int flags = nfsexp_flags(rqstp, exp);
int ret;
+ /* discard any old override before preparing the new set */
+ revert_creds(get_cred(current->real_cred));
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
else
new->cap_effective = cap_raise_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective,
new->cap_permitted);
- return commit_creds(new);
+ put_cred(override_creds(new));
+ return 0;
oom:
ret = -ENOMEM;
extern struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void);
extern int commit_creds(struct cred *);
extern void abort_creds(struct cred *);
-extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *) __deprecated;
-extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *) __deprecated;
+extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
+extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
extern void __init cred_init(void);
/**
}
/**
- * current_cred - Access the current task's credentials
+ * current_cred - Access the current task's subjective credentials
*
- * Access the credentials of the current task.
+ * Access the subjective credentials of the current task.
*/
#define current_cred() \
(current->cred)
/**
- * __task_cred - Access another task's credentials
+ * __task_cred - Access a task's objective credentials
* @task: The task to query
*
- * Access the credentials of another task. The caller must hold the
- * RCU readlock.
+ * Access the objective credentials of a task. The caller must hold the RCU
+ * readlock.
*
* The caller must make sure task doesn't go away, either by holding a ref on
* task or by holding tasklist_lock to prevent it from being unlinked.
*/
#define __task_cred(task) \
- ((const struct cred *)(rcu_dereference((task)->cred)))
+ ((const struct cred *)(rcu_dereference((task)->real_cred)))
/**
- * get_task_cred - Get another task's credentials
+ * get_task_cred - Get another task's objective credentials
* @task: The task to query
*
- * Get the credentials of a task, pinning them so that they can't go away.
- * Accessing a task's credentials directly is not permitted.
+ * Get the objective credentials of a task, pinning them so that they can't go
+ * away. Accessing a task's credentials directly is not permitted.
*
* The caller must make sure task doesn't go away, either by holding a ref on
* task or by holding tasklist_lock to prevent it from being unlinked.
})
/**
- * get_current_cred - Get the current task's credentials
+ * get_current_cred - Get the current task's subjective credentials
*
- * Get the credentials of the current task, pinning them so that they can't go
- * away. Accessing the current task's credentials directly is not permitted.
+ * Get the subjective credentials of the current task, pinning them so that
+ * they can't go away. Accessing the current task's credentials directly is
+ * not permitted.
*/
#define get_current_cred() \
(get_cred(current_cred()))
.children = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.children), \
.sibling = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.sibling), \
.group_leader = &tsk, \
+ .real_cred = &init_cred, \
.cred = &init_cred, \
.cred_exec_mutex = \
__MUTEX_INITIALIZER(tsk.cred_exec_mutex), \
struct list_head cpu_timers[3];
/* process credentials */
- const struct cred *cred; /* actual/objective task credentials (COW) */
+ const struct cred *real_cred; /* objective and real subjective task
+ * credentials (COW) */
+ const struct cred *cred; /* effective (overridable) subjective task
+ * credentials (COW) */
struct mutex cred_exec_mutex; /* execve vs ptrace cred calculation mutex */
char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; /* executable name excluding path
* The initial credentials for the initial task
*/
struct cred init_cred = {
- .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(3),
+ .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(4),
.securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT,
.cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET,
.cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET,
* prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by
* calling commit_creds().
*
+ * Preparation involves making a copy of the objective creds for modification.
+ *
* Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise.
*
* Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up.
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
- BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->cred->usage) < 1);
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->real_cred->usage) < 1);
new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
*
* We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new
* set.
+ *
+ * The new process gets the current process's subjective credentials as its
+ * objective and subjective credentials
*/
int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
#endif
clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD
) {
+ p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
get_cred(p->cred);
atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
return 0;
#endif
atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
- p->cred = new;
+ p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
return 0;
}
* @new: The credentials to be assigned
*
* Install a new set of credentials to the current task, using RCU to replace
- * the old set.
+ * the old set. Both the objective and the subjective credentials pointers are
+ * updated. This function may not be called if the subjective credentials are
+ * in an overridden state.
*
* This function eats the caller's reference to the new credentials.
*
struct task_struct *task = current;
const struct cred *old;
+ BUG_ON(task->cred != task->real_cred);
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->real_cred->usage) < 2);
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
- BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->cred->usage) < 1);
- old = task->cred;
+ old = task->real_cred;
security_commit_creds(new, old);
+ get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
+
/* dumpability changes */
if (old->euid != new->euid ||
old->egid != new->egid ||
*/
if (new->user != old->user)
atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
if (new->user != old->user)
atomic_dec(&old->user->processes);
new->fsgid != old->fsgid)
proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_GID);
+ /* release the old obj and subj refs both */
+ put_cred(old);
put_cred(old);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort_creds);
/**
- * override_creds - Temporarily override the current process's credentials
+ * override_creds - Override the current process's subjective credentials
* @new: The credentials to be assigned
*
- * Install a set of temporary override credentials on the current process,
- * returning the old set for later reversion.
+ * Install a set of temporary override subjective credentials on the current
+ * process, returning the old set for later reversion.
*/
const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
{
EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds);
/**
- * revert_creds - Revert a temporary credentials override
+ * revert_creds - Revert a temporary subjective credentials override
* @old: The credentials to be restored
*
- * Revert a temporary set of override credentials to an old set, discarding the
- * override set.
+ * Revert a temporary set of override subjective credentials to an old set,
+ * discarding the override set.
*/
void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
{
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&tsk->usage));
WARN_ON(tsk == current);
+ put_cred(tsk->real_cred);
put_cred(tsk->cred);
delayacct_tsk_free(tsk);
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
#endif
retval = -EAGAIN;
- if (atomic_read(&p->cred->user->processes) >=
+ if (atomic_read(&p->real_cred->user->processes) >=
p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) {
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
- p->cred->user != current->nsproxy->user_ns->root_user)
+ p->real_cred->user != current->nsproxy->user_ns->root_user)
goto bad_fork_free;
}
module_put(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module);
bad_fork_cleanup_count:
atomic_dec(&p->cred->user->processes);
+ put_cred(p->real_cred);
put_cred(p->cred);
bad_fork_free:
free_task(p);
*/
static void cred_init_security(void)
{
- struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
+ struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
}
/*
- * get the security ID of a task
+ * get the objective security ID of a task
*/
static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
{
}
/*
- * get the security ID of the current task
+ * get the subjective security ID of the current task
*/
static inline u32 current_sid(void)
{
* Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
* fork check, ptrace check, etc.
* tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
+ * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
*/
static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
const struct task_struct *tsk2,
return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
}
+/*
+ * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
+ * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
+ * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
+ * - this uses current's subjective creds
+ */
+static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
+ u32 perms)
+{
+ u32 sid, tsid;
+
+ sid = current_sid();
+ tsid = task_sid(tsk);
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
+}
+
#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
#endif
return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
}
- return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
+ return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
}
static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
int error;
- error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
+ error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
if (error)
return error;
} else if (!vma->vm_file &&
vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
- rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
+ rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
} else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
/*
* We are making executable a file mapping that has
if (rc)
return rc;
- return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
+ return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
}
/*
static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
}
static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
}
static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
}
static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
if (rc)
return rc;
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
if (rc)
return rc;
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
- return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
+ return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
return 0;
}
if (rc)
return rc;
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
else
- rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
+ rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
return rc;
}
unsigned len;
if (current != p) {
- error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
+ error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
if (error)
return error;
}
* above restriction is ever removed.
*/
if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
- error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
+ error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
- error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
+ error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
- error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
+ error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
- error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
+ error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
- error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
+ error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
else
error = -EINVAL;
if (error)
git://ftp.safe.ca / safe / jmp / linux-2.6 / commitdiff