3132 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3137 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3141 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3148 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3150 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3152 fsec = file->f_security;
3153 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3158 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3159 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3162 u32 sid = current_sid();
3164 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3166 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3167 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3169 fsec = file->f_security;
3172 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3174 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3176 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3177 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3180 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3182 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3184 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3187 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3189 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3190 struct inode *inode;
3191 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3193 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3194 fsec = file->f_security;
3195 isec = inode->i_security;
3197 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3198 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3199 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3200 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3201 * struct as its SID.
3203 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3204 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3206 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3207 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3208 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3209 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3210 * new inode label or new policy.
3211 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3213 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3216 /* task security operations */
3218 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3220 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3224 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3226 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3228 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3229 cred->security = NULL;
3234 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3236 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3239 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3240 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3242 old_tsec = old->security;
3244 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3248 new->security = tsec;
3253 * set the security data for a kernel service
3254 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3256 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3258 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3259 u32 sid = current_sid();
3262 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3263 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3264 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3268 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3269 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3270 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3276 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3277 * objective context of the specified inode
3279 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3281 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3282 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3283 u32 sid = current_sid();
3286 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3287 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3288 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3292 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3296 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3298 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3301 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3303 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3306 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3308 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3311 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3313 *secid = task_sid(p);
3316 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3320 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3324 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3327 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3331 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3335 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3338 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3340 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3343 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3345 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3347 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3348 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3349 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3350 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3351 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3352 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3357 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3361 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3365 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3368 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3370 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3373 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3375 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3378 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3385 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3387 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3389 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3390 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3392 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3396 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3398 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3401 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3402 struct inode *inode)
3404 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3405 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3408 isec->initialized = 1;
3411 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3412 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3413 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3415 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3416 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3418 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3419 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3423 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3424 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3427 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3428 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3432 *proto = ih->protocol;
3434 switch (ih->protocol) {
3436 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3438 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3442 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3446 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3447 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3452 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3454 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3458 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3462 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3463 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3467 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3468 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3470 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3474 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3478 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3479 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3490 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3492 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3493 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3494 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3497 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3498 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3500 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3501 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3505 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3506 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3509 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3510 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3511 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3520 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3522 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3526 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3527 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3532 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3534 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3538 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3539 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3543 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3544 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3546 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3550 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3551 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3555 /* includes fragments */
3565 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3566 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3571 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3573 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3576 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3577 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3580 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3582 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3585 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3586 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3596 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3597 " unable to parse packet\n");
3607 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3609 * @family: protocol family
3610 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3613 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3614 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3615 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3616 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3617 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3621 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3628 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3629 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3631 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3632 if (unlikely(err)) {
3634 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3635 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3642 /* socket security operations */
3643 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3646 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3647 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3651 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3653 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3655 sid = task_sid(task);
3657 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3658 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3659 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3665 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3666 int protocol, int kern)
3668 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3669 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3678 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3680 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3681 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3687 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3688 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3690 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3691 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3692 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3693 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3698 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3700 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3703 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3709 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3710 isec->initialized = 1;
3713 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3714 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3715 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3716 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3722 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3723 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3724 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3726 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3731 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3736 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3737 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3738 * check the first address now.
3740 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3741 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3743 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3744 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3745 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3746 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3747 unsigned short snum;
3748 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3751 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3753 if (family == PF_INET) {
3754 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3755 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3756 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3758 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3759 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3760 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3766 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3768 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3769 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3773 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3774 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3775 ad.u.net.family = family;
3776 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3778 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3784 switch (isec->sclass) {
3785 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3786 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3789 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3790 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3793 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3794 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3798 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3802 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3806 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3807 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3808 ad.u.net.family = family;
3810 if (family == PF_INET)
3811 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3813 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3815 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3816 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3824 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3826 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3827 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3830 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3835 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3837 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3838 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3839 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3840 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3841 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3842 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3843 unsigned short snum;
3846 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3847 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3848 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3850 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3852 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3853 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3855 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3858 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3862 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3863 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3865 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3866 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3867 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3868 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3873 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3879 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3881 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3884 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3887 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3888 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3890 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3894 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3896 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3897 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3898 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3899 newisec->initialized = 1;
3904 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3909 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3913 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3916 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3917 int size, int flags)
3919 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3922 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3924 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3927 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3929 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3932 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3936 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3940 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3943 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3946 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3949 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3951 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3954 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3955 struct socket *other,
3958 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3959 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3960 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3961 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3964 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3965 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3967 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3968 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3970 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3972 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3976 /* connecting socket */
3977 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3978 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3980 /* server child socket */
3981 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3982 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3983 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3988 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3989 struct socket *other)
3991 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3992 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3993 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3996 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3997 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3999 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4000 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4002 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4003 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4010 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4012 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4018 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4021 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4022 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4026 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4029 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4030 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4033 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4034 struct sk_buff *skb,
4035 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4040 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4042 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4043 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4045 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4046 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4049 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4050 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4051 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4052 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4054 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4055 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4056 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4057 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4059 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4060 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4061 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4062 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4065 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4066 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4071 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4074 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4078 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4081 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4087 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4088 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4089 if (unlikely(err)) {
4091 "SELinux: failure in"
4092 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4093 " network port label not found\n");
4096 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4099 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4103 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4105 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4106 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4109 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4110 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4111 ad.u.net.family = family;
4112 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4116 if (selinux_compat_net)
4117 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4119 else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4120 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4125 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4126 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4129 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4130 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4132 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4134 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4137 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4143 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4146 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4147 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4148 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4149 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4154 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4157 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4158 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4161 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4162 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4163 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4164 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4165 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4166 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4168 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4169 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4170 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4173 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4174 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4175 ad.u.net.family = family;
4176 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4180 if (peerlbl_active) {
4183 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4186 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4189 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4192 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4195 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4198 if (secmark_active) {
4199 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4208 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4209 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4214 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4215 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4216 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4218 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4220 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4221 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4222 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4223 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4225 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4230 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4235 if (scontext_len > len) {
4240 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4244 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4252 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4254 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4257 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4259 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4262 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4266 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4267 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4269 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4272 *secid = peer_secid;
4273 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4278 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4280 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4283 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4285 sk_free_security(sk);
4288 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4290 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4291 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4293 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4294 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4295 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4297 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4300 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4303 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4305 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4307 *secid = sksec->sid;
4311 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4313 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4314 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4316 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4317 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4318 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4319 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4322 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4323 struct request_sock *req)
4325 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4327 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4331 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4332 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4335 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4338 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4339 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4340 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4344 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4348 req->secid = newsid;
4349 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4353 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4354 const struct request_sock *req)
4356 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4358 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4359 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4360 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4361 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4362 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4363 time it will have been created and available. */
4365 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4366 * thread with access to newsksec */
4367 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4370 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4372 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4373 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4375 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4376 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4379 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4381 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4384 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4387 fl->secid = req->secid;
4390 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4394 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4395 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4396 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4398 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4402 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4404 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4406 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4407 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4408 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4409 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4410 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4411 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4421 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4426 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4428 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4434 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4439 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4442 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4443 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4444 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4445 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4448 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4451 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4452 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4453 ad.u.net.family = family;
4454 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4457 if (peerlbl_active) {
4458 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4461 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4467 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4468 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4472 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4473 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4474 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4476 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4482 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4483 struct sk_buff *skb,
4484 const struct net_device *in,
4485 const struct net_device *out,
4486 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4488 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4491 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4492 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4493 struct sk_buff *skb,
4494 const struct net_device *in,
4495 const struct net_device *out,
4496 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4498 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4502 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4507 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4510 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4511 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4512 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4514 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4517 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4518 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4524 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4525 struct sk_buff *skb,
4526 const struct net_device *in,
4527 const struct net_device *out,
4528 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4530 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4533 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4535 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4536 u16 family, char *addrp)
4539 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4541 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4542 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4544 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4545 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4548 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4549 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4550 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4551 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4553 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4554 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4555 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4556 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4558 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4559 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4560 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4561 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4564 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4565 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4570 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4573 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4576 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4579 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4586 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4587 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4588 if (unlikely(err)) {
4590 "SELinux: failure in"
4591 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4592 " network port label not found\n");
4595 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4598 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4602 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4603 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4604 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4610 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4612 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4613 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4614 ad.u.net.family = family;
4615 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4618 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4619 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4620 &ad, family, addrp))
4622 } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4623 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4624 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4628 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4629 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4635 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4641 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4646 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4647 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4648 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4649 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4650 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4651 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4653 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4654 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4655 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4656 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4657 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4658 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4659 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4662 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4663 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4664 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4667 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4668 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4669 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4670 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4675 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4676 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4678 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4681 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4682 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4684 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4689 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4690 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4693 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4695 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4696 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4697 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4700 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4701 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4702 ad.u.net.family = family;
4703 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4707 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4708 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4711 if (peerlbl_active) {
4715 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4717 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4718 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4721 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4723 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4724 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4731 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4732 struct sk_buff *skb,
4733 const struct net_device *in,
4734 const struct net_device *out,
4735 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4737 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4740 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4741 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4742 struct sk_buff *skb,
4743 const struct net_device *in,
4744 const struct net_device *out,
4745 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4747 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4751 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4753 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4757 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4761 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4762 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4767 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4770 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4772 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4776 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4777 ad.u.cap = capability;
4779 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4780 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4783 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4784 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4787 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4790 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4794 sid = task_sid(task);
4795 isec->sclass = sclass;
4797 perm->security = isec;
4802 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4804 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4805 perm->security = NULL;
4809 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4811 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4813 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4817 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4818 msg->security = msec;
4823 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4825 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4827 msg->security = NULL;
4831 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4834 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4835 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4836 u32 sid = current_sid();
4838 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4840 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4841 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4843 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4846 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4848 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4851 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4853 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4856 /* message queue security operations */
4857 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4859 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4860 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4861 u32 sid = current_sid();
4864 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4868 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4870 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4871 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4873 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4876 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4882 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4884 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4887 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4889 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4890 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4891 u32 sid = current_sid();
4893 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4895 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4896 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4898 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4899 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4902 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4910 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4911 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4914 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4917 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4920 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4926 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4930 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4932 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4933 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4934 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4935 u32 sid = current_sid();
4938 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4939 msec = msg->security;
4942 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4944 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4946 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4947 * message queue this message will be stored in
4949 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4955 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4956 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4958 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4959 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4962 /* Can this process send the message */
4963 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4966 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4967 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4968 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4973 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4974 struct task_struct *target,
4975 long type, int mode)
4977 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4978 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4979 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4980 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4983 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4984 msec = msg->security;
4986 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4987 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4989 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4990 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4992 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4993 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4997 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4998 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5000 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5001 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5002 u32 sid = current_sid();
5005 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5009 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5011 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5012 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5014 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5017 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5023 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5025 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5028 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5030 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5031 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5032 u32 sid = current_sid();
5034 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5036 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5037 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5039 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5040 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5043 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5044 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5052 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5053 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5056 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5059 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5066 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5072 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5076 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5077 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5081 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5084 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5086 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5089 /* Semaphore security operations */
5090 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5092 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5093 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5094 u32 sid = current_sid();
5097 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5101 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5103 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5104 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5106 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5109 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5115 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5117 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5120 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5122 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5123 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5124 u32 sid = current_sid();
5126 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5128 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5129 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5131 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5132 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5135 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5136 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5144 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5145 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5149 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5160 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5163 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5167 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5173 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5177 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5178 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5183 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5187 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5190 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5196 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5198 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5203 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5206 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5208 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5212 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5215 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5218 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5219 char *name, char **value)
5221 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5227 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5233 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5235 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5237 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5239 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5240 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5241 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5242 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5243 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5244 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5245 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5246 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5254 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5264 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5265 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5267 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5268 struct task_struct *tracer;
5275 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5276 security attributes. */
5281 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5282 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5283 * above restriction is ever removed.
5285 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5286 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5287 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5288 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5289 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5290 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5291 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5292 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5293 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5294 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5300 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5301 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5302 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5306 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5307 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5308 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5310 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5317 new = prepare_creds();
5321 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5322 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5323 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5324 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5325 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5326 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5327 tsec = new->security;
5328 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5329 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5330 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5331 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5332 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5333 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5336 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5337 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5338 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5339 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5344 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5346 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5347 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5352 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5353 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5354 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5358 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5359 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5362 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5364 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5368 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5369 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5388 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5390 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5393 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5395 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5398 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5405 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5406 unsigned long flags)
5408 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5409 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5411 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5415 tsec = cred->security;
5416 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5417 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5419 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5425 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5427 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5433 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5434 const struct cred *cred,
5438 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5441 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5442 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5443 appear to be created. */
5447 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5449 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5450 ksec = key->security;
5452 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5455 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5457 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5458 char *context = NULL;
5462 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5471 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5474 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5475 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5476 .capget = selinux_capget,
5477 .capset = selinux_capset,
5478 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5479 .capable = selinux_capable,
5480 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5481 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5482 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5483 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5485 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5486 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5488 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5489 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5490 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5491 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5493 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5494 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5495 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5496 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5497 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5498 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5499 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5500 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5501 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5502 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5503 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5506 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5507 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5508 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5509 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5510 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5511 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5512 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5513 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5514 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5515 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5516 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5517 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5518 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5519 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5520 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5521 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5522 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5523 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5524 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5525 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5526 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5527 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5528 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5529 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5530 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5532 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5533 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5534 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5535 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5536 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5537 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5538 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5539 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5540 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5541 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5542 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5544 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5546 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5547 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5548 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5549 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5550 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5551 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5552 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5553 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5554 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5555 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5556 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5557 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5558 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5559 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5560 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5561 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5562 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5563 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5564 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5566 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5567 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5569 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5570 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5572 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5573 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5574 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5575 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5576 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5577 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5579 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5580 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5581 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5582 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5583 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5585 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5586 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5587 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5588 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5589 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5591 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5593 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5594 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5596 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5597 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5598 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5600 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5601 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5603 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5604 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5605 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5606 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5607 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5608 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5609 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5610 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5611 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5612 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5613 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5614 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5615 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5616 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5617 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5618 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5619 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5620 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5621 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5622 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5623 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5624 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5625 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5626 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5627 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5629 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5630 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5631 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5632 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5633 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5634 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5635 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5636 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5637 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5638 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5639 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5643 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5644 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5645 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5646 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5650 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5651 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5652 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5653 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5657 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5659 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5660 selinux_enabled = 0;
5664 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5665 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5669 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5671 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5672 cred_init_security();
5674 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5675 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5676 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5679 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5681 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5682 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5683 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5685 if (selinux_enforcing)
5686 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5688 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5693 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5695 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5697 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5698 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5699 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5700 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5702 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5703 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5704 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5705 struct superblock_security_struct,
5707 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5709 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5710 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5711 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5713 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5715 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5716 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5717 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5720 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5721 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5724 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5725 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5726 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5728 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5730 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5732 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5733 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5735 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5736 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5739 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5740 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5742 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5743 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5746 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5747 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5749 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5750 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5754 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5756 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5758 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5759 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5761 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5762 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5765 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5766 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5768 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5769 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5775 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5779 if (!selinux_enabled)
5782 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5784 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5786 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5788 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5789 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5791 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5798 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5800 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5801 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5803 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5805 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5806 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5807 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5812 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5814 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5815 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5818 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5820 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5821 static int selinux_disabled;
5823 int selinux_disable(void)
5825 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5827 if (ss_initialized) {
5828 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5832 if (selinux_disabled) {
5833 /* Only do this once. */
5837 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5839 selinux_disabled = 1;
5840 selinux_enabled = 0;
5842 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5843 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5845 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5846 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5848 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */