2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
160 * initialise the security for the init task
162 static void cred_init_security(void)
164 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
167 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
171 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
172 cred->security = tsec;
176 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
180 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
182 tsec = cred->security;
187 * get the security ID of a task
189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
194 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
200 * get the security ID of the current task
202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
204 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
213 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
214 u32 sid = current_sid();
216 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
220 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
221 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
223 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
224 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
225 isec->task_sid = sid;
226 inode->i_security = isec;
231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
233 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
234 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
236 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
237 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
238 list_del_init(&isec->list);
239 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
241 inode->i_security = NULL;
242 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
248 u32 sid = current_sid();
250 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
255 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
256 file->f_security = fsec;
261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
263 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
264 file->f_security = NULL;
268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
270 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
272 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
276 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
278 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
279 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
281 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
283 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
284 sb->s_security = sbsec;
289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
291 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
293 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
294 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
295 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
296 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
298 sb->s_security = NULL;
302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
304 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
306 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
310 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sk->sk_security = ssec;
314 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
321 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
323 sk->sk_security = NULL;
324 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
328 /* The security server must be initialized before
329 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
330 extern int ss_initialized;
332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
336 "uses transition SIDs",
338 "uses genfs_contexts",
339 "not configured for labeling",
340 "uses mountpoint labeling",
343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
347 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
358 static const match_table_t tokens = {
359 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
366 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
368 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
369 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
370 const struct cred *cred)
372 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
375 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
376 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
380 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
381 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
385 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
386 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
387 const struct cred *cred)
389 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
391 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
392 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
396 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
397 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
401 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
403 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
404 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
405 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
408 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
409 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
410 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
411 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
412 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
413 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
414 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
415 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
416 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
420 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
421 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
422 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
423 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
424 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
425 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
427 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
428 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
429 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
434 sbsec->initialized = 1;
436 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
437 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
438 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
440 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
441 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
442 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
444 /* Initialize the root inode. */
445 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
447 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
448 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
449 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
451 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
453 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
454 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
455 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
456 struct inode_security_struct, list);
457 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
458 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
459 inode = igrab(inode);
461 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
465 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
466 list_del_init(&isec->list);
469 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
475 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
476 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
477 * mount options, or whatever.
479 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
480 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
483 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
484 char *context = NULL;
488 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
490 if (!sbsec->initialized)
497 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
498 * settings this is going to need a mask
501 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
502 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
504 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
508 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
509 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
514 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
515 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
521 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
522 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
525 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
526 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
528 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
529 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
532 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
533 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
535 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
536 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
539 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
540 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
542 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
543 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
544 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
546 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
549 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
550 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
553 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
558 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
562 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
563 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
565 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
566 if (sbsec->initialized)
567 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
568 (old_sid != new_sid))
571 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
572 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
574 if (!sbsec->initialized)
575 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
581 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
582 * labeling information.
584 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
585 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
587 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
589 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
590 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
591 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
592 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
593 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
594 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
595 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
596 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
597 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
599 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
601 if (!ss_initialized) {
603 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
604 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
605 server is ready to handle calls. */
606 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
607 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
608 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
609 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
613 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
614 "before the security server is initialized\n");
619 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
620 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
621 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
622 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
624 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
625 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
626 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
627 * will be used for both mounts)
629 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
634 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
635 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
636 * than once with different security options.
638 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
640 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
641 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
643 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
644 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
645 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
652 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
654 goto out_double_mount;
656 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
663 goto out_double_mount;
665 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
667 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
668 rootcontext_sid = sid;
670 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
672 goto out_double_mount;
674 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
678 defcontext_sid = sid;
680 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
682 goto out_double_mount;
684 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
693 if (sbsec->initialized) {
694 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
695 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
696 goto out_double_mount;
701 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
704 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
705 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
707 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
708 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
712 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
714 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
718 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
722 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
723 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
724 * the superblock context if not already set.
727 if (!fscontext_sid) {
728 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
732 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
734 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
739 if (!rootcontext_sid)
740 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
742 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
743 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
746 if (rootcontext_sid) {
747 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
752 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
753 root_isec->initialized = 1;
756 if (defcontext_sid) {
757 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
759 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
760 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
764 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
765 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
771 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
774 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
776 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
780 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
781 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
785 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
786 struct super_block *newsb)
788 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
789 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
791 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
792 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
793 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
796 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
797 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
800 if (!ss_initialized) {
801 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
802 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
803 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
804 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
808 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
809 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
811 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
812 if (newsbsec->initialized)
815 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
817 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
819 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
820 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
821 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
824 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
828 if (!set_rootcontext) {
829 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
830 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
833 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
835 if (set_rootcontext) {
836 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
837 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
838 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
839 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
841 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
844 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
845 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
848 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
849 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
852 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
853 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
854 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
856 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
858 /* Standard string-based options. */
859 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
861 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
866 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
870 if (context || defcontext) {
872 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
875 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
885 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
888 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
895 case Opt_rootcontext:
898 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
901 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
909 if (context || defcontext) {
911 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
914 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
923 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
930 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
934 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
935 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
936 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
941 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
942 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
945 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
946 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
949 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
950 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
953 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
954 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
957 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
968 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
970 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
973 char *options = data;
974 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
976 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
981 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
983 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
988 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
991 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
995 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
996 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1001 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1002 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1004 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1006 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1009 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1011 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1012 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1014 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1015 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1020 /* we need a comma before each option */
1022 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1025 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1031 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1033 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1036 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1038 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1044 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1046 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1051 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1053 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1055 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1057 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1059 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1061 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1063 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1065 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1067 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1071 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1074 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1076 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1079 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1081 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1084 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1090 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1091 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1093 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1100 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1101 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1105 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1106 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1108 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1110 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1112 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1118 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1119 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1120 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1121 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1122 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1124 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1126 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1127 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1128 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1130 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1131 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1132 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1133 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1134 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1135 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1136 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1138 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1141 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1143 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1145 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1148 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1151 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1152 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1157 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1159 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1164 end = buffer+buflen;
1169 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1170 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1174 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1179 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1180 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1184 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1192 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1193 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1195 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1196 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1198 struct dentry *dentry;
1199 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1200 char *context = NULL;
1204 if (isec->initialized)
1207 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1208 if (isec->initialized)
1211 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1212 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1213 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1214 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1215 server is ready to handle calls. */
1216 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1217 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1218 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1219 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1223 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1224 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1225 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1226 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1230 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1231 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1233 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1234 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1236 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1237 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1240 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1241 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1246 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1247 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1253 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1255 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1256 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1257 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1265 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1271 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1277 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1278 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1279 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1280 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1284 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1285 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1288 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1292 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1293 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1294 __func__, context, -rc,
1295 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1297 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1305 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1306 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1308 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1309 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1310 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1312 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1313 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1314 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1322 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1323 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1326 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1327 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1329 if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1330 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1332 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1333 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1344 isec->initialized = 1;
1347 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1349 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1350 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1354 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1355 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1361 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1362 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1365 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1366 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1369 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1370 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1373 /* All other signals. */
1374 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1382 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1383 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1385 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1386 const struct cred *target,
1389 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1391 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1395 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1396 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1397 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1399 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1400 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1403 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1407 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1408 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1410 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1413 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1414 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1417 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1418 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1421 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1422 struct av_decision avd;
1424 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1425 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1428 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1432 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1434 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1437 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1441 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1445 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1446 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1447 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1451 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1452 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1455 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1457 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1458 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1461 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1462 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1463 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1464 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1465 struct inode *inode,
1467 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1469 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1470 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1473 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1476 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1477 isec = inode->i_security;
1481 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1482 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1485 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1488 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1489 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1490 pathname if needed. */
1491 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1492 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1493 struct dentry *dentry,
1496 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1497 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1499 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1500 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1501 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1502 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1505 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1506 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1507 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1508 check a particular permission to the file.
1509 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1510 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1511 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1512 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1513 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1517 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1518 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1519 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1520 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1523 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1524 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1526 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1527 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1535 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1538 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1544 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1545 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1546 struct dentry *dentry,
1549 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1550 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1551 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1552 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1554 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1557 dsec = dir->i_security;
1558 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1561 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1563 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1564 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1566 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1567 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1572 if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1573 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1578 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1582 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1583 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1584 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1587 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1588 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1589 struct task_struct *ctx)
1591 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1593 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1597 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1600 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1601 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1602 struct dentry *dentry,
1606 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1607 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1608 u32 sid = current_sid();
1612 dsec = dir->i_security;
1613 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1615 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1616 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1619 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1620 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1635 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1640 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1644 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1645 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1646 struct inode *new_dir,
1647 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1649 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1650 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1651 u32 sid = current_sid();
1653 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1656 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1657 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1658 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1659 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1661 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1663 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1664 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1665 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1668 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1669 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1672 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1673 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1674 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1679 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1680 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1681 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1682 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1683 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1686 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1687 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1688 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1689 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1691 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1699 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1700 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1701 struct super_block *sb,
1703 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1705 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1706 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1708 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1709 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1712 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1713 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1717 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1718 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1719 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1720 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1723 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1725 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1729 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1731 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1733 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1740 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1741 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1745 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1747 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1748 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1755 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1764 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1767 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1769 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1771 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1772 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1774 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1778 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1779 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1780 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1781 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1782 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1783 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1784 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1787 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1788 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1793 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1795 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1800 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1804 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1805 u32 sid = current_sid();
1806 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1807 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1810 return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1813 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1817 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1821 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1824 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1825 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1829 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1833 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1836 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1837 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1838 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1839 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1843 error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
1844 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1848 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1851 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
1855 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap, audit);
1859 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap, audit);
1862 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1865 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1868 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1873 end = buffer+buflen;
1879 const char *name = table->procname;
1880 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1881 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1885 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1888 table = table->parent;
1894 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1896 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1898 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1903 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1910 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1914 sid = current_sid();
1916 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1917 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1919 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1920 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1923 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1924 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1926 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1927 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1935 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1936 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1942 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1944 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1956 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1961 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1964 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1970 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1972 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1974 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1977 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1981 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1986 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1987 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1988 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1990 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1991 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1992 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1993 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1995 case 0: /* Close log */
1996 case 1: /* Open log */
1997 case 2: /* Read from log */
1998 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1999 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2001 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2008 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2009 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2010 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2012 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
2013 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
2014 * the capability is granted.
2016 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2017 * processes that allocate mappings.
2019 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2021 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2023 rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2027 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2030 /* binprm security operations */
2032 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2034 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2035 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2036 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2037 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2038 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2041 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2045 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2046 * the script interpreter */
2047 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2050 old_tsec = current_security();
2051 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2052 isec = inode->i_security;
2054 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2055 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2056 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2058 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2059 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2060 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2061 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2063 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2064 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2065 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2066 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2068 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2069 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2070 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2075 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2076 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2078 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2079 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2081 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2082 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2083 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2087 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2088 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2089 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2093 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2094 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2098 /* Check for shared state */
2099 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2100 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2101 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2107 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2108 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2110 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2111 struct task_struct *tracer;
2112 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2116 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2117 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2118 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2124 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2126 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2132 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2133 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2139 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2141 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2144 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2146 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2147 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2155 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2156 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2157 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2158 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2160 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2163 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2166 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2167 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2169 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2170 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2171 struct files_struct *files)
2173 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2174 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2175 struct tty_struct *tty;
2176 struct fdtable *fdt;
2180 tty = get_current_tty();
2183 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2184 struct inode *inode;
2186 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2187 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2188 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2189 file may belong to another process and we are only
2190 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2191 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2192 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2193 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2194 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2201 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2205 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2207 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2209 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2211 unsigned long set, i;
2216 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2217 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2219 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2222 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2223 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2228 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2230 file_to_av(file))) {
2232 fd = get_unused_fd();
2242 devnull = dentry_open(
2244 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2246 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2253 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2258 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2261 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2265 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2267 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2269 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2270 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2273 secondary_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
2275 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2276 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2279 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2280 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2282 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2283 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2285 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2286 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2287 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2289 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2290 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2291 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2292 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2293 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2295 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2296 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2298 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2299 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2300 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2301 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2303 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2308 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2311 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2313 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2314 struct itimerval itimer;
2315 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2318 unsigned long flags;
2320 secondary_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
2328 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2329 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2330 * flush and unblock signals.
2332 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2333 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2335 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2337 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2338 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2339 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2340 flush_signals(current);
2341 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2342 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2343 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2344 recalc_sigpending();
2345 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2348 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2349 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2350 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2351 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2352 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2353 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2354 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2355 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2358 /* superblock security operations */
2360 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2362 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2365 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2367 superblock_free_security(sb);
2370 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2375 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2378 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2380 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2381 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2382 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2383 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2386 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2393 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2397 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2400 int current_size = 0;
2408 while (current_size < len) {
2418 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2420 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2421 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2422 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2428 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2436 in_save = in_end = orig;
2440 open_quote = !open_quote;
2441 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2443 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2445 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2446 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2448 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2450 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2452 } while (*in_end++);
2454 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2455 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2460 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2462 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2463 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2466 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2470 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2471 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2472 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2475 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2477 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2478 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2480 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2481 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2482 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2485 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2488 unsigned long flags,
2491 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2494 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2498 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2499 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2500 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2502 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2506 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2508 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2511 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2515 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2516 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2519 /* inode security operations */
2521 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2523 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2526 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2528 inode_free_security(inode);
2531 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2532 char **name, void **value,
2535 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2536 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2537 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2538 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2539 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2541 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2543 dsec = dir->i_security;
2544 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2547 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2549 if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2550 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2551 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2554 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2555 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2558 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2563 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2564 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2565 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2566 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2568 isec->initialized = 1;
2571 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2575 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2582 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2594 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2596 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2599 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2603 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2606 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2609 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2613 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2616 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2619 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2621 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2624 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2626 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2629 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2631 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2634 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2638 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2642 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2645 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2646 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2648 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2651 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2653 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2655 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2658 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2660 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2663 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2666 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2669 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2671 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2674 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2679 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2683 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2684 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2687 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2689 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2692 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2696 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2699 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2700 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2701 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2703 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2706 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2708 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2710 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2713 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2715 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2717 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2718 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2719 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2720 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2722 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2723 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2724 Restrict to administrator. */
2729 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2730 ordinary setattr permission. */
2731 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2734 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2735 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2737 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2738 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2739 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2740 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2741 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2744 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2745 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2747 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2748 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2751 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2754 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2755 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2757 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2758 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2762 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2763 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2764 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2766 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2771 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2772 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2776 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2781 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2783 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2784 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2788 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2789 const void *value, size_t size,
2792 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2793 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2797 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2798 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2802 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2804 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2805 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2806 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2814 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2816 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2818 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2821 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2823 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2825 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2828 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2830 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2831 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2833 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2834 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2839 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2841 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2843 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2847 char *context = NULL;
2848 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2850 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2854 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2855 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2856 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2857 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2858 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2859 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2860 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2862 error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2864 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2867 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2880 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2881 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2883 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2887 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2890 if (!value || !size)
2893 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2901 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2903 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2904 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2905 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2909 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2911 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2914 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2916 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2919 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2921 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2925 /* file security operations */
2927 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2929 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2931 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2934 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2938 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2939 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2942 rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2943 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2947 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2950 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2952 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2953 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2954 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2955 u32 sid = current_sid();
2958 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2962 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2963 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2964 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2966 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2969 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2971 return file_alloc_security(file);
2974 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2976 file_free_security(file);
2979 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2982 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2985 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2987 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2992 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
2995 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2997 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3000 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3001 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3003 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3004 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3005 * This has an additional check.
3007 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3014 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3015 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3017 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3018 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3021 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3022 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3024 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3031 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3032 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3033 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3036 u32 sid = current_sid();
3038 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3039 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3040 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3041 if (rc || addr_only)
3044 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3047 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3048 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3051 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3052 unsigned long reqprot,
3055 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3058 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3062 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3065 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3066 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3068 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3069 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3070 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3071 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3072 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3073 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3074 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3075 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3077 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3078 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3079 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3080 * modified content. This typically should only
3081 * occur for text relocations.
3083 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3090 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3093 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3095 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3097 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3100 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3103 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3108 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3113 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3114 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3123 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3124 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3129 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3134 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3138 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3145 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3147 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3149 fsec = file->f_security;
3150 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3155 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3156 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3159 u32 sid = current_sid();
3161 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3163 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3164 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3166 fsec = file->f_security;
3169 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3171 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3173 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3174 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3177 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3179 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3181 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3184 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3186 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3187 struct inode *inode;
3188 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3190 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3191 fsec = file->f_security;
3192 isec = inode->i_security;
3194 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3195 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3196 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3197 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3198 * struct as its SID.
3200 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3201 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3203 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3204 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3205 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3206 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3207 * new inode label or new policy.
3208 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3210 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3213 /* task security operations */
3215 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3219 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3223 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3227 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3229 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3231 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3232 cred->security = NULL;
3237 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3239 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3242 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3243 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3245 old_tsec = old->security;
3247 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3251 new->security = tsec;
3256 * commit new credentials
3258 static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3260 secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
3263 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3265 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3266 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3267 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3268 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3269 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3274 static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3277 return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
3280 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3282 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3286 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3288 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3291 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3293 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3296 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3298 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3301 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3303 *secid = task_sid(p);
3306 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3308 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3312 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3316 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3320 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3323 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3327 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3331 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3334 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3336 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3339 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3341 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3344 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3348 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3349 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3350 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3351 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3352 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3353 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3358 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3362 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3366 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3369 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3371 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3374 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3376 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3379 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3385 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3390 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3392 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3394 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3395 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3397 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3401 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3407 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3408 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3409 the state of the current process. */
3410 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
3413 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3415 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3418 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3419 struct inode *inode)
3421 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3422 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3425 isec->initialized = 1;
3428 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3429 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3430 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3432 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3433 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3435 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3436 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3440 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3441 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3444 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3445 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3449 *proto = ih->protocol;
3451 switch (ih->protocol) {
3453 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3455 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3459 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3463 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3464 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3469 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3471 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3475 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3479 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3480 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3484 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3485 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3487 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3491 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3495 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3496 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3507 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3509 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3510 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3511 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3514 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3515 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3517 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3518 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3522 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3523 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3526 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3527 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3528 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3537 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3539 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3543 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3544 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3549 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3551 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3555 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3556 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3560 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3561 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3563 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3567 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3568 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3572 /* includes fragments */
3582 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3583 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3588 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3590 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3593 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3594 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3597 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3599 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3602 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3603 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3613 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3614 " unable to parse packet\n");
3624 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3626 * @family: protocol family
3627 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3630 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3631 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3632 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3633 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3634 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3638 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3645 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3646 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3648 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3649 if (unlikely(err)) {
3651 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3652 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3659 /* socket security operations */
3660 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3663 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3664 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3668 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3670 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3672 sid = task_sid(task);
3674 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3675 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3676 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3682 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3683 int protocol, int kern)
3685 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3686 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3695 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3697 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3698 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3704 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3705 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3707 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3708 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3709 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3710 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3715 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3717 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3720 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3726 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3727 isec->initialized = 1;
3730 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3731 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3732 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3733 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3739 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3740 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3741 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3743 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3748 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3753 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3754 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3755 * check the first address now.
3757 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3758 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3760 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3761 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3762 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3763 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3764 unsigned short snum;
3765 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3768 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3770 if (family == PF_INET) {
3771 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3772 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3773 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3775 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3776 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3777 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3783 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3785 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3786 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3790 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3791 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3792 ad.u.net.family = family;
3793 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3795 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3801 switch (isec->sclass) {
3802 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3803 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3806 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3807 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3810 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3811 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3815 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3819 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3823 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3824 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3825 ad.u.net.family = family;
3827 if (family == PF_INET)
3828 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3830 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3832 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3833 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3841 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3843 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3844 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3847 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3852 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3854 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3855 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3856 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3857 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3858 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3859 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3860 unsigned short snum;
3863 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3864 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3865 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3867 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3869 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3870 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3872 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3875 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3879 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3880 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3882 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3883 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3884 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3885 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3890 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3896 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3898 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3901 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3904 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3905 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3907 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3911 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3913 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3914 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3915 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3916 newisec->initialized = 1;
3921 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3926 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3930 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3933 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3934 int size, int flags)
3936 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3939 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3941 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3944 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3946 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3949 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3953 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3957 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3960 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3963 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3966 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3968 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3971 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3972 struct socket *other,
3975 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3976 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3977 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3978 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3981 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3985 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3986 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3988 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3989 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3991 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3993 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3997 /* connecting socket */
3998 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3999 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
4001 /* server child socket */
4002 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
4003 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
4004 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
4009 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4010 struct socket *other)
4012 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4013 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4014 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4017 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4018 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4020 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4021 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4023 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4024 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4031 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4033 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4039 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4042 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4043 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4047 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4050 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4051 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4054 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4055 struct sk_buff *skb,
4056 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4061 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4063 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4064 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4066 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4067 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4070 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4071 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4072 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4073 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4075 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4076 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4077 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4078 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4080 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4081 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4082 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4083 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4086 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4087 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4092 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4095 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4099 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4102 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4108 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4109 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4110 if (unlikely(err)) {
4112 "SELinux: failure in"
4113 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4114 " network port label not found\n");
4117 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4120 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4124 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4126 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4127 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4130 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4131 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4132 ad.u.net.family = family;
4133 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4137 if (selinux_compat_net)
4138 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4141 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4146 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4147 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4150 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4151 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4153 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4155 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4158 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4164 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4167 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4168 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4169 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4170 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4175 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4178 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4179 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4182 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4183 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4184 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4185 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4186 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4187 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4189 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4190 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4191 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4194 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4195 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4196 ad.u.net.family = family;
4197 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4201 if (peerlbl_active) {
4204 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4207 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4210 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4213 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4216 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4219 if (secmark_active) {
4220 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4229 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4230 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4235 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4236 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4237 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4239 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4241 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4242 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4243 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4244 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4246 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4251 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4256 if (scontext_len > len) {
4261 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4265 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4273 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4275 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4278 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4280 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4283 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4287 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4288 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4290 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4293 *secid = peer_secid;
4294 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4299 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4301 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4304 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4306 sk_free_security(sk);
4309 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4311 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4312 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4314 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4315 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4316 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4318 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4321 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4324 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4326 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4328 *secid = sksec->sid;
4332 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4334 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4335 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4337 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4338 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4339 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4340 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4343 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4344 struct request_sock *req)
4346 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4348 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4352 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4353 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4356 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4359 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4360 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4361 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4365 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4369 req->secid = newsid;
4370 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4374 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4375 const struct request_sock *req)
4377 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4379 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4380 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4381 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4382 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4383 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4384 time it will have been created and available. */
4386 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4387 * thread with access to newsksec */
4388 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4391 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4393 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4394 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4396 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4397 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4400 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4402 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4405 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4408 fl->secid = req->secid;
4411 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4415 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4416 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4417 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4419 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4423 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4425 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4427 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4428 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4429 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4430 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4431 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4432 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4442 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4447 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4449 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4455 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4460 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4463 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4464 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4465 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4466 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4469 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4472 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4473 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4474 ad.u.net.family = family;
4475 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4478 if (peerlbl_active) {
4479 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4482 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4488 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4489 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4493 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4494 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4495 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4497 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4503 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4504 struct sk_buff *skb,
4505 const struct net_device *in,
4506 const struct net_device *out,
4507 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4509 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4512 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4513 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4514 struct sk_buff *skb,
4515 const struct net_device *in,
4516 const struct net_device *out,
4517 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4519 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4523 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4528 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4531 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4532 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4533 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4535 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4538 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4539 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4545 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4546 struct sk_buff *skb,
4547 const struct net_device *in,
4548 const struct net_device *out,
4549 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4551 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4554 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4556 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4557 u16 family, char *addrp)
4560 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4562 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4563 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4565 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4566 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4569 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4570 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4571 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4572 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4574 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4575 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4576 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4577 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4579 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4580 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4581 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4582 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4585 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4586 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4591 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4594 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4597 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4600 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4607 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4608 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4609 if (unlikely(err)) {
4611 "SELinux: failure in"
4612 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4613 " network port label not found\n");
4616 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4619 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4623 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4624 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4625 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4631 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4633 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4634 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4635 ad.u.net.family = family;
4636 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4639 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4640 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4641 &ad, family, addrp))
4644 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4645 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4649 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4650 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4656 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4662 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4667 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4668 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4669 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4670 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4671 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4672 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4674 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4675 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4676 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4677 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4678 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4679 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4680 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4683 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4684 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4685 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4688 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4689 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4690 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4691 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4696 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4697 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4699 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4702 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4703 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4705 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4710 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4711 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4714 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4716 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4717 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4718 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4721 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4722 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4723 ad.u.net.family = family;
4724 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4728 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4729 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4732 if (peerlbl_active) {
4736 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4738 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4739 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4742 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4744 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4745 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4752 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4753 struct sk_buff *skb,
4754 const struct net_device *in,
4755 const struct net_device *out,
4756 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4758 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4761 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4762 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4763 struct sk_buff *skb,
4764 const struct net_device *in,
4765 const struct net_device *out,
4766 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4768 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4772 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4774 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4778 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4782 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4783 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4788 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4791 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4793 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4797 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4798 ad.u.cap = capability;
4800 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4801 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4804 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4805 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4808 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4811 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4815 sid = task_sid(task);
4816 isec->sclass = sclass;
4818 perm->security = isec;
4823 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4825 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4826 perm->security = NULL;
4830 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4832 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4834 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4838 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4839 msg->security = msec;
4844 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4846 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4848 msg->security = NULL;
4852 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4855 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4856 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4857 u32 sid = current_sid();
4859 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4861 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4862 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4864 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4867 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4869 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4872 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4874 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4877 /* message queue security operations */
4878 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4880 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4881 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4882 u32 sid = current_sid();
4885 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4889 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4891 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4892 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4894 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4897 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4903 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4905 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4908 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4910 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4911 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4912 u32 sid = current_sid();
4914 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4916 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4917 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4919 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4920 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4923 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4931 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4932 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4935 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4938 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4941 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4947 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4951 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4953 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4954 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4955 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4956 u32 sid = current_sid();
4959 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4960 msec = msg->security;
4963 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4965 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4967 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4968 * message queue this message will be stored in
4970 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4976 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4977 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4979 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4980 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4983 /* Can this process send the message */
4984 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4987 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4988 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4989 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4994 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4995 struct task_struct *target,
4996 long type, int mode)
4998 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4999 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5000 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5001 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5004 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5005 msec = msg->security;
5007 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5008 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5010 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5011 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5013 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5014 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5018 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5019 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5021 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5022 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5023 u32 sid = current_sid();
5026 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5030 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5032 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5033 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5035 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5038 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5044 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5046 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5049 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5051 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5052 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5053 u32 sid = current_sid();
5055 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5057 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5058 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5060 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5061 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5064 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5065 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5073 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5074 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5077 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5080 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5087 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5093 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5097 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5098 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5103 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5107 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5110 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5112 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5115 /* Semaphore security operations */
5116 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5118 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5119 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5120 u32 sid = current_sid();
5123 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5127 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5129 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5130 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5132 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5135 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5141 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5143 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5146 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5148 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5149 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5150 u32 sid = current_sid();
5152 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5154 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5155 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5157 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5158 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5161 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5162 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5170 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5171 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5175 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5186 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5189 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5193 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5199 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5203 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5204 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5209 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5213 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5216 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5222 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5224 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5229 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5232 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5234 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5238 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5241 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5244 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5245 char *name, char **value)
5247 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5253 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5259 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5261 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5263 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5265 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5266 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5267 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5268 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5269 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5270 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5271 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5272 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5280 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5290 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5291 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5293 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5294 struct task_struct *tracer;
5301 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5302 security attributes. */
5307 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5308 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5309 * above restriction is ever removed.
5311 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5312 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5313 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5314 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5315 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5316 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5317 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5318 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5319 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5320 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5326 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5327 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5328 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5332 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5333 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5334 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5336 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5343 new = prepare_creds();
5347 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5348 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5349 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5350 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5351 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5352 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5353 tsec = new->security;
5354 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5355 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5356 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5357 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5358 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5359 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5362 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5363 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5364 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5365 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5370 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5372 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5373 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5378 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5379 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5380 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5384 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5385 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5388 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5390 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5394 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5395 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5414 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5416 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5419 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5421 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5424 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5431 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5432 unsigned long flags)
5434 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5435 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5437 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5441 tsec = cred->security;
5442 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5443 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5445 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5451 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5453 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5459 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5460 const struct cred *cred,
5464 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5467 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5468 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5469 appear to be created. */
5473 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5475 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5476 ksec = key->security;
5478 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5481 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5483 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5484 char *context = NULL;
5488 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5497 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5500 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5501 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5502 .capget = selinux_capget,
5503 .capset = selinux_capset,
5504 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5505 .capable = selinux_capable,
5506 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5507 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5508 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5509 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5511 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5512 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5514 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5515 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5516 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5517 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5518 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5520 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5521 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5522 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5523 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5524 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5525 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5526 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5527 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5528 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5529 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5530 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5533 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5534 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5535 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5536 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5537 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5538 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5539 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5540 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5541 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5542 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5543 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5544 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5545 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5546 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5547 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5548 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5549 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5550 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5551 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5552 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5553 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5554 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5555 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5556 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5557 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5558 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5559 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5561 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5562 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5563 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5564 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5565 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5566 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5567 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5568 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5569 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5570 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5571 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5573 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5575 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5576 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5577 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5578 .cred_commit = selinux_cred_commit,
5579 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5580 .task_fix_setuid = selinux_task_fix_setuid,
5581 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5582 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5583 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5584 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5585 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5586 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5587 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5588 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5589 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5590 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5591 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5592 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5593 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5594 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5595 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5596 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5597 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5599 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5600 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5602 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5603 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5605 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5606 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5607 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5608 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5609 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5610 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5612 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5613 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5614 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5615 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5616 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5618 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5619 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5620 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5621 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5622 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5624 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5626 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5627 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5629 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5630 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5631 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5633 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5634 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5636 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5637 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5638 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5639 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5640 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5641 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5642 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5643 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5644 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5645 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5646 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5647 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5648 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5649 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5650 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5651 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5652 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5653 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5654 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5655 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5656 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5657 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5658 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5659 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5660 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5662 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5663 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5664 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5665 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5666 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5667 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5668 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5669 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5670 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5671 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5672 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5676 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5677 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5678 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5679 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5683 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5684 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5685 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5686 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5690 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5692 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5693 selinux_enabled = 0;
5697 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5698 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5702 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5704 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5705 cred_init_security();
5707 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5708 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5709 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5712 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5714 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5715 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5716 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5718 if (selinux_enforcing)
5719 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5721 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5726 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5728 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5730 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5731 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5732 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5733 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5735 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5736 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5737 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5738 struct superblock_security_struct,
5740 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5742 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5743 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5744 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5746 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5748 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5749 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5750 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5753 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5754 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5757 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5758 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5759 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5761 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5763 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5765 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5766 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5768 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5769 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5772 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5773 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5775 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5776 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5779 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5780 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5782 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5783 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5787 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5789 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5791 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5792 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5794 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5795 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5798 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5799 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5801 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5802 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5808 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5812 if (!selinux_enabled)
5815 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5817 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5819 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5821 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5822 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5824 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5831 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5833 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5834 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5836 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5838 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5839 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5840 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5845 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5847 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5848 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5851 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5853 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5854 static int selinux_disabled;
5856 int selinux_disable(void)
5858 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5860 if (ss_initialized) {
5861 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5865 if (selinux_disabled) {
5866 /* Only do this once. */
5870 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5872 selinux_disabled = 1;
5873 selinux_enabled = 0;
5875 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5876 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5878 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5879 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5881 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */