2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
88 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
89 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
91 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
93 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
94 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
95 extern int selinux_compat_net;
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
134 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
141 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
158 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
160 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
162 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
164 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
168 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
169 task->security = tsec;
174 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
176 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
177 task->security = NULL;
181 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
183 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
184 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
186 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
190 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
191 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
193 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
194 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
195 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
196 inode->i_security = isec;
201 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
203 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
204 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
206 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
207 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
208 list_del_init(&isec->list);
209 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
211 inode->i_security = NULL;
212 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
215 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
217 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
218 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
220 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
224 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
225 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
226 file->f_security = fsec;
231 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
233 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
234 file->f_security = NULL;
238 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
240 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
242 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
246 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
249 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
251 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
253 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
254 sb->s_security = sbsec;
259 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
261 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
263 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
264 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
265 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
266 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
268 sb->s_security = NULL;
272 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
274 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
276 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
280 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sk->sk_security = ssec;
284 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
289 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
291 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
293 sk->sk_security = NULL;
294 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
298 /* The security server must be initialized before
299 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
300 extern int ss_initialized;
302 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
304 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
306 "uses transition SIDs",
308 "uses genfs_contexts",
309 "not configured for labeling",
310 "uses mountpoint labeling",
313 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
315 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
317 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
328 static match_table_t tokens = {
329 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
331 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
332 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
336 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
338 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
340 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
344 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
345 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
349 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
350 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
354 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
355 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
356 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
359 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
360 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
364 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
365 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
369 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
372 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
373 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
376 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
377 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
378 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
379 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
380 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
381 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
382 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
383 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
384 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
388 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
389 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
390 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
391 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
392 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
393 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
395 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
396 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
397 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
402 sbsec->initialized = 1;
404 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
405 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
406 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
408 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
409 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
410 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
412 /* Initialize the root inode. */
413 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
415 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
416 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
417 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
419 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
421 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
422 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
423 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
424 struct inode_security_struct, list);
425 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
426 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
427 inode = igrab(inode);
429 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
433 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
434 list_del_init(&isec->list);
437 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
443 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
444 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
445 * mount options, or whatever.
447 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
448 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
451 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
452 char *context = NULL;
456 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
458 if (!sbsec->initialized)
465 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
466 * settings this is going to need a mask
469 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
470 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
472 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
476 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
477 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
482 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
483 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
489 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
490 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
493 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
494 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
496 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
497 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
500 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
501 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
503 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
504 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
507 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
508 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
510 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
511 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
512 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
514 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
517 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
518 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
521 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
526 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
530 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
531 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
533 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
534 if (sbsec->initialized)
535 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
536 (old_sid != new_sid))
539 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
540 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
542 if (!sbsec->initialized)
543 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
549 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
550 * labeling information.
552 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
553 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
556 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
557 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
558 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
559 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
560 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
561 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
562 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
563 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
564 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
565 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
567 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
569 if (!ss_initialized) {
571 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
572 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
573 server is ready to handle calls. */
574 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
575 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
576 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
577 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
581 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
582 "before the security server is initialized\n");
587 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
588 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
589 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
590 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
592 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
593 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
594 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
595 * will be used for both mounts)
597 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
602 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
603 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
604 * than once with different security options.
606 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
608 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
609 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
611 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
620 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
622 goto out_double_mount;
624 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
629 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
631 goto out_double_mount;
633 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
636 rootcontext_sid = sid;
638 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
640 goto out_double_mount;
642 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
646 defcontext_sid = sid;
648 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
650 goto out_double_mount;
652 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (sbsec->initialized) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
664 goto out_double_mount;
669 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
675 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
683 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
687 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
691 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
692 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
693 * the superblock context if not already set.
696 if (!fscontext_sid) {
697 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
700 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
702 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
706 if (!rootcontext_sid)
707 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
709 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
713 if (rootcontext_sid) {
714 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
718 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
719 root_isec->initialized = 1;
722 if (defcontext_sid) {
723 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
725 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
726 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
730 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
731 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
737 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
740 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
742 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
746 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
747 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
751 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
752 struct super_block *newsb)
754 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
755 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
757 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
758 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
759 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
762 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
763 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
766 if (!ss_initialized) {
767 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
768 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
769 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
770 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
774 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
775 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
777 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
778 if (newsbsec->initialized)
781 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
783 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
785 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
786 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
787 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
790 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
794 if (!set_rootcontext) {
795 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
796 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
799 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
801 if (set_rootcontext) {
802 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
803 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
804 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
805 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
807 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
810 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
811 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
814 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
815 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
818 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
819 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
820 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
822 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
824 /* Standard string-based options. */
825 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
827 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
832 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
836 if (context || defcontext) {
838 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
841 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
851 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
854 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
861 case Opt_rootcontext:
864 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
867 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
875 if (context || defcontext) {
877 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
880 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
889 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
896 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
900 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
901 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
902 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
907 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
908 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
911 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
912 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
915 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
916 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
919 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
920 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
923 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
934 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
936 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
939 char *options = data;
940 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
942 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
947 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
949 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
954 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
957 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
961 void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
966 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
967 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
969 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
971 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
974 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
976 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
977 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
980 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
985 /* we need a comma before each option */
990 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
996 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
998 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1001 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1003 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1009 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1011 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1016 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1018 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1020 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1022 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1024 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1026 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1028 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1030 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1032 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1036 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1039 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1041 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1044 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1046 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1049 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1055 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1056 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1058 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1065 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1066 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1068 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1070 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1071 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1073 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1075 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1077 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1083 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1084 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1085 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1086 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1087 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1089 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1092 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1096 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1098 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1106 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1108 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1110 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1113 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1116 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1117 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1122 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1124 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1129 end = buffer+buflen;
1134 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1135 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1139 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1144 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1145 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1149 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1157 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1158 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1160 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1161 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1163 struct dentry *dentry;
1164 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1165 char *context = NULL;
1169 if (isec->initialized)
1172 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1173 if (isec->initialized)
1176 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1177 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1178 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1179 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1180 server is ready to handle calls. */
1181 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1182 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1183 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1184 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1188 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1189 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1190 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1191 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1195 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1196 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1198 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1199 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1201 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1202 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1205 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1206 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1211 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1212 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1218 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1220 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1221 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1222 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1230 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1236 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1242 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1243 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1244 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1245 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1249 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1250 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1253 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1257 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1258 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1259 __func__, context, -rc,
1260 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1262 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1270 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1271 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1273 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1274 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1275 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1277 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1278 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1279 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1287 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1288 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1291 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1292 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1295 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1297 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1298 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1309 isec->initialized = 1;
1312 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1314 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1315 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1319 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1320 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1326 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1327 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1330 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1331 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1334 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1335 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1338 /* All other signals. */
1339 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1346 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1347 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1348 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1349 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1352 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1354 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1355 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1356 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1357 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1360 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1361 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1364 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1365 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1368 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1369 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1371 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1373 tsec = tsk->security;
1375 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1379 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1381 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1384 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1388 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1391 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1394 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1395 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1398 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1400 tsec = tsk->security;
1402 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1403 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1406 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1407 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1408 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1409 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1410 struct inode *inode,
1412 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1414 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1415 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1416 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1418 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1421 tsec = tsk->security;
1422 isec = inode->i_security;
1426 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1427 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1430 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1433 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1434 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1435 pathname if needed. */
1436 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1437 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1438 struct dentry *dentry,
1441 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1442 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1443 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1444 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1445 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1446 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1449 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1450 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1451 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1452 check a particular permission to the file.
1453 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1454 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1455 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1456 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1457 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1461 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1462 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1463 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1464 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1467 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1468 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1470 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1471 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1479 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1481 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1486 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1487 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1488 struct dentry *dentry,
1491 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1492 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1493 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1495 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1498 tsec = current->security;
1499 dsec = dir->i_security;
1500 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1502 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1503 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1505 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1506 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1511 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1512 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1514 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1520 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1524 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1525 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1526 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1529 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1530 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1531 struct task_struct *ctx)
1533 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1535 tsec = ctx->security;
1537 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1541 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1544 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1545 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1546 struct dentry *dentry,
1550 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1551 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1552 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1556 tsec = current->security;
1557 dsec = dir->i_security;
1558 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1560 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1561 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1564 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1565 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1580 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1585 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1589 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1590 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1591 struct inode *new_dir,
1592 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1594 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1595 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1596 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1598 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1601 tsec = current->security;
1602 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1603 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1604 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1605 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1607 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1609 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1610 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1611 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1614 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1615 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1618 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1619 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1620 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1625 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1626 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1627 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1628 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1629 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1632 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1633 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1634 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1635 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1637 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1645 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1646 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1647 struct super_block *sb,
1649 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1651 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1652 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1654 tsec = tsk->security;
1655 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1656 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1660 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1661 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1665 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1666 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1667 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1668 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1671 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1673 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1677 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1679 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1681 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1689 * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1692 static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1694 u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
1696 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1698 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1702 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1703 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1704 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1705 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1706 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1707 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1708 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1711 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1712 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
1717 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1718 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1722 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1724 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1725 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1732 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1740 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1742 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1747 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1751 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1752 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1753 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1754 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
1755 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1758 return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1761 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1765 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1769 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1772 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1773 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1777 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1781 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1784 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1785 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1789 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1793 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1796 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1797 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1799 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1802 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1806 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1810 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1813 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1816 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1819 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1824 end = buffer+buflen;
1830 const char *name = table->procname;
1831 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1832 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1836 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1839 table = table->parent;
1845 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1847 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1849 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1854 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1858 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1862 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1866 tsec = current->security;
1868 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1869 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1871 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1872 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1875 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1876 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1878 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1879 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1887 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1888 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1894 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1907 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1913 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1917 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1923 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1925 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1928 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1932 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1937 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1938 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1939 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1941 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1942 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1943 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1944 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1946 case 0: /* Close log */
1947 case 1: /* Open log */
1948 case 2: /* Read from log */
1949 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1950 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1952 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1959 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1960 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1961 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1963 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1964 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1965 * the capability is granted.
1967 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1968 * processes that allocate mappings.
1970 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1972 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1973 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1975 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1977 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1978 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1979 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1986 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1989 /* binprm security operations */
1991 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1993 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1995 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1999 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2002 bprm->security = bsec;
2006 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2008 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2009 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2010 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2011 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2013 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2016 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
2020 bsec = bprm->security;
2025 tsec = current->security;
2026 isec = inode->i_security;
2028 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2029 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
2031 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2032 tsec->create_sid = 0;
2033 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2034 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2036 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
2037 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
2038 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2041 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2042 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2043 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
2048 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2049 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2051 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2054 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2055 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2056 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2060 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2061 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2062 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2066 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2067 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2071 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2072 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2074 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2082 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2084 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2088 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2090 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2093 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2094 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2095 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2096 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2097 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2099 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2102 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2105 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2107 kfree(bprm->security);
2108 bprm->security = NULL;
2111 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2112 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2114 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2115 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2117 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2118 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2119 struct tty_struct *tty;
2120 struct fdtable *fdt;
2124 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
2125 tty = get_current_tty();
2128 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
2130 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2131 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2132 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2133 file may belong to another process and we are only
2134 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2135 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2136 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2137 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2143 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
2144 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2148 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2150 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2152 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2154 unsigned long set, i;
2159 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2160 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2162 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2165 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2166 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2171 if (file_has_perm(current,
2173 file_to_av(file))) {
2175 fd = get_unused_fd();
2185 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2186 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2193 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2198 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2201 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2204 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2206 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2207 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2211 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2213 tsec = current->security;
2215 bsec = bprm->security;
2218 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2220 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2221 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2222 unchanged and kill. */
2223 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2224 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2225 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2232 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2233 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2234 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2235 struct task_struct *tracer;
2236 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2240 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2241 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2242 sec = tracer->security;
2248 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2249 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2261 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2263 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2265 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2266 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2267 struct itimerval itimer;
2268 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2271 tsec = current->security;
2272 bsec = bprm->security;
2275 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2278 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2281 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2282 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2284 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2285 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2286 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2287 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2288 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2289 will be checked against the new SID. */
2290 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2291 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2293 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2294 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2295 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2296 flush_signals(current);
2297 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2298 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2299 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2300 recalc_sigpending();
2301 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2304 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2305 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2307 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2308 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2309 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2310 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2311 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2312 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2313 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2314 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2315 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2317 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2318 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2320 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2321 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2322 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2323 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2325 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2327 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2330 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2334 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2335 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2336 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2339 /* superblock security operations */
2341 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2343 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2346 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2348 superblock_free_security(sb);
2351 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2356 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2359 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2361 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2362 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2363 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2364 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2367 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2374 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2378 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2381 int current_size = 0;
2389 while (current_size < len) {
2399 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2401 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2402 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2403 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2409 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2417 in_save = in_end = orig;
2421 open_quote = !open_quote;
2422 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2424 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2426 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2427 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2429 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2431 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2433 } while (*in_end++);
2435 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2436 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2441 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2443 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2446 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2450 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2451 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2452 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2455 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2457 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2459 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2460 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2461 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2464 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2467 unsigned long flags,
2472 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2476 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2477 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2478 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2480 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2484 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2488 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2492 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2493 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2496 /* inode security operations */
2498 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2500 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2503 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2505 inode_free_security(inode);
2508 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2509 char **name, void **value,
2512 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2513 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2514 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2517 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2519 tsec = current->security;
2520 dsec = dir->i_security;
2521 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2523 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2524 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2526 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2527 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2530 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2531 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2534 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2539 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2540 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2541 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2542 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2544 isec->initialized = 1;
2547 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2551 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2558 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2570 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2572 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2575 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2579 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2582 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2585 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2589 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2592 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2595 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2597 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2600 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2602 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2605 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2607 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2610 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2614 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2618 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2621 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2622 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2624 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2627 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2629 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2632 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2636 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2639 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2642 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2646 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2651 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2655 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2656 open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2659 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2663 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2667 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2670 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2671 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2672 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2674 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2677 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2679 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2682 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2684 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2685 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2686 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2687 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2689 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2690 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2691 Restrict to administrator. */
2696 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2697 ordinary setattr permission. */
2698 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2701 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2702 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2704 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2705 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2706 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2707 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2708 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2712 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2713 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2715 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2716 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2719 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2722 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2723 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2725 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2726 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2730 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2731 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2732 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2734 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2739 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2740 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2744 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2749 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2751 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2752 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2756 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2757 const void *value, size_t size,
2760 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2761 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2765 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2766 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2770 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2772 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2773 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2774 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2782 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2784 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2787 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2789 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2792 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2794 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2795 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2797 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2798 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2803 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2805 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2807 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2811 char *context = NULL;
2812 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2813 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2815 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2819 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2820 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2821 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2822 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2823 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2824 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2825 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2827 error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
2829 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2830 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
2831 CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
2835 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2838 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2851 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2852 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2854 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2858 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2861 if (!value || !size)
2864 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2872 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2874 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2875 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2876 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2880 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2882 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2885 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2887 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2890 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2892 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2896 /* file security operations */
2898 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2901 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2904 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2908 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2909 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2912 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2913 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2917 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2920 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2922 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2923 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2924 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2925 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2928 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2932 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2933 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2934 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2936 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2939 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2941 return file_alloc_security(file);
2944 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2946 file_free_security(file);
2949 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2954 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2956 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2961 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2964 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2966 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2967 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2969 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2970 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2971 * This has an additional check.
2973 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2980 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2981 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2983 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2984 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2987 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2988 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2990 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2995 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2996 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2997 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3000 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
3002 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3003 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3004 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3005 if (rc || addr_only)
3008 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3011 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3012 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3015 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3016 unsigned long reqprot,
3021 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3025 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3028 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3029 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3031 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3032 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3033 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
3035 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3036 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3037 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3038 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3039 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3041 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3042 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3043 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3044 * modified content. This typically should only
3045 * occur for text relocations.
3047 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3055 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3058 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3060 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3063 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3070 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3075 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3076 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3085 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3086 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3091 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3096 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3100 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3107 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3109 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3110 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3112 tsec = current->security;
3113 fsec = file->f_security;
3114 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3119 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3120 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3124 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3125 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3127 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3128 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3130 tsec = tsk->security;
3131 fsec = file->f_security;
3134 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3136 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3138 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3139 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3142 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3144 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3147 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3149 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3150 struct inode *inode;
3151 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3152 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3153 fsec = file->f_security;
3154 isec = inode->i_security;
3156 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3157 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3158 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3159 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3160 * struct as its SID.
3162 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3163 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3165 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3166 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3167 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3168 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3169 * new inode label or new policy.
3170 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3172 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
3175 /* task security operations */
3177 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3181 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3185 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3188 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3190 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3193 tsec1 = current->security;
3195 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3198 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3200 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3201 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3203 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3204 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3205 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3206 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3207 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3212 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3214 task_free_security(tsk);
3217 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3219 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3220 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3221 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3222 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3223 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3228 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3230 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3233 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3235 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3239 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3241 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3244 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3246 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3249 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3251 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3254 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3256 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3260 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3262 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3266 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3270 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3274 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3277 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3281 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3285 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3288 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3290 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3293 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3295 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3298 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3302 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3303 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3304 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3305 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3306 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3307 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3312 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3316 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3320 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3323 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3325 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3328 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3330 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3333 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3338 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3340 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3345 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3347 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3350 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3352 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3356 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3363 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3364 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3365 the state of the current process. */
3366 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3369 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3371 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3374 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3376 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3378 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3381 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3382 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3386 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3387 struct inode *inode)
3389 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3390 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3392 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3393 isec->initialized = 1;
3397 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3398 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3399 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3401 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3402 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3404 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3405 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3409 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3410 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3413 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3414 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3418 *proto = ih->protocol;
3420 switch (ih->protocol) {
3422 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3424 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3428 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3432 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3433 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3438 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3440 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3444 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3448 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3449 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3453 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3454 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3456 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3460 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3464 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3465 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3476 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3478 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3479 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3480 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3483 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3484 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3486 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3487 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3491 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3492 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3495 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3496 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3497 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3506 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3508 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3512 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3513 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3518 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3520 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3524 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3525 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3529 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3530 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3532 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3536 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3537 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3541 /* includes fragments */
3551 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3552 char **addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3556 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3558 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3561 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3562 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3565 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3567 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3570 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3571 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3580 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3581 " unable to parse packet\n");
3587 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3589 * @family: protocol family
3590 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3593 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3594 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3595 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3596 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3597 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3601 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3608 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3609 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3611 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3612 if (unlikely(err)) {
3614 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3615 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3622 /* socket security operations */
3623 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3626 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3627 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3628 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3631 tsec = task->security;
3632 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3634 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3637 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3638 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3639 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3645 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3646 int protocol, int kern)
3649 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3655 tsec = current->security;
3656 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3657 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3658 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3659 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3665 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3666 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3669 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3670 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3671 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3674 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3676 tsec = current->security;
3677 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3678 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3679 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3680 isec->initialized = 1;
3683 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3684 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3685 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3686 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3692 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3693 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3694 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3696 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3701 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3706 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3707 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3708 * check the first address now.
3710 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3711 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3713 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3714 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3715 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3716 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3717 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3718 unsigned short snum;
3719 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3722 tsec = current->security;
3723 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3725 if (family == PF_INET) {
3726 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3727 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3728 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3730 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3731 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3732 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3738 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3740 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3741 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3745 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3746 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3747 ad.u.net.family = family;
3748 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3750 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3756 switch (isec->sclass) {
3757 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3758 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3761 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3762 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3765 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3766 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3770 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3774 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3778 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3779 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3780 ad.u.net.family = family;
3782 if (family == PF_INET)
3783 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3785 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3787 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3788 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3796 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3798 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3799 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3802 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3807 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3809 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3810 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3811 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3812 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3813 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3814 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3815 unsigned short snum;
3818 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3819 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3820 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3822 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3824 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3825 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3827 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3830 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3834 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3835 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3837 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3838 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3839 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3840 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3845 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3851 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3853 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3856 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3859 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3860 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3862 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3866 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3868 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3869 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3870 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3871 newisec->initialized = 1;
3876 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3881 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3885 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3888 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3889 int size, int flags)
3891 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3894 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3896 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3899 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3901 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3904 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3908 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3912 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3915 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3918 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3921 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3923 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3926 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3927 struct socket *other,
3930 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3931 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3932 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3933 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3936 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3940 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3941 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3943 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3944 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3946 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3948 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3952 /* connecting socket */
3953 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3954 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3956 /* server child socket */
3957 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3958 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3959 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3964 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3965 struct socket *other)
3967 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3968 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3969 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3972 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3973 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3975 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3976 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3978 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3979 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3986 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3988 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3994 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
3997 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
3998 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4002 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4005 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4006 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4009 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4010 struct sk_buff *skb,
4011 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4016 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4018 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4019 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4021 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4022 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4025 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4026 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4027 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4028 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4030 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4031 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4032 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4033 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4035 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4036 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4037 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4038 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4041 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4042 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4047 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4050 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4054 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4057 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4063 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4064 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4065 if (unlikely(err)) {
4067 "SELinux: failure in"
4068 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4069 " network port label not found\n");
4072 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4075 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4079 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4081 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4082 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4085 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4086 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4087 ad.u.net.family = family;
4088 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4092 if (selinux_compat_net)
4093 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4096 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4101 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4102 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4105 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4106 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4108 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4110 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4113 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4119 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4122 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4123 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4124 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4125 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4130 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4133 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4134 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4137 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4138 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4139 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4140 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4141 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4142 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4144 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4145 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4146 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4149 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4150 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4151 ad.u.net.family = family;
4152 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4156 if (peerlbl_active) {
4159 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4162 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4165 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4168 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4171 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4174 if (secmark_active) {
4175 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4184 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4185 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4190 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4191 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4192 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4194 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4196 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4197 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4198 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4199 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4201 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4206 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4211 if (scontext_len > len) {
4216 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4220 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4228 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4230 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4233 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4235 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4238 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4242 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4243 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4245 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4248 *secid = peer_secid;
4249 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4254 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4256 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4259 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4261 sk_free_security(sk);
4264 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4266 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4267 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4269 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4270 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4271 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4273 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4276 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4279 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4281 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4283 *secid = sksec->sid;
4287 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4289 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4290 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4292 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4293 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4294 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4295 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4298 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4299 struct request_sock *req)
4301 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4303 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4307 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4308 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4311 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4314 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4315 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4316 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4320 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4324 req->secid = newsid;
4325 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4329 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4330 const struct request_sock *req)
4332 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4334 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4335 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4336 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4337 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4338 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4339 time it will have been created and available. */
4341 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4342 * thread with access to newsksec */
4343 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4346 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4348 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4349 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4351 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4352 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4355 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4357 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4360 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4363 fl->secid = req->secid;
4366 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4370 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4371 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4372 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4374 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4378 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4380 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4382 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4383 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4384 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4385 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4386 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4387 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4397 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4402 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4404 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4410 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4415 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4418 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4419 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4420 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4421 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4424 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4427 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4428 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4429 ad.u.net.family = family;
4430 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4433 if (peerlbl_active) {
4434 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4437 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4443 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4444 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4448 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4449 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4450 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4452 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4458 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4459 struct sk_buff *skb,
4460 const struct net_device *in,
4461 const struct net_device *out,
4462 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4464 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4467 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4468 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4469 struct sk_buff *skb,
4470 const struct net_device *in,
4471 const struct net_device *out,
4472 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4474 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4478 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4483 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4486 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4487 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4488 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4490 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4493 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4494 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4500 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4501 struct sk_buff *skb,
4502 const struct net_device *in,
4503 const struct net_device *out,
4504 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4506 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4509 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4511 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4512 u16 family, char *addrp)
4515 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4517 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4518 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4520 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4521 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4524 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4525 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4526 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4527 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4529 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4530 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4531 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4532 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4534 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4535 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4536 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4537 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4540 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4541 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4546 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4549 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4552 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4555 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4562 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4563 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4564 if (unlikely(err)) {
4566 "SELinux: failure in"
4567 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4568 " network port label not found\n");
4571 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4574 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4578 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4579 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4580 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4586 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4588 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4589 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4590 ad.u.net.family = family;
4591 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4594 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4595 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4596 &ad, family, addrp))
4599 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4600 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4604 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4605 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4611 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4617 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4622 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4623 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4624 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4625 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4626 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4627 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4629 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4630 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4631 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4632 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4633 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4634 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4635 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4638 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4639 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4640 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4643 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4644 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4645 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4646 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4651 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4652 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4654 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4657 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4658 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4660 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4665 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4666 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4669 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4671 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4672 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4673 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4676 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4677 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4678 ad.u.net.family = family;
4679 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4683 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4684 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4687 if (peerlbl_active) {
4691 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4693 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4694 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4697 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4699 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4700 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4707 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4708 struct sk_buff *skb,
4709 const struct net_device *in,
4710 const struct net_device *out,
4711 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4713 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4716 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4717 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4718 struct sk_buff *skb,
4719 const struct net_device *in,
4720 const struct net_device *out,
4721 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4723 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4727 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4729 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4733 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4737 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4738 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4743 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4746 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4748 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4752 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4753 ad.u.cap = capability;
4755 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4756 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4759 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4760 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4763 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4764 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4766 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4770 isec->sclass = sclass;
4771 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4772 perm->security = isec;
4777 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4779 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4780 perm->security = NULL;
4784 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4786 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4788 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4792 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4793 msg->security = msec;
4798 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4800 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4802 msg->security = NULL;
4806 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4809 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4810 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4811 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4813 tsec = current->security;
4814 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4816 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4817 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4819 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4822 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4824 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4827 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4829 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4832 /* message queue security operations */
4833 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4835 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4836 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4837 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4840 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4844 tsec = current->security;
4845 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4847 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4848 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4850 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4853 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4859 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4861 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4864 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4866 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4867 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4868 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4870 tsec = current->security;
4871 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4873 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4874 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4876 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4877 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4880 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4888 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4889 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4892 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4895 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4898 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4904 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4908 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4910 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4911 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4912 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4913 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4916 tsec = current->security;
4917 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4918 msec = msg->security;
4921 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4923 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4925 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4926 * message queue this message will be stored in
4928 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4936 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4937 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4939 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4940 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4943 /* Can this process send the message */
4944 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4945 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4947 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4948 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4949 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4954 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4955 struct task_struct *target,
4956 long type, int mode)
4958 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4959 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4960 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4961 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4964 tsec = target->security;
4965 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4966 msec = msg->security;
4968 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4969 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4971 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4972 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4974 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4975 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4979 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4980 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4982 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4983 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4984 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4987 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4991 tsec = current->security;
4992 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4994 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4995 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4997 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5000 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5006 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5008 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5011 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5013 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5014 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5015 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5017 tsec = current->security;
5018 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5020 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5021 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5023 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5024 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5027 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5028 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5036 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5037 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5040 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5043 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5050 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5056 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5060 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5061 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5066 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5070 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5073 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5075 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5078 /* Semaphore security operations */
5079 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5081 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5082 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5083 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5086 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5090 tsec = current->security;
5091 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5093 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5094 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5096 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5099 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5105 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5107 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5110 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5112 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5113 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5114 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5116 tsec = current->security;
5117 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5119 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5120 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5122 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5123 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5126 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5127 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5135 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5136 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5140 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5151 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5154 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5158 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5164 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5168 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5169 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5174 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5178 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5181 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5187 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5189 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5194 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5197 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5199 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5203 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5206 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5209 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5210 char *name, char **value)
5212 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5218 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5225 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5227 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5229 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5230 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5231 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5232 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5233 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5234 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5235 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5236 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5243 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5249 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5250 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5252 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5253 struct task_struct *tracer;
5259 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5260 security attributes. */
5265 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5266 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5267 * above restriction is ever removed.
5269 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5270 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5271 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5272 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5273 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5274 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5275 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5276 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5277 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5278 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5284 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5285 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5286 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5290 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5291 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5292 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5294 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5301 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5302 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5303 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5304 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5305 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5306 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5308 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5309 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5310 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5311 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5312 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5313 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5316 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5317 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5318 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5319 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5320 struct av_decision avd;
5325 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5326 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5327 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5328 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5329 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5330 do_each_thread(g, t) {
5331 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5332 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5335 } while_each_thread(g, t);
5336 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5339 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5340 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5341 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5345 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5346 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5349 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5350 if (tracer != NULL) {
5351 struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5352 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5354 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5356 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5360 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5361 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5375 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5377 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5380 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5382 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5385 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5392 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5393 unsigned long flags)
5395 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5396 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5398 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5402 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5403 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5405 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5411 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5413 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5419 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5420 struct task_struct *ctx,
5424 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5425 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5427 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5429 tsec = ctx->security;
5430 ksec = key->security;
5432 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5433 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5434 appear to be created. */
5438 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5439 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5442 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5444 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5445 char *context = NULL;
5449 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5458 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5461 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5462 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5463 .capget = selinux_capget,
5464 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5465 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5466 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5467 .capable = selinux_capable,
5468 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5469 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5470 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5471 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5473 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5474 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5476 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5477 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5478 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5479 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5480 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5481 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5482 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5484 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5485 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5486 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5487 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5488 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5489 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5490 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5491 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5492 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5493 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5494 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5497 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5498 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5499 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5500 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5501 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5502 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5503 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5504 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5505 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5506 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5507 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5508 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5509 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5510 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5511 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5512 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5513 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5514 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5515 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5516 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5517 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5518 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5519 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5520 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5521 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5522 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5523 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5525 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5526 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5527 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5528 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5529 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5530 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5531 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5532 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5533 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5534 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5535 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5537 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5539 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5540 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5541 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5542 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5543 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5544 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5545 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5546 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5547 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5548 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5549 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5550 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5551 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5552 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5553 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5554 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5555 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5556 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5557 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5558 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5559 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5560 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5561 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5563 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5564 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5566 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5567 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5569 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5570 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5571 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5572 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5573 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5574 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5576 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5577 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5578 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5579 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5580 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5582 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5583 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5584 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5585 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5586 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5588 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5590 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5591 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5593 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5594 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5595 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5597 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5598 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5600 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5601 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5602 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5603 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5604 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5605 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5606 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5607 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5608 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5609 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5610 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5611 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5612 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5613 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5614 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5615 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5616 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5617 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5618 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5619 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5620 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5621 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5622 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5623 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5624 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5626 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5627 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5628 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5629 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5630 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5631 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5632 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5633 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5634 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5635 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5636 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5640 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5641 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5642 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5643 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5647 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5648 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5649 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5650 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5654 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5656 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5658 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5659 selinux_enabled = 0;
5663 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5664 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5668 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5670 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5671 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5672 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5673 tsec = current->security;
5674 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5676 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5677 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5678 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5681 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5683 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5684 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5685 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5687 if (selinux_enforcing)
5688 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5690 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5695 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5697 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5699 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5700 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5701 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5702 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5704 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5705 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5706 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5707 struct superblock_security_struct,
5709 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5711 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5712 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5713 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5715 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5717 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5718 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5719 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5722 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5723 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5726 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5727 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5728 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5730 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5732 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5734 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5735 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5737 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5738 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5741 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5742 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5744 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5745 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5748 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5749 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5751 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5752 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5756 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5758 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5760 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5761 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5763 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5764 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5767 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5768 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5770 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5771 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5777 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5781 if (!selinux_enabled)
5784 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5786 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5788 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5790 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5791 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5793 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5800 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5802 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5803 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5805 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5807 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5808 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5809 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5814 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5816 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5817 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5820 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5822 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5823 static int selinux_disabled;
5825 int selinux_disable(void)
5827 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5829 if (ss_initialized) {
5830 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5834 if (selinux_disabled) {
5835 /* Only do this once. */
5839 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5841 selinux_disabled = 1;
5842 selinux_enabled = 0;
5844 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5845 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5847 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5848 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5850 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */