* Implementation of the security services.
*
* Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
- * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
*
* Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
*
*
* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
*
- * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
*
* Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
*
* Added support for NetLabel
+ * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
*
* Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
*
* Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
*
- * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
* Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
* Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include "flask.h"
#include "netlabel.h"
#include "xfrm.h"
#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "audit.h"
extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
-/*
- * This is declared in avc.c
- */
-extern const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm;
+int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
+int selinux_policycap_openperm;
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
-#define POLICY_RDLOCK read_lock(&policy_rwlock)
-#define POLICY_WRLOCK write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
-#define POLICY_RDUNLOCK read_unlock(&policy_rwlock)
-#define POLICY_WRUNLOCK write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
-
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(load_mutex);
-#define LOAD_LOCK mutex_lock(&load_mutex)
-#define LOAD_UNLOCK mutex_unlock(&load_mutex)
static struct sidtab sidtab;
struct policydb policydb;
-int ss_initialized = 0;
+int ss_initialized;
/*
* The largest sequence number that has been used when
* The sequence number only changes when a policy change
* occurs.
*/
-static u32 latest_granting = 0;
+static u32 latest_granting;
/* Forward declaration. */
static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
u32 *scontext_len);
+static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd);
+
+struct selinux_mapping {
+ u16 value; /* policy value */
+ unsigned num_perms;
+ u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8];
+};
+
+static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
+static u16 current_mapping_size;
+
+static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
+ struct security_class_mapping *map,
+ struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p,
+ u16 *out_map_size)
+{
+ struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL;
+ size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
+ u16 i, j;
+ unsigned k;
+ bool print_unknown_handle = false;
+
+ /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
+ if (!map)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ i = 0;
+ while (map[i].name)
+ i++;
+
+ /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
+ out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!out_map)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Store the raw class and permission values */
+ j = 0;
+ while (map[j].name) {
+ struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
+ struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j;
+
+ /* An empty class string skips ahead */
+ if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
+ p_out->num_perms = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
+ if (!p_out->value) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO
+ "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+ p_in->name);
+ if (pol->reject_unknown)
+ goto err;
+ p_out->num_perms = 0;
+ print_unknown_handle = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ k = 0;
+ while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) {
+ /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
+ if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
+ k++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
+ p_in->perms[k]);
+ if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO
+ "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+ p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
+ if (pol->reject_unknown)
+ goto err;
+ print_unknown_handle = true;
+ }
+
+ k++;
+ }
+ p_out->num_perms = k;
+ }
+
+ if (print_unknown_handle)
+ printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
+ pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
+
+ *out_map_p = out_map;
+ *out_map_size = i;
+ return 0;
+err:
+ kfree(out_map);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get real, policy values from mapped values
+ */
+
+static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
+{
+ if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
+ return current_mapping[tclass].value;
+
+ return tclass;
+}
+
+static u32 unmap_perm(u16 tclass, u32 tperm)
+{
+ if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
+ unsigned i;
+ u32 kperm = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < current_mapping[tclass].num_perms; i++)
+ if (tperm & (1<<i)) {
+ kperm |= current_mapping[tclass].perms[i];
+ tperm &= ~(1<<i);
+ }
+ return kperm;
+ }
+
+ return tperm;
+}
+
+static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+ int allow_unknown)
+{
+ if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
+ unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms;
+ u32 result;
+
+ for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ }
+ avd->allowed = result;
+
+ for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
+ if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ avd->auditallow = result;
+
+ for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ }
+ avd->auditdeny = result;
+ }
+}
+
+
/*
* Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
* when it is applied to the specified source and target
val1 - 1);
continue;
case CEXPR_INCOMP:
- s[++sp] = ( !ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
- val2 - 1) &&
- !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
- val1 - 1) );
+ s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+ val2 - 1) &&
+ !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+ val1 - 1));
continue;
default:
break;
}
/*
+ * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
+ * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
+ */
+static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+ struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
+ char **permission_names = args;
+
+ BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
+
+ permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 permissions,
+ const char *reason)
+{
+ struct common_datum *common_dat;
+ struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ char *tclass_name;
+ char *scontext_name = NULL;
+ char *tcontext_name = NULL;
+ char *permission_names[32];
+ int index, length;
+ bool need_comma = false;
+
+ if (!permissions)
+ return;
+
+ tclass_name = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
+ tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+ common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
+
+ /* init permission_names */
+ if (common_dat &&
+ hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
+ dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
+ dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
+ if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
+ &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
+ &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* audit a message */
+ ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
+ GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+ if (!ab)
+ goto out;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
+ "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
+ reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
+
+ for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+ u32 mask = (1 << index);
+
+ if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
+ need_comma ? "," : "",
+ permission_names[index]
+ ? permission_names[index] : "????");
+ need_comma = true;
+ }
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+out:
+ /* release scontext/tcontext */
+ kfree(tcontext_name);
+ kfree(scontext_name);
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
+ * on boundary constraint.
+ */
+static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ struct context lo_scontext;
+ struct context lo_tcontext;
+ struct av_decision lo_avd;
+ struct type_datum *source
+ = policydb.type_val_to_struct[scontext->type - 1];
+ struct type_datum *target
+ = policydb.type_val_to_struct[tcontext->type - 1];
+ u32 masked = 0;
+
+ if (source->bounds) {
+ memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
+
+ memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
+ lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
+
+ context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
+ tcontext,
+ tclass,
+ requested,
+ &lo_avd);
+ if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
+ return; /* no masked permission */
+ masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+ }
+
+ if (target->bounds) {
+ memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
+
+ memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
+ lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
+
+ context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
+ &lo_tcontext,
+ tclass,
+ requested,
+ &lo_avd);
+ if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
+ return; /* no masked permission */
+ masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+ }
+
+ if (source->bounds && target->bounds) {
+ memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
+ /*
+ * lo_scontext and lo_tcontext are already
+ * set up.
+ */
+
+ context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
+ &lo_tcontext,
+ tclass,
+ requested,
+ &lo_avd);
+ if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
+ return; /* no masked permission */
+ masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+ }
+
+ if (masked) {
+ /* mask violated permissions */
+ avd->allowed &= ~masked;
+
+ /* audit masked permissions */
+ security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
+ tclass, masked, "bounds");
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
* the permissions in a particular class.
*/
* to remain in the correct class.
*/
if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
- if (tclass >= SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET &&
- tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)
- tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
-
- if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av: unrecognized class %d\n",
- tclass);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+ if (tclass >= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET) &&
+ tclass <= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET))
+ tclass = unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET);
/*
* Initialize the access vectors to the default values.
*/
avd->allowed = 0;
- avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
avd->auditallow = 0;
avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+ avd->flags = 0;
+
+ if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
+ if (printk_ratelimit())
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
/*
* If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
sattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[scontext->type - 1];
tattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[tcontext->type - 1];
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
- if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(snode, i))
- continue;
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
- if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(tnode, j))
- continue;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
avkey.source_type = i + 1;
avkey.target_type = j + 1;
for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
- node != NULL;
+ node;
node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
!constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
constraint->expr)) {
- avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(constraint->permissions);
+ avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
}
constraint = constraint->next;
}
* role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
* pair.
*/
- if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS &&
- (avd->allowed & (PROCESS__TRANSITION | PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION)) &&
+ if (tclass == policydb.process_class &&
+ (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) &&
scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
break;
}
if (!ra)
- avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
- PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
+ avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms;
}
+ /*
+ * If the given source and target types have boundary
+ * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
+ * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
+ */
+ type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
+ tclass, requested, avd);
+
return 0;
}
static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
- struct context *ncontext,
- struct context *tcontext,
- u16 tclass)
+ struct context *ncontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass)
{
char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
goto out;
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
- "security_validate_transition: denied for"
- " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
- o, n, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
+ "security_validate_transition: denied for"
+ " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+ o, n, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
out:
kfree(o);
kfree(n);
}
int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
- u16 tclass)
+ u16 orig_tclass)
{
struct context *ocontext;
struct context *ncontext;
struct context *tcontext;
struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
struct constraint_node *constraint;
+ u16 tclass;
int rc = 0;
if (!ss_initialized)
return 0;
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+ tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
/*
* Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions.
* to remain in the correct class.
*/
if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
- if (tclass >= SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET &&
- tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)
- tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+ if (tclass >= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET) &&
+ tclass <= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET))
+ tclass = unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET);
if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
- "unrecognized class %d\n", tclass);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n",
+ __func__, tclass);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
if (!ocontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
- " unrecognized SID %d\n", oldsid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, oldsid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
if (!ncontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
- " unrecognized SID %d\n", newsid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, newsid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
if (!tcontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
- " unrecognized SID %d\n", tasksid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tasksid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
while (constraint) {
if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
- constraint->expr)) {
+ constraint->expr)) {
rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
- tcontext, tclass);
+ tcontext, tclass);
goto out;
}
constraint = constraint->next;
}
out:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
+ * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
+ * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
+ * Otherwise, it returns error code.
+ *
+ * @oldsid : current security identifier
+ * @newsid : destinated security identifier
+ */
+int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
+{
+ struct context *old_context, *new_context;
+ struct type_datum *type;
+ int index;
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+ old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
+ if (!old_context) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
+ __func__, old_sid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
+ if (!new_context) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
+ __func__, new_sid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* type/domain unchaned */
+ if (old_context->type == new_context->type) {
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ index = new_context->type;
+ while (true) {
+ type = policydb.type_val_to_struct[index - 1];
+ BUG_ON(!type);
+
+ /* not bounded anymore */
+ if (!type->bounds) {
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
+ if (type->bounds == old_context->type) {
+ rc = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ index = type->bounds;
+ }
+
+ if (rc) {
+ char *old_name = NULL;
+ char *new_name = NULL;
+ int length;
+
+ if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
+ &old_name, &length) &&
+ !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
+ &new_name, &length)) {
+ audit_log(current->audit_context,
+ GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+ "op=security_bounded_transition "
+ "result=denied "
+ "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
+ old_name, new_name);
+ }
+ kfree(new_name);
+ kfree(old_name);
+ }
+out:
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int security_compute_av_core(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass,
+ requested, avd);
+
+ /* permissive domain? */
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
+ avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
+
return rc;
}
*/
int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass,
- u32 requested,
+ u16 orig_tclass,
+ u32 orig_requested,
struct av_decision *avd)
{
- struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
- int rc = 0;
+ u16 tclass;
+ u32 requested;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized)
+ goto allow;
+
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+ requested = unmap_perm(orig_tclass, orig_requested);
+ tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+ if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+ if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+ goto allow;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ rc = security_compute_av_core(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);
+ map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+ return rc;
+allow:
+ avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
+ avd->auditallow = 0;
+ avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+ avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+ avd->flags = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ int rc;
if (!ss_initialized) {
avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
- avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
avd->auditallow = 0;
avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
avd->seqno = latest_granting;
return 0;
}
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
-
- scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
- if (!scontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av: unrecognized SID %d\n",
- ssid);
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
- if (!tcontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av: unrecognized SID %d\n",
- tsid);
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass,
- requested, avd);
-out:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+ rc = security_compute_av_core(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
*scontext = NULL;
*scontext_len = 0;
+ if (context->len) {
+ *scontext_len = context->len;
+ *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!(*scontext))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
/* Compute the size of the context. */
*scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) + 1;
*scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) + 1;
/* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!scontextp) {
+ if (!scontextp)
return -ENOMEM;
- }
*scontext = scontextp;
/*
policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1],
policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) +
- 1 + strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) +
- 1 + strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
+ 1 + strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) +
+ 1 + strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
}
-/**
- * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
- * @sid: security identifier, SID
- * @scontext: security context
- * @scontext_len: length in bytes
- *
- * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
- * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
- * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
- */
-int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
+ u32 *scontext_len, int force)
{
struct context *context;
int rc = 0;
char *scontextp;
*scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
- scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len,GFP_ATOMIC);
+ scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!scontextp) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
*scontext = scontextp;
goto out;
}
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_to_context: called before initial "
- "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", sid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: called before initial "
+ "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
- context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+ if (force)
+ context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
+ else
+ context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
if (!context) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_to_context: unrecognized SID "
- "%d\n", sid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
out_unlock:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
out:
return rc;
}
-static int security_context_to_sid_core(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, u32 def_sid)
+/**
+ * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
+ * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0);
+}
+
+int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Caveat: Mutates scontext.
+ */
+static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
+ struct sidtab *sidtabp,
+ char *scontext,
+ u32 scontext_len,
+ struct context *ctx,
+ u32 def_sid)
{
- char *scontext2;
- struct context context;
struct role_datum *role;
struct type_datum *typdatum;
struct user_datum *usrdatum;
char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
int rc = 0;
- if (!ss_initialized) {
- int i;
-
- for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
- if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
- *sid = i;
- goto out;
- }
- }
- *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
- goto out;
- }
- *sid = SECSID_NULL;
-
- /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it.
- The string should already by null terminated, but we append a
- null suffix to the copy to avoid problems with the existing
- attr package, which doesn't view the null terminator as part
- of the attribute value. */
- scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1,GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!scontext2) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
- scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
-
- context_init(&context);
- *sid = SECSID_NULL;
-
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ context_init(ctx);
/* Parse the security context. */
rc = -EINVAL;
- scontextp = (char *) scontext2;
+ scontextp = (char *) scontext;
/* Extract the user. */
p = scontextp;
p++;
if (*p == 0)
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto out;
*p++ = 0;
- usrdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, scontextp);
+ usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
if (!usrdatum)
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto out;
- context.user = usrdatum->value;
+ ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
/* Extract role. */
scontextp = p;
p++;
if (*p == 0)
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto out;
*p++ = 0;
- role = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, scontextp);
+ role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
if (!role)
- goto out_unlock;
- context.role = role->value;
+ goto out;
+ ctx->role = role->value;
/* Extract type. */
scontextp = p;
oldc = *p;
*p++ = 0;
- typdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, scontextp);
- if (!typdatum)
- goto out_unlock;
-
- context.type = typdatum->value;
+ typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
+ if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
+ goto out;
+
+ ctx->type = typdatum->value;
- rc = mls_context_to_sid(oldc, &p, &context, &sidtab, def_sid);
+ rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
if (rc)
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto out;
- if ((p - scontext2) < scontext_len) {
+ if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len) {
rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto out;
}
/* Check the validity of the new context. */
- if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &context)) {
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx)) {
rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ if (rc)
+ context_destroy(ctx);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+ u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
+ int force)
+{
+ char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
+ struct context context;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+ if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
+ *sid = i;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
+ scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1, gfp_flags);
+ if (!scontext2)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
+ scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
+
+ if (force) {
+ /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
+ str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
+ if (!str) {
+ kfree(scontext2);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
}
- /* Obtain the new sid. */
+
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+ rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab,
+ scontext2, scontext_len,
+ &context, def_sid);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
+ context.str = str;
+ context.len = scontext_len;
+ str = NULL;
+ } else if (rc)
+ goto out;
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
-out_unlock:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
context_destroy(&context);
- kfree(scontext2);
out:
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+ kfree(scontext2);
+ kfree(str);
return rc;
}
* Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
* memory is available, or 0 on success.
*/
-int security_context_to_sid(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
+int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
{
return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
- sid, SECSID_NULL);
+ sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
}
/**
* @scontext: security context
* @scontext_len: length in bytes
* @sid: security identifier, SID
- * @def_sid: default SID to assign on errror
+ * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
*
* Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
* has the string representation specified by @scontext.
* The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
* kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
* (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
+ * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
* Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
* memory is available, or 0 on success.
*/
-int security_context_to_sid_default(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, u32 def_sid)
+int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+ u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+ return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+ sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
+}
+
+int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+ u32 *sid)
{
return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
- sid, def_sid);
+ sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
}
static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass,
+ u16 orig_tclass,
u32 specified,
- u32 *out_sid)
+ u32 *out_sid,
+ bool kern)
{
struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
struct avtab_key avkey;
struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
struct avtab_node *node;
+ u16 tclass;
int rc = 0;
if (!ss_initialized) {
- switch (tclass) {
- case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+ switch (orig_tclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
*out_sid = ssid;
break;
default:
context_init(&newcontext);
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+ if (kern)
+ tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+ else
+ tclass = orig_tclass;
scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
if (!scontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_sid: unrecognized SID %d\n",
- ssid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
if (!tcontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_sid: unrecognized SID %d\n",
- tsid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
/* Set the role and type to default values. */
- switch (tclass) {
- case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+ if (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
/* Use the current role and type of process. */
newcontext.role = scontext->role;
newcontext.type = scontext->type;
- break;
- default:
+ } else {
/* Use the well-defined object role. */
newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
/* Use the type of the related object. */
avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
/* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
- if(!avdatum) {
+ if (!avdatum) {
node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
- for (; node != NULL; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
+ for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
avdatum = &node->datum;
break;
}
/* Check for class-specific changes. */
- switch (tclass) {
- case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+ if (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
/* Look for a role transition rule. */
for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr;
}
}
}
- break;
- default:
- break;
}
/* Set the MLS attributes.
/* Obtain the sid for the context. */
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
out_unlock:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
context_destroy(&newcontext);
out:
return rc;
u16 tclass,
u32 *out_sid)
{
- return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, out_sid);
+ return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+ out_sid, true);
+}
+
+int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+ out_sid, false);
}
/**
u16 tclass,
u32 *out_sid)
{
- return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid);
+ return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid,
+ false);
}
/**
u16 tclass,
u32 *out_sid)
{
- return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid);
-}
-
-/*
- * Verify that each kernel class that is defined in the
- * policy is correct
- */
-static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
-{
- int i, j;
- struct class_datum *cladatum;
- struct perm_datum *perdatum;
- u32 nprim, tmp, common_pts_len, perm_val, pol_val;
- u16 class_val;
- const struct selinux_class_perm *kdefs = &selinux_class_perm;
- const char *def_class, *def_perm, *pol_class;
- struct symtab *perms;
-
- for (i = 1; i < kdefs->cts_len; i++) {
- def_class = kdefs->class_to_string[i];
- if (!def_class)
- continue;
- if (i > p->p_classes.nprim) {
- printk(KERN_INFO
- "security: class %s not defined in policy\n",
- def_class);
- continue;
- }
- pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[i-1];
- if (strcmp(pol_class, def_class)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "security: class %d is incorrect, found %s but should be %s\n",
- i, pol_class, def_class);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- }
- for (i = 0; i < kdefs->av_pts_len; i++) {
- class_val = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].tclass;
- perm_val = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].value;
- def_perm = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].name;
- if (class_val > p->p_classes.nprim)
- continue;
- pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[class_val-1];
- cladatum = hashtab_search(p->p_classes.table, pol_class);
- BUG_ON(!cladatum);
- perms = &cladatum->permissions;
- nprim = 1 << (perms->nprim - 1);
- if (perm_val > nprim) {
- printk(KERN_INFO
- "security: permission %s in class %s not defined in policy\n",
- def_perm, pol_class);
- continue;
- }
- perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm);
- if (perdatum == NULL) {
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "security: permission %s in class %s not found in policy\n",
- def_perm, pol_class);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- pol_val = 1 << (perdatum->value - 1);
- if (pol_val != perm_val) {
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "security: permission %s in class %s has incorrect value\n",
- def_perm, pol_class);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- }
- for (i = 0; i < kdefs->av_inherit_len; i++) {
- class_val = kdefs->av_inherit[i].tclass;
- if (class_val > p->p_classes.nprim)
- continue;
- pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[class_val-1];
- cladatum = hashtab_search(p->p_classes.table, pol_class);
- BUG_ON(!cladatum);
- if (!cladatum->comdatum) {
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "security: class %s should have an inherits clause but does not\n",
- pol_class);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- tmp = kdefs->av_inherit[i].common_base;
- common_pts_len = 0;
- while (!(tmp & 0x01)) {
- common_pts_len++;
- tmp >>= 1;
- }
- perms = &cladatum->comdatum->permissions;
- for (j = 0; j < common_pts_len; j++) {
- def_perm = kdefs->av_inherit[i].common_pts[j];
- if (j >= perms->nprim) {
- printk(KERN_INFO
- "security: permission %s in class %s not defined in policy\n",
- def_perm, pol_class);
- continue;
- }
- perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm);
- if (perdatum == NULL) {
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "security: permission %s in class %s not found in policy\n",
- def_perm, pol_class);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- if (perdatum->value != j + 1) {
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "security: permission %s in class %s has incorrect value\n",
- def_perm, pol_class);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- }
- }
- return 0;
+ return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid,
+ false);
}
/* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
char *s;
u32 len;
- context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len);
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: context %s is invalid\n", s);
- kfree(s);
+ if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n",
+ s);
+ kfree(s);
+ }
}
return rc;
}
args = p;
+ if (c->str) {
+ struct context ctx;
+ s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!s) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
+ c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
+ kfree(s);
+ if (!rc) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO
+ "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
+ c->str);
+ /* Replace string with mapped representation. */
+ kfree(c->str);
+ memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
+ goto out;
+ } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+ /* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
+ c->str, -rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
if (rc)
goto out;
/* Convert the user. */
usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
- args->oldp->p_user_val_to_name[c->user - 1]);
- if (!usrdatum) {
+ args->oldp->p_user_val_to_name[c->user - 1]);
+ if (!usrdatum)
goto bad;
- }
c->user = usrdatum->value;
/* Convert the role. */
role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
- args->oldp->p_role_val_to_name[c->role - 1]);
- if (!role) {
+ args->oldp->p_role_val_to_name[c->role - 1]);
+ if (!role)
goto bad;
- }
c->role = role->value;
/* Convert the type. */
typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
- args->oldp->p_type_val_to_name[c->type - 1]);
- if (!typdatum) {
+ args->oldp->p_type_val_to_name[c->type - 1]);
+ if (!typdatum)
goto bad;
- }
c->type = typdatum->value;
rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
}
context_destroy(&oldc);
+ rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
bad:
- context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
+ /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
+ if (context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len))
+ return -ENOMEM;
context_destroy(&oldc);
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: invalidating context %s\n", s);
- kfree(s);
+ context_destroy(c);
+ c->str = s;
+ c->len = len;
+ printk(KERN_INFO
+ "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
+ c->str);
+ rc = 0;
goto out;
}
+static void security_load_policycaps(void)
+{
+ selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
+ POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
+ selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
+ POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
+}
+
extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
{
struct policydb oldpolicydb, newpolicydb;
struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
+ struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
struct convert_context_args args;
u32 seqno;
+ u16 map_size;
int rc = 0;
struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
- LOAD_LOCK;
-
if (!ss_initialized) {
avtab_cache_init();
if (policydb_read(&policydb, fp)) {
- LOAD_UNLOCK;
avtab_cache_destroy();
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) {
- LOAD_UNLOCK;
+ if (selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
+ ¤t_mapping,
+ ¤t_mapping_size)) {
policydb_destroy(&policydb);
avtab_cache_destroy();
return -EINVAL;
}
- /* Verify that the kernel defined classes are correct. */
- if (validate_classes(&policydb)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "security: the definition of a class is incorrect\n");
- LOAD_UNLOCK;
- sidtab_destroy(&sidtab);
+ if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) {
policydb_destroy(&policydb);
avtab_cache_destroy();
return -EINVAL;
}
+ security_load_policycaps();
policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
ss_initialized = 1;
seqno = ++latest_granting;
- LOAD_UNLOCK;
selinux_complete_init();
avc_ss_reset(seqno);
selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
#endif
- if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp)) {
- LOAD_UNLOCK;
+ if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp))
return -EINVAL;
- }
- sidtab_init(&newsidtab);
+ if (sidtab_init(&newsidtab)) {
+ policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
- /* Verify that the kernel defined classes are correct. */
- if (validate_classes(&newpolicydb)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "security: the definition of a class is incorrect\n");
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicydb, secclass_map,
+ &map, &map_size))
goto err;
- }
rc = security_preserve_bools(&newpolicydb);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: unable to preserve booleans\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
goto err;
}
goto err;
}
- /* Convert the internal representations of contexts
- in the new SID table and remove invalid SIDs. */
+ /*
+ * Convert the internal representations of contexts
+ * in the new SID table.
+ */
args.oldp = &policydb;
args.newp = &newpolicydb;
- sidtab_map_remove_on_error(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
+ rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
/* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
memcpy(&oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb);
sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
/* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
- POLICY_WRLOCK;
+ write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
+ security_load_policycaps();
+ oldmap = current_mapping;
+ current_mapping = map;
+ current_mapping_size = map_size;
seqno = ++latest_granting;
policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
- POLICY_WRUNLOCK;
- LOAD_UNLOCK;
+ write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
/* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb);
sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
+ kfree(oldmap);
avc_ss_reset(seqno);
selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
return 0;
err:
- LOAD_UNLOCK;
+ kfree(map);
sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
return rc;
/**
* security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
- * @domain: communication domain aka address family
- * @type: socket type
* @protocol: protocol number
* @port: port number
* @out_sid: security identifier
*/
-int security_port_sid(u16 domain,
- u16 type,
- u8 protocol,
- u16 port,
- u32 *out_sid)
+int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
{
struct ocontext *c;
int rc = 0;
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
while (c) {
}
out:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
* security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
* @name: interface name
* @if_sid: interface SID
- * @msg_sid: default SID for received packets
*/
-int security_netif_sid(char *name,
- u32 *if_sid,
- u32 *msg_sid)
+int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
{
int rc = 0;
struct ocontext *c;
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
while (c) {
goto out;
}
*if_sid = c->sid[0];
- *msg_sid = c->sid[1];
- } else {
+ } else
*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
- *msg_sid = SECINITSID_NETMSG;
- }
out:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
{
int i, fail = 0;
- for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)
- if(addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
fail = 1;
break;
}
int rc = 0;
struct ocontext *c;
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
switch (domain) {
case AF_INET: {
}
out:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
*/
int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
- char *username,
+ char *username,
u32 **sids,
u32 *nel)
{
struct context *fromcon, usercon;
- u32 *mysids, *mysids2, sid;
+ u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
struct user_datum *user;
struct role_datum *role;
- struct av_decision avd;
struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
int rc = 0, i, j;
- if (!ss_initialized) {
- *sids = NULL;
- *nel = 0;
+ *sids = NULL;
+ *nel = 0;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized)
goto out;
- }
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+ context_init(&usercon);
fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
if (!fromcon) {
goto out_unlock;
}
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
- if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(rnode, i))
- continue;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
usercon.role = i+1;
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
- if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(tnode, j))
- continue;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
usercon.type = j+1;
if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
continue;
- rc = context_struct_compute_av(fromcon, &usercon,
- SECCLASS_PROCESS,
- PROCESS__TRANSITION,
- &avd);
- if (rc || !(avd.allowed & PROCESS__TRANSITION))
- continue;
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
- if (rc) {
- kfree(mysids);
+ if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
- }
if (mynel < maxnel) {
mysids[mynel++] = sid;
} else {
mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!mysids2) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
- kfree(mysids);
goto out_unlock;
}
memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
}
}
- *sids = mysids;
- *nel = mynel;
-
out_unlock:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+ if (rc || !mynel) {
+ kfree(mysids);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!mysids2) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ kfree(mysids);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
+ PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
+ NULL);
+ if (!rc)
+ mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+ kfree(mysids);
+ *sids = mysids2;
+ *nel = j;
out:
return rc;
}
* transition SIDs or task SIDs.
*/
int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
- char *path,
- u16 sclass,
+ char *path,
+ u16 orig_sclass,
u32 *sid)
{
int len;
+ u16 sclass;
struct genfs *genfs;
struct ocontext *c;
int rc = 0, cmp = 0;
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
+ path++;
+
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+ sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
*sid = c->sid[0];
out:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
int rc = 0;
struct ocontext *c;
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
while (c) {
}
out:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
{
int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
*names = NULL;
*values = NULL;
goto out;
}
- *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char*), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!*names)
goto err;
size_t name_len;
(*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
- (*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ (*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!(*names)[i])
goto err;
strncpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len);
}
rc = 0;
out:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
err:
if (*names) {
int lenp, seqno = 0;
struct cond_node *cur;
- POLICY_WRLOCK;
+ write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
if (len != lenp) {
if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u",
+ "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
!!values[i],
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
- audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
+ audit_get_loginuid(current),
+ audit_get_sessionid(current));
}
- if (values[i]) {
+ if (values[i])
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
- } else {
+ else
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
- }
}
- for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+ for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
if (rc)
goto out;
seqno = ++latest_granting;
out:
- POLICY_WRUNLOCK;
+ write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
if (!rc) {
avc_ss_reset(seqno);
selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
int rc = 0;
int len;
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
if (bool >= len) {
rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
out:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
if (booldatum)
booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
}
- for (cur = p->cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+ for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
if (rc)
goto out;
context_init(&newcon);
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
if (!context1) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_mls_copy: unrecognized SID "
- "%d\n", sid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
if (!context2) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_mls_copy: unrecognized SID "
- "%d\n", mls_sid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, mls_sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
out_unlock:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
context_destroy(&newcon);
out:
return rc;
}
+/**
+ * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
+ * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
+ * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
+ * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
+ * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
+ * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
+ * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
+ *
+ * | function return | @sid
+ * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
+ * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
+ * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
+ * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
+ * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
+ *
+ */
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+ u32 xfrm_sid,
+ u32 *peer_sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct context *nlbl_ctx;
+ struct context *xfrm_ctx;
+
+ /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
+ * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
+ * single or absent peer SID/label */
+ if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+ *peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
+ * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
+ * is present */
+ if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
+ *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
+ * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
+ * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
+ if (!selinux_mls_enabled) {
+ *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+ nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
+ if (!nlbl_ctx) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, nlbl_sid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_slowpath;
+ }
+ xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
+ if (!xfrm_ctx) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, xfrm_sid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_slowpath;
+ }
+ rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
+
+out_slowpath:
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
+ * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
+ * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
+ * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
+ * expressive */
+ *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+ else
+ *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
{
struct class_datum *datum = d;
{
int rc = -ENOMEM;
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
*nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
*classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(*classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
}
out:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
int rc = -ENOMEM, i;
struct class_datum *match;
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
if (!match) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s: unrecognized class %s\n",
- __FUNCTION__, class);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
+ __func__, class);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
goto err;
out:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
err:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
kfree((*perms)[i]);
kfree(*perms);
return rc;
}
+int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
+{
+ return policydb.reject_unknown;
+}
+
+int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
+{
+ return policydb.allow_unknown;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
+ * @req_cap: capability
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
+ * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is
+ * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
+ *
+ */
+int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+ rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
struct selinux_audit_rule {
u32 au_seqno;
struct context au_ctxt;
};
-void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
{
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+
if (rule) {
context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
kfree(rule);
}
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
{
struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
struct role_datum *roledatum;
struct type_datum *typedatum;
struct user_datum *userdatum;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
int rc = 0;
*rule = NULL;
if (!ss_initialized)
- return -ENOTSUPP;
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
switch (field) {
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
/* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
- if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
+ if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
break;
}
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
if (rc) {
selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
return rc;
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
- struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
{
struct context *ctxt;
struct mls_level *level;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
int match = 0;
if (!rule) {
audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
- "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
+ "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
- "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n");
+ "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n");
match = -ESTALE;
goto out;
}
ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
if (!ctxt) {
audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
- "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
- sid);
+ "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ sid);
match = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
switch (op) {
- case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_equal:
match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
break;
- case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_not_equal:
match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
break;
}
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
switch (op) {
- case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_equal:
match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
break;
- case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_not_equal:
match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
break;
}
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
switch (op) {
- case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_equal:
match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
break;
- case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_not_equal:
match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
break;
}
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
- field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
- &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
+ field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
+ &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
switch (op) {
- case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_equal:
match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
- level);
+ level);
break;
- case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_not_equal:
match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
- level);
+ level);
break;
- case AUDIT_LESS_THAN:
+ case Audit_lt:
match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
- level) &&
- !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
- level));
+ level) &&
+ !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level));
break;
- case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_le:
match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
- level);
+ level);
break;
- case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN:
+ case Audit_gt:
match = (mls_level_dom(level,
- &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
- !mls_level_eq(level,
- &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
+ !mls_level_eq(level,
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
break;
- case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_ge:
match = mls_level_dom(level,
- &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
break;
}
}
out:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return match;
}
-static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = NULL;
+static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
+ u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
{
int err = 0;
int err;
err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
- SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
+ SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
if (err)
panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
}
__initcall(aurule_init);
-void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
-{
- aurule_callback = callback;
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
-/*
- * NetLabel cache structure
- */
-#define NETLBL_CACHE(x) ((struct selinux_netlbl_cache *)(x))
-#define NETLBL_CACHE_T_NONE 0
-#define NETLBL_CACHE_T_SID 1
-#define NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS 2
-struct selinux_netlbl_cache {
- u32 type;
- union {
- u32 sid;
- struct mls_range mls_label;
- } data;
-};
-
-/**
- * security_netlbl_cache_free - Free the NetLabel cached data
- * @data: the data to free
- *
- * Description:
- * This function is intended to be used as the free() callback inside the
- * netlbl_lsm_cache structure.
- *
- */
-static void security_netlbl_cache_free(const void *data)
-{
- struct selinux_netlbl_cache *cache;
-
- if (data == NULL)
- return;
-
- cache = NETLBL_CACHE(data);
- switch (cache->type) {
- case NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS:
- ebitmap_destroy(&cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat);
- break;
- }
- kfree(data);
-}
-
/**
* security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
* @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
- * @ctx: the SELinux context
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
*
* Description:
* Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
*
*/
static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
- struct context *ctx)
+ u32 sid)
{
- struct selinux_netlbl_cache *cache = NULL;
+ u32 *sid_cache;
- secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (secattr->cache == NULL)
+ sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (sid_cache == NULL)
return;
-
- cache = kzalloc(sizeof(*cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (cache == NULL)
+ secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
+ kfree(sid_cache);
return;
+ }
- cache->type = NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS;
- if (ebitmap_cpy(&cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat,
- &ctx->range.level[0].cat) != 0)
- return;
- cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.highbit =
- cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.highbit;
- cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.node =
- cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.node;
- cache->data.mls_label.level[0].sens = ctx->range.level[0].sens;
- cache->data.mls_label.level[1].sens = ctx->range.level[0].sens;
-
- secattr->cache->free = security_netlbl_cache_free;
- secattr->cache->data = (void *)cache;
+ *sid_cache = sid;
+ secattr->cache->free = kfree;
+ secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
}
/**
* security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
* @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
- * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only attributes
* @sid: the SELinux SID
*
* Description:
* Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
* SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
- * SID/context then use the context in @base_sid as the foundation. If
- * possibile the 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set;
- * this is to allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to
- * SID conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative
- * values on failure.
+ * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possibile the
+ * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
+ * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
+ * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
*
*/
int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
- u32 base_sid,
u32 *sid)
{
int rc = -EIDRM;
struct context *ctx;
struct context ctx_new;
- struct selinux_netlbl_cache *cache;
if (!ss_initialized) {
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
return 0;
}
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) {
- cache = NETLBL_CACHE(secattr->cache->data);
- switch (cache->type) {
- case NETLBL_CACHE_T_SID:
- *sid = cache->data.sid;
- rc = 0;
- break;
- case NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS:
- ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, base_sid);
- if (ctx == NULL)
- goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
-
- ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
- ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
- ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
- ctx_new.range.level[0].sens =
- cache->data.mls_label.level[0].sens;
- ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.highbit =
- cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.highbit;
- ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.node =
- cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.node;
- ctx_new.range.level[1].sens =
- cache->data.mls_label.level[1].sens;
- ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.highbit =
- cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.highbit;
- ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.node =
- cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.node;
-
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
- break;
- default:
- goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
- }
+ *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
+ rc = 0;
+ } else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) {
+ *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+ rc = 0;
} else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
- ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, base_sid);
+ ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
+ context_init(&ctx_new);
ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
if (ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
- secattr->mls_cat) != 0)
+ secattr->attr.mls.cat) != 0)
goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
- ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.highbit =
- ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.highbit;
- ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.node =
- ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.node;
- } else {
- ebitmap_init(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
- ebitmap_init(&ctx_new.range.level[1].cat);
+ memcpy(&ctx_new.range.level[1].cat,
+ &ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
+ sizeof(ctx_new.range.level[0].cat));
}
if (mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new) != 1)
goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
if (rc != 0)
goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
- security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, &ctx_new);
+ security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
} else {
}
netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup:
ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
*/
int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
- int rc = -ENOENT;
+ int rc;
struct context *ctx;
- netlbl_secattr_init(secattr);
-
if (!ss_initialized)
return 0;
- POLICY_RDLOCK;
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
- if (ctx == NULL)
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOENT;
goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
+ }
secattr->domain = kstrdup(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[ctx->type - 1],
GFP_ATOMIC);
- secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN;
+ if (secattr->domain == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
+ }
+ secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+ secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
if (rc != 0)
goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return 0;
netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure:
- POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
- netlbl_secattr_destroy(secattr);
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
git://ftp.safe.ca / safe / jmp / linux-2.6 / blobdiff