2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
159 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
161 static int cred_alloc_security(struct cred *cred)
163 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
165 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
170 cred->security = tsec;
176 * get the security ID of a task
178 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
180 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
184 tsec = __task_cred(task)->security;
191 * get the security ID of the current task
193 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
195 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
200 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
202 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
203 u32 sid = current_sid();
205 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
209 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
210 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
212 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
213 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
214 isec->task_sid = sid;
215 inode->i_security = isec;
220 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
223 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
225 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
226 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
227 list_del_init(&isec->list);
228 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
230 inode->i_security = NULL;
231 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
234 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
236 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
237 u32 sid = current_sid();
239 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
244 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
245 file->f_security = fsec;
250 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
252 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
253 file->f_security = NULL;
257 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
259 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
261 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
265 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
266 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
267 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
268 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
270 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
271 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
272 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
273 sb->s_security = sbsec;
278 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
280 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
282 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
283 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
284 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
285 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
287 sb->s_security = NULL;
291 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
293 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
295 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
299 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
300 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
301 sk->sk_security = ssec;
303 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
308 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
310 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
312 sk->sk_security = NULL;
313 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
317 /* The security server must be initialized before
318 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
319 extern int ss_initialized;
321 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
323 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
325 "uses transition SIDs",
327 "uses genfs_contexts",
328 "not configured for labeling",
329 "uses mountpoint labeling",
332 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
334 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
336 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
347 static const match_table_t tokens = {
348 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
349 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
350 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
351 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
355 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
357 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
358 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
359 const struct cred *cred)
361 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
364 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
365 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
369 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
370 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
374 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
375 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
376 const struct cred *cred)
378 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
380 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
381 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
385 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
386 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
390 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
392 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
393 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
394 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
397 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
398 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
399 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
400 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
401 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
402 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
403 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
404 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
405 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
409 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
410 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
411 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
412 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
413 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
414 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
416 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
417 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
418 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
423 sbsec->initialized = 1;
425 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
426 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
427 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
429 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
430 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
431 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
433 /* Initialize the root inode. */
434 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
436 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
437 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
438 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
440 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
442 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
443 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
444 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
445 struct inode_security_struct, list);
446 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
447 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
448 inode = igrab(inode);
450 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
454 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
455 list_del_init(&isec->list);
458 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
464 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
465 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
466 * mount options, or whatever.
468 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
469 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
472 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
473 char *context = NULL;
477 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
479 if (!sbsec->initialized)
486 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
487 * settings this is going to need a mask
490 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
491 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
493 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
497 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
498 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
503 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
504 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
510 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
511 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
514 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
515 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
517 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
518 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
521 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
522 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
524 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
525 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
528 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
529 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
531 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
532 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
533 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
535 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
538 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
539 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
542 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
547 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
551 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
552 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
554 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
555 if (sbsec->initialized)
556 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
557 (old_sid != new_sid))
560 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
561 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
563 if (!sbsec->initialized)
564 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
570 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
571 * labeling information.
573 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
574 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
576 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
578 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
579 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
580 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
581 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
582 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
583 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
584 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
585 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
586 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
588 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
590 if (!ss_initialized) {
592 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
593 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
594 server is ready to handle calls. */
595 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
596 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
597 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
598 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
602 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
603 "before the security server is initialized\n");
608 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
609 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
610 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
611 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
613 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
614 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
615 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
616 * will be used for both mounts)
618 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
623 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
624 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
625 * than once with different security options.
627 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
629 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
630 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
632 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
633 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
634 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
641 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
643 goto out_double_mount;
645 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
650 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
652 goto out_double_mount;
654 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
656 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
657 rootcontext_sid = sid;
659 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
661 goto out_double_mount;
663 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
667 defcontext_sid = sid;
669 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
671 goto out_double_mount;
673 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
682 if (sbsec->initialized) {
683 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
684 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
685 goto out_double_mount;
690 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
693 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
694 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
696 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
697 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
701 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
703 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
707 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
711 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
712 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
713 * the superblock context if not already set.
716 if (!fscontext_sid) {
717 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
721 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
723 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
728 if (!rootcontext_sid)
729 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
731 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
732 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
735 if (rootcontext_sid) {
736 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
741 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
742 root_isec->initialized = 1;
745 if (defcontext_sid) {
746 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
748 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
749 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
753 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
754 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
760 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
763 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
765 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
769 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
770 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
774 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
775 struct super_block *newsb)
777 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
778 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
780 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
781 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
782 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
785 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
786 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
789 if (!ss_initialized) {
790 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
791 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
792 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
793 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
797 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
798 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
800 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
801 if (newsbsec->initialized)
804 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
806 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
808 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
809 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
810 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
813 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
817 if (!set_rootcontext) {
818 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
819 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
822 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
824 if (set_rootcontext) {
825 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
826 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
827 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
828 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
830 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
833 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
834 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
837 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
838 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
841 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
842 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
843 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
845 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
847 /* Standard string-based options. */
848 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
850 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
855 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
859 if (context || defcontext) {
861 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
864 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
874 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
877 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
884 case Opt_rootcontext:
887 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
890 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
898 if (context || defcontext) {
900 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
903 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
912 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
919 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
923 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
924 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
925 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
930 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
931 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
934 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
935 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
938 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
939 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
942 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
943 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
946 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
957 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
959 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
962 char *options = data;
963 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
965 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
970 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
972 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
977 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
980 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
984 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
985 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
990 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
991 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
993 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
995 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
998 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1000 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1001 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1003 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1004 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1009 /* we need a comma before each option */
1011 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1014 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1020 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1022 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1025 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1027 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1033 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1035 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1040 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1042 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1044 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1046 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1048 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1050 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1052 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1054 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1056 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1060 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1063 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1065 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1068 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1070 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1073 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1079 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1080 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1082 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1089 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1090 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1092 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1094 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1095 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1097 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1099 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1101 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1107 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1108 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1109 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1110 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1111 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1113 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1115 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1116 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1117 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1119 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1120 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1121 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1122 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1123 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1124 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1125 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1127 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1130 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1132 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1134 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1137 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1140 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1141 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1146 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1148 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1153 end = buffer+buflen;
1158 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1159 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1163 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1168 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1169 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1173 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1181 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1182 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1184 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1185 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1187 struct dentry *dentry;
1188 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1189 char *context = NULL;
1193 if (isec->initialized)
1196 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1197 if (isec->initialized)
1200 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1201 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1202 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1203 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1204 server is ready to handle calls. */
1205 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1206 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1207 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1208 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1212 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1213 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1214 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1215 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1219 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1220 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1222 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1223 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1225 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1226 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1229 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1230 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1235 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1236 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1242 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1244 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1245 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1246 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1254 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1260 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1266 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1267 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1268 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1269 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1273 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1274 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1277 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1281 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1282 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1283 __func__, context, -rc,
1284 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1286 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1294 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1295 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1297 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1298 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1299 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1301 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1302 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1303 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1311 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1312 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1315 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1316 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1318 if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1319 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1321 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1322 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1333 isec->initialized = 1;
1336 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1338 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1339 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1343 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1344 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1350 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1351 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1354 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1355 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1358 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1359 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1362 /* All other signals. */
1363 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1371 * Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1372 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1373 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1375 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1376 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1379 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1383 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1384 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1386 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1389 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1390 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1393 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1394 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1397 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1398 struct av_decision avd;
1400 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1401 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1404 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1408 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1410 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1413 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1417 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1421 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1422 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1423 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1427 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1428 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1431 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1433 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1434 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1437 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1438 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1439 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1440 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1441 struct inode *inode,
1443 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1445 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1446 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1449 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1452 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1453 isec = inode->i_security;
1457 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1458 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1461 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1464 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1465 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1466 pathname if needed. */
1467 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1468 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1469 struct dentry *dentry,
1472 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1473 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1474 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1475 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1476 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1477 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1480 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1481 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1482 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1483 check a particular permission to the file.
1484 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1485 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1486 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1487 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1488 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1492 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1493 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1494 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1495 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1498 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1499 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1501 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1502 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1510 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1512 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1517 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1518 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1519 struct dentry *dentry,
1522 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1523 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1524 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1525 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1527 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1530 dsec = dir->i_security;
1531 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1534 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1536 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1537 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1539 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1540 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1545 if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1546 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1551 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1555 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1556 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1557 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1560 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1561 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1562 struct task_struct *ctx)
1564 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1566 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1570 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1573 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1574 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1575 struct dentry *dentry,
1579 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1580 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1581 u32 sid = current_sid();
1585 dsec = dir->i_security;
1586 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1588 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1589 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1592 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1593 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1608 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1613 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1617 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1618 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1619 struct inode *new_dir,
1620 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1622 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1623 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1624 u32 sid = current_sid();
1626 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1629 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1630 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1631 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1632 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1634 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1636 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1637 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1638 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1641 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1642 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1645 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1646 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1647 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1652 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1653 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1654 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1655 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1656 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1659 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1660 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1661 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1662 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1664 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1672 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1673 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1674 struct super_block *sb,
1676 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1678 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1679 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1681 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1682 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1685 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1686 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1690 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1691 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1692 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1693 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1696 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1698 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1702 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1704 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1706 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1713 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1714 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1718 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1720 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1721 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1728 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1737 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1740 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1742 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1744 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1745 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1747 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1751 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1752 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1753 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1754 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1755 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1756 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1757 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1760 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1761 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1766 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1768 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1773 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1777 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1778 u32 sid = current_sid();
1779 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1780 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1783 return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1786 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1790 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1794 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1797 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1798 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1802 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1806 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1809 static int selinux_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1810 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1811 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1815 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(effective, inheritable, permitted);
1819 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1822 static void selinux_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1823 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1824 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1826 secondary_ops->capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
1829 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
1833 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap, audit);
1837 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap, audit);
1840 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1843 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1846 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1851 end = buffer+buflen;
1857 const char *name = table->procname;
1858 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1859 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1863 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1866 table = table->parent;
1872 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1874 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1876 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1881 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1888 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1892 sid = current_sid();
1894 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1895 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1897 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1898 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1901 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1902 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1904 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1905 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1913 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1914 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1920 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1933 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1939 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1943 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1949 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1951 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1954 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1958 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1963 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1964 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1965 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1967 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1968 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1969 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1970 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1972 case 0: /* Close log */
1973 case 1: /* Open log */
1974 case 2: /* Read from log */
1975 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1976 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1978 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1985 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1986 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1987 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1989 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1990 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1991 * the capability is granted.
1993 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1994 * processes that allocate mappings.
1996 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1998 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2000 rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2004 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2007 /* binprm security operations */
2009 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2011 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2013 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
2017 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2020 bprm->security = bsec;
2024 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2026 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2027 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2028 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2029 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2031 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2034 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
2038 bsec = bprm->security;
2043 tsec = current_security();
2044 isec = inode->i_security;
2046 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2047 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
2049 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2050 tsec->create_sid = 0;
2051 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2052 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2054 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
2055 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
2056 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2059 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2060 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2061 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
2066 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2067 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2069 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2072 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2073 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2074 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2078 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2079 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2080 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2084 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2085 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2089 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2090 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2092 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2100 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2102 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2106 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2108 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2109 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2117 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2118 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2119 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2120 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2122 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2125 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2128 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2130 kfree(bprm->security);
2131 bprm->security = NULL;
2134 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2135 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2137 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2138 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2140 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2141 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2142 struct tty_struct *tty;
2143 struct fdtable *fdt;
2147 tty = get_current_tty();
2150 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2151 struct inode *inode;
2153 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2154 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2155 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2156 file may belong to another process and we are only
2157 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2158 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2159 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2160 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2161 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2168 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2172 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2174 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2176 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2178 unsigned long set, i;
2183 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2184 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2186 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2189 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2190 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2195 if (file_has_perm(current,
2197 file_to_av(file))) {
2199 fd = get_unused_fd();
2209 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2210 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2217 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2222 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2225 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2228 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2230 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2231 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2235 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2237 tsec = current_security();
2239 bsec = bprm->security;
2242 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2244 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2245 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2246 unchanged and kill. */
2247 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2248 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2249 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2256 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2257 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2258 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2259 struct task_struct *tracer;
2260 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2264 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2265 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2266 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2272 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2273 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2285 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2287 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2289 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2290 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2291 struct itimerval itimer;
2292 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2293 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2295 unsigned long flags;
2297 tsec = current_security();
2298 bsec = bprm->security;
2301 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2304 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2307 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2308 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2310 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2311 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2312 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2313 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2314 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2315 will be checked against the new SID. */
2316 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2317 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2319 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2320 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2321 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2322 flush_signals(current);
2323 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2324 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2325 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2326 recalc_sigpending();
2327 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2330 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2331 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2333 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2334 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2335 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2336 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2337 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2338 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2339 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2340 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2341 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2343 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2344 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2346 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2347 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2348 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2349 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2351 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2354 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2355 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2356 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2357 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2358 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2359 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2360 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2361 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2364 /* superblock security operations */
2366 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2368 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2371 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2373 superblock_free_security(sb);
2376 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2381 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2384 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2386 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2387 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2388 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2389 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2392 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2399 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2403 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2406 int current_size = 0;
2414 while (current_size < len) {
2424 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2426 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2427 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2428 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2434 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2442 in_save = in_end = orig;
2446 open_quote = !open_quote;
2447 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2449 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2451 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2452 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2454 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2456 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2458 } while (*in_end++);
2460 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2461 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2466 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2468 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2471 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2475 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2476 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2477 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2480 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2482 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2484 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2485 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2486 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2489 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2492 unsigned long flags,
2497 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2501 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2502 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2503 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2505 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2509 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2513 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2517 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2518 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2521 /* inode security operations */
2523 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2525 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2528 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2530 inode_free_security(inode);
2533 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2534 char **name, void **value,
2537 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2538 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2539 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2540 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2541 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2543 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2545 dsec = dir->i_security;
2546 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2549 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2551 if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2552 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2553 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2556 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2557 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2560 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2565 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2566 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2567 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2568 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2570 isec->initialized = 1;
2573 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2577 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2584 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2596 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2598 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2601 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2605 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2608 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2611 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2615 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2618 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2621 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2623 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2626 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2628 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2631 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2633 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2636 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2640 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2644 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2647 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2648 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2650 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2653 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2655 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2658 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2662 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2665 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2668 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2672 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2677 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2681 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2682 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2685 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2689 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2693 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2696 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2697 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2698 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2700 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2703 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2705 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2708 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2710 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2711 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2712 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2713 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2715 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2716 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2717 Restrict to administrator. */
2722 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2723 ordinary setattr permission. */
2724 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2727 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2728 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2730 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2731 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2732 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2733 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2734 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2737 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2738 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2740 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2741 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2744 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2747 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2748 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2750 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2751 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2755 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2756 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2757 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2759 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2764 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2765 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2769 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2774 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2776 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2777 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2781 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2782 const void *value, size_t size,
2785 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2786 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2790 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2791 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2795 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2797 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2798 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2799 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2807 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2809 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2812 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2814 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2817 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2819 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2820 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2822 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2823 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2828 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2830 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2832 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2836 char *context = NULL;
2837 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2839 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2843 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2844 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2845 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2846 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2847 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2848 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2849 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2851 error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2853 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2856 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2869 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2870 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2872 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2876 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2879 if (!value || !size)
2882 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2890 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2892 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2893 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2894 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2898 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2900 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2903 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2905 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2908 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2910 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2914 /* file security operations */
2916 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2919 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2922 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2926 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2927 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2930 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2931 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2935 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2938 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2940 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2941 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2942 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2943 u32 sid = current_sid();
2946 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2950 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2951 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2952 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2954 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2957 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2959 return file_alloc_security(file);
2962 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2964 file_free_security(file);
2967 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2972 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2974 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2979 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2982 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2984 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2985 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2987 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2988 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2989 * This has an additional check.
2991 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2998 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2999 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3001 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3002 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3005 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3006 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3008 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
3013 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3014 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3015 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3018 u32 sid = current_sid();
3020 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3021 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3022 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3023 if (rc || addr_only)
3026 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3029 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3030 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3033 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3034 unsigned long reqprot,
3039 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3043 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3046 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3047 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3049 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3050 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3051 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
3053 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3054 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3055 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3056 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3057 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3059 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3060 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3061 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3062 * modified content. This typically should only
3063 * occur for text relocations.
3065 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3073 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3076 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3078 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3081 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3088 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3093 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3094 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3103 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3104 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3109 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3114 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3118 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3125 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3127 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3129 fsec = file->f_security;
3130 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3135 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3136 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3139 u32 sid = current_sid();
3141 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3143 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3144 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3146 fsec = file->f_security;
3149 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3151 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3153 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3154 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3157 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3159 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3162 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3164 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3165 struct inode *inode;
3166 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3167 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3168 fsec = file->f_security;
3169 isec = inode->i_security;
3171 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3172 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3173 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3174 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3175 * struct as its SID.
3177 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3178 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3180 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3181 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3182 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3183 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3184 * new inode label or new policy.
3185 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3187 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3190 /* task security operations */
3192 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3196 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3200 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3203 static int selinux_cred_alloc_security(struct cred *cred)
3205 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3208 tsec1 = current_security();
3210 rc = cred_alloc_security(cred);
3213 tsec2 = cred->security;
3215 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3216 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3218 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3219 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3220 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3221 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3222 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3228 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3230 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3232 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3233 cred->security = NULL;
3237 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3239 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3240 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3241 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3242 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3243 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3248 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3250 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3253 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3255 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3259 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3261 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3264 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3266 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3269 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3271 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3274 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3276 *secid = task_sid(p);
3279 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3281 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3285 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3289 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3293 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3296 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3300 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3304 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3307 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3309 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3312 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3314 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3317 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3321 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3322 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3323 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3324 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3325 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3326 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3331 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3335 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3339 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3342 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3344 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3347 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3349 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3352 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3358 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3363 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3365 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3367 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3368 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3370 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3374 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3381 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3382 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3383 the state of the current process. */
3384 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3387 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3389 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3392 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3394 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3396 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3398 tsec = p->cred->security;
3399 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3400 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3404 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3405 struct inode *inode)
3407 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3408 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3411 isec->initialized = 1;
3414 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3415 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3416 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3418 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3419 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3421 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3422 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3426 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3427 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3430 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3431 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3435 *proto = ih->protocol;
3437 switch (ih->protocol) {
3439 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3441 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3445 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3449 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3450 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3455 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3457 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3461 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3465 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3466 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3470 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3471 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3473 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3477 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3481 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3482 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3493 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3495 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3496 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3497 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3500 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3501 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3503 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3504 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3508 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3509 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3512 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3513 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3514 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3523 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3525 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3529 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3530 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3535 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3537 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3541 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3542 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3546 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3547 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3549 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3553 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3554 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3558 /* includes fragments */
3568 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3569 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3574 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3576 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3579 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3580 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3583 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3585 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3588 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3589 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3599 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3600 " unable to parse packet\n");
3610 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3612 * @family: protocol family
3613 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3616 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3617 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3618 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3619 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3620 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3624 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3631 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3632 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3634 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3635 if (unlikely(err)) {
3637 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3638 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3645 /* socket security operations */
3646 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3649 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3650 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3654 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3656 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3658 sid = task_sid(task);
3660 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3661 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3662 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3668 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3669 int protocol, int kern)
3671 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3672 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3681 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3683 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3684 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3690 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3691 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3693 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3694 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3695 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3696 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3701 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3703 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3706 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3712 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3713 isec->initialized = 1;
3716 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3717 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3718 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3719 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3725 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3726 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3727 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3729 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3734 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3739 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3740 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3741 * check the first address now.
3743 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3744 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3746 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3747 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3748 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3749 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3750 unsigned short snum;
3751 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3754 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3756 if (family == PF_INET) {
3757 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3758 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3759 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3761 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3762 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3763 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3769 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3771 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3772 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3776 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3777 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3778 ad.u.net.family = family;
3779 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3781 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3787 switch (isec->sclass) {
3788 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3789 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3792 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3793 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3796 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3797 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3801 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3805 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3809 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3810 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3811 ad.u.net.family = family;
3813 if (family == PF_INET)
3814 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3816 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3818 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3819 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3827 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3829 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3830 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3833 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3838 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3840 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3841 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3842 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3843 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3844 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3845 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3846 unsigned short snum;
3849 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3850 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3851 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3853 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3855 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3856 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3858 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3861 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3865 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3866 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3868 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3869 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3870 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3871 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3876 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3882 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3884 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3887 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3890 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3891 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3893 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3897 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3899 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3900 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3901 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3902 newisec->initialized = 1;
3907 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3912 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3916 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3919 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3920 int size, int flags)
3922 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3925 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3927 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3930 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3932 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3935 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3939 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3943 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3946 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3949 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3952 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3954 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3957 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3958 struct socket *other,
3961 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3962 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3963 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3964 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3967 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3971 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3972 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3974 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3975 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3977 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3979 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3983 /* connecting socket */
3984 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3985 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3987 /* server child socket */
3988 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3989 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3990 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3995 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3996 struct socket *other)
3998 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3999 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4000 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4003 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4004 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4006 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4007 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4009 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4010 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4017 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4019 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4025 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4028 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4029 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4033 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4036 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4037 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4040 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4041 struct sk_buff *skb,
4042 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4047 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4049 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4050 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4052 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4053 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4056 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4057 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4058 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4059 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4061 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4062 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4063 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4064 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4066 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4067 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4068 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4069 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4072 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4073 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4078 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4081 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4085 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4088 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4094 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4095 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4096 if (unlikely(err)) {
4098 "SELinux: failure in"
4099 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4100 " network port label not found\n");
4103 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4106 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4110 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4112 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4113 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4116 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4117 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4118 ad.u.net.family = family;
4119 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4123 if (selinux_compat_net)
4124 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4127 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4132 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4133 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4136 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4137 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4139 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4141 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4144 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4150 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4153 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4154 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4155 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4156 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4161 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4164 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4165 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4168 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4169 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4170 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4171 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4172 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4173 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4175 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4176 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4177 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4180 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4181 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4182 ad.u.net.family = family;
4183 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4187 if (peerlbl_active) {
4190 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4193 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4196 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4199 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4202 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4205 if (secmark_active) {
4206 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4215 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4216 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4221 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4222 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4223 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4225 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4227 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4228 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4229 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4230 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4232 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4237 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4242 if (scontext_len > len) {
4247 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4251 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4259 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4261 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4264 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4266 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4269 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4273 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4274 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4276 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4279 *secid = peer_secid;
4280 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4285 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4287 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4290 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4292 sk_free_security(sk);
4295 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4297 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4298 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4300 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4301 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4302 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4304 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4307 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4310 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4312 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4314 *secid = sksec->sid;
4318 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4320 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4321 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4323 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4324 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4325 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4326 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4329 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4330 struct request_sock *req)
4332 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4334 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4338 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4339 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4342 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4345 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4346 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4347 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4351 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4355 req->secid = newsid;
4356 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4360 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4361 const struct request_sock *req)
4363 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4365 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4366 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4367 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4368 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4369 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4370 time it will have been created and available. */
4372 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4373 * thread with access to newsksec */
4374 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4377 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4379 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4380 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4382 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4383 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4386 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4388 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4391 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4394 fl->secid = req->secid;
4397 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4401 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4402 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4403 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4405 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4409 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4411 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4413 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4414 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4415 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4416 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4417 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4418 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4428 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4433 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4435 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4441 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4446 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4449 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4450 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4451 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4452 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4455 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4458 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4459 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4460 ad.u.net.family = family;
4461 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4464 if (peerlbl_active) {
4465 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4468 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4474 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4475 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4479 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4480 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4481 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4483 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4489 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4490 struct sk_buff *skb,
4491 const struct net_device *in,
4492 const struct net_device *out,
4493 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4495 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4498 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4499 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4500 struct sk_buff *skb,
4501 const struct net_device *in,
4502 const struct net_device *out,
4503 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4505 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4509 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4514 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4517 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4518 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4519 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4521 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4524 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4525 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4531 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4532 struct sk_buff *skb,
4533 const struct net_device *in,
4534 const struct net_device *out,
4535 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4537 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4540 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4542 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4543 u16 family, char *addrp)
4546 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4548 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4549 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4551 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4552 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4555 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4556 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4557 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4558 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4560 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4561 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4562 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4563 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4565 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4566 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4567 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4568 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4571 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4572 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4577 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4580 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4583 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4586 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4593 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4594 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4595 if (unlikely(err)) {
4597 "SELinux: failure in"
4598 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4599 " network port label not found\n");
4602 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4605 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4609 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4610 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4611 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4617 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4619 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4620 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4621 ad.u.net.family = family;
4622 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4625 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4626 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4627 &ad, family, addrp))
4630 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4631 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4635 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4636 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4642 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4648 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4653 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4654 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4655 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4656 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4657 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4658 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4660 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4661 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4662 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4663 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4664 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4665 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4666 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4669 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4670 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4671 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4674 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4675 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4676 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4677 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4682 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4683 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4685 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4688 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4689 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4691 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4696 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4697 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4700 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4702 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4703 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4704 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4707 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4708 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4709 ad.u.net.family = family;
4710 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4714 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4715 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4718 if (peerlbl_active) {
4722 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4724 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4725 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4728 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4730 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4731 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4738 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4739 struct sk_buff *skb,
4740 const struct net_device *in,
4741 const struct net_device *out,
4742 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4744 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4747 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4748 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4749 struct sk_buff *skb,
4750 const struct net_device *in,
4751 const struct net_device *out,
4752 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4754 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4758 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4760 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4764 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4768 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4769 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4774 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4777 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4779 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4783 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4784 ad.u.cap = capability;
4786 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4787 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4790 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4791 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4794 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4797 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4801 sid = task_sid(task);
4802 isec->sclass = sclass;
4804 perm->security = isec;
4809 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4811 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4812 perm->security = NULL;
4816 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4818 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4820 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4824 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4825 msg->security = msec;
4830 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4832 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4834 msg->security = NULL;
4838 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4841 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4842 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4843 u32 sid = current_sid();
4845 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4847 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4848 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4850 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4853 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4855 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4858 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4860 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4863 /* message queue security operations */
4864 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4866 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4867 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4868 u32 sid = current_sid();
4871 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4875 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4877 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4878 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4880 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4883 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4889 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4891 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4894 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4896 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4897 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4898 u32 sid = current_sid();
4900 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4902 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4903 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4905 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4906 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4909 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4917 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4918 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4921 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4924 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4927 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4933 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4937 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4939 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4940 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4941 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4942 u32 sid = current_sid();
4945 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4946 msec = msg->security;
4949 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4951 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4953 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4954 * message queue this message will be stored in
4956 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4962 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4963 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4965 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4966 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4969 /* Can this process send the message */
4970 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4973 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4974 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4975 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4980 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4981 struct task_struct *target,
4982 long type, int mode)
4984 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4985 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4986 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4987 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4990 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4991 msec = msg->security;
4993 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4994 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4996 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4997 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4999 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5000 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5004 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5005 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5007 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5008 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5009 u32 sid = current_sid();
5012 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5016 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5018 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5019 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5021 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5024 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5030 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5032 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5035 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5037 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5038 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5039 u32 sid = current_sid();
5041 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5043 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5044 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5046 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5047 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5050 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5051 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5059 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5060 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5063 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5066 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5073 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5079 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5083 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5084 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5089 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5093 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5096 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5098 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5101 /* Semaphore security operations */
5102 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5104 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5105 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5106 u32 sid = current_sid();
5109 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5113 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5115 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5116 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5118 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5121 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5127 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5129 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5132 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5134 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5135 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5136 u32 sid = current_sid();
5138 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5140 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5141 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5143 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5144 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5147 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5148 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5156 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5157 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5161 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5172 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5175 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5179 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5185 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5189 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5190 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5195 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5199 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5202 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5208 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5210 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5215 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5218 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5220 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5224 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5227 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5230 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5231 char *name, char **value)
5233 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5239 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5245 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5247 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5249 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5251 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5252 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5253 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5254 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5255 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5256 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5257 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5258 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5266 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5276 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5277 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5279 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5280 struct task_struct *tracer;
5286 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5287 security attributes. */
5292 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5293 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5294 * above restriction is ever removed.
5296 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5297 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5298 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5299 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5300 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5301 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5302 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5303 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5304 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5305 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5311 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5312 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5313 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5317 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5318 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5319 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5321 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5328 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5329 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5330 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5331 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5332 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5333 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5334 tsec = p->cred->security;
5335 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5336 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5337 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5338 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5339 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5340 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5343 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5344 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5345 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5346 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5347 struct av_decision avd;
5352 * SELinux allows to change context in the following case only.
5353 * - Single threaded processes.
5354 * - Multi threaded processes intend to change its context into
5355 * more restricted domain (defined by TYPEBOUNDS statement).
5357 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5358 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5359 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5360 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5361 do_each_thread(g, t) {
5362 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5363 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5364 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5370 } while_each_thread(g, t);
5371 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5375 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5376 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5377 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5381 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5382 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5385 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5386 if (tracer != NULL) {
5387 u32 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5389 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5391 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5395 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5396 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5410 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5412 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5415 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5417 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5420 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5427 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5428 unsigned long flags)
5430 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5431 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5433 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5438 __tsec = __task_cred(tsk)->security;
5439 if (__tsec->keycreate_sid)
5440 ksec->sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5442 ksec->sid = __tsec->sid;
5449 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5451 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5457 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5458 struct task_struct *ctx,
5462 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5465 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5466 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5467 appear to be created. */
5471 sid = task_sid(ctx);
5473 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5474 ksec = key->security;
5476 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5479 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5481 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5482 char *context = NULL;
5486 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5495 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5498 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5499 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5500 .capget = selinux_capget,
5501 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5502 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5503 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5504 .capable = selinux_capable,
5505 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5506 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5507 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5508 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5510 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5511 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5513 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5514 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5515 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5516 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5517 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5518 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5519 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5521 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5522 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5523 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5524 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5525 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5526 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5527 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5528 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5529 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5530 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5531 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5534 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5535 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5536 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5537 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5538 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5539 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5540 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5541 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5542 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5543 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5544 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5545 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5546 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5547 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5548 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5549 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5550 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5551 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5552 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5553 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5554 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5555 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5556 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5557 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5558 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5559 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5560 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5562 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5563 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5564 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5565 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5566 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5567 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5568 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5569 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5570 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5571 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5572 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5574 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5576 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5577 .cred_alloc_security = selinux_cred_alloc_security,
5578 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5579 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5580 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5581 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5582 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5583 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5584 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5585 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5586 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5587 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5588 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5589 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5590 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5591 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5592 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5593 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5594 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5595 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5596 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5597 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5598 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5600 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5601 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5603 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5604 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5606 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5607 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5608 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5609 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5610 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5611 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5613 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5614 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5615 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5616 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5617 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5619 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5620 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5621 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5622 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5623 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5625 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5627 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5628 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5630 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5631 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5632 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5634 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5635 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5637 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5638 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5639 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5640 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5641 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5642 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5643 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5644 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5645 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5646 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5647 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5648 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5649 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5650 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5651 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5652 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5653 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5654 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5655 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5656 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5657 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5658 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5659 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5660 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5661 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5663 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5664 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5665 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5666 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5667 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5668 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5669 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5670 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5671 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5672 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5673 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5677 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5678 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5679 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5680 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5684 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5685 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5686 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5687 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5691 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5693 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5695 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5696 selinux_enabled = 0;
5700 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5701 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5705 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5707 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5708 if (cred_alloc_security(current->cred))
5709 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5710 tsec = current->cred->security;
5711 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5713 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5714 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5715 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5718 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5720 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5721 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5722 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5724 if (selinux_enforcing)
5725 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5727 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5732 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5734 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5736 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5737 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5738 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5739 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5741 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5742 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5743 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5744 struct superblock_security_struct,
5746 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5748 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5749 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5750 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5752 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5754 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5755 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5756 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5759 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5760 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5763 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5764 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5765 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5767 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5769 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5771 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5772 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5774 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5775 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5778 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5779 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5781 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5782 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5785 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5786 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5788 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5789 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5793 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5795 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5797 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5798 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5800 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5801 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5804 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5805 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5807 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5808 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5814 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5818 if (!selinux_enabled)
5821 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5823 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5825 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5827 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5828 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5830 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5837 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5839 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5840 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5842 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5844 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5845 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5846 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5851 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5853 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5854 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5857 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5859 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5860 static int selinux_disabled;
5862 int selinux_disable(void)
5864 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5866 if (ss_initialized) {
5867 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5871 if (selinux_disabled) {
5872 /* Only do this once. */
5876 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5878 selinux_disabled = 1;
5879 selinux_enabled = 0;
5881 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5882 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5884 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5885 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5887 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */