2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
159 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
161 static int cred_alloc_security(struct cred *cred)
163 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
165 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
170 cred->security = tsec;
175 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
177 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
178 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
180 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
184 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
185 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
187 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
188 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
189 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
190 inode->i_security = isec;
195 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
197 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
198 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
200 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
201 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
202 list_del_init(&isec->list);
203 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
205 inode->i_security = NULL;
206 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
209 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
211 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
212 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
214 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
218 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
219 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
220 file->f_security = fsec;
225 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
227 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
228 file->f_security = NULL;
232 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
234 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
236 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
240 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
241 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
242 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
243 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
245 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
246 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
247 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
248 sb->s_security = sbsec;
253 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
255 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
257 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
258 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
259 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
260 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
262 sb->s_security = NULL;
266 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
268 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
270 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
274 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
275 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
276 sk->sk_security = ssec;
278 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
283 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
285 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
287 sk->sk_security = NULL;
288 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
292 /* The security server must be initialized before
293 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
294 extern int ss_initialized;
296 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
298 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
300 "uses transition SIDs",
302 "uses genfs_contexts",
303 "not configured for labeling",
304 "uses mountpoint labeling",
307 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
309 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
311 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
322 static const match_table_t tokens = {
323 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
324 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
325 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
326 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
332 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
333 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
334 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
338 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
339 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
343 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
344 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
348 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
349 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
350 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
353 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
354 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
358 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
359 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
363 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
365 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
366 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
367 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
370 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
371 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
372 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
373 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
374 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
375 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
376 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
377 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
378 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
382 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
383 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
384 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
385 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
386 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
387 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
389 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
390 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
391 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
396 sbsec->initialized = 1;
398 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
399 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
400 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
402 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
403 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
404 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
406 /* Initialize the root inode. */
407 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
409 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
410 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
411 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
413 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
415 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
416 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
417 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
418 struct inode_security_struct, list);
419 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
420 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
421 inode = igrab(inode);
423 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
427 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
428 list_del_init(&isec->list);
431 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
437 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
438 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
439 * mount options, or whatever.
441 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
442 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
445 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
446 char *context = NULL;
450 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
452 if (!sbsec->initialized)
459 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
460 * settings this is going to need a mask
463 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
464 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
466 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
470 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
471 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
476 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
477 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
483 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
484 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
487 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
488 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
490 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
491 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
494 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
495 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
497 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
498 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
501 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
502 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
504 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
505 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
506 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
508 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
511 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
512 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
515 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
520 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
524 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
525 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
527 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
528 if (sbsec->initialized)
529 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
530 (old_sid != new_sid))
533 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
534 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
536 if (!sbsec->initialized)
537 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
543 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
544 * labeling information.
546 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
547 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
550 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
551 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
552 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
553 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
554 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
555 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
556 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
557 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
558 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
559 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
561 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
563 if (!ss_initialized) {
565 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
566 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
567 server is ready to handle calls. */
568 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
569 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
570 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
571 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
575 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
576 "before the security server is initialized\n");
581 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
582 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
583 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
584 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
586 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
587 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
588 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
589 * will be used for both mounts)
591 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
596 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
597 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
598 * than once with different security options.
600 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
602 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
603 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
605 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
606 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
607 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
614 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
616 goto out_double_mount;
618 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
623 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
625 goto out_double_mount;
627 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
629 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
630 rootcontext_sid = sid;
632 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
634 goto out_double_mount;
636 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
640 defcontext_sid = sid;
642 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
644 goto out_double_mount;
646 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
655 if (sbsec->initialized) {
656 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
657 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
658 goto out_double_mount;
663 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
666 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
667 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
669 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
670 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
674 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
677 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
681 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
685 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
686 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
687 * the superblock context if not already set.
690 if (!fscontext_sid) {
691 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
694 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
696 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
700 if (!rootcontext_sid)
701 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
703 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
704 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
707 if (rootcontext_sid) {
708 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
712 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
713 root_isec->initialized = 1;
716 if (defcontext_sid) {
717 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
719 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
720 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
724 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
725 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
731 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
734 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
736 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
740 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
741 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
745 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
746 struct super_block *newsb)
748 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
749 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
751 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
752 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
753 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
756 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
757 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
760 if (!ss_initialized) {
761 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
762 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
763 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
764 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
768 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
769 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
771 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
772 if (newsbsec->initialized)
775 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
777 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
779 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
780 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
781 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
784 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
788 if (!set_rootcontext) {
789 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
790 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
793 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
795 if (set_rootcontext) {
796 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
797 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
798 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
799 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
801 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
804 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
805 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
808 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
809 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
812 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
813 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
814 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
816 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
818 /* Standard string-based options. */
819 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
821 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
826 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
830 if (context || defcontext) {
832 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
835 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
845 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
848 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
855 case Opt_rootcontext:
858 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
861 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
869 if (context || defcontext) {
871 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
874 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
883 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
890 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
894 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
895 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
896 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
901 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
902 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
905 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
906 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
909 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
910 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
913 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
914 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
917 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
928 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
930 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
933 char *options = data;
934 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
936 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
941 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
943 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
948 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
951 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
955 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
956 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
961 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
962 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
964 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
966 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
969 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
971 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
972 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
975 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
980 /* we need a comma before each option */
985 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
991 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
993 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
996 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
998 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1004 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1006 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1011 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1013 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1015 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1017 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1019 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1021 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1023 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1025 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1027 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1031 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1034 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1036 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1039 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1041 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1044 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1050 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1051 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1053 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1060 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1061 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1063 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1065 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1066 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1068 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1070 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1072 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1078 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1079 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1080 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1081 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1082 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1084 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1086 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1087 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1088 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1090 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1091 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1092 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1093 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1094 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1095 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1096 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1098 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1101 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1105 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1108 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1111 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1112 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1117 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1119 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1124 end = buffer+buflen;
1129 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1130 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1134 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1139 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1140 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1144 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1152 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1153 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1155 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1156 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1158 struct dentry *dentry;
1159 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1160 char *context = NULL;
1164 if (isec->initialized)
1167 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1168 if (isec->initialized)
1171 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1172 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1173 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1174 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1175 server is ready to handle calls. */
1176 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1177 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1178 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1179 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1183 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1184 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1185 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1186 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1190 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1191 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1193 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1194 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1196 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1197 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1200 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1201 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1206 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1207 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1213 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1215 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1216 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1217 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1225 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1231 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1237 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1238 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1239 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1240 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1244 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1245 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1248 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1252 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1253 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1254 __func__, context, -rc,
1255 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1257 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1265 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1266 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1268 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1269 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1270 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1272 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1273 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1274 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1282 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1283 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1286 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1287 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1289 if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1290 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1292 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1293 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1304 isec->initialized = 1;
1307 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1309 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1310 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1314 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1315 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1321 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1322 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1325 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1326 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1329 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1330 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1333 /* All other signals. */
1334 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1341 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1342 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1343 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1344 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1347 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1349 tsec1 = tsk1->cred->security;
1350 tsec2 = tsk2->cred->security;
1351 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1352 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1355 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1356 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1359 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1360 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1363 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1364 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1365 struct av_decision avd;
1367 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1370 tsec = tsk->cred->security;
1372 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1376 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1378 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1381 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1385 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1389 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1390 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1391 avc_audit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1395 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1396 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1399 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1401 tsec = tsk->cred->security;
1403 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1404 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1407 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1408 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1409 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1410 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1411 struct inode *inode,
1413 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1415 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1416 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1417 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1419 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1422 tsec = tsk->cred->security;
1423 isec = inode->i_security;
1427 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1428 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1431 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1434 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1435 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1436 pathname if needed. */
1437 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1438 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1439 struct dentry *dentry,
1442 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1443 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1444 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1445 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1446 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1447 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1450 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1451 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1452 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1453 check a particular permission to the file.
1454 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1455 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1456 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1457 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1458 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1462 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->cred->security;
1463 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1464 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1465 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1468 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1469 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1471 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1472 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1480 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1482 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1487 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1488 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1489 struct dentry *dentry,
1492 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1493 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1494 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1496 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1499 tsec = current->cred->security;
1500 dsec = dir->i_security;
1501 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1503 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1504 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1506 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1507 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1512 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1513 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1515 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1521 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1525 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1526 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1527 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1530 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1531 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1532 struct task_struct *ctx)
1534 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1536 tsec = ctx->cred->security;
1538 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1542 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1545 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1546 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1547 struct dentry *dentry,
1551 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1552 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1553 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1557 tsec = current->cred->security;
1558 dsec = dir->i_security;
1559 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1561 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1562 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1565 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1566 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1581 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1586 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1590 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1591 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1592 struct inode *new_dir,
1593 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1595 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1596 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1597 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1599 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1602 tsec = current->cred->security;
1603 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1604 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1605 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1606 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1608 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1610 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1611 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1612 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1615 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1616 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1619 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1620 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1621 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1626 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1627 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1628 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1629 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1630 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1633 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1634 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1635 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1636 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1638 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1646 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1647 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1648 struct super_block *sb,
1650 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1652 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1653 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1655 tsec = tsk->cred->security;
1656 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1657 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1661 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1662 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1666 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1667 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1668 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1669 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1672 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1674 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1678 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1680 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1682 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1689 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1690 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1694 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1696 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1697 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1704 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1713 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1716 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1718 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1720 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1721 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1723 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1727 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1728 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1729 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1730 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1731 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1732 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1733 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1736 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1737 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1742 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1744 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1749 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1753 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1754 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
1755 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->cred->security;
1756 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
1757 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1760 return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1763 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1767 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1771 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1774 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1775 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1779 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1783 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1786 static int selinux_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1787 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1788 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1792 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(effective, inheritable, permitted);
1796 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1799 static void selinux_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1800 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1801 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1803 secondary_ops->capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
1806 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
1810 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap, audit);
1814 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap, audit);
1817 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1820 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1823 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1828 end = buffer+buflen;
1834 const char *name = table->procname;
1835 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1836 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1840 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1843 table = table->parent;
1849 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1851 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1853 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1858 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1862 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1866 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1870 tsec = current->cred->security;
1872 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1873 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1875 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1876 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1879 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1880 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1882 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1883 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1891 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1892 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1898 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1911 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1917 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1921 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1927 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1929 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1932 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1936 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1941 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1942 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1943 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1945 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1946 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1947 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1948 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1950 case 0: /* Close log */
1951 case 1: /* Open log */
1952 case 2: /* Read from log */
1953 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1954 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1956 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1963 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1964 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1965 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1967 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1968 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1969 * the capability is granted.
1971 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1972 * processes that allocate mappings.
1974 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1976 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1978 rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1982 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1985 /* binprm security operations */
1987 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1989 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1991 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1995 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1998 bprm->security = bsec;
2002 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2004 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2005 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2006 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2007 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2009 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2012 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
2016 bsec = bprm->security;
2021 tsec = current->cred->security;
2022 isec = inode->i_security;
2024 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2025 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
2027 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2028 tsec->create_sid = 0;
2029 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2030 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2032 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
2033 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
2034 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2037 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2038 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2039 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
2044 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2045 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2047 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2050 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2051 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2052 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2056 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2057 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2058 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2062 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2063 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2067 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2068 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2070 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2078 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2080 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2084 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2086 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
2089 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2090 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2091 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2092 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2093 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2095 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2098 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2101 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2103 kfree(bprm->security);
2104 bprm->security = NULL;
2107 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2108 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2110 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2111 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2113 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2114 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2115 struct tty_struct *tty;
2116 struct fdtable *fdt;
2120 tty = get_current_tty();
2123 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2124 struct inode *inode;
2126 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2127 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2128 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2129 file may belong to another process and we are only
2130 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2131 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2132 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2133 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2134 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2141 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2145 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2147 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2149 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2151 unsigned long set, i;
2156 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2157 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2159 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2162 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2163 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2168 if (file_has_perm(current,
2170 file_to_av(file))) {
2172 fd = get_unused_fd();
2182 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2183 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2190 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2195 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2198 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2201 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2203 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2204 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2208 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2210 tsec = current->cred->security;
2212 bsec = bprm->security;
2215 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2217 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2218 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2219 unchanged and kill. */
2220 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2221 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2222 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2229 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2230 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2231 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2232 struct task_struct *tracer;
2233 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2237 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2238 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2239 sec = tracer->cred->security;
2245 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2246 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2258 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2260 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2262 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2263 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2264 struct itimerval itimer;
2265 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2266 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2268 unsigned long flags;
2270 tsec = current->cred->security;
2271 bsec = bprm->security;
2274 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2277 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2280 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2281 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2283 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2284 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2285 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2286 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2287 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2288 will be checked against the new SID. */
2289 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2290 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2292 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2293 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2294 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2295 flush_signals(current);
2296 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2297 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2298 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2299 recalc_sigpending();
2300 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2303 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2304 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2306 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2307 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2308 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2309 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2310 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2311 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2312 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2313 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2314 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2316 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2317 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2319 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2320 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2321 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2322 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2324 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2327 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2328 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2329 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2330 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2331 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2332 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2333 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2334 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2337 /* superblock security operations */
2339 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2341 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2344 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2346 superblock_free_security(sb);
2349 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2354 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2357 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2359 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2360 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2361 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2362 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2365 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2372 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2376 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2379 int current_size = 0;
2387 while (current_size < len) {
2397 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2399 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2400 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2401 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2407 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2415 in_save = in_end = orig;
2419 open_quote = !open_quote;
2420 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2422 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2424 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2425 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2427 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2429 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2431 } while (*in_end++);
2433 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2434 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2439 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2441 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2444 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2448 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2449 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2450 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2453 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2455 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2457 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2458 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2459 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2462 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2465 unsigned long flags,
2470 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2474 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2475 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2476 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2478 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2482 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2486 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2490 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2491 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2494 /* inode security operations */
2496 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2498 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2501 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2503 inode_free_security(inode);
2506 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2507 char **name, void **value,
2510 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2511 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2512 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2515 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2517 tsec = current->cred->security;
2518 dsec = dir->i_security;
2519 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2521 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2522 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2524 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2525 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2528 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2529 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2532 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2537 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2538 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2539 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2540 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2542 isec->initialized = 1;
2545 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2549 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2556 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2568 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2570 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2573 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2577 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2580 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2583 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2587 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2590 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2593 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2595 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2598 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2600 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2603 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2605 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2608 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2612 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2616 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2619 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2620 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2622 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2625 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2627 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2630 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2634 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2637 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2640 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2644 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2649 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2653 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2654 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2657 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2661 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2665 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2668 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2669 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2670 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2672 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2675 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2677 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2680 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2682 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2683 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2684 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2685 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2687 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2688 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2689 Restrict to administrator. */
2694 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2695 ordinary setattr permission. */
2696 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2699 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2700 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2702 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
2703 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2704 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2705 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2706 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2710 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2711 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2713 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2714 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2717 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2720 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2721 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2723 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2724 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2728 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2729 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2730 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2732 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2737 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2738 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2742 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2747 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2749 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2750 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2754 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2755 const void *value, size_t size,
2758 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2759 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2763 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2764 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2768 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2770 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2771 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2772 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2780 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2782 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2785 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2787 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2790 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2792 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2793 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2795 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2796 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2801 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2803 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2805 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2809 char *context = NULL;
2810 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2812 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2816 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2817 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2818 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2819 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2820 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2821 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2822 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2824 error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2826 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2829 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2842 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2843 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2845 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2849 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2852 if (!value || !size)
2855 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2863 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2865 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2866 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2867 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2871 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2873 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2876 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2878 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2881 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2883 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2887 /* file security operations */
2889 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2892 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2895 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2899 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2900 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2903 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2904 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2908 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2911 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2913 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2914 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
2915 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2916 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2919 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2923 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2924 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2925 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2927 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2930 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2932 return file_alloc_security(file);
2935 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2937 file_free_security(file);
2940 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2945 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2947 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2952 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2955 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2957 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2958 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2960 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2961 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2962 * This has an additional check.
2964 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2971 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2972 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2974 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2975 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2978 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2979 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2981 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2986 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2987 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2988 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2991 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)
2992 (current->cred->security))->sid;
2994 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
2995 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
2996 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
2997 if (rc || addr_only)
3000 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3003 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3004 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3007 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3008 unsigned long reqprot,
3013 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3017 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3020 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3021 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3023 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3024 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3025 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
3027 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3028 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3029 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3030 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3031 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3033 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3034 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3035 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3036 * modified content. This typically should only
3037 * occur for text relocations.
3039 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3047 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3050 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3052 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3055 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3062 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3067 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3068 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3077 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3078 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3083 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3088 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3092 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3099 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3101 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3102 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3104 tsec = current->cred->security;
3105 fsec = file->f_security;
3106 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3111 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3112 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3116 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3117 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3119 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3120 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3122 tsec = tsk->cred->security;
3123 fsec = file->f_security;
3126 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3128 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3130 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3131 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3134 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3136 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3139 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3141 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3142 struct inode *inode;
3143 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3144 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3145 fsec = file->f_security;
3146 isec = inode->i_security;
3148 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3149 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3150 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3151 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3152 * struct as its SID.
3154 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3155 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3157 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3158 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3159 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3160 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3161 * new inode label or new policy.
3162 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3164 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3167 /* task security operations */
3169 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3173 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3177 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3180 static int selinux_cred_alloc_security(struct cred *cred)
3182 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3185 tsec1 = current->cred->security;
3187 rc = cred_alloc_security(cred);
3190 tsec2 = cred->security;
3192 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3193 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3195 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3196 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3197 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3198 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3199 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3205 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3207 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3209 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3210 cred->security = NULL;
3214 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3216 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3217 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3218 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3219 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3220 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3225 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3227 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3230 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3232 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3236 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3238 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3241 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3243 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3246 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3248 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3251 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3253 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->cred->security;
3257 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3259 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3263 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3267 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3271 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3274 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3278 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3282 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3285 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3287 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3290 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3292 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3295 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3299 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3300 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3301 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3302 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3303 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3304 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3309 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3313 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3317 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3320 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3322 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3325 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3327 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3330 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3335 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3337 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3342 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3344 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3345 tsec = p->cred->security;
3347 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3349 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3353 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3360 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3361 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3362 the state of the current process. */
3363 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3366 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3368 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3371 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3373 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3375 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3377 tsec = p->cred->security;
3378 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3379 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3383 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3384 struct inode *inode)
3386 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->cred->security;
3387 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3389 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3390 isec->initialized = 1;
3394 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3395 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3396 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3398 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3399 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3401 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3402 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3406 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3407 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3410 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3411 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3415 *proto = ih->protocol;
3417 switch (ih->protocol) {
3419 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3421 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3425 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3429 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3430 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3435 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3437 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3441 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3445 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3446 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3450 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3451 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3453 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3457 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3461 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3462 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3473 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3475 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3476 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3477 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3480 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3481 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3483 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3484 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3488 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3489 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3492 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3493 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3494 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3503 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3505 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3509 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3510 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3515 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3517 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3521 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3522 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3526 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3527 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3529 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3533 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3534 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3538 /* includes fragments */
3548 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3549 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3554 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3556 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3559 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3560 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3563 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3565 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3568 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3569 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3579 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3580 " unable to parse packet\n");
3590 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3592 * @family: protocol family
3593 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3596 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3597 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3598 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3599 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3600 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3604 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3611 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3612 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3614 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3615 if (unlikely(err)) {
3617 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3618 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3625 /* socket security operations */
3626 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3629 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3630 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3631 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3634 tsec = task->cred->security;
3635 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3637 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3640 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3641 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3642 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3648 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3649 int protocol, int kern)
3652 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3658 tsec = current->cred->security;
3659 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3660 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3661 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3662 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3668 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3669 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3672 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3673 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3674 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3677 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3679 tsec = current->cred->security;
3680 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3681 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3682 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3683 isec->initialized = 1;
3686 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3687 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3688 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3689 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3695 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3696 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3697 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3699 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3704 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3709 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3710 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3711 * check the first address now.
3713 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3714 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3716 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3717 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3718 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3719 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3720 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3721 unsigned short snum;
3722 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3725 tsec = current->cred->security;
3726 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3728 if (family == PF_INET) {
3729 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3730 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3731 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3733 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3734 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3735 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3741 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3743 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3744 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3748 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3749 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3750 ad.u.net.family = family;
3751 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3753 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3759 switch (isec->sclass) {
3760 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3761 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3764 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3765 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3768 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3769 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3773 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3777 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3781 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3782 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3783 ad.u.net.family = family;
3785 if (family == PF_INET)
3786 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3788 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3790 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3791 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3799 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3801 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3802 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3805 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3810 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3812 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3813 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3814 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3815 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3816 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3817 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3818 unsigned short snum;
3821 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3822 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3823 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3825 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3827 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3828 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3830 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3833 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3837 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3838 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3840 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3841 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3842 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3843 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3848 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3854 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3856 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3859 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3862 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3863 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3865 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3869 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3871 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3872 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3873 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3874 newisec->initialized = 1;
3879 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3884 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3888 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3891 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3892 int size, int flags)
3894 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3897 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3899 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3902 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3904 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3907 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3911 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3915 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3918 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3921 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3924 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3926 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3929 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3930 struct socket *other,
3933 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3934 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3935 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3936 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3939 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3943 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3944 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3946 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3947 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3949 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3951 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3955 /* connecting socket */
3956 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3957 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3959 /* server child socket */
3960 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3961 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3962 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3967 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3968 struct socket *other)
3970 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3971 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3972 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3975 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3976 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3978 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3979 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3981 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3982 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3989 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3991 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3997 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4000 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4001 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4005 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4008 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4009 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4012 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4013 struct sk_buff *skb,
4014 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4019 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4021 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4022 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4024 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4025 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4028 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4029 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4030 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4031 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4033 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4034 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4035 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4036 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4038 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4039 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4040 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4041 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4044 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4045 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4050 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4053 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4057 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4060 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4066 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4067 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4068 if (unlikely(err)) {
4070 "SELinux: failure in"
4071 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4072 " network port label not found\n");
4075 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4078 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4082 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4084 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4085 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4088 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4089 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4090 ad.u.net.family = family;
4091 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4095 if (selinux_compat_net)
4096 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4099 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4104 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4105 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4108 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4109 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4111 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4113 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4116 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4122 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4125 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4126 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4127 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4128 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4133 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4136 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4137 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4140 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4141 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4142 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4143 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4144 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4145 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4147 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4148 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4149 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4152 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4153 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4154 ad.u.net.family = family;
4155 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4159 if (peerlbl_active) {
4162 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4165 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4168 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4171 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4174 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4177 if (secmark_active) {
4178 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4187 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4188 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4193 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4194 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4195 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4197 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4199 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4200 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4201 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4202 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4204 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4209 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4214 if (scontext_len > len) {
4219 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4223 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4231 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4233 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4236 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4238 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4241 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4245 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4246 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4248 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4251 *secid = peer_secid;
4252 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4257 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4259 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4262 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4264 sk_free_security(sk);
4267 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4269 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4270 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4272 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4273 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4274 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4276 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4279 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4282 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4284 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4286 *secid = sksec->sid;
4290 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4292 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4293 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4295 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4296 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4297 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4298 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4301 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4302 struct request_sock *req)
4304 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4306 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4310 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4311 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4314 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4317 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4318 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4319 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4323 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4327 req->secid = newsid;
4328 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4332 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4333 const struct request_sock *req)
4335 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4337 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4338 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4339 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4340 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4341 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4342 time it will have been created and available. */
4344 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4345 * thread with access to newsksec */
4346 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4349 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4351 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4352 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4354 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4355 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4358 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4360 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4363 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4366 fl->secid = req->secid;
4369 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4373 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4374 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4375 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4377 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4381 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4383 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4385 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4386 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4387 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4388 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4389 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4390 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4400 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4405 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4407 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4413 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4418 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4421 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4422 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4423 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4424 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4427 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4430 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4431 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4432 ad.u.net.family = family;
4433 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4436 if (peerlbl_active) {
4437 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4440 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4446 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4447 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4451 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4452 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4453 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4455 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4461 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4462 struct sk_buff *skb,
4463 const struct net_device *in,
4464 const struct net_device *out,
4465 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4467 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4470 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4471 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4472 struct sk_buff *skb,
4473 const struct net_device *in,
4474 const struct net_device *out,
4475 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4477 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4481 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4486 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4489 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4490 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4491 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4493 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4496 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4497 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4503 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4504 struct sk_buff *skb,
4505 const struct net_device *in,
4506 const struct net_device *out,
4507 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4509 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4512 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4514 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4515 u16 family, char *addrp)
4518 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4520 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4521 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4523 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4524 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4527 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4528 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4529 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4530 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4532 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4533 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4534 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4535 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4537 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4538 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4539 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4540 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4543 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4544 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4549 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4552 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4555 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4558 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4565 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4566 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4567 if (unlikely(err)) {
4569 "SELinux: failure in"
4570 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4571 " network port label not found\n");
4574 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4577 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4581 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4582 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4583 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4589 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4591 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4592 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4593 ad.u.net.family = family;
4594 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4597 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4598 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4599 &ad, family, addrp))
4602 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4603 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4607 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4608 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4614 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4620 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4625 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4626 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4627 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4628 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4629 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4630 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4632 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4633 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4634 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4635 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4636 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4637 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4638 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4641 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4642 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4643 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4646 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4647 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4648 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4649 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4654 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4655 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4657 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4660 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4661 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4663 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4668 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4669 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4672 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4674 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4675 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4676 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4679 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4680 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4681 ad.u.net.family = family;
4682 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4686 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4687 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4690 if (peerlbl_active) {
4694 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4696 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4697 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4700 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4702 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4703 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4710 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4711 struct sk_buff *skb,
4712 const struct net_device *in,
4713 const struct net_device *out,
4714 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4716 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4719 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4720 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4721 struct sk_buff *skb,
4722 const struct net_device *in,
4723 const struct net_device *out,
4724 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4726 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4730 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4732 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4736 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4740 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4741 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4746 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4749 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4751 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4755 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4756 ad.u.cap = capability;
4758 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4759 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4762 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4763 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4766 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->cred->security;
4767 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4769 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4773 isec->sclass = sclass;
4774 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4775 perm->security = isec;
4780 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4782 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4783 perm->security = NULL;
4787 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4789 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4791 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4795 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4796 msg->security = msec;
4801 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4803 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4805 msg->security = NULL;
4809 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4812 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4813 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4814 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4816 tsec = current->cred->security;
4817 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4819 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4820 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4822 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4825 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4827 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4830 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4832 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4835 /* message queue security operations */
4836 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4838 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4839 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4840 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4843 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4847 tsec = current->cred->security;
4848 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4850 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4851 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4853 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4856 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4862 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4864 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4867 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4869 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4870 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4871 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4873 tsec = current->cred->security;
4874 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4876 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4877 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4879 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4880 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4883 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4891 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4892 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4895 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4898 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4901 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4907 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4911 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4913 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4914 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4915 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4916 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4919 tsec = current->cred->security;
4920 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4921 msec = msg->security;
4924 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4926 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4928 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4929 * message queue this message will be stored in
4931 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4939 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4940 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4942 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4943 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4946 /* Can this process send the message */
4947 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4948 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4950 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4951 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4952 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4957 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4958 struct task_struct *target,
4959 long type, int mode)
4961 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4962 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4963 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4964 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4967 tsec = target->cred->security;
4968 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4969 msec = msg->security;
4971 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4972 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4974 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4975 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4977 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4978 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4982 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4983 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4985 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4986 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4987 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4990 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4994 tsec = current->cred->security;
4995 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4997 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4998 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5000 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5003 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5009 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5011 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5014 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5016 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5017 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5018 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5020 tsec = current->cred->security;
5021 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5023 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5024 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5026 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5027 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5030 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5031 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5039 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5040 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5043 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5046 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5053 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5059 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5063 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5064 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5069 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5073 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5076 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5078 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5081 /* Semaphore security operations */
5082 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5084 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5085 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5086 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5089 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5093 tsec = current->cred->security;
5094 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5096 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5097 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5099 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5102 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5108 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5110 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5113 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5115 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5116 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5117 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5119 tsec = current->cred->security;
5120 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5122 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5123 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5125 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5126 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5129 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5130 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5138 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5139 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5143 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5154 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5157 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5161 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5167 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5171 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5172 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5177 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5181 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5184 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5190 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5192 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5197 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5200 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5202 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5206 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5209 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5212 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5213 char *name, char **value)
5215 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5221 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5226 tsec = p->cred->security;
5228 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5230 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5232 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5233 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5234 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5235 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5236 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5237 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5238 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5239 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5246 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5252 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5253 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5255 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5256 struct task_struct *tracer;
5262 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5263 security attributes. */
5268 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5269 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5270 * above restriction is ever removed.
5272 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5273 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5274 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5275 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5276 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5277 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5278 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5279 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5280 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5281 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5287 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5288 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5289 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5293 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5294 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5295 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5297 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5304 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5305 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5306 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5307 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5308 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5309 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5310 tsec = p->cred->security;
5311 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5312 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5313 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5314 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5315 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5316 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5319 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5320 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5321 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5322 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5323 struct av_decision avd;
5328 * SELinux allows to change context in the following case only.
5329 * - Single threaded processes.
5330 * - Multi threaded processes intend to change its context into
5331 * more restricted domain (defined by TYPEBOUNDS statement).
5333 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5334 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5335 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5336 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5337 do_each_thread(g, t) {
5338 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5339 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5340 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5346 } while_each_thread(g, t);
5347 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5351 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5352 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5353 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5357 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5358 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5361 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5362 if (tracer != NULL) {
5363 struct task_security_struct *ptsec =
5364 tracer->cred->security;
5365 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5367 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5369 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5373 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5374 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5388 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5390 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5393 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5395 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5398 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5405 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5406 unsigned long flags)
5408 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->cred->security;
5409 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5411 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5415 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5416 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5418 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5424 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5426 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5432 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5433 struct task_struct *ctx,
5437 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5438 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5440 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5442 tsec = ctx->cred->security;
5443 ksec = key->security;
5445 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5446 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5447 appear to be created. */
5451 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5452 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5455 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5457 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5458 char *context = NULL;
5462 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5471 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5474 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5475 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5476 .capget = selinux_capget,
5477 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5478 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5479 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5480 .capable = selinux_capable,
5481 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5482 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5483 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5484 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5486 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5487 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5489 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5490 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5491 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5492 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5493 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5494 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5495 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5497 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5498 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5499 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5500 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5501 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5502 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5503 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5504 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5505 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5506 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5507 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5510 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5511 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5512 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5513 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5514 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5515 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5516 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5517 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5518 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5519 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5520 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5521 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5522 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5523 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5524 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5525 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5526 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5527 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5528 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5529 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5530 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5531 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5532 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5533 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5534 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5535 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5536 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5538 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5539 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5540 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5541 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5542 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5543 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5544 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5545 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5546 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5547 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5548 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5550 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5552 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5553 .cred_alloc_security = selinux_cred_alloc_security,
5554 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5555 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5556 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5557 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5558 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5559 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5560 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5561 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5562 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5563 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5564 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5565 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5566 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5567 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5568 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5569 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5570 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5571 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5572 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5573 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5574 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5576 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5577 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5579 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5580 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5582 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5583 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5584 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5585 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5586 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5587 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5589 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5590 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5591 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5592 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5593 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5595 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5596 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5597 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5598 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5599 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5601 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5603 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5604 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5606 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5607 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5608 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5610 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5611 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5613 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5614 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5615 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5616 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5617 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5618 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5619 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5620 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5621 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5622 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5623 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5624 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5625 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5626 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5627 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5628 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5629 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5630 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5631 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5632 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5633 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5634 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5635 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5636 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5637 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5639 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5640 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5641 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5642 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5643 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5644 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5645 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5646 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5647 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5648 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5649 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5653 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5654 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5655 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5656 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5660 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5661 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5662 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5663 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5667 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5669 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5671 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5672 selinux_enabled = 0;
5676 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5677 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5681 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5683 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5684 if (cred_alloc_security(current->cred))
5685 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5686 tsec = current->cred->security;
5687 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5689 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5690 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5691 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5694 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5696 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5697 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5698 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5700 if (selinux_enforcing)
5701 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5703 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5708 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5710 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5712 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5713 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5714 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5715 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5717 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5718 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5719 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5720 struct superblock_security_struct,
5722 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5724 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5725 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5726 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5728 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5730 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5731 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5732 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5735 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5736 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5739 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5740 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5741 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5743 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5745 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5747 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5748 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5750 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5751 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5754 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5755 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5757 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5758 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5761 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5762 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5764 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5765 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5769 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5771 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5773 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5774 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5776 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5777 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5780 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5781 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5783 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5784 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5790 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5794 if (!selinux_enabled)
5797 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5799 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5801 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5803 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5804 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5806 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5813 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5815 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5816 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5818 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5820 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5821 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5822 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5827 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5829 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5830 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5833 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5835 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5836 static int selinux_disabled;
5838 int selinux_disable(void)
5840 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5842 if (ss_initialized) {
5843 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5847 if (selinux_disabled) {
5848 /* Only do this once. */
5852 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5854 selinux_disabled = 1;
5855 selinux_enabled = 0;
5857 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5858 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5860 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5861 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5863 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */