SAFE public projects git trees. - safe/jmp/linux-2.6/blob - security/commoncap.c

   1 /* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o
   2  *
   3  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   4  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
   5  *      the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
   6  *      (at your option) any later version.
   7  *
   8  */
   9
  10 #include <linux/capability.h>
  11 #include <linux/module.h>
  12 #include <linux/init.h>
  13 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  14 #include <linux/security.h>
  15 #include <linux/file.h>
  16 #include <linux/mm.h>
  17 #include <linux/mman.h>
  18 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  19 #include <linux/swap.h>
  20 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
  21 #include <linux/netlink.h>
  22 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
  23 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  24 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  25 #include <linux/mount.h>
  26 #include <linux/sched.h>
  27 #include <linux/prctl.h>
  28 #include <linux/securebits.h>
  29
  30 int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
  31 {
  32         NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective;
  33         return 0;
  34 }
  35
  36 int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
  37 {
  38         if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, cap))
  39                 return -EPERM;
  40         return 0;
  41 }
  42
  43 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
  44
  45 /*
  46  * NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
  47  * function.  That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable()
  48  * returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable()
  49  * returns 1 for this case.
  50  */
  51 int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
  52 {
  53         /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
  54         if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap))
  55                 return 0;
  56         return -EPERM;
  57 }
  58
  59 int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
  60 {
  61         if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME))
  62                 return -EPERM;
  63         return 0;
  64 }
  65
  66 int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
  67 {
  68         /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
  69         if (cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
  70                 return 0;
  71         if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
  72                 return 0;
  73         return -EPERM;
  74 }
  75
  76 int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
  77 {
  78         /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
  79         if (cap_issubset(current->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted))
  80                 return 0;
  81         if (has_capability(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
  82                 return 0;
  83         return -EPERM;
  84 }
  85
  86 int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
  87                 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
  88 {
  89         /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
  90         *effective = target->cap_effective;
  91         *inheritable = target->cap_inheritable;
  92         *permitted = target->cap_permitted;
  93         return 0;
  94 }
  95
  96 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
  97
  98 static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *target)
  99 {
 100         /*
 101          * No support for remote process capability manipulation with
 102          * filesystem capability support.
 103          */
 104         return (target != current);
 105 }
 106
 107 static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
 108 {
 109         /*
 110          * Return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited
 111          * to the old permitted set. That is, if the current task
 112          * does *not* possess the CAP_SETPCAP capability.
 113          */
 114         return (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0);
 115 }
 116
 117 static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void) { return 1; }
 118
 119 #else /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
 120
 121 static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *t) { return 0; }
 122 static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { return 1; }
 123 static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)
 124 {
 125         return !capable(CAP_SETPCAP);
 126 }
 127
 128 #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
 129
 130 int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 131                       kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 132 {
 133         if (cap_block_setpcap(target)) {
 134                 return -EPERM;
 135         }
 136         if (cap_inh_is_capped()
 137             && !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
 138                              cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
 139                                          current->cap_permitted))) {
 140                 /* incapable of using this inheritable set */
 141                 return -EPERM;
 142         }
 143         if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
 144                            cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
 145                                        current->cap_bset))) {
 146                 /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
 147                 return -EPERM;
 148         }
 149
 150         /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
 151         if (!cap_issubset (*permitted,
 152                            cap_combine (target->cap_permitted,
 153                                         current->cap_permitted))) {
 154                 return -EPERM;
 155         }
 156
 157         /* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */
 158         if (!cap_issubset (*effective, *permitted)) {
 159                 return -EPERM;
 160         }
 161
 162         return 0;
 163 }
 164
 165 void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 166                      kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 167 {
 168         target->cap_effective = *effective;
 169         target->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
 170         target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
 171 }
 172
 173 static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 174 {
 175         cap_clear(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted);
 176         bprm->cap_effective = false;
 177 }
 178
 179 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 180
 181 int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 182 {
 183         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 184         int error;
 185
 186         if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
 187                return 0;
 188
 189         error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
 190         if (error <= 0)
 191                 return 0;
 192         return 1;
 193 }
 194
 195 int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 196 {
 197         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 198
 199         if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->removexattr)
 200                return 0;
 201
 202         return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
 203 }
 204
 205 static inline int cap_from_disk(struct vfs_cap_data *caps,
 206                                 struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned size)
 207 {
 208         __u32 magic_etc;
 209         unsigned tocopy, i;
 210         int ret;
 211
 212         if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
 213                 return -EINVAL;
 214
 215         magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
 216
 217         switch ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)) {
 218         case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
 219                 if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
 220                         return -EINVAL;
 221                 tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_1;
 222                 break;
 223         case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2:
 224                 if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
 225                         return -EINVAL;
 226                 tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
 227                 break;
 228         default:
 229                 return -EINVAL;
 230         }
 231
 232         if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) {
 233                 bprm->cap_effective = true;
 234         } else {
 235                 bprm->cap_effective = false;
 236         }
 237
 238         ret = 0;
 239
 240         CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
 241                 __u32 value_cpu;
 242
 243                 if (i >= tocopy) {
 244                         /*
 245                          * Legacy capability sets have no upper bits
 246                          */
 247                         bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i] = 0;
 248                         continue;
 249                 }
 250                 /*
 251                  * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
 252                  */
 253                 value_cpu = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
 254                 bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i] =
 255                         (current->cap_bset.cap[i] & value_cpu) |
 256                         (current->cap_inheritable.cap[i] &
 257                                 le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable));
 258                 if (value_cpu & ~bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i]) {
 259                         /*
 260                          * insufficient to execute correctly
 261                          */
 262                         ret = -EPERM;
 263                 }
 264         }
 265
 266         /*
 267          * For legacy apps, with no internal support for recognizing they
 268          * do not have enough capabilities, we return an error if they are
 269          * missing some "forced" (aka file-permitted) capabilities.
 270          */
 271         return bprm->cap_effective ? ret : 0;
 272 }
 273
 274 /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
 275 static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 276 {
 277         struct dentry *dentry;
 278         int rc = 0;
 279         struct vfs_cap_data vcaps;
 280         struct inode *inode;
 281
 282         bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
 283
 284         if (!file_caps_enabled)
 285                 return 0;
 286
 287         if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
 288                 return 0;
 289
 290         dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
 291         inode = dentry->d_inode;
 292         if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
 293                 goto out;
 294
 295         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &vcaps,
 296                                    XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
 297         if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
 298                 /* no data, that's ok */
 299                 rc = 0;
 300                 goto out;
 301         }
 302         if (rc < 0)
 303                 goto out;
 304
 305         rc = cap_from_disk(&vcaps, bprm, rc);
 306         if (rc == -EINVAL)
 307                 printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
 308                        __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
 309
 310 out:
 311         dput(dentry);
 312         if (rc)
 313                 bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
 314
 315         return rc;
 316 }
 317
 318 #else
 319 int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 320 {
 321         return 0;
 322 }
 323
 324 int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 325 {
 326         return 0;
 327 }
 328
 329 static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 330 {
 331         bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
 332         return 0;
 333 }
 334 #endif
 335
 336 int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 337 {
 338         int ret;
 339
 340         ret = get_file_caps(bprm);
 341
 342         if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
 343                 /*
 344                  * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
 345                  * executables under compatibility mode, we override the
 346                  * capability sets for the file.
 347                  *
 348                  * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective
 349                  * bit.
 350                  */
 351                 if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
 352                         /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
 353                         bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted = cap_combine(
 354                                 current->cap_bset, current->cap_inheritable
 355                                 );
 356                         bprm->cap_effective = (bprm->e_uid == 0);
 357                         ret = 0;
 358                 }
 359         }
 360
 361         return ret;
 362 }
 363
 364 void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
 365 {
 366         if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid ||
 367             !cap_issubset(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted,
 368                           current->cap_permitted)) {
 369                 set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
 370                 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
 371
 372                 if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
 373                         if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
 374                                 bprm->e_uid = current->uid;
 375                                 bprm->e_gid = current->gid;
 376                         }
 377                         if (cap_limit_ptraced_target()) {
 378                                 bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted = cap_intersect(
 379                                         bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted,
 380                                         current->cap_permitted);
 381                         }
 382                 }
 383         }
 384
 385         current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
 386         current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
 387
 388         /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
 389          * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
 390          * capability rules */
 391         if (!is_global_init(current)) {
 392                 current->cap_permitted = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
 393                 if (bprm->cap_effective)
 394                         current->cap_effective = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
 395                 else
 396                         cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
 397         }
 398
 399         /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
 400
 401         current->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 402 }
 403
 404 int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 405 {
 406         if (current->uid != 0) {
 407                 if (bprm->cap_effective)
 408                         return 1;
 409                 if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted))
 410                         return 1;
 411         }
 412
 413         return (current->euid != current->uid ||
 414                 current->egid != current->gid);
 415 }
 416
 417 int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 418                        const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 419 {
 420         if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
 421                 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
 422                         return -EPERM;
 423                 return 0;
 424         } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 425                      sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&
 426             !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 427                 return -EPERM;
 428         return 0;
 429 }
 430
 431 int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 432 {
 433         if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
 434                 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
 435                         return -EPERM;
 436                 return 0;
 437         } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 438                      sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&
 439             !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 440                 return -EPERM;
 441         return 0;
 442 }
 443
 444 /* moved from kernel/sys.c. */
 445 /*
 446  * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
 447  * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
 448  *
 449  *  1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of
 450  *  {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
 451  *  cleared.
 452  *
 453  *  2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective
 454  *  capabilities of the process are cleared.
 455  *
 456  *  3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective
 457  *  capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities.
 458  *
 459  *  fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should
 460  *  never happen.
 461  *
 462  *  -astor
 463  *
 464  * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
 465  * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it
 466  * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and
 467  * effective sets will be retained.
 468  * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some
 469  * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges!
 470  * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital
 471  * files..
 472  * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this.
 473  */
 474 static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (int old_ruid, int old_euid,
 475                                         int old_suid)
 476 {
 477         if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) &&
 478             (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) &&
 479             !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
 480                 cap_clear (current->cap_permitted);
 481                 cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
 482         }
 483         if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) {
 484                 cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
 485         }
 486         if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) {
 487                 current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
 488         }
 489 }
 490
 491 int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
 492                           int flags)
 493 {
 494         switch (flags) {
 495         case LSM_SETID_RE:
 496         case LSM_SETID_ID:
 497         case LSM_SETID_RES:
 498                 /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setreuid/setuid/setresuid. */
 499                 if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
 500                         cap_emulate_setxuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
 501                 }
 502                 break;
 503         case LSM_SETID_FS:
 504                 {
 505                         uid_t old_fsuid = old_ruid;
 506
 507                         /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setfsuid. */
 508
 509                         /*
 510                          * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
 511                          *          if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
 512                          */
 513
 514                         if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
 515                                 if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) {
 516                                         current->cap_effective =
 517                                                 cap_drop_fs_set(
 518                                                     current->cap_effective);
 519                                 }
 520                                 if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) {
 521                                         current->cap_effective =
 522                                                 cap_raise_fs_set(
 523                                                     current->cap_effective,
 524                                                     current->cap_permitted);
 525                                 }
 526                         }
 527                         break;
 528                 }
 529         default:
 530                 return -EINVAL;
 531         }
 532
 533         return 0;
 534 }
 535
 536 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 537 /*
 538  * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
 539  * task_setnice, assumes that
 540  *   . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed
 541  *   . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes,
 542  *      then those actions should be allowed
 543  * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but
 544  * yet with increased caps.
 545  * So we check for increased caps on the target process.
 546  */
 547 static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
 548 {
 549         if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
 550             !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
 551                 return -EPERM;
 552         return 0;
 553 }
 554
 555 int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
 556                            struct sched_param *lp)
 557 {
 558         return cap_safe_nice(p);
 559 }
 560
 561 int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 562 {
 563         return cap_safe_nice(p);
 564 }
 565
 566 int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 567 {
 568         return cap_safe_nice(p);
 569 }
 570
 571 /*
 572  * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
 573  * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
 574  * no new races - i.e. only another task doing capget() on
 575  * this task could get inconsistent info.  There can be no
 576  * racing writer bc a task can only change its own caps.
 577  */
 578 static long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
 579 {
 580         if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
 581                 return -EPERM;
 582         if (!cap_valid(cap))
 583                 return -EINVAL;
 584         cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap);
 585         return 0;
 586 }
 587
 588 #else
 589 int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
 590                            struct sched_param *lp)
 591 {
 592         return 0;
 593 }
 594 int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 595 {
 596         return 0;
 597 }
 598 int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 599 {
 600         return 0;
 601 }
 602 #endif
 603
 604 int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 605                    unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
 606 {
 607         long error = 0;
 608
 609         switch (option) {
 610         case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
 611                 if (!cap_valid(arg2))
 612                         error = -EINVAL;
 613                 else
 614                         error = !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2);
 615                 break;
 616 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 617         case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
 618                 error = cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
 619                 break;
 620
 621         /*
 622          * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
 623          * system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem
 624          * capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem
 625          * capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended.
 626          *
 627          * Note:
 628          *
 629          *  PR_SET_SECUREBITS =
 630          *      issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)
 631          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)
 632          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)
 633          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)
 634          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)
 635          *
 636          * will ensure that the current process and all of its
 637          * children will be locked into a pure
 638          * capability-based-privilege environment.
 639          */
 640         case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
 641                 if ((((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
 642                      & (current->securebits ^ arg2))                  /*[1]*/
 643                     || ((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
 644                          & ~arg2))                                    /*[2]*/
 645                     || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
 646                     || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0)) {    /*[4]*/
 647                         /*
 648                          * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
 649                          * [2] no unlocking of locks
 650                          * [3] no setting of unsupported bits
 651                          * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
 652                          *     the "sendmail capabilities bug")
 653                          */
 654                         error = -EPERM;  /* cannot change a locked bit */
 655                 } else {
 656                         current->securebits = arg2;
 657                 }
 658                 break;
 659         case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
 660                 error = current->securebits;
 661                 break;
 662
 663 #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
 664
 665         case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
 666                 if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
 667                         error = 1;
 668                 break;
 669         case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
 670                 if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
 671                         error = -EINVAL;
 672                 else if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
 673                         error = -EPERM;
 674                 else if (arg2)
 675                         current->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 676                 else
 677                         current->securebits &=
 678                                 ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 679                 break;
 680
 681         default:
 682                 /* No functionality available - continue with default */
 683                 return 0;
 684         }
 685
 686         /* Functionality provided */
 687         *rc_p = error;
 688         return 1;
 689 }
 690
 691 void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
 692 {
 693         cap_set_init_eff(p->cap_effective);
 694         cap_clear(p->cap_inheritable);
 695         cap_set_full(p->cap_permitted);
 696         p->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT;
 697         return;
 698 }
 699
 700 int cap_syslog (int type)
 701 {
 702         if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 703                 return -EPERM;
 704         return 0;
 705 }
 706
 707 int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 708 {
 709         int cap_sys_admin = 0;
 710
 711         if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
 712                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
 713         return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
 714 }
 715