1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <asm/atomic.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/module.h>
52 #include <linux/mount.h>
53 #include <linux/socket.h>
54 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
55 #include <linux/audit.h>
56 #include <linux/personality.h>
57 #include <linux/time.h>
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/compiler.h>
60 #include <asm/unistd.h>
61 #include <linux/security.h>
62 #include <linux/list.h>
63 #include <linux/tty.h>
64 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
65 #include <linux/highmem.h>
66 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
67 #include <linux/inotify.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
72 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
73 * for saving names from getname(). */
74 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
76 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
77 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
79 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
80 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
82 /* number of audit rules */
85 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
88 struct audit_cap_data {
89 kernel_cap_t permitted;
90 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
92 unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */
93 kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */
97 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
98 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
99 * pointers at syscall exit time).
101 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
104 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
105 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
113 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
114 unsigned int fcap_ver;
117 struct audit_aux_data {
118 struct audit_aux_data *next;
122 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
124 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
125 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
127 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open {
128 struct audit_aux_data d;
134 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv {
135 struct audit_aux_data d;
138 unsigned int msg_prio;
139 struct timespec abs_timeout;
142 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify {
143 struct audit_aux_data d;
145 struct sigevent notification;
148 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr {
149 struct audit_aux_data d;
151 struct mq_attr mqstat;
154 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
155 struct audit_aux_data d;
158 struct mm_struct *mm;
161 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair {
162 struct audit_aux_data d;
166 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
167 struct audit_aux_data d;
168 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
169 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
170 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
171 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
172 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
173 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
177 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
178 struct audit_aux_data d;
179 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
180 unsigned int fcap_ver;
181 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
182 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
185 struct audit_aux_data_capset {
186 struct audit_aux_data d;
188 struct audit_cap_data cap;
191 struct audit_tree_refs {
192 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
193 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
196 /* The per-task audit context. */
197 struct audit_context {
198 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
199 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
200 enum audit_state state;
201 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
202 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
203 int major; /* syscall number */
204 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
205 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
206 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
207 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
209 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
210 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
212 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
213 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
214 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
215 struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
217 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
219 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
220 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
221 unsigned long personality;
227 unsigned int target_sessionid;
229 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
231 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
249 unsigned long qbytes;
259 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
260 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
262 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
263 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
264 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
268 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
275 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
277 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
278 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
280 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
281 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
283 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
284 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
287 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
288 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
289 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
291 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
292 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
294 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
295 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
299 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
301 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
302 case 4: /* socketcall */
303 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
305 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
311 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which)
313 unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT;
314 mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT;
319 if (index >= ctx->name_count)
321 if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1)
323 if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT)
329 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
330 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
331 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
332 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
333 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
334 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
335 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
338 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
339 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
341 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
342 int left = ctx->tree_count;
344 p->c[--left] = chunk;
345 ctx->tree_count = left;
354 ctx->tree_count = 30;
360 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
362 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
363 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
369 p->next = ctx->trees;
371 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
372 ctx->tree_count = 31;
377 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
378 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
380 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
381 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
384 /* we started with empty chain */
385 p = ctx->first_trees;
387 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
392 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
394 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
398 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
399 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
403 ctx->tree_count = count;
407 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
409 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
410 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
416 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
418 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
419 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
424 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
425 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
426 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
431 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
432 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
439 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
440 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
442 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
443 struct audit_krule *rule,
444 struct audit_context *ctx,
445 struct audit_names *name,
446 enum audit_state *state)
448 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
449 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
452 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
453 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
458 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
463 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
464 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
468 result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val);
471 result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val);
474 result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val);
477 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
480 result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val);
483 result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val);
486 result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val);
489 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
492 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
496 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
500 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
501 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
504 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
506 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
508 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
513 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
516 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
517 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
526 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
529 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
530 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
539 result = (name->ino == f->val);
541 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
542 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
550 if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
551 result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
552 name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
556 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
561 result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
563 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
564 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
565 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
568 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
569 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
570 match for now to avoid losing information that
571 may be wanted. An error message will also be
575 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
578 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
587 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
588 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
589 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
592 /* Find files that match */
594 result = security_audit_rule_match(
595 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
598 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
599 if (security_audit_rule_match(
608 /* Find ipc objects that match */
609 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
611 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
622 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
624 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
625 /* ignore this field for filtering */
629 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
632 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
641 if (rule->filterkey && ctx)
642 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
643 switch (rule->action) {
644 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
645 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
651 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
652 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
653 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
655 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
657 struct audit_entry *e;
658 enum audit_state state;
661 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
662 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
668 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
671 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
672 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
673 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
674 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
676 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
677 struct audit_context *ctx,
678 struct list_head *list)
680 struct audit_entry *e;
681 enum audit_state state;
683 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
684 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
687 if (!list_empty(list)) {
688 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
689 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
691 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
692 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
693 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
701 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
704 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
705 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
706 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
707 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
709 enum audit_state audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
710 struct audit_context *ctx)
713 struct audit_entry *e;
714 enum audit_state state;
716 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
717 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
720 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
721 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
722 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
723 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
724 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
725 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
727 if (list_empty(list))
730 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
731 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
732 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
739 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
742 void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
747 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
751 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
753 if (likely(!context))
755 context->return_valid = return_valid;
758 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
759 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
762 * This is actually a test for:
763 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
764 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
766 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
768 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
769 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
770 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
771 context->return_code = -EINTR;
773 context->return_code = return_code;
775 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
776 enum audit_state state;
778 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
779 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
780 context->auditable = 1;
784 state = audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
785 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
786 context->auditable = 1;
792 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
796 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
801 if (context->auditable
802 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
803 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
804 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
805 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
807 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
808 context->name_count, context->put_count,
810 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
811 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
812 context->names[i].name,
813 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
820 context->put_count = 0;
821 context->ino_count = 0;
824 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
825 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
826 __putname(context->names[i].name);
828 context->name_count = 0;
829 path_put(&context->pwd);
830 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
831 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
834 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
836 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
838 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
839 context->aux = aux->next;
842 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
843 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
848 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
849 enum audit_state state)
851 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
852 context->state = state;
855 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
857 struct audit_context *context;
859 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
861 audit_zero_context(context, state);
866 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
869 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
870 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
871 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
874 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
876 struct audit_context *context;
877 enum audit_state state;
879 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
880 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
882 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
883 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
886 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
887 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
891 tsk->audit_context = context;
892 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
896 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
898 struct audit_context *previous;
902 previous = context->previous;
903 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
905 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
906 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
907 context->serial, context->major,
908 context->name_count, count);
910 audit_free_names(context);
911 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
912 free_tree_refs(context);
913 audit_free_aux(context);
914 kfree(context->filterkey);
915 kfree(context->sockaddr);
920 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
923 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
930 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
934 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
936 if (error != -EINVAL)
941 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
942 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
946 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
950 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
952 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
954 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
955 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
956 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
960 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
961 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
962 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
965 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
968 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
970 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
971 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
976 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
978 audit_log_task_context(ab);
981 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
982 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
985 struct audit_buffer *ab;
990 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
994 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
996 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
997 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
1000 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1001 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1003 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1004 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1011 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1012 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1013 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry)
1015 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1016 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1017 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1018 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1019 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1021 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1022 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1025 const char __user *p,
1028 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1029 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1030 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 3 is the length of a=\n */
1031 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 3;
1032 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1033 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1034 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1037 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1038 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1041 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1042 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1043 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1046 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1048 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1052 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1054 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1055 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1058 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1060 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1061 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1066 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1069 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1070 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1073 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1074 * send half as much in each message
1076 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1079 len_left -= to_send;
1081 } while (len_left > 0);
1085 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1088 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1089 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1092 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1093 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1097 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1098 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1100 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1102 room_left -= to_send;
1103 if (room_left < 0) {
1106 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1112 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1113 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1115 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1116 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d_len=%zu ", arg_num,
1117 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1120 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1121 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1122 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1124 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1125 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1130 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1133 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1135 /* actually log it */
1136 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d", arg_num);
1138 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1139 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1141 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1143 audit_log_format(*ab, "\"%s\"", buf);
1144 audit_log_format(*ab, "\n");
1147 len_left -= to_send;
1148 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1150 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1152 *len_sent += to_send;
1154 /* include the null we didn't log */
1158 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1159 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1160 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1163 size_t len, len_sent = 0;
1164 const char __user *p;
1167 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1168 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1170 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1172 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d ", axi->argc);
1175 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1176 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1177 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1178 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1180 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1182 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1186 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1187 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1196 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
1200 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1201 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
1202 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
1206 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1208 kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
1209 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
1212 if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
1213 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
1216 if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
1217 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
1222 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
1225 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1227 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1230 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1234 switch (context->type) {
1235 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1236 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1237 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1238 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1239 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1240 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1243 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1245 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1246 context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode);
1250 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1251 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1254 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1255 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1258 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1260 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1261 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1262 audit_log_format(ab,
1263 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1264 context->ipc.qbytes,
1265 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1266 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1267 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1276 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1278 const struct cred *cred;
1279 int i, call_panic = 0;
1280 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1281 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1284 /* tsk == current */
1285 context->pid = tsk->pid;
1287 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
1288 cred = current_cred();
1289 context->uid = cred->uid;
1290 context->gid = cred->gid;
1291 context->euid = cred->euid;
1292 context->suid = cred->suid;
1293 context->fsuid = cred->fsuid;
1294 context->egid = cred->egid;
1295 context->sgid = cred->sgid;
1296 context->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
1297 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1299 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1301 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1302 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1303 context->arch, context->major);
1304 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1305 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1306 if (context->return_valid)
1307 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1308 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1309 context->return_code);
1311 spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1312 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1313 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
1316 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1318 audit_log_format(ab,
1319 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
1320 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1321 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1322 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
1327 context->name_count,
1333 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
1334 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
1338 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1339 if (context->filterkey) {
1340 audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
1341 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
1343 audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
1346 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1348 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1350 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1352 switch (aux->type) {
1353 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1354 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *axi = (void *)aux;
1355 audit_log_format(ab,
1356 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1357 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1358 axi->oflag, axi->mode, axi->attr.mq_flags,
1359 axi->attr.mq_maxmsg, axi->attr.mq_msgsize,
1360 axi->attr.mq_curmsgs);
1363 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1364 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *axi = (void *)aux;
1365 audit_log_format(ab,
1366 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1367 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1368 axi->mqdes, axi->msg_len, axi->msg_prio,
1369 axi->abs_timeout.tv_sec, axi->abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1372 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1373 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *axi = (void *)aux;
1374 audit_log_format(ab,
1375 "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1377 axi->notification.sigev_signo);
1380 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1381 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *axi = (void *)aux;
1382 audit_log_format(ab,
1383 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1386 axi->mqstat.mq_flags, axi->mqstat.mq_maxmsg,
1387 axi->mqstat.mq_msgsize, axi->mqstat.mq_curmsgs);
1390 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1391 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1392 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
1395 case AUDIT_FD_PAIR: {
1396 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *axs = (void *)aux;
1397 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs->fd[0], axs->fd[1]);
1400 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1401 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1402 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1403 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1404 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1405 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1406 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1407 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1408 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1409 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1410 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1411 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1414 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1415 struct audit_aux_data_capset *axs = (void *)aux;
1416 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", axs->pid);
1417 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &axs->cap.inheritable);
1418 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &axs->cap.permitted);
1419 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &axs->cap.effective);
1427 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1429 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1430 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1432 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1433 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1434 context->sockaddr_len);
1439 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1440 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1442 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1443 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1444 axs->target_auid[i],
1446 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1448 axs->target_comm[i]))
1452 if (context->target_pid &&
1453 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1454 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1455 context->target_sessionid,
1456 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1459 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1460 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1462 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1466 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
1467 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
1469 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1471 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1473 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
1476 switch(n->name_len) {
1477 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1478 /* log the full path */
1479 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1480 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1483 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1484 * directory component is the cwd */
1485 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1488 /* log the name's directory component */
1489 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1490 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
1494 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1496 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1497 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1498 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1499 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1512 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1513 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1514 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1517 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1518 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1522 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1527 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1528 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1532 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1536 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1537 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1539 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1541 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1543 struct audit_context *context;
1545 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1546 if (likely(!context))
1549 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1550 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1551 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1552 * in the context of the idle thread */
1553 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1554 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1555 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1557 audit_free_context(context);
1561 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1562 * @arch: architecture type
1563 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1564 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1565 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1566 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1567 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1569 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1570 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1571 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1572 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1573 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1574 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1577 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1578 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1579 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1581 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1582 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1583 enum audit_state state;
1585 if (unlikely(!context))
1589 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1590 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1591 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1592 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1593 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1597 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1599 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1600 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1602 if (context->in_syscall) {
1603 struct audit_context *newctx;
1607 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1608 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1609 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1611 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1613 newctx->previous = context;
1615 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1617 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1618 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1619 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1620 * to abandon auditing. */
1621 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1624 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1629 context->arch = arch;
1630 context->major = major;
1631 context->argv[0] = a1;
1632 context->argv[1] = a2;
1633 context->argv[2] = a3;
1634 context->argv[3] = a4;
1636 state = context->state;
1637 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1638 if (!context->dummy && (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT))
1639 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1640 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1643 context->serial = 0;
1644 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1645 context->in_syscall = 1;
1646 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
1650 void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child)
1652 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
1653 struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context;
1654 if (!p || !ctx || !ctx->auditable)
1656 p->arch = ctx->arch;
1657 p->major = ctx->major;
1658 memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv));
1659 p->ctime = ctx->ctime;
1660 p->dummy = ctx->dummy;
1661 p->auditable = ctx->auditable;
1662 p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall;
1663 p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
1664 p->ppid = current->pid;
1668 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1669 * @valid: success/failure flag
1670 * @return_code: syscall return value
1672 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1673 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1674 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1675 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1676 * free the names stored from getname().
1678 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
1680 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1681 struct audit_context *context;
1683 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1685 if (likely(!context))
1688 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1689 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1691 context->in_syscall = 0;
1692 context->auditable = 0;
1694 if (context->previous) {
1695 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1696 context->previous = NULL;
1697 audit_free_context(context);
1698 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1700 audit_free_names(context);
1701 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1702 audit_free_aux(context);
1703 context->aux = NULL;
1704 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1705 context->target_pid = 0;
1706 context->target_sid = 0;
1707 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1709 kfree(context->filterkey);
1710 context->filterkey = NULL;
1711 tsk->audit_context = context;
1715 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1717 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1718 struct audit_context *context;
1719 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1720 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1722 if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
1724 context = current->audit_context;
1726 count = context->tree_count;
1728 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1732 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1734 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1735 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1736 audit_set_auditable(context);
1737 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1738 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1741 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1745 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1747 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1748 struct audit_context *context;
1749 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1750 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1751 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1755 context = current->audit_context;
1757 count = context->tree_count;
1762 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1764 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1765 if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
1766 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1767 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1769 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1775 parent = d->d_parent;
1780 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1783 /* just a race with rename */
1784 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1787 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1788 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1789 /* OK, got more space */
1790 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1795 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1796 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1797 audit_set_auditable(context);
1805 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1806 * @name: name to add
1808 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1809 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1811 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
1813 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1815 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1818 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1819 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1820 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1821 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1826 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1827 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1828 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1829 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
1830 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1831 context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
1832 ++context->name_count;
1833 if (!context->pwd.dentry) {
1834 read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
1835 context->pwd = current->fs->pwd;
1836 path_get(¤t->fs->pwd);
1837 read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
1842 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1843 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1845 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1846 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1847 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1849 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1851 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1854 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1855 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1856 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1857 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1858 if (context->name_count) {
1860 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1861 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1862 context->names[i].name,
1863 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
1870 ++context->put_count;
1871 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1872 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1873 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1876 context->serial, context->major,
1877 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1878 context->put_count);
1885 static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
1886 const struct inode *inode)
1888 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
1890 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
1891 "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n",
1892 MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1893 MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1897 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n");
1900 context->name_count++;
1902 context->ino_count++;
1908 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1910 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1913 memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1914 memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1921 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1925 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1926 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1927 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1928 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1934 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1935 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1936 const struct inode *inode)
1938 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1939 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1940 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1941 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1942 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1943 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1944 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1945 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
1949 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1950 * @name: name being audited
1951 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1953 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1955 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1958 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1959 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1961 if (!context->in_syscall)
1963 if (context->name_count
1964 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1965 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1966 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1967 else if (context->name_count > 1
1968 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1969 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1970 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1972 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1973 * associated name? */
1974 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
1976 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1977 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1979 handle_path(dentry);
1980 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode);
1984 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1985 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1986 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1987 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1989 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1990 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1991 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1992 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1993 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1994 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1995 * unsuccessful attempts.
1997 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
1998 const struct inode *parent)
2001 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2002 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2003 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2006 if (!context->in_syscall)
2011 /* determine matching parent */
2015 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
2016 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2017 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
2022 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
2023 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2024 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
2025 found_parent = n->name;
2030 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
2031 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2032 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
2037 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
2038 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
2039 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2041 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
2043 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2044 found_child = n->name;
2050 if (!found_parent) {
2051 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
2053 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2054 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2055 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent);
2059 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
2061 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2063 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2064 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2065 * audit_free_names() */
2067 context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
2068 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2069 /* don't call __putname() */
2070 context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
2072 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2076 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode);
2078 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2081 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2084 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2085 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2086 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2087 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2089 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2091 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2092 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
2094 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2097 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2098 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2099 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2100 *serial = ctx->serial;
2105 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2106 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2109 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
2110 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
2111 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2115 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2117 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
2119 unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2120 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
2122 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
2123 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2125 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
2127 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
2128 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2129 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
2130 task->pid, task_uid(task),
2131 task->loginuid, loginuid,
2132 task->sessionid, sessionid);
2136 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2137 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2142 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2145 * @u_attr: queue attributes
2147 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2149 int __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr __user *u_attr)
2151 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *ax;
2152 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2157 if (likely(!context))
2160 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2164 if (u_attr != NULL) {
2165 if (copy_from_user(&ax->attr, u_attr, sizeof(ax->attr))) {
2170 memset(&ax->attr, 0, sizeof(ax->attr));
2175 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2176 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2177 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2182 * __audit_mq_timedsend - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send
2183 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2184 * @msg_len: Message length
2185 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2186 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2188 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2190 int __audit_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2191 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
2193 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
2194 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2199 if (likely(!context))
2202 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2206 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
2207 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
2212 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
2215 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
2216 ax->msg_prio = msg_prio;
2218 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2219 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2220 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2225 * __audit_mq_timedreceive - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed receive
2226 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2227 * @msg_len: Message length
2228 * @u_msg_prio: Message priority
2229 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2231 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2233 int __audit_mq_timedreceive(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len,
2234 unsigned int __user *u_msg_prio,
2235 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
2237 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
2238 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2243 if (likely(!context))
2246 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2250 if (u_msg_prio != NULL) {
2251 if (get_user(ax->msg_prio, u_msg_prio)) {
2258 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
2259 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
2264 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
2267 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
2269 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2270 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2271 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2276 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2277 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2278 * @u_notification: Notification event
2280 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2283 int __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent __user *u_notification)
2285 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *ax;
2286 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2291 if (likely(!context))
2294 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2298 if (u_notification != NULL) {
2299 if (copy_from_user(&ax->notification, u_notification, sizeof(ax->notification))) {
2304 memset(&ax->notification, 0, sizeof(ax->notification));
2308 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2309 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2310 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2315 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2316 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2319 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2321 int __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2323 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *ax;
2324 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2329 if (likely(!context))
2332 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2337 ax->mqstat = *mqstat;
2339 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2340 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2341 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2346 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2347 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2350 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2352 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2353 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2354 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2355 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2356 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2357 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2358 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2362 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2363 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2364 * @uid: msgq user id
2365 * @gid: msgq group id
2366 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2368 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2370 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
2372 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2374 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2375 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2376 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2377 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2378 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2381 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2383 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2384 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2386 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
2389 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2393 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2394 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
2396 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2397 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2398 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2404 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2405 * @nargs: number of args
2409 void audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2411 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2413 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2416 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2417 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2418 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2422 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2423 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2424 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2426 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2428 int __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2430 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2431 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *ax;
2433 if (likely(!context)) {
2437 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2445 ax->d.type = AUDIT_FD_PAIR;
2446 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2447 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2452 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2453 * @len: data length in user space
2454 * @a: data address in kernel space
2456 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2458 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2460 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2462 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2465 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2466 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2469 context->sockaddr = p;
2472 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2473 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2477 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2479 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2481 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2482 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2483 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2484 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2485 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2486 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2490 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2491 * @sig: signal value
2492 * @t: task being signaled
2494 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2495 * and uid that is doing that.
2497 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2499 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2500 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2501 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2502 uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2504 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2505 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2506 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2507 if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
2508 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2510 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2511 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2513 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2517 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2518 * in audit_context */
2519 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2520 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2521 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2522 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2523 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2524 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2525 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2529 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2530 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2531 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2535 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2536 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2537 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2539 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2541 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2542 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2543 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2544 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2545 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2546 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2553 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2554 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2555 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2556 * @old: the old credentials
2558 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2559 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2563 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2564 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2566 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2567 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2568 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2569 struct dentry *dentry;
2571 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2575 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2576 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2577 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2579 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2580 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2583 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2584 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2585 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2586 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2588 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2589 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2590 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2592 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2593 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2594 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2599 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2600 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2601 * @new: the new credentials
2602 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2604 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2605 * audit system if applicable
2607 int __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
2608 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2610 struct audit_aux_data_capset *ax;
2611 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2613 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
2616 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2620 ax->d.type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2621 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2622 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2625 ax->cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2626 ax->cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2627 ax->cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2633 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2634 * @signr: signal value
2636 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2637 * should record the event for investigation.
2639 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2641 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2643 uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid;
2645 unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2650 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2653 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2654 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2655 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2656 auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
2657 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
2662 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
2663 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
2665 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
2666 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
2669 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2670 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2671 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);