-/* SCTP kernel reference Implementation
+/* SCTP kernel implementation
* (C) Copyright IBM Corp. 2001, 2004
* Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Cisco, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Motorola, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2002 Intel Corp.
*
- * This file is part of the SCTP kernel reference Implementation
+ * This file is part of the SCTP kernel implementation
*
* These functions work with the state functions in sctp_sm_statefuns.c
* to implement the state operations. These functions implement the
* steps which require modifying existing data structures.
*
- * The SCTP reference implementation is free software;
+ * This SCTP implementation is free software;
* you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of
* the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
* any later version.
*
- * The SCTP reference implementation is distributed in the hope that it
+ * This SCTP implementation is distributed in the hope that it
* will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
* ************************
* warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/inet.h>
-#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
union sctp_params param,
const union sctp_addr *peer_addr,
gfp_t gfp);
+static void *sctp_addto_param(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, int len,
+ const void *data);
/* What was the inbound interface for this chunk? */
int sctp_chunk_iif(const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
*/
static const struct sctp_paramhdr ecap_param = {
SCTP_PARAM_ECN_CAPABLE,
- __constant_htons(sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)),
+ cpu_to_be16(sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)),
};
static const struct sctp_paramhdr prsctp_param = {
SCTP_PARAM_FWD_TSN_SUPPORT,
- __constant_htons(sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)),
+ cpu_to_be16(sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)),
};
/* A helper to initialize to initialize an op error inside a
* abort chunk.
*/
void sctp_init_cause(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, __be16 cause_code,
- const void *payload, size_t paylen)
+ size_t paylen)
{
sctp_errhdr_t err;
- int padlen;
__u16 len;
/* Cause code constants are now defined in network order. */
err.cause = cause_code;
len = sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t) + paylen;
- padlen = len % 4;
err.length = htons(len);
- len += padlen;
chunk->subh.err_hdr = sctp_addto_chunk(chunk, sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t), &err);
- sctp_addto_chunk(chunk, paylen, payload);
}
/* 3.3.2 Initiation (INIT) (1)
sctp_supported_addrs_param_t sat;
__be16 types[2];
sctp_adaptation_ind_param_t aiparam;
+ sctp_supported_ext_param_t ext_param;
+ int num_ext = 0;
+ __u8 extensions[3];
+ sctp_paramhdr_t *auth_chunks = NULL,
+ *auth_hmacs = NULL;
/* RFC 2960 3.3.2 Initiation (INIT) (1)
*
chunksize = sizeof(init) + addrs_len + SCTP_SAT_LEN(num_types);
chunksize += sizeof(ecap_param);
+
if (sctp_prsctp_enable)
chunksize += sizeof(prsctp_param);
- chunksize += sizeof(aiparam);
+
+ /* ADDIP: Section 4.2.7:
+ * An implementation supporting this extension [ADDIP] MUST list
+ * the ASCONF,the ASCONF-ACK, and the AUTH chunks in its INIT and
+ * INIT-ACK parameters.
+ */
+ if (sctp_addip_enable) {
+ extensions[num_ext] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF;
+ extensions[num_ext+1] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK;
+ num_ext += 2;
+ }
+
+ if (sp->adaptation_ind)
+ chunksize += sizeof(aiparam);
+
chunksize += vparam_len;
+ /* Account for AUTH related parameters */
+ if (sctp_auth_enable) {
+ /* Add random parameter length*/
+ chunksize += sizeof(asoc->c.auth_random);
+
+ /* Add HMACS parameter length if any were defined */
+ auth_hmacs = (sctp_paramhdr_t *)asoc->c.auth_hmacs;
+ if (auth_hmacs->length)
+ chunksize += ntohs(auth_hmacs->length);
+ else
+ auth_hmacs = NULL;
+
+ /* Add CHUNKS parameter length */
+ auth_chunks = (sctp_paramhdr_t *)asoc->c.auth_chunks;
+ if (auth_chunks->length)
+ chunksize += ntohs(auth_chunks->length);
+ else
+ auth_chunks = NULL;
+
+ extensions[num_ext] = SCTP_CID_AUTH;
+ num_ext += 1;
+ }
+
+ /* If we have any extensions to report, account for that */
+ if (num_ext)
+ chunksize += sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t) + num_ext;
+
/* RFC 2960 3.3.2 Initiation (INIT) (1)
*
* Note 3: An INIT chunk MUST NOT contain more than one Host
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, num_types * sizeof(__u16), &types);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(ecap_param), &ecap_param);
+
+ /* Add the supported extensions parameter. Be nice and add this
+ * fist before addiding the parameters for the extensions themselves
+ */
+ if (num_ext) {
+ ext_param.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT;
+ ext_param.param_hdr.length =
+ htons(sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t) + num_ext);
+ sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t),
+ &ext_param);
+ sctp_addto_param(retval, num_ext, extensions);
+ }
+
if (sctp_prsctp_enable)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(prsctp_param), &prsctp_param);
- aiparam.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND;
- aiparam.param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(aiparam));
- aiparam.adaptation_ind = htonl(sp->adaptation_ind);
- sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(aiparam), &aiparam);
+
+ if (sp->adaptation_ind) {
+ aiparam.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND;
+ aiparam.param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(aiparam));
+ aiparam.adaptation_ind = htonl(sp->adaptation_ind);
+ sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(aiparam), &aiparam);
+ }
+
+ /* Add SCTP-AUTH chunks to the parameter list */
+ if (sctp_auth_enable) {
+ sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(asoc->c.auth_random),
+ asoc->c.auth_random);
+ if (auth_hmacs)
+ sctp_addto_chunk(retval, ntohs(auth_hmacs->length),
+ auth_hmacs);
+ if (auth_chunks)
+ sctp_addto_chunk(retval, ntohs(auth_chunks->length),
+ auth_chunks);
+ }
nodata:
kfree(addrs.v);
return retval;
sctp_inithdr_t initack;
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
union sctp_params addrs;
+ struct sctp_sock *sp;
int addrs_len;
sctp_cookie_param_t *cookie;
int cookie_len;
size_t chunksize;
sctp_adaptation_ind_param_t aiparam;
+ sctp_supported_ext_param_t ext_param;
+ int num_ext = 0;
+ __u8 extensions[3];
+ sctp_paramhdr_t *auth_chunks = NULL,
+ *auth_hmacs = NULL,
+ *auth_random = NULL;
retval = NULL;
/* Calculate the total size of allocation, include the reserved
* space for reporting unknown parameters if it is specified.
*/
+ sp = sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk);
chunksize = sizeof(initack) + addrs_len + cookie_len + unkparam_len;
/* Tell peer that we'll do ECN only if peer advertised such cap. */
if (asoc->peer.ecn_capable)
chunksize += sizeof(ecap_param);
- /* Tell peer that we'll do PR-SCTP only if peer advertised. */
if (asoc->peer.prsctp_capable)
chunksize += sizeof(prsctp_param);
- chunksize += sizeof(aiparam);
+ if (asoc->peer.asconf_capable) {
+ extensions[num_ext] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF;
+ extensions[num_ext+1] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK;
+ num_ext += 2;
+ }
+
+ if (sp->adaptation_ind)
+ chunksize += sizeof(aiparam);
+
+ if (asoc->peer.auth_capable) {
+ auth_random = (sctp_paramhdr_t *)asoc->c.auth_random;
+ chunksize += ntohs(auth_random->length);
+
+ auth_hmacs = (sctp_paramhdr_t *)asoc->c.auth_hmacs;
+ if (auth_hmacs->length)
+ chunksize += ntohs(auth_hmacs->length);
+ else
+ auth_hmacs = NULL;
+
+ auth_chunks = (sctp_paramhdr_t *)asoc->c.auth_chunks;
+ if (auth_chunks->length)
+ chunksize += ntohs(auth_chunks->length);
+ else
+ auth_chunks = NULL;
+
+ extensions[num_ext] = SCTP_CID_AUTH;
+ num_ext += 1;
+ }
+
+ if (num_ext)
+ chunksize += sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t) + num_ext;
/* Now allocate and fill out the chunk. */
retval = sctp_make_chunk(asoc, SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK, 0, chunksize);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, cookie_len, cookie);
if (asoc->peer.ecn_capable)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(ecap_param), &ecap_param);
+ if (num_ext) {
+ ext_param.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT;
+ ext_param.param_hdr.length =
+ htons(sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t) + num_ext);
+ sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t),
+ &ext_param);
+ sctp_addto_param(retval, num_ext, extensions);
+ }
if (asoc->peer.prsctp_capable)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(prsctp_param), &prsctp_param);
- aiparam.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND;
- aiparam.param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(aiparam));
- aiparam.adaptation_ind = htonl(sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk)->adaptation_ind);
- sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(aiparam), &aiparam);
+ if (sp->adaptation_ind) {
+ aiparam.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND;
+ aiparam.param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(aiparam));
+ aiparam.adaptation_ind = htonl(sp->adaptation_ind);
+ sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(aiparam), &aiparam);
+ }
+
+ if (asoc->peer.auth_capable) {
+ sctp_addto_chunk(retval, ntohs(auth_random->length),
+ auth_random);
+ if (auth_hmacs)
+ sctp_addto_chunk(retval, ntohs(auth_hmacs->length),
+ auth_hmacs);
+ if (auth_chunks)
+ sctp_addto_chunk(retval, ntohs(auth_chunks->length),
+ auth_chunks);
+ }
/* We need to remove the const qualifier at this point. */
retval->asoc = (struct sctp_association *) asoc;
__u32 ctsn;
__u16 num_gabs, num_dup_tsns;
struct sctp_tsnmap *map = (struct sctp_tsnmap *)&asoc->peer.tsn_map;
+ struct sctp_gap_ack_block gabs[SCTP_MAX_GABS];
+ memset(gabs, 0, sizeof(gabs));
ctsn = sctp_tsnmap_get_ctsn(map);
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("sackCTSNAck sent: 0x%x.\n", ctsn);
/* How much room is needed in the chunk? */
- num_gabs = sctp_tsnmap_num_gabs(map);
+ num_gabs = sctp_tsnmap_num_gabs(map, gabs);
num_dup_tsns = sctp_tsnmap_num_dups(map);
/* Initialize the SACK header. */
/* Add the gap ack block information. */
if (num_gabs)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(__u32) * num_gabs,
- sctp_tsnmap_get_gabs(map));
+ gabs);
/* Add the duplicate TSN information. */
if (num_dup_tsns)
/* Put the tsn back into network byte order. */
payload = htonl(tsn);
- sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_NO_DATA, (const void *)&payload,
- sizeof(payload));
+ sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_NO_DATA, sizeof(payload));
+ sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(payload), (const void *)&payload);
/* RFC 2960 6.4 Multi-homed SCTP Endpoints
*
goto err_copy;
}
- sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_USER_ABORT, payload, paylen);
+ sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_USER_ABORT, paylen);
+ sctp_addto_chunk(retval, paylen, payload);
if (paylen)
kfree(payload);
return retval;
}
+/* Append bytes to the end of a parameter. Will panic if chunk is not big
+ * enough.
+ */
+static void *sctp_addto_param(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, int len,
+ const void *data)
+{
+ void *target;
+ int chunklen = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
+
+ target = skb_put(chunk->skb, len);
+
+ memcpy(target, data, len);
+
+ /* Adjust the chunk length field. */
+ chunk->chunk_hdr->length = htons(chunklen + len);
+ chunk->chunk_end = skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb);
+
+ return target;
+}
+
/* Make an ABORT chunk with a PROTOCOL VIOLATION cause code. */
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_abort_violation(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_paramhdr phdr;
retval = sctp_make_abort(asoc, chunk, sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t) + paylen
- + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
+ + sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t));
if (!retval)
goto end;
- sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION, payload, paylen);
+ sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION, paylen
+ + sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t));
phdr.type = htons(chunk->chunk_hdr->type);
phdr.length = chunk->chunk_hdr->length;
- sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t), &phdr);
+ sctp_addto_chunk(retval, paylen, payload);
+ sctp_addto_param(retval, sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t), &phdr);
end:
return retval;
}
+struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_violation_paramlen(
+ const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
+ struct sctp_paramhdr *param)
+{
+ struct sctp_chunk *retval;
+ static const char error[] = "The following parameter had invalid length:";
+ size_t payload_len = sizeof(error) + sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t) +
+ sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
+
+ retval = sctp_make_abort(asoc, chunk, payload_len);
+ if (!retval)
+ goto nodata;
+
+ sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION,
+ sizeof(error) + sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t));
+ sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(error), error);
+ sctp_addto_param(retval, sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t), param);
+
+nodata:
+ return retval;
+}
+
/* Make a HEARTBEAT chunk. */
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_heartbeat(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_transport *transport,
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
- sctp_init_cause(retval, cause_code, payload, paylen);
+ sctp_init_cause(retval, cause_code, paylen);
+ sctp_addto_chunk(retval, paylen, payload);
nodata:
return retval;
}
+struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_auth(const struct sctp_association *asoc)
+{
+ struct sctp_chunk *retval;
+ struct sctp_hmac *hmac_desc;
+ struct sctp_authhdr auth_hdr;
+ __u8 *hmac;
+
+ /* Get the first hmac that the peer told us to use */
+ hmac_desc = sctp_auth_asoc_get_hmac(asoc);
+ if (unlikely(!hmac_desc))
+ return NULL;
+
+ retval = sctp_make_chunk(asoc, SCTP_CID_AUTH, 0,
+ hmac_desc->hmac_len + sizeof(sctp_authhdr_t));
+ if (!retval)
+ return NULL;
+
+ auth_hdr.hmac_id = htons(hmac_desc->hmac_id);
+ auth_hdr.shkey_id = htons(asoc->active_key_id);
+
+ retval->subh.auth_hdr = sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(sctp_authhdr_t),
+ &auth_hdr);
+
+ hmac = skb_put(retval->skb, hmac_desc->hmac_len);
+ memset(hmac, 0, hmac_desc->hmac_len);
+
+ /* Adjust the chunk header to include the empty MAC */
+ retval->chunk_hdr->length =
+ htons(ntohs(retval->chunk_hdr->length) + hmac_desc->hmac_len);
+ retval->chunk_end = skb_tail_pointer(retval->skb);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+
/********************************************************************
* 2nd Level Abstractions
********************************************************************/
*/
retval->tsn_missing_report = 0;
retval->tsn_gap_acked = 0;
- retval->fast_retransmit = 0;
+ retval->fast_retransmit = SCTP_CAN_FRTX;
/* If this is a fragmented message, track all fragments
* of the message (for SEND_FAILED).
retval->chunk_hdr = chunk_hdr;
retval->chunk_end = ((__u8 *)chunk_hdr) + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr);
+ /* Determine if the chunk needs to be authenticated */
+ if (sctp_auth_send_cid(type, asoc))
+ retval->auth = 1;
+
/* Set the skb to the belonging sock for accounting. */
skb->sk = sk;
/* Release the memory occupied by a chunk. */
static void sctp_chunk_destroy(struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
+ BUG_ON(!list_empty(&chunk->list));
+ list_del_init(&chunk->transmitted_list);
+
/* Free the chunk skb data and the SCTP_chunk stub itself. */
dev_kfree_skb(chunk->skb);
/* Possibly, free the chunk. */
void sctp_chunk_free(struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
- BUG_ON(!list_empty(&chunk->list));
- list_del_init(&chunk->transmitted_list);
-
/* Release our reference on the message tracker. */
if (chunk->msg)
sctp_datamsg_put(chunk->msg);
void *target;
void *padding;
int chunklen = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
- int padlen = chunklen % 4;
+ int padlen = WORD_ROUND(chunklen) - chunklen;
padding = skb_put(chunk->skb, padlen);
target = skb_put(chunk->skb, len);
*/
void sctp_chunk_assign_ssn(struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
+ struct sctp_datamsg *msg;
+ struct sctp_chunk *lchunk;
+ struct sctp_stream *stream;
__u16 ssn;
__u16 sid;
if (chunk->has_ssn)
return;
- /* This is the last possible instant to assign a SSN. */
- if (chunk->chunk_hdr->flags & SCTP_DATA_UNORDERED) {
- ssn = 0;
- } else {
- sid = ntohs(chunk->subh.data_hdr->stream);
- if (chunk->chunk_hdr->flags & SCTP_DATA_LAST_FRAG)
- ssn = sctp_ssn_next(&chunk->asoc->ssnmap->out, sid);
- else
- ssn = sctp_ssn_peek(&chunk->asoc->ssnmap->out, sid);
- }
+ /* All fragments will be on the same stream */
+ sid = ntohs(chunk->subh.data_hdr->stream);
+ stream = &chunk->asoc->ssnmap->out;
- chunk->subh.data_hdr->ssn = htons(ssn);
- chunk->has_ssn = 1;
+ /* Now assign the sequence number to the entire message.
+ * All fragments must have the same stream sequence number.
+ */
+ msg = chunk->msg;
+ list_for_each_entry(lchunk, &msg->chunks, frag_list) {
+ if (lchunk->chunk_hdr->flags & SCTP_DATA_UNORDERED) {
+ ssn = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (lchunk->chunk_hdr->flags & SCTP_DATA_LAST_FRAG)
+ ssn = sctp_ssn_next(stream, sid);
+ else
+ ssn = sctp_ssn_peek(stream, sid);
+ }
+
+ lchunk->subh.data_hdr->ssn = htons(ssn);
+ lchunk->has_ssn = 1;
+ }
}
/* Helper function to assign a TSN if needed. This assumes that both
struct hash_desc desc;
/* Sign the message. */
- sg.page = virt_to_page(&cookie->c);
- sg.offset = (unsigned long)(&cookie->c) % PAGE_SIZE;
- sg.length = bodysize;
+ sg_init_one(&sg, &cookie->c, bodysize);
keylen = SCTP_SECRET_SIZE;
key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key];
desc.tfm = sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac;
/* Check the signature. */
keylen = SCTP_SECRET_SIZE;
- sg.page = virt_to_page(bear_cookie);
- sg.offset = (unsigned long)(bear_cookie) % PAGE_SIZE;
- sg.length = bodysize;
+ sg_init_one(&sg, bear_cookie, bodysize);
key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key];
desc.tfm = sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac;
desc.flags = 0;
do_gettimeofday(&tv);
if (!asoc && tv_lt(bear_cookie->expiration, tv)) {
- __u16 len;
/*
* Section 3.3.10.3 Stale Cookie Error (3)
*
__be32 n = htonl(usecs);
sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_STALE_COOKIE,
- &n, sizeof(n));
+ sizeof(n));
+ sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, sizeof(n), &n);
*error = -SCTP_IERROR_STALE_COOKIE;
} else
*error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
/* Also, add the destination address. */
if (list_empty(&retval->base.bind_addr.address_list)) {
- sctp_add_bind_addr(&retval->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest, 1,
- GFP_ATOMIC);
+ sctp_add_bind_addr(&retval->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest,
+ SCTP_ADDR_SRC, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
retval->next_tsn = retval->c.initial_tsn;
report.num_missing = htonl(1);
report.type = paramtype;
sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_MISS_PARAM,
- &report, sizeof(report));
+ sizeof(report));
+ sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, sizeof(report), &report);
}
/* Stop processing this chunk. */
*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, 0);
if (*errp)
- sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM, NULL, 0);
+ sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM, 0);
/* Stop processing this chunk. */
return 0;
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
struct sctp_chunk **errp)
{
- char error[] = "The following parameter had invalid length:";
- size_t payload_len = WORD_ROUND(sizeof(error)) +
- sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
-
+ /* This is a fatal error. Any accumulated non-fatal errors are
+ * not reported.
+ */
+ if (*errp)
+ sctp_chunk_free(*errp);
/* Create an error chunk and fill it in with our payload. */
- if (!*errp)
- *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, payload_len);
-
- if (*errp) {
- sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION, error,
- sizeof(error));
- sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t), param);
- }
+ *errp = sctp_make_violation_paramlen(asoc, chunk, param);
return 0;
}
{
__u16 len = ntohs(param.p->length);
- /* Make an ERROR chunk. */
- if (!*errp)
- *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, len);
-
+ /* Processing of the HOST_NAME parameter will generate an
+ * ABORT. If we've accumulated any non-fatal errors, they
+ * would be unrecognized parameters and we should not include
+ * them in the ABORT.
+ */
if (*errp)
- sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED,
- param.v, len);
+ sctp_chunk_free(*errp);
+
+ *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, len);
+
+ if (*errp) {
+ sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED, len);
+ sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, len, param.v);
+ }
/* Stop processing this chunk. */
return 0;
}
+static int sctp_verify_ext_param(union sctp_params param)
+{
+ __u16 num_ext = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
+ int have_auth = 0;
+ int have_asconf = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_ext; i++) {
+ switch (param.ext->chunks[i]) {
+ case SCTP_CID_AUTH:
+ have_auth = 1;
+ break;
+ case SCTP_CID_ASCONF:
+ case SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK:
+ have_asconf = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* ADD-IP Security: The draft requires us to ABORT or ignore the
+ * INIT/INIT-ACK if ADD-IP is listed, but AUTH is not. Do this
+ * only if ADD-IP is turned on and we are not backward-compatible
+ * mode.
+ */
+ if (sctp_addip_noauth)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (sctp_addip_enable && !have_auth && have_asconf)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void sctp_process_ext_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ union sctp_params param)
+{
+ __u16 num_ext = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_ext; i++) {
+ switch (param.ext->chunks[i]) {
+ case SCTP_CID_FWD_TSN:
+ if (sctp_prsctp_enable &&
+ !asoc->peer.prsctp_capable)
+ asoc->peer.prsctp_capable = 1;
+ break;
+ case SCTP_CID_AUTH:
+ /* if the peer reports AUTH, assume that he
+ * supports AUTH.
+ */
+ if (sctp_auth_enable)
+ asoc->peer.auth_capable = 1;
+ break;
+ case SCTP_CID_ASCONF:
+ case SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK:
+ if (sctp_addip_enable)
+ asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/* RFC 3.2.1 & the Implementers Guide 2.2.
*
* The Parameter Types are encoded such that the
* taken if the processing endpoint does not recognize the
* Parameter Type.
*
- * 00 - Stop processing this SCTP chunk and discard it,
- * do not process any further chunks within it.
+ * 00 - Stop processing this parameter; do not process any further
+ * parameters within this chunk
*
- * 01 - Stop processing this SCTP chunk and discard it,
- * do not process any further chunks within it, and report
- * the unrecognized parameter in an 'Unrecognized
- * Parameter Type' (in either an ERROR or in the INIT ACK).
+ * 01 - Stop processing this parameter, do not process any further
+ * parameters within this chunk, and report the unrecognized
+ * parameter in an 'Unrecognized Parameter' ERROR chunk.
*
* 10 - Skip this parameter and continue processing.
*
* 11 - Skip this parameter and continue processing but
* report the unrecognized parameter in an
- * 'Unrecognized Parameter Type' (in either an ERROR or in
- * the INIT ACK).
+ * 'Unrecognized Parameter' ERROR chunk.
*
* Return value:
- * 0 - discard the chunk
- * 1 - continue with the chunk
+ * SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR - continue with the chunk
+ * SCTP_IERROR_ERROR - stop and report an error.
+ * SCTP_IERROR_NOMEME - out of memory.
*/
-static int sctp_process_unk_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
- union sctp_params param,
- struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
- struct sctp_chunk **errp)
+static sctp_ierror_t sctp_process_unk_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ union sctp_params param,
+ struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
+ struct sctp_chunk **errp)
{
- int retval = 1;
+ int retval = SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR;
switch (param.p->type & SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_MASK) {
case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_DISCARD:
- retval = 0;
- break;
- case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_DISCARD_ERR:
- retval = 0;
- /* Make an ERROR chunk, preparing enough room for
- * returning multiple unknown parameters.
- */
- if (NULL == *errp)
- *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk,
- ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length));
-
- if (*errp)
- sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM,
- param.v,
- WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)));
-
+ retval = SCTP_IERROR_ERROR;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_SKIP:
break;
+ case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_DISCARD_ERR:
+ retval = SCTP_IERROR_ERROR;
+ /* Fall through */
case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_SKIP_ERR:
/* Make an ERROR chunk, preparing enough room for
* returning multiple unknown parameters.
if (*errp) {
sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM,
- param.v,
WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)));
+ sctp_addto_chunk(*errp,
+ WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)),
+ param.v);
} else {
/* If there is no memory for generating the ERROR
* report as specified, an ABORT will be triggered
* to the peer and the association won't be
* established.
*/
- retval = 0;
+ retval = SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
}
-
break;
default:
break;
return retval;
}
-/* Find unrecognized parameters in the chunk.
+/* Verify variable length parameters
* Return values:
- * 0 - discard the chunk
- * 1 - continue with the chunk
+ * SCTP_IERROR_ABORT - trigger an ABORT
+ * SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM - out of memory (abort)
+ * SCTP_IERROR_ERROR - stop processing, trigger an ERROR
+ * SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR - continue with the chunk
*/
-static int sctp_verify_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
- union sctp_params param,
- sctp_cid_t cid,
- struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
- struct sctp_chunk **err_chunk)
+static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ union sctp_params param,
+ sctp_cid_t cid,
+ struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
+ struct sctp_chunk **err_chunk)
{
- int retval = 1;
+ struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *hmacs;
+ int retval = SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR;
+ __u16 n_elt, id = 0;
+ int i;
/* FIXME - This routine is not looking at each parameter per the
* chunk type, i.e., unrecognized parameters should be further
case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND:
break;
+ case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT:
+ if (!sctp_verify_ext_param(param))
+ return SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
+ break;
+
+ case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
+ if (sctp_addip_enable)
+ break;
+ goto fallthrough;
+
case SCTP_PARAM_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS:
/* Tell the peer, we won't support this param. */
- return sctp_process_hn_param(asoc, param, chunk, err_chunk);
+ sctp_process_hn_param(asoc, param, chunk, err_chunk);
+ retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
+ break;
+
case SCTP_PARAM_FWD_TSN_SUPPORT:
if (sctp_prsctp_enable)
break;
- /* Fall Through */
+ goto fallthrough;
+
+ case SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM:
+ if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+ goto fallthrough;
+
+ /* SCTP-AUTH: Secion 6.1
+ * If the random number is not 32 byte long the association
+ * MUST be aborted. The ABORT chunk SHOULD contain the error
+ * cause 'Protocol Violation'.
+ */
+ if (SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_LENGTH !=
+ ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t)) {
+ sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p,
+ chunk, err_chunk);
+ retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS:
+ if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+ goto fallthrough;
+
+ /* SCTP-AUTH: Section 3.2
+ * The CHUNKS parameter MUST be included once in the INIT or
+ * INIT-ACK chunk if the sender wants to receive authenticated
+ * chunks. Its maximum length is 260 bytes.
+ */
+ if (260 < ntohs(param.p->length)) {
+ sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p,
+ chunk, err_chunk);
+ retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO:
+ if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+ goto fallthrough;
+
+ hmacs = (struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *)param.p;
+ n_elt = (ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t)) >> 1;
+
+ /* SCTP-AUTH: Section 6.1
+ * The HMAC algorithm based on SHA-1 MUST be supported and
+ * included in the HMAC-ALGO parameter.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < n_elt; i++) {
+ id = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]);
+
+ if (id == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) {
+ sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p, chunk,
+ err_chunk);
+ retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
+ }
+ break;
+fallthrough:
default:
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("Unrecognized param: %d for chunk %d.\n",
ntohs(param.p->type), cid);
- return sctp_process_unk_param(asoc, param, chunk, err_chunk);
-
+ retval = sctp_process_unk_param(asoc, param, chunk, err_chunk);
break;
}
return retval;
{
union sctp_params param;
int has_cookie = 0;
+ int result;
/* Verify stream values are non-zero. */
if ((0 == peer_init->init_hdr.num_outbound_streams) ||
(0 == peer_init->init_hdr.init_tag) ||
(SCTP_DEFAULT_MINWINDOW > ntohl(peer_init->init_hdr.a_rwnd))) {
- sctp_process_inv_mandatory(asoc, chunk, errp);
- return 0;
+ return sctp_process_inv_mandatory(asoc, chunk, errp);
}
/* Check for missing mandatory parameters. */
* VIOLATION error. We build the ERROR chunk here and let the normal
* error handling code build and send the packet.
*/
- if (param.v < (void*)chunk->chunk_end - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t)) {
- sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p, chunk, errp);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (param.v != (void*)chunk->chunk_end)
+ return sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p, chunk, errp);
/* The only missing mandatory param possible today is
* the state cookie for an INIT-ACK chunk.
*/
- if ((SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK == cid) && !has_cookie) {
- sctp_process_missing_param(asoc, SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE,
- chunk, errp);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Find unrecognized parameters. */
+ if ((SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK == cid) && !has_cookie)
+ return sctp_process_missing_param(asoc, SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE,
+ chunk, errp);
+ /* Verify all the variable length parameters */
sctp_walk_params(param, peer_init, init_hdr.params) {
- if (!sctp_verify_param(asoc, param, cid, chunk, errp)) {
- if (SCTP_PARAM_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS == param.p->type)
+ result = sctp_verify_param(asoc, param, cid, chunk, errp);
+ switch (result) {
+ case SCTP_IERROR_ABORT:
+ case SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM:
return 0;
- else
+ case SCTP_IERROR_ERROR:
return 1;
+ case SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR:
+ default:
+ break;
}
} /* for (loop through all parameters) */
}
/* Process the initialization parameters. */
-
sctp_walk_params(param, peer_init, init_hdr.params) {
if (!sctp_process_param(asoc, param, peer_addr, gfp))
goto clean_up;
}
+ /* AUTH: After processing the parameters, make sure that we
+ * have all the required info to potentially do authentications.
+ */
+ if (asoc->peer.auth_capable && (!asoc->peer.peer_random ||
+ !asoc->peer.peer_hmacs))
+ asoc->peer.auth_capable = 0;
+
+ /* In a non-backward compatible mode, if the peer claims
+ * support for ADD-IP but not AUTH, the ADD-IP spec states
+ * that we MUST ABORT the association. Section 6. The section
+ * also give us an option to silently ignore the packet, which
+ * is what we'll do here.
+ */
+ if (!sctp_addip_noauth &&
+ (asoc->peer.asconf_capable && !asoc->peer.auth_capable)) {
+ asoc->peer.addip_disabled_mask |= (SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP |
+ SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP |
+ SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY);
+ asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 0;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+
/* Walk list of transports, removing transports in the UNKNOWN state. */
list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
transport = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports);
* high (for example, implementations MAY use the size of the receiver
* advertised window).
*/
- list_for_each(pos, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
- transport = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports);
+ list_for_each_entry(transport, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
+ transports) {
transport->ssthresh = asoc->peer.i.a_rwnd;
}
/* Set up the TSN tracking pieces. */
- sctp_tsnmap_init(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, SCTP_TSN_MAP_SIZE,
- asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn);
+ if (!sctp_tsnmap_init(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, SCTP_TSN_MAP_INITIAL,
+ asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn, gfp))
+ goto clean_up;
/* RFC 2960 6.5 Stream Identifier and Stream Sequence Number
*
/* Release the transport structures. */
list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
transport = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports);
- list_del_init(pos);
- sctp_transport_free(transport);
+ if (transport->state != SCTP_ACTIVE)
+ sctp_assoc_rm_peer(asoc, transport);
}
- asoc->peer.transport_count = 0;
-
nomem:
return 0;
}
sctp_scope_t scope;
time_t stale;
struct sctp_af *af;
+ union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
+ struct sctp_transport *t;
/* We maintain all INIT parameters in network byte order all the
* time. This allows us to not worry about whether the parameters
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
if (PF_INET6 != asoc->base.sk->sk_family)
break;
- /* Fall through. */
+ goto do_addr_param;
+
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
+ /* v4 addresses are not allowed on v6-only socket */
+ if (ipv6_only_sock(asoc->base.sk))
+ break;
+do_addr_param:
af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type));
af->from_addr_param(&addr, param.addr, htons(asoc->peer.port), 0);
scope = sctp_scope(peer_addr);
asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 0;
asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 0;
+ /* Assume that peer supports the address family
+ * by which it sends a packet.
+ */
+ if (peer_addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
+ asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 1;
+ else if (peer_addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+ asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 1;
+
/* Cycle through address types; avoid divide by 0. */
sat = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
if (sat)
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
- asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 1;
+ if (PF_INET6 == asoc->base.sk->sk_family)
+ asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 1;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS:
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND:
- asoc->peer.adaptation_ind = param.aind->adaptation_ind;
+ asoc->peer.adaptation_ind = ntohl(param.aind->adaptation_ind);
+ break;
+
+ case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
+ if (!sctp_addip_enable)
+ goto fall_through;
+
+ addr_param = param.v + sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t);
+
+ af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type));
+ af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param,
+ htons(asoc->peer.port), 0);
+
+ /* if the address is invalid, we can't process it.
+ * XXX: see spec for what to do.
+ */
+ if (!af->addr_valid(&addr, NULL, NULL))
+ break;
+
+ t = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr);
+ if (!t)
+ break;
+
+ sctp_assoc_set_primary(asoc, t);
+ break;
+
+ case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT:
+ sctp_process_ext_param(asoc, param);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_FWD_TSN_SUPPORT:
break;
}
/* Fall Through */
+ goto fall_through;
+
+ case SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM:
+ if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+ goto fall_through;
+
+ /* Save peer's random parameter */
+ asoc->peer.peer_random = kmemdup(param.p,
+ ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
+ if (!asoc->peer.peer_random) {
+ retval = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO:
+ if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+ goto fall_through;
+
+ /* Save peer's HMAC list */
+ asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = kmemdup(param.p,
+ ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
+ if (!asoc->peer.peer_hmacs) {
+ retval = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the default HMAC the peer requested*/
+ sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac(asoc, param.hmac_algo);
+ break;
+
+ case SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS:
+ if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+ goto fall_through;
+
+ asoc->peer.peer_chunks = kmemdup(param.p,
+ ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
+ if (!asoc->peer.peer_chunks)
+ retval = 0;
+ break;
+fall_through:
default:
/* Any unrecognized parameters should have been caught
* and handled by sctp_verify_param() which should be
struct sctp_transport *peer;
struct sctp_af *af;
union sctp_addr addr;
- struct list_head *pos;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
addr_param = (union sctp_addr_param *)
((void *)asconf_param + sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t));
+ if (asconf_param->param_hdr.type != SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP &&
+ asconf_param->param_hdr.type != SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP &&
+ asconf_param->param_hdr.type != SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY)
+ return SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM;
+
+ switch (addr_param->v4.param_hdr.type) {
+ case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
+ if (!asoc->peer.ipv6_address)
+ return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
+ break;
+ case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
+ if (!asoc->peer.ipv4_address)
+ return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
+ }
+
af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(addr_param->v4.param_hdr.type));
if (unlikely(!af))
- return SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM;
+ return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param, htons(asoc->peer.port), 0);
+
+ /* ADDIP 4.2.1 This parameter MUST NOT contain a broadcast
+ * or multicast address.
+ * (note: wildcard is permitted and requires special handling so
+ * make sure we check for that)
+ */
+ if (!af->is_any(&addr) && !af->addr_valid(&addr, NULL, asconf->skb))
+ return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
+
switch (asconf_param->param_hdr.type) {
case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
+ /* Section 4.2.1:
+ * If the address 0.0.0.0 or ::0 is provided, the source
+ * address of the packet MUST be added.
+ */
+ if (af->is_any(&addr))
+ memcpy(&addr, &asconf->source, sizeof(addr));
+
/* ADDIP 4.3 D9) If an endpoint receives an ADD IP address
* request and does not have the local resources to add this
* new address to the association, it MUST return an Error
* MUST send an Error Cause TLV with the error cause set to the
* new error code 'Request to Delete Last Remaining IP Address'.
*/
- pos = asoc->peer.transport_addr_list.next;
- if (pos->next == &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list)
+ if (asoc->peer.transport_count == 1)
return SCTP_ERROR_DEL_LAST_IP;
/* ADDIP 4.3 D8) If a request is received to delete an IP
if (sctp_cmp_addr_exact(sctp_source(asconf), &addr))
return SCTP_ERROR_DEL_SRC_IP;
- sctp_assoc_del_peer(asoc, &addr);
+ /* Section 4.2.2
+ * If the address 0.0.0.0 or ::0 is provided, all
+ * addresses of the peer except the source address of the
+ * packet MUST be deleted.
+ */
+ if (af->is_any(&addr)) {
+ sctp_assoc_set_primary(asoc, asconf->transport);
+ sctp_assoc_del_nonprimary_peers(asoc,
+ asconf->transport);
+ } else
+ sctp_assoc_del_peer(asoc, &addr);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
+ /* ADDIP Section 4.2.4
+ * If the address 0.0.0.0 or ::0 is provided, the receiver
+ * MAY mark the source address of the packet as its
+ * primary.
+ */
+ if (af->is_any(&addr))
+ memcpy(&addr.v4, sctp_source(asconf), sizeof(addr));
+
peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr);
if (!peer)
- return SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM;
+ return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
sctp_assoc_set_primary(asoc, peer);
break;
- default:
- return SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM;
- break;
}
return SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
+/* Verify the ASCONF packet before we process it. */
+int sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ struct sctp_paramhdr *param_hdr, void *chunk_end,
+ struct sctp_paramhdr **errp) {
+ sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param;
+ union sctp_params param;
+ int length, plen;
+
+ param.v = (sctp_paramhdr_t *) param_hdr;
+ while (param.v <= chunk_end - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t)) {
+ length = ntohs(param.p->length);
+ *errp = param.p;
+
+ if (param.v > chunk_end - length ||
+ length < sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (param.p->type) {
+ case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
+ case SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP:
+ case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
+ asconf_param = (sctp_addip_param_t *)param.v;
+ plen = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
+ if (plen < sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t) +
+ sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case SCTP_PARAM_SUCCESS_REPORT:
+ case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND:
+ if (length != sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t))
+ return 0;
+
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ param.v += WORD_ROUND(length);
+ }
+
+ if (param.v != chunk_end)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
/* Process an incoming ASCONF chunk with the next expected serial no. and
* return an ASCONF_ACK chunk to be sent in response.
*/
__be16 err_code;
int length = 0;
- int chunk_len = asconf->skb->len;
+ int chunk_len;
__u32 serial;
int all_param_pass = 1;
+ chunk_len = ntohs(asconf->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t);
hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)asconf->skb->data;
serial = ntohl(hdr->serial);
chunk_len -= length;
/* Skip the address parameter and store a pointer to the first
- * asconf paramter.
+ * asconf parameter.
*/
length = ntohs(addr_param->v4.param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (sctp_addip_param_t *)((void *)addr_param + length);
/* create an ASCONF_ACK chunk.
* Based on the definitions of parameters, we know that the size of
* ASCONF_ACK parameters are less than or equal to the twice of ASCONF
- * paramters.
+ * parameters.
*/
asconf_ack = sctp_make_asconf_ack(asoc, serial, chunk_len * 2);
if (!asconf_ack)
* after freeing the reference to old asconf ack if any.
*/
if (asconf_ack) {
- if (asoc->addip_last_asconf_ack)
- sctp_chunk_free(asoc->addip_last_asconf_ack);
-
sctp_chunk_hold(asconf_ack);
- asoc->addip_last_asconf_ack = asconf_ack;
+ list_add_tail(&asconf_ack->transmitted_list,
+ &asoc->asconf_ack_list);
}
return asconf_ack;
}
/* Process a asconf parameter that is successfully acked. */
-static int sctp_asconf_param_success(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+static void sctp_asconf_param_success(struct sctp_association *asoc,
sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param)
{
struct sctp_af *af;
union sctp_addr addr;
struct sctp_bind_addr *bp = &asoc->base.bind_addr;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
- struct list_head *pos;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *saddr;
- int retval = 0;
addr_param = (union sctp_addr_param *)
((void *)asconf_param + sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t));
switch (asconf_param->param_hdr.type) {
case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
- sctp_local_bh_disable();
- sctp_write_lock(&asoc->base.addr_lock);
- list_for_each(pos, &bp->address_list) {
- saddr = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_sockaddr_entry, list);
+ /* This is always done in BH context with a socket lock
+ * held, so the list can not change.
+ */
+ local_bh_disable();
+ list_for_each_entry(saddr, &bp->address_list, list) {
if (sctp_cmp_addr_exact(&saddr->a, &addr))
- saddr->use_as_src = 1;
+ saddr->state = SCTP_ADDR_SRC;
+ }
+ local_bh_enable();
+ list_for_each_entry(transport, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
+ transports) {
+ if (transport->state == SCTP_ACTIVE)
+ continue;
+ dst_release(transport->dst);
+ sctp_transport_route(transport, NULL,
+ sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk));
}
- sctp_write_unlock(&asoc->base.addr_lock);
- sctp_local_bh_enable();
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP:
- sctp_local_bh_disable();
- sctp_write_lock(&asoc->base.addr_lock);
- retval = sctp_del_bind_addr(bp, &addr);
- sctp_write_unlock(&asoc->base.addr_lock);
- sctp_local_bh_enable();
- list_for_each(pos, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
- transport = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport,
- transports);
+ local_bh_disable();
+ sctp_del_bind_addr(bp, &addr);
+ local_bh_enable();
+ list_for_each_entry(transport, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
+ transports) {
dst_release(transport->dst);
sctp_transport_route(transport, NULL,
sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk));
default:
break;
}
-
- return retval;
}
/* Get the corresponding ASCONF response error code from the ASCONF_ACK chunk
sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_ack_param;
sctp_errhdr_t *err_param;
int length;
- int asconf_ack_len = asconf_ack->skb->len;
+ int asconf_ack_len;
__be16 err_code;
if (no_err)
else
err_code = SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
+ asconf_ack_len = ntohs(asconf_ack->chunk_hdr->length) -
+ sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t);
+
/* Skip the addiphdr from the asconf_ack chunk and store a pointer to
* the first asconf_ack parameter.
*/
asconf_len -= length;
/* Skip the address parameter in the last asconf sent and store a
- * pointer to the first asconf paramter.
+ * pointer to the first asconf parameter.
*/
length = ntohs(addr_param->v4.param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (sctp_addip_param_t *)((void *)addr_param + length);
switch (err_code) {
case SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR:
- retval = sctp_asconf_param_success(asoc, asconf_param);
+ sctp_asconf_param_success(asoc, asconf_param);
break;
case SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW:
retval = 1;
break;
- case SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM:
+ case SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM:
/* Disable sending this type of asconf parameter in
* future.
*/
}
/* Free the cached last sent asconf chunk. */
+ list_del_init(&asconf->transmitted_list);
sctp_chunk_free(asconf);
asoc->addip_last_asconf = NULL;
git://ftp.safe.ca / safe / jmp / linux-2.6 / blobdiff