Currently SELinux jumps through some ugly hoops to not audit a capbility

check when determining if a process has additional powers to override
memory limits or when trying to read/write illegal file labels.  Use
the new noaudit call instead.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 88a3ee3..378dc53 100644 (file)
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1979,16 +1979,8 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
        int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
-       struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
-
-       rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
-       if (rc == 0)
-               rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
-                                         SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
-                                         CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
-                                         0,
-                                         NULL);
 
+       rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
        if (rc == 0)
                cap_sys_admin = 1;
 
@@ -2820,7 +2812,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
        u32 size;
        int error;
        char *context = NULL;
-       struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
        struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 
        if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
@@ -2835,13 +2826,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
         * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
         * in-core context value, not a denial.
         */
-       error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
-       if (!error)
-               error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
-                                            SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
-                                            CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
-                                            0,
-                                            NULL);
+       error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
        if (!error)
                error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
                                                      &size);