2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
21 #include <linux/config.h>
22 #include <linux/module.h>
23 #include <linux/init.h>
24 #include <linux/kernel.h>
25 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
26 #include <linux/errno.h>
27 #include <linux/sched.h>
28 #include <linux/security.h>
29 #include <linux/xattr.h>
30 #include <linux/capability.h>
31 #include <linux/unistd.h>
33 #include <linux/mman.h>
34 #include <linux/slab.h>
35 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
36 #include <linux/swap.h>
37 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
38 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
39 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
40 #include <linux/file.h>
41 #include <linux/namei.h>
42 #include <linux/mount.h>
43 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
44 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
46 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
48 #include <linux/tty.h>
50 #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
51 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
52 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
53 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
54 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
55 #include <linux/bitops.h>
56 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
57 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/tcp.h>
60 #include <linux/udp.h>
61 #include <linux/quota.h>
62 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
63 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64 #include <linux/parser.h>
65 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
67 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
68 #include <linux/personality.h>
69 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
70 #include <linux/audit.h>
71 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
79 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
81 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
82 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
84 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
85 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
87 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
89 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
92 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
95 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
96 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
98 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
100 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
103 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
106 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
107 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
109 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
110 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
111 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
112 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
113 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
115 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
116 before the policy was loaded. */
117 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
118 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
120 /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
121 length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
122 static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
128 rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
132 if (!buffer || !size)
133 goto getsecurity_exit;
137 goto getsecurity_exit;
139 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
146 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
148 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
150 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
152 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
157 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
158 task->security = tsec;
163 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
165 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
166 task->security = NULL;
170 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
172 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
173 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
175 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
179 init_MUTEX(&isec->sem);
180 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
182 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
183 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
184 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
185 inode->i_security = isec;
190 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
192 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
193 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
195 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
196 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
197 list_del_init(&isec->list);
198 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
200 inode->i_security = NULL;
204 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
206 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
207 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
209 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
214 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
215 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
216 file->f_security = fsec;
221 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
223 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
224 file->f_security = NULL;
228 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
230 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
232 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
236 init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem);
237 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
238 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
239 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
241 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
242 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
243 sb->s_security = sbsec;
248 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
250 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
252 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
253 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
254 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
255 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
257 sb->s_security = NULL;
261 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
263 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
265 if (family != PF_UNIX)
268 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
273 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
274 sk->sk_security = ssec;
279 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
281 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
283 if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX)
286 sk->sk_security = NULL;
290 /* The security server must be initialized before
291 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
292 extern int ss_initialized;
294 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
296 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
298 "uses transition SIDs",
300 "uses genfs_contexts",
301 "not configured for labeling",
302 "uses mountpoint labeling",
305 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
307 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
309 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
318 static match_table_t tokens = {
319 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
320 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
321 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
324 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
326 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
328 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
331 int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
332 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
333 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
338 name = sb->s_type->name;
340 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
342 /* NFS we understand. */
343 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
344 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
346 if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
350 context = d->context;
357 /* Standard string-based options. */
358 char *p, *options = data;
360 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
362 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
367 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
373 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
376 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
387 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) {
389 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
392 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
399 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
403 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
405 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
406 "defcontext option is invalid "
407 "for this filesystem type\n");
410 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
412 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
415 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
422 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
427 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
439 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
441 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
442 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
443 context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
447 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
448 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
452 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
453 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
459 if (seen & Opt_context)
460 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
464 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
466 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
467 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
468 defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
472 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
475 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
476 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
480 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
481 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
485 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
497 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
499 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
500 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
501 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
505 if (sbsec->initialized)
508 if (!ss_initialized) {
509 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
510 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
511 server is ready to handle calls. */
512 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
513 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
514 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
515 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
519 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
520 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
522 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
523 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
527 rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
531 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
532 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
533 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
534 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
535 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
536 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
537 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
538 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
539 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
543 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
544 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
545 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
546 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
547 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
548 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
550 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
551 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
552 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
557 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
560 sbsec->initialized = 1;
562 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
563 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
564 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
567 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
568 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
569 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
572 /* Initialize the root inode. */
573 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
575 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
576 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
577 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
579 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
581 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
582 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
583 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
584 struct inode_security_struct, list);
585 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
586 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
587 inode = igrab(inode);
589 if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
593 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
594 list_del_init(&isec->list);
597 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
603 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
605 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
607 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
609 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
611 return SECCLASS_FILE;
613 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
617 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
619 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
623 return SECCLASS_FILE;
626 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
628 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
631 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
633 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
636 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
643 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
645 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
652 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
653 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
655 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
657 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
658 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
660 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
662 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
668 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
669 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
670 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
671 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
672 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
674 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
676 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
677 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
678 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
680 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
682 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
683 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
684 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
685 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
686 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
688 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
691 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
693 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
696 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
699 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
700 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
705 char *buffer, *path, *end;
707 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
717 while (de && de != de->parent) {
718 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
722 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
727 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
728 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
732 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
740 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
741 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
743 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
744 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
746 struct dentry *dentry;
747 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
748 char *context = NULL;
753 if (isec->initialized)
758 if (isec->initialized)
761 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
762 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
763 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
764 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
765 server is ready to handle calls. */
766 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
767 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
768 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
769 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
773 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
774 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
775 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
776 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
780 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
781 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
783 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
784 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
786 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
787 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
790 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
791 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
796 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
797 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
803 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
806 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
807 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
815 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
821 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
827 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
828 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
829 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
830 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
834 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
835 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
838 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
841 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
842 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
843 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
844 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
846 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
854 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
855 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
857 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
858 /* Default to the fs SID. */
859 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
861 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
862 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
863 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
872 /* Default to the fs SID. */
873 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
876 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
878 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
879 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
890 isec->initialized = 1;
893 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
894 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
901 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
902 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
908 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
909 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
912 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
913 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
916 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
917 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
920 /* All other signals. */
921 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
928 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
929 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
930 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
931 struct task_struct *tsk2,
934 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
936 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
937 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
938 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
939 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
942 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
943 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
946 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
947 struct avc_audit_data ad;
949 tsec = tsk->security;
951 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
955 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
956 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
959 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
960 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
963 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
965 tsec = tsk->security;
967 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
968 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
971 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
972 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
973 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
974 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
977 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
979 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
980 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
981 struct avc_audit_data ad;
983 tsec = tsk->security;
984 isec = inode->i_security;
988 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
989 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
992 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
995 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
996 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
997 pathname if needed. */
998 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
999 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1000 struct dentry *dentry,
1003 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1004 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1005 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1007 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1008 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1011 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1012 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1013 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1014 check a particular permission to the file.
1015 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1016 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1017 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1018 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1019 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1023 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1024 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1025 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
1026 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
1027 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1028 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1031 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1033 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1035 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1036 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1044 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1046 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1051 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1052 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1053 struct dentry *dentry,
1056 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1057 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1058 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1060 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1063 tsec = current->security;
1064 dsec = dir->i_security;
1065 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1067 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1068 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1070 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1071 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1076 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1077 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1079 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1085 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1089 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1090 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1091 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1095 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1098 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1099 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1100 struct dentry *dentry,
1104 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1105 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1106 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1110 tsec = current->security;
1111 dsec = dir->i_security;
1112 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1114 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1115 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1118 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1119 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1134 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1138 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1142 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1143 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1144 struct inode *new_dir,
1145 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1147 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1148 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1149 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1151 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1154 tsec = current->security;
1155 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1156 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1157 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1158 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1160 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1162 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1163 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1164 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1167 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1168 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1171 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1172 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1173 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1178 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1179 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1180 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1181 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1182 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1185 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1186 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1187 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1188 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1190 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1198 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1199 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1200 struct super_block *sb,
1202 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1204 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1205 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1207 tsec = tsk->security;
1208 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1209 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1213 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1214 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1218 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1219 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1220 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1221 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1224 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1226 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1230 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1232 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1234 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1241 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1242 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1246 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1248 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1249 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1258 /* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */
1259 static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid)
1261 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1262 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1264 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1265 /* Defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
1270 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1272 isec->initialized = 1;
1277 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1279 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1281 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1282 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1285 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1289 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1290 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1291 if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
1292 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1296 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1297 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1301 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1305 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1308 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1309 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1313 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1317 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1320 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1321 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1323 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1326 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1330 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1334 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1337 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1341 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1345 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1349 tsec = current->security;
1351 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
1352 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1354 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1355 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1358 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1359 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1361 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1362 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1370 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1371 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1377 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1390 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1392 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1397 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1399 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1402 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1408 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1410 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1413 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1417 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1422 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1423 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1424 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1426 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1427 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1428 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1429 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1431 case 0: /* Close log */
1432 case 1: /* Open log */
1433 case 2: /* Read from log */
1434 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1435 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1437 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1444 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1445 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1446 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1448 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1449 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1450 * the capability is granted.
1452 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1453 * processes that allocate mappings.
1455 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1457 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1458 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1460 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1462 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1463 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1464 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1470 return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1473 /* binprm security operations */
1475 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1477 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1479 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1484 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1487 bprm->security = bsec;
1491 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1493 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1494 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1495 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1496 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1498 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1501 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1505 bsec = bprm->security;
1510 tsec = current->security;
1511 isec = inode->i_security;
1513 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1514 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1516 /* Reset create SID on execve. */
1517 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1519 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1520 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1521 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1524 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1525 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1526 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1531 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1532 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
1533 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
1535 if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1538 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1539 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1540 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1544 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1545 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1546 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1550 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1551 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1555 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1556 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1558 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1566 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1568 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1572 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1574 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1577 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1578 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1579 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1580 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1581 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1583 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1586 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1589 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1591 kfree(bprm->security);
1592 bprm->security = NULL;
1595 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1596 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1598 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1599 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1601 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1602 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1603 struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty;
1604 struct fdtable *fdt;
1609 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1611 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1612 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1613 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1614 file may belong to another process and we are only
1615 interested in the inode-based check here. */
1616 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1617 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1618 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1619 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1620 current->signal->tty = NULL;
1621 current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
1627 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1629 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1631 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1633 unsigned long set, i;
1638 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
1639 if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset)
1641 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1644 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1645 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1650 if (file_has_perm(current,
1652 file_to_av(file))) {
1654 fd = get_unused_fd();
1664 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1671 fd_install(fd, devnull);
1676 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1679 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1682 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1684 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1685 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1689 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1691 tsec = current->security;
1693 bsec = bprm->security;
1696 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1698 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1699 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
1700 unchanged and kill. */
1701 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1702 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1703 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1710 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1711 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1712 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1713 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1714 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1726 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1728 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1730 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1731 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1732 struct itimerval itimer;
1733 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1736 tsec = current->security;
1737 bsec = bprm->security;
1740 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1743 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1746 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1747 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1749 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1750 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
1751 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1752 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1753 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1754 will be checked against the new SID. */
1755 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1756 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1758 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1759 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1760 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1761 flush_signals(current);
1762 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1763 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1764 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
1765 recalc_sigpending();
1766 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1769 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1770 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
1771 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1772 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
1773 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1774 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1775 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1776 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1777 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1779 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1780 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1782 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1783 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1784 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1785 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1787 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1789 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1792 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1796 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1797 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1798 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1801 /* superblock security operations */
1803 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1805 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1808 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1810 superblock_free_security(sb);
1813 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1818 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1821 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1823 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1824 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1825 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len));
1828 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1836 memcpy(*to, from, len);
1840 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1842 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1843 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1844 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
1849 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
1850 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
1851 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
1855 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1863 in_save = in_end = orig;
1866 if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') {
1867 int len = in_end - in_curr;
1869 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
1870 take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1872 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
1874 in_curr = in_end + 1;
1876 } while (*in_end++);
1878 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
1879 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
1884 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1886 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1889 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
1893 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1894 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1895 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
1898 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct super_block *sb)
1900 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1902 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1903 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1904 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
1907 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
1908 struct nameidata *nd,
1910 unsigned long flags,
1915 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
1919 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
1920 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
1921 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
1923 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
1927 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
1931 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
1935 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
1936 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
1939 /* inode security operations */
1941 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
1943 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
1946 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
1948 inode_free_security(inode);
1951 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
1952 char **name, void **value,
1955 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1956 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1957 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1958 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1961 char *namep = NULL, *context;
1963 tsec = current->security;
1964 dsec = dir->i_security;
1965 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1966 isec = inode->i_security;
1968 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1969 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1971 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
1972 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
1975 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
1976 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
1979 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1984 inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
1986 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
1990 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
1997 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2009 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2011 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2014 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2018 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2021 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2024 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2028 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2031 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2034 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2036 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2039 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2041 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2044 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2046 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2049 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2053 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2057 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2060 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2061 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2063 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2066 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2068 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2071 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2075 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2078 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2081 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2082 struct nameidata *nd)
2086 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2091 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2095 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2096 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2099 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2103 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2107 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2110 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2111 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2112 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2114 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2117 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2119 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2122 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2124 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2125 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2126 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2127 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2128 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2132 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2133 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2134 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2135 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2136 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2137 Restrict to administrator. */
2141 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2142 ordinary setattr permission. */
2143 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2146 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2147 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2150 if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2153 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2154 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2156 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2157 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2161 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2165 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2166 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2170 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2175 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2177 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2178 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2182 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2183 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2185 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2186 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2190 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2191 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2195 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2197 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2198 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2206 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2208 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2211 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2213 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2216 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2218 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2219 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2220 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2221 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2222 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2223 Restrict to administrator. */
2227 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2228 ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2229 permission for removexattr. */
2230 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2233 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2234 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2238 static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
2240 return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2244 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2245 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2246 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2248 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2250 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
2252 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2254 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2257 return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
2260 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2261 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2263 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2267 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2270 if (!value || !size)
2273 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2281 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2283 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2284 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2285 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2289 /* file security operations */
2291 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2293 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
2296 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2300 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2301 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2304 return file_has_perm(current, file,
2305 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2308 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2310 return file_alloc_security(file);
2313 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2315 file_free_security(file);
2318 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2330 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2332 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2333 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2336 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2338 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2339 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2342 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2346 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2351 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2354 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2355 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2358 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2364 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2366 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2367 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2369 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2370 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2371 * This has an additional check.
2373 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2380 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2381 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2383 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2384 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2387 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2388 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2390 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2395 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2396 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2400 rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2404 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2407 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2408 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2411 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2412 unsigned long reqprot,
2417 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2421 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2424 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2425 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2427 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2428 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2429 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2431 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2432 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2433 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2434 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2435 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2437 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2438 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2439 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2440 * modified content. This typically should only
2441 * occur for text relocations.
2443 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2451 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2454 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2456 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2459 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2466 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2471 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2472 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2481 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2482 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2487 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2492 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2496 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2503 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2505 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2506 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2508 tsec = current->security;
2509 fsec = file->f_security;
2510 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2515 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2516 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2520 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2521 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2523 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2524 file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
2526 tsec = tsk->security;
2527 fsec = file->f_security;
2530 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2532 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2534 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2535 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2538 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2540 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2543 /* task security operations */
2545 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2549 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2553 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2556 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2558 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2561 tsec1 = current->security;
2563 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2566 tsec2 = tsk->security;
2568 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2569 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2571 /* Retain the exec and create SIDs across fork */
2572 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2573 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2575 /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2576 This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2577 subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2578 tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2583 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2585 task_free_security(tsk);
2588 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2590 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2591 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2592 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2593 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
2594 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2599 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2601 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2604 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2606 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2610 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2612 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2615 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2617 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2620 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2622 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2625 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2627 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2631 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2635 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2639 return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2642 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2644 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2647 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2651 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2652 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2653 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2654 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2655 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2656 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2661 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2663 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2666 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2668 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2671 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
2676 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
2680 if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2684 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2686 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2688 return task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2691 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2697 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2698 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2699 the state of the current process. */
2703 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2707 perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2709 return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2712 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2714 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2716 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2719 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2720 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2724 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2725 struct inode *inode)
2727 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2728 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2730 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2731 isec->initialized = 1;
2735 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2736 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2738 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2739 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2741 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2742 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2746 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2747 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2750 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2751 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2754 switch (ih->protocol) {
2756 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2758 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2762 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2766 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2767 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2772 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2774 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2778 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2782 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2783 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2794 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2796 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2797 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2800 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
2801 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
2803 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2804 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
2808 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
2809 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
2812 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
2813 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
2814 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
2820 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2822 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2826 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2827 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2832 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2834 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2838 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2839 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2843 /* includes fragments */
2853 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
2854 char **addrp, int *len, int src)
2858 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
2860 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
2864 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
2865 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
2868 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2870 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
2874 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
2875 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
2885 /* socket security operations */
2886 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
2889 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2890 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2891 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2894 tsec = task->security;
2895 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2897 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
2900 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
2901 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
2902 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
2908 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
2909 int protocol, int kern)
2912 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2917 tsec = current->security;
2918 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2919 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
2920 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
2926 static void selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2927 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2929 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2930 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2932 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2934 tsec = current->security;
2935 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
2936 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid;
2937 isec->initialized = 1;
2942 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
2943 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
2944 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
2945 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
2946 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
2948 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
2953 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
2958 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
2959 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
2960 * check the first address now.
2962 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
2963 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
2965 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2966 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2967 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2968 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
2969 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
2970 unsigned short snum;
2971 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2972 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
2974 tsec = current->security;
2975 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2977 if (family == PF_INET) {
2978 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
2979 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
2980 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
2981 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
2983 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
2984 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
2985 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
2986 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
2989 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
2990 snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
2991 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
2992 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
2995 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
2996 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
2997 ad.u.net.family = family;
2998 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3000 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3005 switch(isec->sclass) {
3006 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3007 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3010 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3011 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3015 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3019 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3023 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3024 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3025 ad.u.net.family = family;
3027 if (family == PF_INET)
3028 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3030 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3032 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3033 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3041 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3043 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3046 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3051 * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3053 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3054 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3055 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3056 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3057 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3058 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3059 unsigned short snum;
3062 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3063 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3064 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3066 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3068 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3069 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3071 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3074 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3075 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3079 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3080 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3081 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3082 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
3083 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
3092 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3094 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3097 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3100 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3101 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3103 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3107 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3109 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3110 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3111 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3112 newisec->initialized = 1;
3117 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3120 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3123 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3124 int size, int flags)
3126 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3129 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3131 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3134 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3136 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3139 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3141 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3144 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3147 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3150 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3152 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3155 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3156 struct socket *other,
3159 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3160 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3161 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3162 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3165 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3169 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3170 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3172 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3173 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3175 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3177 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3181 /* connecting socket */
3182 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3183 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3185 /* server child socket */
3186 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3187 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3192 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3193 struct socket *other)
3195 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3196 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3197 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3200 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3201 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3203 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3204 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3206 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3207 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3214 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3219 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3222 struct socket *sock;
3223 struct net_device *dev;
3224 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3226 family = sk->sk_family;
3227 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3230 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3231 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
3234 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3235 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3237 struct inode *inode;
3238 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3240 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3241 isec = inode->i_security;
3242 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3243 sock_class = isec->sclass;
3246 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3254 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3258 switch (sock_class) {
3259 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3260 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3261 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3262 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3265 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3266 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3267 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3268 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3272 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3273 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3277 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3278 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3279 ad.u.net.family = family;
3281 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
3285 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, &ad);
3289 /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
3290 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3294 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, &ad);
3301 /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
3302 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3303 sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad.u.net.sport),
3308 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3309 sock_class, recv_perm, &ad);
3313 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb);
3319 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3320 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3325 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3326 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3328 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3329 if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
3334 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3336 err = security_sid_to_context(ssec->peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3340 if (scontext_len > len) {
3345 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3349 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3357 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
3359 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3362 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3364 sk_free_security(sk);
3367 static unsigned int selinux_sk_getsid_security(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl, u8 dir)
3369 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3370 u32 sock_sid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
3373 return selinux_no_sk_sid(fl);
3375 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3376 isec = get_sock_isec(sk);
3379 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3381 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3385 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3389 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3390 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3391 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3393 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3397 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
3399 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3401 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3402 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3403 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
3404 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3405 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3406 if (!selinux_enforcing)
3416 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3421 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3423 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3424 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3425 const struct net_device *in,
3426 const struct net_device *out,
3427 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3431 int len, err = NF_ACCEPT;
3432 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3434 struct socket *sock;
3435 struct inode *inode;
3436 struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3437 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3438 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3439 struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3445 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3449 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3453 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3457 isec = inode->i_security;
3459 switch (isec->sclass) {
3460 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3461 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3462 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3463 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3466 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3467 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3468 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3469 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3473 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3474 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3479 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3480 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3481 ad.u.net.family = family;
3483 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp,
3484 &len, 0) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3485 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3488 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF,
3489 netif_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3490 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3493 /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
3494 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len,
3495 &node_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3496 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3499 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE,
3500 node_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3501 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3507 /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
3508 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3511 ntohs(ad.u.net.dport),
3512 &port_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3513 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3516 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3517 send_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3520 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3523 err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb);
3529 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3530 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3531 const struct net_device *in,
3532 const struct net_device *out,
3533 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3535 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3538 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3540 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3541 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3542 const struct net_device *in,
3543 const struct net_device *out,
3544 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3546 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3551 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3553 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3555 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3556 struct av_decision avd;
3559 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
3563 tsec = current->security;
3566 avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
3567 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd);
3568 cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed);
3570 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
3571 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
3576 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
3578 if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
3583 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
3584 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
3587 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
3588 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3590 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3594 isec->sclass = sclass;
3595 isec->ipc_perm = perm;
3596 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3597 perm->security = isec;
3602 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
3604 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
3605 perm->security = NULL;
3609 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3611 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3613 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3618 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3619 msg->security = msec;
3624 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3626 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
3628 msg->security = NULL;
3632 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
3635 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3636 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3637 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3639 tsec = current->security;
3640 isec = ipc_perms->security;
3642 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3643 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
3645 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3648 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3650 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
3653 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3655 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
3658 /* message queue security operations */
3659 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3661 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3662 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3663 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3666 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
3670 tsec = current->security;
3671 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3673 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3674 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3676 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3679 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3685 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3687 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3690 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3692 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3693 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3694 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3696 tsec = current->security;
3697 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3699 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3700 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3702 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3703 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3706 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3714 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3715 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3718 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
3721 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
3724 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
3730 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
3734 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
3736 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3737 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3738 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3739 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3742 tsec = current->security;
3743 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3744 msec = msg->security;
3747 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
3749 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
3751 * Compute new sid based on current process and
3752 * message queue this message will be stored in
3754 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
3762 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3763 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3765 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
3766 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3769 /* Can this process send the message */
3770 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3771 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
3773 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
3774 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
3775 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
3780 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3781 struct task_struct *target,
3782 long type, int mode)
3784 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3785 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3786 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3787 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3790 tsec = target->security;
3791 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3792 msec = msg->security;
3794 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3795 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3797 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
3798 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
3800 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3801 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
3805 /* Shared Memory security operations */
3806 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3808 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3809 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3810 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3813 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
3817 tsec = current->security;
3818 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3820 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3821 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3823 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3826 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3832 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3834 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3837 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
3839 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3840 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3841 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3843 tsec = current->security;
3844 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3846 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3847 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3849 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3850 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3853 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
3854 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
3862 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3863 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3866 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
3869 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
3876 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
3882 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3886 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
3887 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
3892 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
3896 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
3899 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
3901 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3904 /* Semaphore security operations */
3905 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3907 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3908 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3909 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3912 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
3916 tsec = current->security;
3917 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
3919 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3920 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
3922 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
3925 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
3931 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3933 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
3936 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
3938 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3939 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3940 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3942 tsec = current->security;
3943 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
3945 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3946 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
3948 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
3949 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3952 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
3953 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
3961 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3962 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3966 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
3977 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
3980 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
3984 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
3990 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
3994 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
3995 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4000 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4004 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4007 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4013 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4015 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4020 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4023 static int selinux_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
4025 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
4027 return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
4030 /* module stacking operations */
4031 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4033 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4034 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security "
4035 "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4039 secondary_ops = ops;
4041 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
4048 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4050 if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4051 printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
4052 "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4056 secondary_ops = original_ops;
4061 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4064 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4067 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4068 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4070 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4075 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4082 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4084 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4086 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4087 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4088 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4089 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4096 return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size);
4099 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4100 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4102 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4108 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4109 security attributes. */
4114 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4115 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4116 * above restriction is ever removed.
4118 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4119 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4120 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4121 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4122 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4123 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4129 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4130 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4131 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4135 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4140 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4141 performed during the actual operation (execve,
4142 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4143 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4144 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4145 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4147 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4148 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4149 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4150 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4151 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4152 struct av_decision avd;
4157 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4158 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4159 struct task_struct *g, *t;
4160 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4161 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4162 do_each_thread(g, t)
4163 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4164 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4167 while_each_thread(g, t);
4168 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4171 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4172 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4173 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4177 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4178 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4180 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4181 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4183 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
4187 avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4188 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4202 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4203 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
4204 .capget = selinux_capget,
4205 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
4206 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
4207 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
4208 .capable = selinux_capable,
4209 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
4210 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
4211 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
4212 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4214 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
4215 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
4217 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4218 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
4219 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4220 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4221 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
4222 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
4223 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4225 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4226 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
4227 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
4228 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4229 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
4230 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
4231 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
4233 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4234 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
4235 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
4236 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
4237 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
4238 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
4239 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
4240 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
4241 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
4242 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
4243 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
4244 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
4245 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
4246 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
4247 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
4248 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
4249 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
4250 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4251 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
4252 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
4253 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
4254 .inode_xattr_getsuffix = selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
4255 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4256 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4257 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4259 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
4260 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
4261 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
4262 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
4263 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
4264 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
4265 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
4266 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
4267 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
4268 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4269 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
4271 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
4272 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
4273 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
4274 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
4275 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
4276 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
4277 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
4278 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
4279 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
4280 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
4281 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
4282 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
4283 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
4284 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
4285 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
4286 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
4287 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
4288 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4289 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
4291 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
4292 .ipc_getsecurity = selinux_ipc_getsecurity,
4294 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4295 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4297 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4298 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4299 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4300 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4301 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4302 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4304 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4305 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
4306 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
4307 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
4308 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
4310 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4311 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
4312 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
4313 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
4314 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
4316 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
4317 .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security,
4319 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
4321 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
4322 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
4324 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4325 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4327 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
4328 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
4329 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
4330 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
4331 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
4332 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
4333 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4334 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4335 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
4336 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
4337 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4338 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4339 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
4340 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4341 .socket_getpeersec = selinux_socket_getpeersec,
4342 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4343 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
4344 .sk_getsid = selinux_sk_getsid_security,
4346 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
4347 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
4348 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
4349 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
4350 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
4351 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
4352 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
4356 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4358 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4360 if (!selinux_enabled) {
4361 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
4365 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
4367 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4368 if (task_alloc_security(current))
4369 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4370 tsec = current->security;
4371 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4375 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4377 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4378 if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4379 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4381 if (selinux_enforcing) {
4382 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4384 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
4389 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4391 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
4393 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4394 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4395 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4397 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4398 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4399 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4400 struct superblock_security_struct,
4402 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4403 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4405 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4406 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4407 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4409 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4411 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4412 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4415 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4418 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4419 all processes and objects when they are created. */
4420 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4422 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4424 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4425 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4426 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4428 .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4429 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4432 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4434 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4435 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4436 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4438 .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4439 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4444 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
4448 if (!selinux_enabled)
4451 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
4453 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4455 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
4457 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4459 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4461 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
4469 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
4471 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4472 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
4474 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
4476 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4477 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4478 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4483 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4485 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4486 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
4489 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4491 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4492 int selinux_disable(void)
4494 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
4495 static int selinux_disabled = 0;
4497 if (ss_initialized) {
4498 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
4502 if (selinux_disabled) {
4503 /* Only do this once. */
4507 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
4509 selinux_disabled = 1;
4511 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
4512 security_ops = secondary_ops;
4514 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
4515 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
4517 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */