1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <asm/atomic.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/module.h>
52 #include <linux/mount.h>
53 #include <linux/socket.h>
54 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
55 #include <linux/audit.h>
56 #include <linux/personality.h>
57 #include <linux/time.h>
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/compiler.h>
60 #include <asm/unistd.h>
61 #include <linux/security.h>
62 #include <linux/list.h>
63 #include <linux/tty.h>
64 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
65 #include <linux/highmem.h>
66 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
67 #include <linux/inotify.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
72 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
73 * for saving names from getname(). */
74 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
76 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
77 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
79 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
80 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
82 /* number of audit rules */
85 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
88 struct audit_cap_data {
89 kernel_cap_t permitted;
90 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
92 unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */
93 kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */
97 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
98 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
99 * pointers at syscall exit time).
101 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
104 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
105 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
113 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
114 unsigned int fcap_ver;
117 struct audit_aux_data {
118 struct audit_aux_data *next;
122 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
124 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
125 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
127 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open {
128 struct audit_aux_data d;
134 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv {
135 struct audit_aux_data d;
138 unsigned int msg_prio;
139 struct timespec abs_timeout;
142 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify {
143 struct audit_aux_data d;
145 struct sigevent notification;
148 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr {
149 struct audit_aux_data d;
151 struct mq_attr mqstat;
154 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
155 struct audit_aux_data d;
157 unsigned long qbytes;
164 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
165 struct audit_aux_data d;
168 struct mm_struct *mm;
171 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
172 struct audit_aux_data d;
174 unsigned long args[0];
177 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
178 struct audit_aux_data d;
183 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair {
184 struct audit_aux_data d;
188 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
189 struct audit_aux_data d;
190 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
191 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
192 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
193 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
194 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
195 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
199 struct audit_tree_refs {
200 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
201 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
204 /* The per-task audit context. */
205 struct audit_context {
206 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
207 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
208 enum audit_state state;
209 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
210 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
211 int major; /* syscall number */
212 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
213 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
214 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
215 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
217 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
218 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
220 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
221 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
222 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
224 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
226 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
227 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
228 unsigned long personality;
234 unsigned int target_sessionid;
236 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
238 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
247 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
248 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
250 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
251 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
252 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
256 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
263 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
265 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
266 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
268 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
269 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
271 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
272 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
275 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
276 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
277 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
279 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
280 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
282 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
283 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
287 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
289 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
290 case 4: /* socketcall */
291 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
293 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
299 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which)
301 unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT;
302 mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT;
307 if (index >= ctx->name_count)
309 if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1)
311 if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT)
317 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
318 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
319 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
320 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
321 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
322 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
323 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
326 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
327 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
329 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
330 int left = ctx->tree_count;
332 p->c[--left] = chunk;
333 ctx->tree_count = left;
342 ctx->tree_count = 30;
348 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
350 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
351 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
357 p->next = ctx->trees;
359 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
360 ctx->tree_count = 31;
365 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
366 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
368 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
369 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
372 /* we started with empty chain */
373 p = ctx->first_trees;
375 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
380 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
382 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
386 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
387 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
391 ctx->tree_count = count;
395 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
397 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
398 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
404 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
406 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
407 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
412 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
413 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
414 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
419 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
420 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
427 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
428 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
430 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
431 struct audit_krule *rule,
432 struct audit_context *ctx,
433 struct audit_names *name,
434 enum audit_state *state)
436 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
439 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
440 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
445 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
450 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
451 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
455 result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
458 result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
461 result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
464 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
467 result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
470 result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
473 result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
476 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
479 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
483 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
487 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
488 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
491 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
493 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
495 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
500 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
503 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
504 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
513 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
516 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
517 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
526 result = (name->ino == f->val);
528 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
529 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
537 if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
538 result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
539 name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
543 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
548 result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
550 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
551 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
552 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
555 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
556 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
557 match for now to avoid losing information that
558 may be wanted. An error message will also be
562 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
565 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
574 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
575 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
576 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
579 /* Find files that match */
581 result = security_audit_rule_match(
582 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
585 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
586 if (security_audit_rule_match(
595 /* Find ipc objects that match */
597 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
598 for (aux = ctx->aux; aux;
600 if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
601 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
602 if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
616 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
618 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
619 /* ignore this field for filtering */
623 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
626 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
633 if (rule->filterkey && ctx)
634 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
635 switch (rule->action) {
636 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
637 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
642 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
643 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
644 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
646 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
648 struct audit_entry *e;
649 enum audit_state state;
652 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
653 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
659 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
662 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
663 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
664 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
665 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
667 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
668 struct audit_context *ctx,
669 struct list_head *list)
671 struct audit_entry *e;
672 enum audit_state state;
674 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
675 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
678 if (!list_empty(list)) {
679 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
680 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
682 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
683 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
684 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
692 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
695 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
696 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
697 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
698 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
700 enum audit_state audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
701 struct audit_context *ctx)
704 struct audit_entry *e;
705 enum audit_state state;
707 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
708 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
711 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
712 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
713 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
714 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
715 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
716 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
718 if (list_empty(list))
721 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
722 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
723 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
730 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
733 void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
738 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
742 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
744 if (likely(!context))
746 context->return_valid = return_valid;
749 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
750 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
753 * This is actually a test for:
754 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
755 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
757 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
759 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
760 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
761 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
762 context->return_code = -EINTR;
764 context->return_code = return_code;
766 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
767 enum audit_state state;
769 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
770 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
771 context->auditable = 1;
775 state = audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
776 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
777 context->auditable = 1;
783 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
787 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
792 if (context->auditable
793 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
794 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
795 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
796 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
798 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
799 context->name_count, context->put_count,
801 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
802 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
803 context->names[i].name,
804 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
811 context->put_count = 0;
812 context->ino_count = 0;
815 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
816 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
817 __putname(context->names[i].name);
819 context->name_count = 0;
820 path_put(&context->pwd);
821 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
822 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
825 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
827 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
829 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
830 context->aux = aux->next;
833 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
834 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
839 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
840 enum audit_state state)
842 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
843 context->state = state;
846 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
848 struct audit_context *context;
850 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
852 audit_zero_context(context, state);
857 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
860 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
861 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
862 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
865 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
867 struct audit_context *context;
868 enum audit_state state;
870 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
871 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
873 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
874 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
877 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
878 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
882 tsk->audit_context = context;
883 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
887 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
889 struct audit_context *previous;
893 previous = context->previous;
894 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
896 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
897 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
898 context->serial, context->major,
899 context->name_count, count);
901 audit_free_names(context);
902 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
903 free_tree_refs(context);
904 audit_free_aux(context);
905 kfree(context->filterkey);
910 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
913 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
920 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
924 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
926 if (error != -EINVAL)
931 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
932 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
936 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
940 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
942 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
944 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
945 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
946 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
950 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
951 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
952 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
955 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
958 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
960 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
961 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
966 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
968 audit_log_task_context(ab);
971 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
972 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
975 struct audit_buffer *ab;
980 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
984 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
986 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
987 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
990 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
991 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
993 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
994 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1001 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1002 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1003 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry)
1005 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1006 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1007 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1008 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1009 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1011 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1012 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1015 const char __user *p,
1018 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1019 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1020 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 3 is the length of a=\n */
1021 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 3;
1022 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1023 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1024 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1027 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1028 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1031 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1032 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1033 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1036 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1038 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1042 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1044 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1045 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1048 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1050 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1051 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1056 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1059 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1060 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1063 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1064 * send half as much in each message
1066 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1069 len_left -= to_send;
1071 } while (len_left > 0);
1075 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1078 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1079 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1082 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1083 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1087 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1088 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1090 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1092 room_left -= to_send;
1093 if (room_left < 0) {
1096 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1102 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1103 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1105 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1106 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d_len=%zu ", arg_num,
1107 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1110 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1111 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1112 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1114 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1115 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1120 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1123 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1125 /* actually log it */
1126 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d", arg_num);
1128 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1129 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1131 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1133 audit_log_format(*ab, "\"%s\"", buf);
1134 audit_log_format(*ab, "\n");
1137 len_left -= to_send;
1138 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1140 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1142 *len_sent += to_send;
1144 /* include the null we didn't log */
1148 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1149 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1150 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1153 size_t len, len_sent = 0;
1154 const char __user *p;
1157 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1158 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1160 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1162 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d ", axi->argc);
1165 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1166 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1167 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1168 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1170 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1172 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1176 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1177 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1186 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
1190 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1191 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
1192 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
1196 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1198 kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
1199 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
1202 if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
1203 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
1206 if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
1207 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
1212 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
1215 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1217 int i, call_panic = 0;
1218 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1219 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1222 /* tsk == current */
1223 context->pid = tsk->pid;
1225 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
1226 context->uid = tsk->uid;
1227 context->gid = tsk->gid;
1228 context->euid = tsk->euid;
1229 context->suid = tsk->suid;
1230 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
1231 context->egid = tsk->egid;
1232 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
1233 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
1234 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1236 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1238 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1239 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1240 context->arch, context->major);
1241 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1242 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1243 if (context->return_valid)
1244 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1245 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1246 context->return_code);
1248 spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1249 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1250 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
1253 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1255 audit_log_format(ab,
1256 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
1257 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1258 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1259 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
1264 context->name_count,
1270 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
1271 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
1275 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1276 if (context->filterkey) {
1277 audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
1278 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
1280 audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
1283 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1285 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1287 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1289 switch (aux->type) {
1290 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1291 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *axi = (void *)aux;
1292 audit_log_format(ab,
1293 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1294 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1295 axi->oflag, axi->mode, axi->attr.mq_flags,
1296 axi->attr.mq_maxmsg, axi->attr.mq_msgsize,
1297 axi->attr.mq_curmsgs);
1300 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1301 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *axi = (void *)aux;
1302 audit_log_format(ab,
1303 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1304 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1305 axi->mqdes, axi->msg_len, axi->msg_prio,
1306 axi->abs_timeout.tv_sec, axi->abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1309 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1310 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *axi = (void *)aux;
1311 audit_log_format(ab,
1312 "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1314 axi->notification.sigev_signo);
1317 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1318 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *axi = (void *)aux;
1319 audit_log_format(ab,
1320 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1323 axi->mqstat.mq_flags, axi->mqstat.mq_maxmsg,
1324 axi->mqstat.mq_msgsize, axi->mqstat.mq_curmsgs);
1328 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
1329 audit_log_format(ab,
1330 "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1331 axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
1332 if (axi->osid != 0) {
1335 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1336 axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1337 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
1341 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1342 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1347 case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
1348 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
1349 audit_log_format(ab,
1350 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1351 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
1354 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1355 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1356 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
1359 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1360 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
1361 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
1362 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
1363 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
1366 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
1367 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
1369 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1370 audit_log_n_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
1373 case AUDIT_FD_PAIR: {
1374 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *axs = (void *)aux;
1375 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs->fd[0], axs->fd[1]);
1382 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1383 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1385 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1386 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1387 axs->target_auid[i],
1389 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1391 axs->target_comm[i]))
1395 if (context->target_pid &&
1396 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1397 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1398 context->target_sessionid,
1399 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1402 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1403 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1405 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1409 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
1410 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
1412 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1414 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1416 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
1419 switch(n->name_len) {
1420 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1421 /* log the full path */
1422 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1423 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1426 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1427 * directory component is the cwd */
1428 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1431 /* log the name's directory component */
1432 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1433 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
1437 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1439 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1440 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1441 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1442 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1455 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1456 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1457 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1460 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1461 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1465 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1470 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1471 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1475 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1479 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1480 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1482 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1484 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1486 struct audit_context *context;
1488 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1489 if (likely(!context))
1492 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1493 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1494 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1495 * in the context of the idle thread */
1496 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1497 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1498 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1500 audit_free_context(context);
1504 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1505 * @tsk: task being audited
1506 * @arch: architecture type
1507 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1508 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1509 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1510 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1511 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1513 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1514 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1515 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1516 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1517 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1518 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1521 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1522 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1523 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1525 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1526 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1527 enum audit_state state;
1529 if (unlikely(!context))
1533 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1534 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1535 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1536 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1537 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1541 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1543 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1544 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1546 if (context->in_syscall) {
1547 struct audit_context *newctx;
1551 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1552 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1553 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1555 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1557 newctx->previous = context;
1559 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1561 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1562 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1563 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1564 * to abandon auditing. */
1565 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1568 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1573 context->arch = arch;
1574 context->major = major;
1575 context->argv[0] = a1;
1576 context->argv[1] = a2;
1577 context->argv[2] = a3;
1578 context->argv[3] = a4;
1580 state = context->state;
1581 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1582 if (!context->dummy && (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT))
1583 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1584 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1587 context->serial = 0;
1588 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1589 context->in_syscall = 1;
1590 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
1595 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1596 * @tsk: task being audited
1597 * @valid: success/failure flag
1598 * @return_code: syscall return value
1600 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1601 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1602 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1603 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1604 * free the names stored from getname().
1606 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
1608 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1609 struct audit_context *context;
1611 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1613 if (likely(!context))
1616 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1617 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1619 context->in_syscall = 0;
1620 context->auditable = 0;
1622 if (context->previous) {
1623 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1624 context->previous = NULL;
1625 audit_free_context(context);
1626 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1628 audit_free_names(context);
1629 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1630 audit_free_aux(context);
1631 context->aux = NULL;
1632 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1633 context->target_pid = 0;
1634 context->target_sid = 0;
1635 kfree(context->filterkey);
1636 context->filterkey = NULL;
1637 tsk->audit_context = context;
1641 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1643 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1644 struct audit_context *context;
1645 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1646 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1648 if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
1650 context = current->audit_context;
1652 count = context->tree_count;
1654 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1658 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1660 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1661 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1662 audit_set_auditable(context);
1663 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1664 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1667 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1671 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1673 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1674 struct audit_context *context;
1675 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1676 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1677 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1681 context = current->audit_context;
1683 count = context->tree_count;
1688 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1690 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1691 if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
1692 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1693 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1695 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1701 parent = d->d_parent;
1706 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1709 /* just a race with rename */
1710 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1713 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1714 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1715 /* OK, got more space */
1716 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1721 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1722 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1723 audit_set_auditable(context);
1731 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1732 * @name: name to add
1734 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1735 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1737 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
1739 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1741 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1744 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1745 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1746 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1747 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1752 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1753 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1754 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1755 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
1756 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1757 context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
1758 ++context->name_count;
1759 if (!context->pwd.dentry) {
1760 read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
1761 context->pwd = current->fs->pwd;
1762 path_get(¤t->fs->pwd);
1763 read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
1768 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1769 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1771 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1772 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1773 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1775 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1777 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1780 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1781 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1782 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1783 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1784 if (context->name_count) {
1786 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1787 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1788 context->names[i].name,
1789 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
1796 ++context->put_count;
1797 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1798 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1799 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1802 context->serial, context->major,
1803 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1804 context->put_count);
1811 static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
1812 const struct inode *inode)
1814 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
1816 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
1817 "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n",
1818 MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1819 MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1823 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n");
1826 context->name_count++;
1828 context->ino_count++;
1834 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1836 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1839 memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1840 memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1847 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1851 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1852 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1853 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1854 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1860 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1861 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1862 const struct inode *inode)
1864 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1865 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1866 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1867 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1868 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1869 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1870 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1871 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
1875 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1876 * @name: name being audited
1877 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1879 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1881 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1884 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1885 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1887 if (!context->in_syscall)
1889 if (context->name_count
1890 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1891 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1892 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1893 else if (context->name_count > 1
1894 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1895 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1896 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1898 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1899 * associated name? */
1900 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
1902 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1903 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1905 handle_path(dentry);
1906 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode);
1910 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1911 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1912 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1913 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1915 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1916 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1917 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1918 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1919 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1920 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1921 * unsuccessful attempts.
1923 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
1924 const struct inode *parent)
1927 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1928 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
1929 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1932 if (!context->in_syscall)
1937 /* determine matching parent */
1941 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
1942 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
1943 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
1948 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
1949 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
1950 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
1951 found_parent = n->name;
1956 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
1957 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
1958 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
1963 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
1964 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
1965 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
1967 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
1969 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1970 found_child = n->name;
1976 if (!found_parent) {
1977 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
1979 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1980 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1981 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent);
1985 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
1987 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1989 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1990 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1991 * audit_free_names() */
1993 context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
1994 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1995 /* don't call __putname() */
1996 context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
1998 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2002 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode);
2004 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2007 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2010 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2011 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2012 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2013 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2015 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2017 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2018 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
2021 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2022 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2023 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2024 *serial = ctx->serial;
2028 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2029 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2032 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
2033 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
2034 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2038 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2040 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
2042 unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2043 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
2045 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
2046 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2048 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
2050 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
2051 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2052 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
2053 task->pid, task->uid,
2054 task->loginuid, loginuid,
2055 task->sessionid, sessionid);
2059 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2060 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2065 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2068 * @u_attr: queue attributes
2070 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2072 int __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr __user *u_attr)
2074 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *ax;
2075 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2080 if (likely(!context))
2083 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2087 if (u_attr != NULL) {
2088 if (copy_from_user(&ax->attr, u_attr, sizeof(ax->attr))) {
2093 memset(&ax->attr, 0, sizeof(ax->attr));
2098 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2099 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2100 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2105 * __audit_mq_timedsend - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send
2106 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2107 * @msg_len: Message length
2108 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2109 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2111 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2113 int __audit_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2114 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
2116 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
2117 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2122 if (likely(!context))
2125 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2129 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
2130 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
2135 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
2138 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
2139 ax->msg_prio = msg_prio;
2141 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2142 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2143 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2148 * __audit_mq_timedreceive - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed receive
2149 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2150 * @msg_len: Message length
2151 * @u_msg_prio: Message priority
2152 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2154 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2156 int __audit_mq_timedreceive(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len,
2157 unsigned int __user *u_msg_prio,
2158 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
2160 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
2161 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2166 if (likely(!context))
2169 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2173 if (u_msg_prio != NULL) {
2174 if (get_user(ax->msg_prio, u_msg_prio)) {
2181 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
2182 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
2187 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
2190 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
2192 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2193 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2194 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2199 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2200 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2201 * @u_notification: Notification event
2203 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2206 int __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent __user *u_notification)
2208 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *ax;
2209 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2214 if (likely(!context))
2217 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2221 if (u_notification != NULL) {
2222 if (copy_from_user(&ax->notification, u_notification, sizeof(ax->notification))) {
2227 memset(&ax->notification, 0, sizeof(ax->notification));
2231 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2232 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2233 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2238 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2239 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2242 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2244 int __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2246 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *ax;
2247 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2252 if (likely(!context))
2255 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2260 ax->mqstat = *mqstat;
2262 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2263 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2264 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2269 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2270 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2272 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2274 int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2276 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
2277 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2279 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2283 ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
2284 ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
2285 ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
2286 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
2287 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
2288 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2289 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2294 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2295 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2296 * @uid: msgq user id
2297 * @gid: msgq group id
2298 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2300 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2302 int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
2304 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
2305 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2307 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2311 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
2316 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
2317 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2318 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2322 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2324 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2325 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2327 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
2330 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2334 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2335 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
2337 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2338 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2339 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2345 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2346 * @nargs: number of args
2349 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2351 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2353 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
2354 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2356 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2359 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
2364 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2366 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2367 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2368 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2373 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2374 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2375 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2377 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2379 int __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2381 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2382 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *ax;
2384 if (likely(!context)) {
2388 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2396 ax->d.type = AUDIT_FD_PAIR;
2397 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2398 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2403 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2404 * @len: data length in user space
2405 * @a: data address in kernel space
2407 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2409 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2411 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
2412 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2414 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2417 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
2422 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
2424 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
2425 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2426 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2430 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2432 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2434 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2435 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2436 context->target_uid = t->uid;
2437 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2438 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2439 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2443 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2444 * @sig: signal value
2445 * @t: task being signaled
2447 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2448 * and uid that is doing that.
2450 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2452 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2453 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2454 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2456 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2457 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2458 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2459 if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
2460 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2462 audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
2463 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2465 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2469 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2470 * in audit_context */
2471 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2472 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2473 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2474 ctx->target_uid = t->uid;
2475 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2476 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2477 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2481 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2482 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2483 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2487 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2488 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2489 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2491 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2493 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2494 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2495 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t->uid;
2496 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2497 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2498 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2505 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2506 * @signr: signal value
2508 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2509 * should record the event for investigation.
2511 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2513 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2515 uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2516 unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2521 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2524 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2525 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2526 auid, current->uid, current->gid, sessionid);
2527 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
2532 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
2533 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
2535 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
2536 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
2539 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2540 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2541 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);