2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
79 #include <linux/syslog.h>
90 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
91 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
93 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
134 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
141 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
159 * initialise the security for the init task
161 static void cred_init_security(void)
163 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
164 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
166 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
168 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
170 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
171 cred->security = tsec;
175 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
177 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
179 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
181 tsec = cred->security;
186 * get the objective security ID of a task
188 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
193 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
199 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
201 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
203 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
208 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
210 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
212 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
213 u32 sid = current_sid();
215 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
219 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
220 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
222 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
223 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
224 isec->task_sid = sid;
225 inode->i_security = isec;
230 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
232 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
233 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
235 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
236 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
237 list_del_init(&isec->list);
238 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
240 inode->i_security = NULL;
241 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
244 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
246 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
247 u32 sid = current_sid();
249 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
254 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
255 file->f_security = fsec;
260 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
262 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
263 file->f_security = NULL;
267 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
269 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
271 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
275 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
276 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
278 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
280 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
282 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
283 sb->s_security = sbsec;
288 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
290 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
292 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
293 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
294 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
295 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
297 sb->s_security = NULL;
301 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
303 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
305 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
309 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
310 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 sk->sk_security = ssec;
313 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec);
318 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
320 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
322 sk->sk_security = NULL;
323 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
327 /* The security server must be initialized before
328 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
329 extern int ss_initialized;
331 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
333 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
335 "uses transition SIDs",
337 "uses genfs_contexts",
338 "not configured for labeling",
339 "uses mountpoint labeling",
342 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
344 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
346 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
355 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
358 static const match_table_t tokens = {
359 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
367 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
369 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
370 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
371 const struct cred *cred)
373 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
376 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
377 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
381 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
382 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
386 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
387 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
388 const struct cred *cred)
390 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
392 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
393 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
397 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
398 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
402 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
404 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
405 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
406 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
409 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
410 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
411 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
412 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
413 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
414 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
415 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
416 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
417 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
421 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
422 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
423 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
424 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
425 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
426 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
428 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
429 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
430 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
435 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
437 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
438 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
439 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
441 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
442 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
443 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
445 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
446 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
448 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
449 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
451 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
452 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
453 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
455 /* Initialize the root inode. */
456 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
458 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
459 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
460 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
462 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
464 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
465 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
466 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
467 struct inode_security_struct, list);
468 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
469 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
470 inode = igrab(inode);
472 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
476 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
477 list_del_init(&isec->list);
480 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
486 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
487 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
488 * mount options, or whatever.
490 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
491 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
494 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
495 char *context = NULL;
499 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
501 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
507 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
508 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
509 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
511 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
514 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
515 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
516 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
518 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
519 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
524 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
525 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
531 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
532 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
535 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
536 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
538 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
539 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
542 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
543 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
545 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
546 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
549 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
550 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
552 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
553 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
554 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
556 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
559 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
560 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
562 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
563 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
564 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
567 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
572 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
576 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
577 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
579 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
581 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
582 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
583 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
584 (old_sid != new_sid))
587 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
588 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
590 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
591 if (mnt_flags & flag)
597 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
598 * labeling information.
600 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
601 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
603 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
605 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
606 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
607 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
608 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
609 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
610 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
611 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
612 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
613 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
615 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
617 if (!ss_initialized) {
619 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
620 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
621 server is ready to handle calls. */
622 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
623 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
624 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
625 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
629 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
630 "before the security server is initialized\n");
635 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
636 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
637 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
638 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
640 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
641 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
642 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
643 * will be used for both mounts)
645 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
650 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
651 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
652 * than once with different security options.
654 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
657 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
659 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
660 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
662 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
663 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
664 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
671 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
673 goto out_double_mount;
675 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
680 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
682 goto out_double_mount;
684 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
686 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
687 rootcontext_sid = sid;
689 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
691 goto out_double_mount;
693 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
697 defcontext_sid = sid;
699 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
701 goto out_double_mount;
703 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
712 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
713 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
714 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
715 goto out_double_mount;
720 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
721 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
723 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
724 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
726 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
727 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
731 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
733 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
737 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
741 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
742 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
743 * the superblock context if not already set.
746 if (!fscontext_sid) {
747 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
751 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
753 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
758 if (!rootcontext_sid)
759 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
761 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
762 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
765 if (rootcontext_sid) {
766 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
771 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
772 root_isec->initialized = 1;
775 if (defcontext_sid) {
776 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
778 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
779 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
783 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
784 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
790 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
793 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
795 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
799 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
800 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
804 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
805 struct super_block *newsb)
807 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
808 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
810 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
811 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
812 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
815 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
816 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
819 if (!ss_initialized) {
820 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
821 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
822 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
823 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
827 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
828 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
830 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
831 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
834 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
836 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
838 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
839 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
840 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
843 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
847 if (!set_rootcontext) {
848 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
849 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
852 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
854 if (set_rootcontext) {
855 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
856 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
857 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
858 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
860 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
863 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
864 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
867 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
868 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
871 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
872 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
873 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
875 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
877 /* Standard string-based options. */
878 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
880 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
885 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
889 if (context || defcontext) {
891 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
894 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
904 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
907 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
914 case Opt_rootcontext:
917 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
920 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
928 if (context || defcontext) {
930 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
933 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
939 case Opt_labelsupport:
943 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
950 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
954 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
955 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
956 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
961 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
962 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
965 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
966 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
969 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
970 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
973 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
974 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
977 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
988 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
990 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
993 char *options = data;
994 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
996 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1001 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1003 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1008 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1011 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1015 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1016 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1021 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1024 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1025 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1029 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1031 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1034 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1036 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1037 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1039 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1040 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1042 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1044 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1049 /* we need a comma before each option */
1051 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1054 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1060 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1062 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1065 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1067 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1073 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1075 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1080 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1082 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1084 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1086 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1088 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1090 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1092 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1094 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1096 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1100 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1103 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1105 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1108 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1110 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1113 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1119 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1120 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1122 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1129 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1130 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1132 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1134 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1135 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1137 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1139 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1141 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1147 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1148 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1149 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1150 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1151 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1153 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1155 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1156 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1157 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1159 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1160 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1161 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1162 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1163 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1164 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1165 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1167 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1170 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1172 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1174 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1177 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1180 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1181 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1186 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1188 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1193 end = buffer+buflen;
1198 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1199 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1203 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1208 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1209 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1213 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1221 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1222 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1224 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1225 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1227 struct dentry *dentry;
1228 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1229 char *context = NULL;
1233 if (isec->initialized)
1236 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1237 if (isec->initialized)
1240 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1241 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1242 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1243 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1244 server is ready to handle calls. */
1245 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1246 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1247 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1248 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1252 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1253 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1254 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1255 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1259 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1260 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1262 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1263 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1265 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1266 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1270 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1271 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1272 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1273 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1274 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1275 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1276 * be used again by userspace.
1281 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1282 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1288 context[len] = '\0';
1289 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1291 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1294 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1295 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1302 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1308 context[len] = '\0';
1309 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1315 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1316 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1317 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1318 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1322 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1323 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1326 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1330 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1331 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1333 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1334 if (printk_ratelimit())
1335 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1336 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1337 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1339 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1340 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1341 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1344 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1352 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1353 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1355 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1356 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1357 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1359 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1360 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1361 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1369 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1370 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1373 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1374 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1376 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1377 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1379 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1380 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1391 isec->initialized = 1;
1394 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1396 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1397 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1401 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1402 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1408 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1409 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1412 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1413 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1416 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1417 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1420 /* All other signals. */
1421 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1429 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1430 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1432 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1433 const struct cred *target,
1436 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1438 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1442 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1443 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1444 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1445 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1447 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1448 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1451 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1455 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1456 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1458 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1462 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1463 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1464 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1465 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1467 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1472 sid = current_sid();
1473 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1474 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1477 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1478 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1481 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1482 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1483 const struct cred *cred,
1486 struct common_audit_data ad;
1487 struct av_decision avd;
1489 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1490 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1493 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1497 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1499 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1502 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1506 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1510 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1511 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1512 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1516 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1517 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1520 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1522 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1523 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1526 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1527 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1528 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1529 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1530 struct inode *inode,
1532 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1534 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1535 struct common_audit_data ad;
1538 validate_creds(cred);
1540 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1543 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1544 isec = inode->i_security;
1548 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1549 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1552 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1555 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1556 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1557 pathname if needed. */
1558 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1559 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1560 struct dentry *dentry,
1563 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1564 struct common_audit_data ad;
1566 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1567 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1568 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1569 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1572 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1573 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1574 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1575 check a particular permission to the file.
1576 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1577 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1578 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1579 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1580 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1584 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1585 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1586 struct common_audit_data ad;
1587 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1590 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1591 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1593 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1594 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1602 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1605 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1611 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1612 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1613 struct dentry *dentry,
1616 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1617 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1618 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1619 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1621 struct common_audit_data ad;
1624 dsec = dir->i_security;
1625 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1628 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1630 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1631 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1633 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1634 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1639 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1640 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1645 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1649 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1650 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1651 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1654 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1655 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1656 struct task_struct *ctx)
1658 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1660 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1664 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1667 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1668 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1669 struct dentry *dentry,
1673 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1674 struct common_audit_data ad;
1675 u32 sid = current_sid();
1679 dsec = dir->i_security;
1680 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1682 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1683 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1686 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1687 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1702 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1707 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1711 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1712 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1713 struct inode *new_dir,
1714 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1716 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1717 struct common_audit_data ad;
1718 u32 sid = current_sid();
1720 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1723 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1724 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1725 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1726 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1728 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1730 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1731 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1732 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1735 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1736 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1739 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1740 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1741 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1746 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1747 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1748 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1749 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1750 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1753 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1754 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1755 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1756 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1758 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1766 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1767 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1768 struct super_block *sb,
1770 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1772 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1773 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1775 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1776 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1779 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1780 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1784 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1785 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1786 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1787 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1790 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1792 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1796 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1798 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1800 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1807 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1808 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1812 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1814 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1815 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1822 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1831 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1834 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1836 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1838 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1839 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1841 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1845 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1846 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1847 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1848 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1849 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1850 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1851 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1853 else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
1854 av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
1856 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1857 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1862 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1864 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1869 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1873 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1874 u32 sid = current_sid();
1875 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1876 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1879 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1882 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1886 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1890 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1893 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1894 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1898 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1902 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1905 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1906 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1907 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1908 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1912 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1913 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1917 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1921 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1922 * which was removed).
1924 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1925 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1926 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1927 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1930 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1935 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1939 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1942 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1945 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1948 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1953 end = buffer+buflen;
1959 const char *name = table->procname;
1960 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1961 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1965 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1968 table = table->parent;
1974 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1976 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1978 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1983 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1990 sid = current_sid();
1992 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1993 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1995 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1996 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1999 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
2000 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
2002 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
2003 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
2011 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
2012 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
2018 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2020 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2032 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2037 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2040 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2046 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2048 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2050 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2053 static int selinux_syslog(int type, bool from_file)
2057 rc = cap_syslog(type, from_file);
2062 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2063 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2064 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2066 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2067 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2068 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2069 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2070 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2072 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
2073 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
2074 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
2075 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2076 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2078 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2085 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2086 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2087 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2089 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2090 * processes that allocate mappings.
2092 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2094 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2096 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2097 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2101 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2104 /* binprm security operations */
2106 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2108 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2109 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2110 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2111 struct common_audit_data ad;
2112 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2115 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2119 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2120 * the script interpreter */
2121 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2124 old_tsec = current_security();
2125 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2126 isec = inode->i_security;
2128 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2129 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2130 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2132 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2133 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2134 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2135 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2137 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2138 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2139 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2140 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2142 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2143 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2144 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2149 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2150 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2152 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2153 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2155 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2156 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2157 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2161 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2162 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2163 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2167 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2168 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2172 /* Check for shared state */
2173 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2174 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2175 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2181 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2182 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2184 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2185 struct task_struct *tracer;
2186 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2190 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2191 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2192 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2198 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2200 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2206 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2207 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2213 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2215 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2216 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2224 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2225 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2226 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2227 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2229 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2232 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2235 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2236 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2238 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2239 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2240 struct files_struct *files)
2242 struct common_audit_data ad;
2243 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2244 struct tty_struct *tty;
2245 struct fdtable *fdt;
2249 tty = get_current_tty();
2252 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2253 struct inode *inode;
2255 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2256 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2257 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2258 file may belong to another process and we are only
2259 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2260 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2261 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2262 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2263 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2270 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2274 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2276 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2278 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2280 unsigned long set, i;
2285 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2286 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2288 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2291 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2292 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2297 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2299 file_to_av(file))) {
2301 fd = get_unused_fd();
2311 devnull = dentry_open(
2313 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2315 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2322 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2327 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2330 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2334 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2336 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2338 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2339 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2342 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2343 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2346 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2347 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2349 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2350 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2352 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2353 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2354 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2356 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2357 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2358 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2359 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2360 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2362 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2363 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2365 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2366 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2367 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2368 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2370 update_rlimit_cpu(current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur);
2375 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2378 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2380 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2381 struct itimerval itimer;
2391 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2392 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2393 * flush and unblock signals.
2395 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2396 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2398 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2400 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2401 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2402 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2403 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2404 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2405 __flush_signals(current);
2406 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2407 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2409 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2412 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2413 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2414 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2415 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2416 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2419 /* superblock security operations */
2421 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2423 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2426 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2428 superblock_free_security(sb);
2431 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2436 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2439 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2441 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2442 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2443 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2444 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2445 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2448 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2455 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2459 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2462 int current_size = 0;
2470 while (current_size < len) {
2480 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2482 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2483 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2484 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2490 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2498 in_save = in_end = orig;
2502 open_quote = !open_quote;
2503 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2505 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2507 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2508 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2510 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2512 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2514 } while (*in_end++);
2516 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2517 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2522 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2524 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2525 struct common_audit_data ad;
2528 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2532 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2533 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2536 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2537 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2538 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2541 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2543 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2544 struct common_audit_data ad;
2546 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2547 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2548 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2551 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2554 unsigned long flags,
2557 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2559 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2560 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2561 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2563 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2567 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2569 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2571 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2572 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2575 /* inode security operations */
2577 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2579 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2582 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2584 inode_free_security(inode);
2587 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2588 char **name, void **value,
2591 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2592 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2593 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2594 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2595 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2597 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2599 dsec = dir->i_security;
2600 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2603 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2605 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2606 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2607 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2610 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2611 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2614 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2619 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2620 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2621 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2622 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2624 isec->initialized = 1;
2627 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2631 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2638 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2650 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2652 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2655 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2657 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2660 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2662 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2665 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2667 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2670 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2672 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2675 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2677 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2680 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2682 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2685 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2686 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2688 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2691 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2693 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2695 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2698 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2700 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2702 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2705 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2707 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2710 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2714 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2715 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2718 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2720 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2721 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2723 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2724 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2725 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2731 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2732 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2733 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2735 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2738 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2740 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2742 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2745 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2747 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2749 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2750 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2751 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2752 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2754 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2755 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2756 Restrict to administrator. */
2761 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2762 ordinary setattr permission. */
2763 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2766 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2767 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2769 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2770 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2771 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2772 struct common_audit_data ad;
2773 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2776 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2777 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2779 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2780 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2783 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2786 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2787 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2789 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2790 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2794 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2795 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2796 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2798 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2803 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2804 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2808 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2813 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2815 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2816 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2820 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2821 const void *value, size_t size,
2824 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2825 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2829 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2830 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2834 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2836 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2837 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2838 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2846 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2848 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2850 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2853 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2855 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2857 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2860 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2862 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2863 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2865 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2866 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2871 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2873 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2875 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2879 char *context = NULL;
2880 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2882 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2886 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2887 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2888 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2889 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2890 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2891 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2892 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2894 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2895 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2897 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2900 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2913 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2914 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2916 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2920 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2923 if (!value || !size)
2926 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2931 isec->initialized = 1;
2935 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2937 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2938 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2939 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2943 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2945 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2949 /* file security operations */
2951 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2953 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2954 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2956 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2957 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2960 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2961 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2964 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2966 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2967 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2968 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2969 u32 sid = current_sid();
2972 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2975 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2976 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2977 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2980 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2983 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2985 return file_alloc_security(file);
2988 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2990 file_free_security(file);
2993 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2996 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2999 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
3001 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
3006 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3009 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3011 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3014 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3015 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3017 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3018 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3019 * This has an additional check.
3021 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3028 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3029 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3031 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3032 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3035 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3036 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3038 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3045 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3046 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3047 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3050 u32 sid = current_sid();
3053 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3054 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3055 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3056 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3058 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3059 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3060 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3065 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3066 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
3067 if (rc || addr_only)
3070 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3073 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3074 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3077 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3078 unsigned long reqprot,
3081 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3083 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3086 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3087 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3089 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3090 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3091 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3092 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3093 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3094 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3095 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3096 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3098 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3099 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3100 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3101 * modified content. This typically should only
3102 * occur for text relocations.
3104 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3111 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3114 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3116 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3118 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3121 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3124 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3129 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3134 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3135 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3144 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3145 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3150 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3155 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3159 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3166 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3168 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3170 fsec = file->f_security;
3171 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3176 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3177 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3180 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3182 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3184 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3185 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3187 fsec = file->f_security;
3190 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3192 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3194 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3195 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3198 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3200 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3202 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3205 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3207 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3208 struct inode *inode;
3209 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3211 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3212 fsec = file->f_security;
3213 isec = inode->i_security;
3215 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3216 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3217 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3218 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3219 * struct as its SID.
3221 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3222 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3224 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3225 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3226 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3227 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3228 * new inode label or new policy.
3229 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3231 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3234 /* task security operations */
3236 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3238 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3242 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3244 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3246 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3248 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3252 cred->security = tsec;
3257 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3259 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3261 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3263 BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3264 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3269 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3271 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3274 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3275 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3277 old_tsec = old->security;
3279 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3283 new->security = tsec;
3288 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3290 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3292 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3293 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3299 * set the security data for a kernel service
3300 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3302 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3304 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3305 u32 sid = current_sid();
3308 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3309 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3310 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3314 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3315 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3316 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3322 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3323 * objective context of the specified inode
3325 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3327 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3328 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3329 u32 sid = current_sid();
3332 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3333 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3334 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3338 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3342 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3345 struct common_audit_data ad;
3347 sid = task_sid(current);
3349 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
3350 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3352 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3353 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3356 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3358 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3361 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3363 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3366 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3368 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3371 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3373 *secid = task_sid(p);
3376 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3380 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3384 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3387 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3391 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3395 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3398 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3400 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3403 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3405 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3407 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3408 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3409 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3410 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3411 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3412 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3417 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3421 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3425 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3428 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3430 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3433 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3435 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3438 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3445 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3447 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3449 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3450 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3452 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3456 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3458 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3461 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3462 struct inode *inode)
3464 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3465 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3468 isec->initialized = 1;
3471 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3472 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3473 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3475 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3476 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3478 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3479 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3483 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3484 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3487 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3488 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3492 *proto = ih->protocol;
3494 switch (ih->protocol) {
3496 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3498 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3502 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3506 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3507 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3512 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3514 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3518 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3522 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3523 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3527 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3528 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3530 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3534 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3538 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3539 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3550 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3552 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3553 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3554 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3557 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3558 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3560 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3561 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3565 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3566 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3569 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3570 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3571 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3580 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3582 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3586 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3587 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3592 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3594 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3598 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3599 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3603 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3604 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3606 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3610 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3611 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3615 /* includes fragments */
3625 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3626 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3631 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3633 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3636 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3637 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3640 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3642 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3645 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3646 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3656 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3657 " unable to parse packet\n");
3667 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3669 * @family: protocol family
3670 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3673 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3674 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3675 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3676 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3677 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3681 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3688 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3689 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3691 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3692 if (unlikely(err)) {
3694 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3695 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3702 /* socket security operations */
3703 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3706 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3707 struct common_audit_data ad;
3711 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3713 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3715 sid = task_sid(task);
3717 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3718 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3719 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3725 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3726 int protocol, int kern)
3728 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3729 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3738 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3740 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3741 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3747 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3748 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3750 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3751 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3752 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3753 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3758 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3760 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3763 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3769 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3770 isec->initialized = 1;
3773 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3774 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3775 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3776 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3782 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3783 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3784 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3786 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3791 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3796 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3797 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3798 * check the first address now.
3800 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3801 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3803 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3804 struct common_audit_data ad;
3805 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3806 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3807 unsigned short snum;
3808 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3811 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3813 if (family == PF_INET) {
3814 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3815 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3816 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3818 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3819 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3820 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3826 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3828 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3829 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3833 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3834 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3835 ad.u.net.family = family;
3836 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3838 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3844 switch (isec->sclass) {
3845 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3846 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3849 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3850 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3853 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3854 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3858 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3862 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3866 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3867 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3868 ad.u.net.family = family;
3870 if (family == PF_INET)
3871 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3873 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3875 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3876 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3884 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3886 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3887 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3890 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3895 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3897 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3898 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3899 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3900 struct common_audit_data ad;
3901 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3902 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3903 unsigned short snum;
3906 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3907 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3908 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3910 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3912 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3913 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3915 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3918 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3922 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3923 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3925 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3926 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3927 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3928 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3933 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3939 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3941 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3944 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3947 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3948 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3950 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3954 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3956 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3957 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3958 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3959 newisec->initialized = 1;
3964 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3967 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3970 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3971 int size, int flags)
3973 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3976 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3978 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3981 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3983 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3986 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3990 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3994 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3997 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4000 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4003 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4005 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4008 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
4009 struct socket *other,
4012 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4013 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4014 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4015 struct common_audit_data ad;
4018 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4019 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4021 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4022 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4024 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4026 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4030 /* connecting socket */
4031 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4032 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
4034 /* server child socket */
4035 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
4036 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
4037 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
4042 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4043 struct socket *other)
4045 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4046 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4047 struct common_audit_data ad;
4050 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4051 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4053 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4054 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4056 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4057 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4064 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4066 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4072 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4075 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4076 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4080 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4083 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4084 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4087 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4091 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4093 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4094 struct common_audit_data ad;
4097 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4098 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4099 ad.u.net.family = family;
4100 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4104 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4105 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4111 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4112 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4115 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4116 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4118 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4120 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4123 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4129 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4132 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4133 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4134 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4135 struct common_audit_data ad;
4140 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4143 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4144 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4147 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4148 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4149 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4150 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4151 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4152 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4154 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4155 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4156 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4159 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4160 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4161 ad.u.net.family = family;
4162 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4166 if (peerlbl_active) {
4169 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4172 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4175 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4178 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4181 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4184 if (secmark_active) {
4185 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4194 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4195 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4200 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4201 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4202 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4204 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4206 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4207 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4208 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4209 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4211 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4216 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4221 if (scontext_len > len) {
4226 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4230 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4238 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4240 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4243 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4245 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4248 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4252 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4253 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4255 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4258 *secid = peer_secid;
4259 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4264 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4266 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4269 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4271 sk_free_security(sk);
4274 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4276 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4277 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4279 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4280 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4281 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4283 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec);
4286 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4289 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4291 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4293 *secid = sksec->sid;
4297 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4299 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4300 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4302 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4303 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4304 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4305 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4308 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4309 struct request_sock *req)
4311 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4313 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4317 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4318 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4321 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4324 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4325 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4326 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4328 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4331 req->secid = newsid;
4332 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4335 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4338 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4339 const struct request_sock *req)
4341 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4343 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4344 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4345 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4346 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4347 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4348 time it will have been created and available. */
4350 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4351 * thread with access to newsksec */
4352 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4355 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4357 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4358 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4360 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4361 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4364 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4367 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4370 fl->secid = req->secid;
4373 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4375 u32 sid = current_sid();
4377 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4378 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4379 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4380 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4381 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4382 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4384 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4388 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4390 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4392 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4393 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4394 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4395 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4396 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4397 * protocols were being used */
4399 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4400 * the sockcreate SID here */
4402 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4403 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4406 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4408 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4409 u32 sid = current_sid();
4412 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4413 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4416 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4417 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4426 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4430 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4431 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4432 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4434 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4438 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4440 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4442 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4443 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4444 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4445 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4446 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4447 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4457 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4462 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4464 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4470 struct common_audit_data ad;
4475 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4478 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4479 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4480 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4481 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4484 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4487 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4488 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4489 ad.u.net.family = family;
4490 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4493 if (peerlbl_active) {
4494 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4497 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4503 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4504 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4508 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4509 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4510 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4512 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4518 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4519 struct sk_buff *skb,
4520 const struct net_device *in,
4521 const struct net_device *out,
4522 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4524 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4527 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4528 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4529 struct sk_buff *skb,
4530 const struct net_device *in,
4531 const struct net_device *out,
4532 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4534 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4538 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4543 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4546 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4547 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4548 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4550 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4553 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4554 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4560 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4561 struct sk_buff *skb,
4562 const struct net_device *in,
4563 const struct net_device *out,
4564 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4566 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4569 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4573 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4574 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4575 struct common_audit_data ad;
4581 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4583 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4584 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4585 ad.u.net.family = family;
4586 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4589 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4590 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4591 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4594 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4595 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4601 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4607 struct common_audit_data ad;
4612 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4613 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4614 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4615 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4616 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4617 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4619 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4620 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4621 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4622 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4623 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4624 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4625 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4628 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4629 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4630 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4633 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4634 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4635 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4636 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4641 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4642 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4644 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4647 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4648 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4650 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4655 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4656 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4659 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4661 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4662 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4663 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4666 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4667 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4668 ad.u.net.family = family;
4669 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4673 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4674 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4677 if (peerlbl_active) {
4681 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4683 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4684 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4687 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4689 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4690 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4697 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4698 struct sk_buff *skb,
4699 const struct net_device *in,
4700 const struct net_device *out,
4701 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4703 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4706 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4707 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4708 struct sk_buff *skb,
4709 const struct net_device *in,
4710 const struct net_device *out,
4711 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4713 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4717 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4719 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4723 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4727 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4730 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4733 struct common_audit_data ad;
4735 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4739 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4740 ad.u.cap = capability;
4742 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4743 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4746 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4747 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4750 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4753 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4757 sid = task_sid(task);
4758 isec->sclass = sclass;
4760 perm->security = isec;
4765 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4767 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4768 perm->security = NULL;
4772 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4774 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4776 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4780 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4781 msg->security = msec;
4786 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4788 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4790 msg->security = NULL;
4794 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4797 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4798 struct common_audit_data ad;
4799 u32 sid = current_sid();
4801 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4803 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4804 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4806 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4809 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4811 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4814 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4816 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4819 /* message queue security operations */
4820 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4822 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4823 struct common_audit_data ad;
4824 u32 sid = current_sid();
4827 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4831 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4833 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4834 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4836 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4839 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4845 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4847 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4850 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4852 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4853 struct common_audit_data ad;
4854 u32 sid = current_sid();
4856 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4858 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4859 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4861 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4862 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4865 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4873 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4874 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4877 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4880 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4883 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4889 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4893 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4895 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4896 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4897 struct common_audit_data ad;
4898 u32 sid = current_sid();
4901 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4902 msec = msg->security;
4905 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4907 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4909 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4910 * message queue this message will be stored in
4912 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4918 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4919 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4921 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4922 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4925 /* Can this process send the message */
4926 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4929 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4930 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4931 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4936 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4937 struct task_struct *target,
4938 long type, int mode)
4940 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4941 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4942 struct common_audit_data ad;
4943 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4946 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4947 msec = msg->security;
4949 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4950 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4952 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4953 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4955 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4956 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4960 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4961 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4963 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4964 struct common_audit_data ad;
4965 u32 sid = current_sid();
4968 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4972 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4974 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4975 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4977 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4980 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4986 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4988 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4991 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4993 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4994 struct common_audit_data ad;
4995 u32 sid = current_sid();
4997 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4999 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5000 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5002 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5003 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5006 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5007 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5015 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5016 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5019 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5022 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5029 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5035 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5039 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5040 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5044 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5047 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5049 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5052 /* Semaphore security operations */
5053 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5055 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5056 struct common_audit_data ad;
5057 u32 sid = current_sid();
5060 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5064 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5066 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5067 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5069 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5072 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5078 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5080 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5083 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5085 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5086 struct common_audit_data ad;
5087 u32 sid = current_sid();
5089 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5091 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5092 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5094 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5095 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5098 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5099 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5107 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5108 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5112 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5123 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5126 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5130 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5136 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5140 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5141 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5146 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5150 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5153 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5159 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5161 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5166 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5169 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5171 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5175 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5178 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5181 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5182 char *name, char **value)
5184 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5190 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5196 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5198 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5200 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5202 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5203 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5204 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5205 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5206 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5207 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5208 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5209 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5217 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5227 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5228 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5230 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5231 struct task_struct *tracer;
5238 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5239 security attributes. */
5244 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5245 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5246 * above restriction is ever removed.
5248 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5249 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5250 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5251 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5252 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5253 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5254 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5255 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5256 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5257 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5263 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5264 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5265 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5269 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5270 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5271 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5273 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5280 new = prepare_creds();
5284 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5285 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5286 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5287 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5288 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5289 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5290 tsec = new->security;
5291 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5292 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5293 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5294 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5295 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5296 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5299 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5300 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5301 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5302 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5307 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5309 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5310 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5315 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5316 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5317 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5321 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5322 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5325 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5327 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5331 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5332 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5351 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5353 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5356 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5358 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5361 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5367 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5369 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5371 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5375 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5377 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5379 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5382 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5385 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5394 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5395 unsigned long flags)
5397 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5398 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5400 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5404 tsec = cred->security;
5405 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5406 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5408 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5414 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5416 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5422 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5423 const struct cred *cred,
5427 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5430 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5431 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5432 appear to be created. */
5436 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5438 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5439 ksec = key->security;
5441 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5444 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5446 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5447 char *context = NULL;
5451 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5460 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5463 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5464 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5465 .capget = selinux_capget,
5466 .capset = selinux_capset,
5467 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5468 .capable = selinux_capable,
5469 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5470 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5471 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5472 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5474 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5475 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5477 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5478 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5479 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5480 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5482 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5483 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5484 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5485 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5486 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5487 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5488 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5489 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5490 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5491 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5492 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5495 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5496 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5497 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5498 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5499 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5500 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5501 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5502 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5503 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5504 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5505 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5506 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5507 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5508 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5509 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5510 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5511 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5512 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5513 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5514 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5515 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5516 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5517 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5518 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5519 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5521 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5522 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5523 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5524 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5525 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5526 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5527 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5528 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5529 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5530 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5531 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5533 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5535 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5536 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5537 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5538 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5539 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5540 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5541 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5542 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5543 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5544 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5545 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5546 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5547 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5548 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5549 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5550 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5551 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5552 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5553 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5554 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5555 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5556 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5558 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5559 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5561 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5562 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5564 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5565 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5566 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5567 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5568 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5569 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5571 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5572 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5573 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5574 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5575 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5577 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5578 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5579 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5580 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5581 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5583 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5585 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5586 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5588 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5589 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5590 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5591 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5592 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5593 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5595 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5596 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5598 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5599 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5600 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5601 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5602 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5603 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5604 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5605 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5606 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5607 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5608 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5609 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5610 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5611 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5612 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5613 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5614 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5615 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5616 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5617 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5618 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5619 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5620 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5621 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5622 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5623 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5624 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5625 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5627 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5628 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5629 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5630 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5631 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5632 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5633 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5634 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5635 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5636 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5637 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5641 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5642 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5643 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5644 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5648 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5649 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5650 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5651 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5655 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5657 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5658 selinux_enabled = 0;
5662 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5663 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5667 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5669 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5670 cred_init_security();
5672 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5673 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5674 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5677 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5679 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5680 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5681 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5683 if (selinux_enforcing)
5684 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5686 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5691 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5693 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5695 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5696 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5697 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5698 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5700 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5701 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5702 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5703 struct superblock_security_struct,
5705 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5707 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5708 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5709 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5711 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5713 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5714 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5715 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5718 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5719 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5722 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5723 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5724 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5726 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5728 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5730 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5731 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5733 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5734 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5737 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5738 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5740 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5741 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5744 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5745 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5747 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5748 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5752 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5754 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5756 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5757 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5759 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5760 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5763 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5764 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5766 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5767 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5773 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5777 if (!selinux_enabled)
5780 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5782 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5784 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5786 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5787 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5789 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5796 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5798 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5799 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5801 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5803 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5804 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5805 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5810 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5812 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5813 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5816 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5818 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5819 static int selinux_disabled;
5821 int selinux_disable(void)
5823 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5825 if (ss_initialized) {
5826 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5830 if (selinux_disabled) {
5831 /* Only do this once. */
5835 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5837 selinux_disabled = 1;
5838 selinux_enabled = 0;
5840 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5841 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5843 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5846 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5847 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5849 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */