*
* Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
* Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
* All Rights Reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
* okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
*
+ * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
+ * 2006.
+ *
* The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
* added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
*
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <asm/types.h>
#include <asm/atomic.h>
-#include <asm/types.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
+#include <linux/mqueue.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/inotify.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
#include "audit.h"
-extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
-
-/* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
-extern int audit_enabled;
-
/* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
* for saving names from getname(). */
#define AUDIT_NAMES 20
-/* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
- * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
- * path_lookup. */
-#define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
+/* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
+#define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
+
+/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
+#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
+
+/* number of audit rules */
+int audit_n_rules;
+
+/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
+int audit_signals;
+
+struct audit_cap_data {
+ kernel_cap_t permitted;
+ kernel_cap_t inheritable;
+ union {
+ unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */
+ kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */
+ };
+};
/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
* we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
* Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
struct audit_names {
const char *name;
+ int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
+ unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
unsigned long ino;
- unsigned long pino;
dev_t dev;
umode_t mode;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- char *ctx;
+ u32 osid;
+ struct audit_cap_data fcap;
+ unsigned int fcap_ver;
};
struct audit_aux_data {
#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
-struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
+/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
+#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
+
+struct audit_aux_data_execve {
struct audit_aux_data d;
- struct ipc_perm p;
- unsigned long qbytes;
- uid_t uid;
- gid_t gid;
- mode_t mode;
- char *ctx;
+ int argc;
+ int envc;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
};
-struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
+struct audit_aux_data_pids {
struct audit_aux_data d;
- int nargs;
- unsigned long args[0];
+ pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
+ int pid_count;
};
-struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
+struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
struct audit_aux_data d;
- int len;
- char a[0];
+ struct audit_cap_data fcap;
+ unsigned int fcap_ver;
+ struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
+ struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
};
-struct audit_aux_data_path {
+struct audit_aux_data_capset {
struct audit_aux_data d;
- struct dentry *dentry;
- struct vfsmount *mnt;
+ pid_t pid;
+ struct audit_cap_data cap;
+};
+
+struct audit_tree_refs {
+ struct audit_tree_refs *next;
+ struct audit_chunk *c[31];
};
/* The per-task audit context. */
struct audit_context {
+ int dummy; /* must be the first element */
int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
- enum audit_state state;
+ enum audit_state state, current_state;
unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
- struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
- uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
int major; /* syscall number */
+ struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
- int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
long return_code;/* syscall return code */
- int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
+ u64 prio;
+ int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
int name_count;
struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
- struct dentry * pwd;
- struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
+ char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
+ struct path pwd;
struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
-
+ struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
+ struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
+ size_t sockaddr_len;
/* Save things to print about task_struct */
- pid_t pid;
+ pid_t pid, ppid;
uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
unsigned long personality;
int arch;
+ pid_t target_pid;
+ uid_t target_auid;
+ uid_t target_uid;
+ unsigned int target_sessionid;
+ u32 target_sid;
+ char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
+
+ struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
+ struct list_head killed_trees;
+ int tree_count;
+
+ int type;
+ union {
+ struct {
+ int nargs;
+ long args[6];
+ } socketcall;
+ struct {
+ uid_t uid;
+ gid_t gid;
+ mode_t mode;
+ u32 osid;
+ int has_perm;
+ uid_t perm_uid;
+ gid_t perm_gid;
+ mode_t perm_mode;
+ unsigned long qbytes;
+ } ipc;
+ struct {
+ mqd_t mqdes;
+ struct mq_attr mqstat;
+ } mq_getsetattr;
+ struct {
+ mqd_t mqdes;
+ int sigev_signo;
+ } mq_notify;
+ struct {
+ mqd_t mqdes;
+ size_t msg_len;
+ unsigned int msg_prio;
+ struct timespec abs_timeout;
+ } mq_sendrecv;
+ struct {
+ int oflag;
+ mode_t mode;
+ struct mq_attr attr;
+ } mq_open;
+ struct {
+ pid_t pid;
+ struct audit_cap_data cap;
+ } capset;
+ };
+ int fds[2];
+
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
int put_count;
int ino_count;
#endif
};
+static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
+{
+ int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
+ if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
+ n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
+ return n & mask;
+}
+static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
+{
+ unsigned n;
+ if (unlikely(!ctx))
+ return 0;
+ n = ctx->major;
+
+ switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
+ case 0: /* native */
+ if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
+ audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
+ return 1;
+ if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
+ audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
+ return 1;
+ if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
+ audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
+ if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
+ audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
+ return 1;
+ if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
+ audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
+ return 1;
+ if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
+ audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ case 2: /* open */
+ return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
+ case 3: /* openat */
+ return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
+ case 4: /* socketcall */
+ return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
+ case 5: /* execve */
+ return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which)
+{
+ unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT;
+ mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT;
+
+ if (unlikely(!ctx))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (index >= ctx->name_count)
+ return 0;
+ if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1)
+ return 0;
+ if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
+ * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
+ * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
+ * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
+ * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
+ * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
+ * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
+ */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (!ctx->prio) {
+ ctx->prio = 1;
+ ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
+ }
+}
+
+static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
+{
+ struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
+ int left = ctx->tree_count;
+ if (likely(left)) {
+ p->c[--left] = chunk;
+ ctx->tree_count = left;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (!p)
+ return 0;
+ p = p->next;
+ if (p) {
+ p->c[30] = chunk;
+ ctx->trees = p;
+ ctx->tree_count = 30;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+ struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
+ ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->trees) {
+ ctx->trees = p;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (p)
+ p->next = ctx->trees;
+ else
+ ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
+ ctx->tree_count = 31;
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
+ struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+ struct audit_tree_refs *q;
+ int n;
+ if (!p) {
+ /* we started with empty chain */
+ p = ctx->first_trees;
+ count = 31;
+ /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
+ if (!p)
+ return;
+ }
+ n = count;
+ for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
+ while (n--) {
+ audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
+ q->c[n] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
+ audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
+ q->c[n] = NULL;
+ }
+ ctx->trees = p;
+ ctx->tree_count = count;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+ struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
+ for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
+ q = p->next;
+ kfree(p);
+ }
+}
+
+static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+ struct audit_tree_refs *p;
+ int n;
+ if (!tree)
+ return 0;
+ /* full ones */
+ for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
+ for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
+ if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* partial */
+ if (p) {
+ for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
+ if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
* otherwise. */
static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_krule *rule,
struct audit_context *ctx,
+ struct audit_names *name,
enum audit_state *state)
{
- int i, j;
+ const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
+ int i, j, need_sid = 1;
+ u32 sid;
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
case AUDIT_PID:
result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
break;
+ case AUDIT_PPID:
+ if (ctx) {
+ if (!ctx->ppid)
+ ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
+ }
+ break;
case AUDIT_UID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_EUID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_SUID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_FSUID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_GID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_EGID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_SGID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_FSGID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_PERS:
result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_ARCH:
- if (ctx)
+ if (ctx)
result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
break;
}
break;
case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
- if (ctx) {
+ if (name)
+ result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
+ f->op, f->val);
+ else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
}
break;
case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
- if (ctx) {
+ if (name)
+ result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
+ f->op, f->val);
+ else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
}
break;
case AUDIT_INODE:
- if (ctx) {
+ if (name)
+ result = (name->ino == f->val);
+ else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val) ||
- audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, f->op, f->val)) {
+ if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
break;
}
}
}
break;
+ case AUDIT_WATCH:
+ if (name && audit_watch_inode(rule->watch) != (unsigned long)-1)
+ result = (name->dev == audit_watch_dev(rule->watch) &&
+ name->ino == audit_watch_inode(rule->watch));
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_DIR:
+ if (ctx)
+ result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
+ break;
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
result = 0;
if (ctx)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
+ a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
+ match for now to avoid losing information that
+ may be wanted. An error message will also be
+ logged upon error */
+ if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (need_sid) {
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
+ need_sid = 0;
+ }
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ f->op,
+ f->lsm_rule,
+ ctx);
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
+ also applies here */
+ if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ /* Find files that match */
+ if (name) {
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(
+ name->osid, f->type, f->op,
+ f->lsm_rule, ctx);
+ } else if (ctx) {
+ for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(
+ ctx->names[j].osid,
+ f->type, f->op,
+ f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
+ ++result;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* Find ipc objects that match */
+ if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
+ break;
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+ f->type, f->op,
+ f->lsm_rule, ctx))
+ ++result;
+ }
break;
case AUDIT_ARG0:
case AUDIT_ARG1:
if (ctx)
result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
break;
+ case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+ /* ignore this field for filtering */
+ result = 1;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_PERM:
+ result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
+ result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
+ break;
}
- if (!result)
+ if (!result) {
+ put_cred(cred);
return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ctx) {
+ if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
+ return 0;
+ if (rule->filterkey) {
+ kfree(ctx->filterkey);
+ ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ }
+ ctx->prio = rule->prio;
}
switch (rule->action) {
case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
- case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
}
+ put_cred(cred);
return 1;
}
* completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
* structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
*/
-static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
+static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
{
struct audit_entry *e;
enum audit_state state;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
- if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
+ if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
+ if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+ *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
rcu_read_unlock();
return state;
}
int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
- && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
+ if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
+ &state)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
+ ctx->current_state = state;
return state;
}
}
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}
-/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
+/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
+ * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
+ * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
+ * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
+ */
+void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+ enum audit_state state;
+
+ if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
+ return;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
+ int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
+ int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+ struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
+ int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
+ struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
+
+ if (list_empty(list))
+ continue;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+ if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ ctx->current_state = state;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
int return_valid,
- int return_code)
+ long return_code)
{
struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
if (likely(!context))
return NULL;
context->return_valid = return_valid;
- context->return_code = return_code;
- if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
- enum audit_state state;
- state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
- if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
- context->auditable = 1;
+ /*
+ * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
+ * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
+ * signal handlers
+ *
+ * This is actually a test for:
+ * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
+ * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
+ *
+ * but is faster than a bunch of ||
+ */
+ if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
+ (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
+ (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
+ context->return_code = -EINTR;
+ else
+ context->return_code = return_code;
+
+ if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
+ audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
+ audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
}
- context->pid = tsk->pid;
- context->uid = tsk->uid;
- context->gid = tsk->gid;
- context->euid = tsk->euid;
- context->suid = tsk->suid;
- context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
- context->egid = tsk->egid;
- context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
- context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
- context->personality = tsk->personality;
tsk->audit_context = NULL;
return context;
}
int i;
#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
- if (context->auditable
- ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
+ if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
" name_count=%d put_count=%d"
" ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
#endif
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
- char *p = context->names[i].ctx;
- context->names[i].ctx = NULL;
- kfree(p);
- if (context->names[i].name)
+ if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
__putname(context->names[i].name);
}
context->name_count = 0;
- if (context->pwd)
- dput(context->pwd);
- if (context->pwdmnt)
- mntput(context->pwdmnt);
- context->pwd = NULL;
- context->pwdmnt = NULL;
+ path_put(&context->pwd);
+ context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
+ context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
}
static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
while ((aux = context->aux)) {
- if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
- struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
- dput(axi->dentry);
- mntput(axi->mnt);
- }
- if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) {
- struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
- if (axi->ctx)
- kfree(axi->ctx);
- }
-
context->aux = aux->next;
kfree(aux);
}
+ while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
+ context->aux_pids = aux->next;
+ kfree(aux);
+ }
}
static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
enum audit_state state)
{
- uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
-
memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
context->state = state;
- context->loginuid = loginuid;
+ context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
}
static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
return NULL;
audit_zero_context(context, state);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
return context;
}
{
struct audit_context *context;
enum audit_state state;
+ char *key = NULL;
- if (likely(!audit_enabled))
+ if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
- state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
+ state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
return 0;
if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
+ kfree(key);
audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
return -ENOMEM;
}
-
- /* Preserve login uid */
- context->loginuid = -1;
- if (current->audit_context)
- context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
+ context->filterkey = key;
tsk->audit_context = context;
set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
context->name_count, count);
}
audit_free_names(context);
+ unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
+ free_tree_refs(context);
audit_free_aux(context);
+ kfree(context->filterkey);
+ kfree(context->sockaddr);
kfree(context);
context = previous;
} while (context);
printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
}
-static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
char *ctx = NULL;
- ssize_t len = 0;
+ unsigned len;
+ int error;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
+ if (!sid)
+ return;
- len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
- if (len < 0) {
- if (len != -EINVAL)
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ if (error) {
+ if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
return;
}
- ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask);
- if (!ctx)
- goto error_path;
-
- len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
- if (len < 0 )
- goto error_path;
-
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return;
error_path:
- if (ctx)
- kfree(ctx);
audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
return;
}
-static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
+
+static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
- struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
+ struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
- get_task_comm(name, current);
+ /* tsk == current */
+
+ get_task_comm(name, tsk);
audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
- if (!mm)
- return;
+ if (mm) {
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ vma = mm->mmap;
+ while (vma) {
+ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
+ vma->vm_file) {
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
+ &vma->vm_file->f_path);
+ break;
+ }
+ vma = vma->vm_next;
+ }
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ }
+ audit_log_task_context(ab);
+}
+
+static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
+ uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
+ u32 sid, char *comm)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
+ if (!ab)
+ return rc;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
+ uid, sessionid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
+ rc = 1;
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
+ * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
+ * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry)
+ *
+ * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
+ * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
+ * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
+ * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
+ * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
+ */
+static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
+ struct audit_buffer **ab,
+ int arg_num,
+ size_t *len_sent,
+ const char __user *p,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ char arg_num_len_buf[12];
+ const char __user *tmp_p = p;
+ /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
+ size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
+ size_t len, len_left, to_send;
+ size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
+ unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
+ len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
/*
- * this is brittle; all callers that pass GFP_ATOMIC will have
- * NULL current->mm and we won't get here.
+ * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
+ * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
+ * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
+ * any.
*/
- down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- vma = mm->mmap;
- while (vma) {
- if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
- vma->vm_file) {
- audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
- vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
- vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
+ if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
+ do {
+ if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
+ to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
+ else
+ to_send = len_left;
+ ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
+ /*
+ * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
+ * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
+ * space yet.
+ */
+ if (ret) {
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ buf[to_send] = '\0';
+ has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
+ if (has_cntl) {
+ /*
+ * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
+ * send half as much in each message
+ */
+ max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
break;
}
- vma = vma->vm_next;
+ len_left -= to_send;
+ tmp_p += to_send;
+ } while (len_left > 0);
+
+ len_left = len;
+
+ if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
+ too_long = 1;
+
+ /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
+ for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
+ int room_left;
+
+ if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
+ to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
+ else
+ to_send = len_left;
+
+ /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
+ room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
+ if (has_cntl)
+ room_left -= (to_send * 2);
+ else
+ room_left -= to_send;
+ if (room_left < 0) {
+ *len_sent = 0;
+ audit_log_end(*ab);
+ *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
+ if (!*ab)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * first record needs to say how long the original string was
+ * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
+ */
+ if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
+ audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
+ has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
+
+ /*
+ * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
+ * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
+ * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
+ */
+ if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
+ ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
+ else
+ ret = 0;
+ if (ret) {
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ buf[to_send] = '\0';
+
+ /* actually log it */
+ audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
+ if (too_long)
+ audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
+ audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
+ if (has_cntl)
+ audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
+ else
+ audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
+
+ p += to_send;
+ len_left -= to_send;
+ *len_sent += arg_num_len;
+ if (has_cntl)
+ *len_sent += to_send * 2;
+ else
+ *len_sent += to_send;
+ }
+ /* include the null we didn't log */
+ return len + 1;
+}
+
+static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
+ struct audit_buffer **ab,
+ struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
+{
+ int i;
+ size_t len, len_sent = 0;
+ const char __user *p;
+ char *buf;
+
+ if (axi->mm != current->mm)
+ return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
+
+ p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
+
+ audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc);
+
+ /*
+ * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
+ * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
+ * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
+ * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
+ */
+ buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf) {
+ audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
+ len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
+ &len_sent, p, buf);
+ if (len <= 0)
+ break;
+ p += len;
+ }
+ kfree(buf);
+}
+
+static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
+ CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
+ }
+}
+
+static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
+{
+ kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
+ kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
+ int log = 0;
+
+ if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
+ log = 1;
}
- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- audit_log_task_context(ab, gfp_mask);
+ if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
+ log = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (log)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
}
-static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
+
+ switch (context->type) {
+ case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
+ int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
+ audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
+ for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
+ context->socketcall.args[i]);
+ break; }
+ case AUDIT_IPC: {
+ u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
+ context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode);
+ if (osid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
+ *call_panic = 1;
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
+ }
+ if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
+ context->ipc.qbytes,
+ context->ipc.perm_uid,
+ context->ipc.perm_gid,
+ context->ipc.perm_mode);
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
+ }
+ break; }
+ case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
+ "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
+ context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
+ context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
+ context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
+ context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
+ context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
+ break; }
+ case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
+ "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
+ context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
+ context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
+ context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
+ context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
+ context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
+ break; }
+ case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
+ context->mq_notify.mqdes,
+ context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
+ break; }
+ case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
+ struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
+ "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
+ context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
+ attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
+ attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
+ break; }
+ case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
+ break; }
+ }
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
+static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred;
+ int i, call_panic = 0;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+ const char *tty;
+
+ /* tsk == current */
+ context->pid = tsk->pid;
+ if (!context->ppid)
+ context->ppid = sys_getppid();
+ cred = current_cred();
+ context->uid = cred->uid;
+ context->gid = cred->gid;
+ context->euid = cred->euid;
+ context->suid = cred->suid;
+ context->fsuid = cred->fsuid;
+ context->egid = cred->egid;
+ context->sgid = cred->sgid;
+ context->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
+ context->personality = tsk->personality;
- ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
if (!ab)
return; /* audit_panic has been called */
audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
if (context->return_valid)
- audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
+ audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
(context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
context->return_code);
+
+ spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+ if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
+ tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
+ else
+ tty = "(none)";
+ spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+
audit_log_format(ab,
" a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
- " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
+ " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
" euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
- " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
+ " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
context->argv[0],
context->argv[1],
context->argv[2],
context->argv[3],
context->name_count,
+ context->ppid,
context->pid,
- context->loginuid,
+ tsk->loginuid,
context->uid,
context->gid,
context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
- context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
- audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask);
+ context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
+ tsk->sessionid);
+
+
+ audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
+ audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
audit_log_end(ab);
for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
- ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, aux->type);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
if (!ab)
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
switch (aux->type) {
- case AUDIT_IPC: {
- struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
- audit_log_format(ab,
- " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s",
- axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx);
+
+ case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
+ struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
+ audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
break; }
- case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
- int i;
- struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
- audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
- for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
- audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
+ case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
+ struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
+ audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
break; }
- case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
- struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
+ }
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ }
- audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
- audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
- break; }
+ if (context->type)
+ show_special(context, &call_panic);
- case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
- struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
- audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
- break; }
+ if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
+ if (ab) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
+ context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ }
+ }
+ if (context->sockaddr_len) {
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
+ if (ab) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
+ audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
+ context->sockaddr_len);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
}
- audit_log_end(ab);
}
- if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
- ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_CWD);
+ for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
+ struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
+ if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
+ axs->target_auid[i],
+ axs->target_uid[i],
+ axs->target_sessionid[i],
+ axs->target_sid[i],
+ axs->target_comm[i]))
+ call_panic = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (context->target_pid &&
+ audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
+ context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
+ context->target_sessionid,
+ context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
+ call_panic = 1;
+
+ if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
if (ab) {
- audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
- unsigned long ino = context->names[i].ino;
- unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
+ struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
- ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
if (!ab)
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
- if (context->names[i].name)
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
- else
- audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
-
- if (pino != (unsigned long)-1)
- audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu", pino);
- if (ino != (unsigned long)-1)
- audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu", ino);
- if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1))
- audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
- " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
- MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
- MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
- context->names[i].mode,
- context->names[i].uid,
- context->names[i].gid,
- MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
- MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
- if (context->names[i].ctx) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s",
- context->names[i].ctx);
+ if (n->name) {
+ switch(n->name_len) {
+ case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
+ /* log the full path */
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ /* name was specified as a relative path and the
+ * directory component is the cwd */
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, "name=", &context->pwd);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* log the name's directory component */
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
+ n->name_len);
+ }
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
+
+ if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
+ " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
+ " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
+ n->ino,
+ MAJOR(n->dev),
+ MINOR(n->dev),
+ n->mode,
+ n->uid,
+ n->gid,
+ MAJOR(n->rdev),
+ MINOR(n->rdev));
+ }
+ if (n->osid != 0) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
+ n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+ call_panic = 2;
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
+ audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
+
audit_log_end(ab);
}
+
+ /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
+ if (ab)
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ if (call_panic)
+ audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
}
/**
* audit_free - free a per-task audit context
* @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
*
- * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct.
+ * Called from copy_process and do_exit
*/
void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct audit_context *context;
- task_lock(tsk);
context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
- task_unlock(tsk);
-
if (likely(!context))
return;
/* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
- * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
- * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
+ * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
+ * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
* in the context of the idle thread */
- if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
- audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
+ if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+ audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
+ if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
+ audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
audit_free_context(context);
}
/**
* audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
- * @tsk: task being audited
* @arch: architecture type
* @major: major syscall type (function)
* @a1: additional syscall register 1
* will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
* be written).
*/
-void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
+void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
{
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
enum audit_state state;
- BUG_ON(!context);
+ if (unlikely(!context))
+ return;
/*
* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
*
* i386 no
* x86_64 no
- * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
+ * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
*
* This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
* (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
context->argv[3] = a4;
state = context->state;
- if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
+ context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
+ if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
+ context->prio = 0;
state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
+ }
if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
return;
context->serial = 0;
context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
context->in_syscall = 1;
- context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
+ context->current_state = state;
+ context->ppid = 0;
+}
+
+void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child)
+{
+ struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
+ struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context;
+ if (!p || !ctx)
+ return;
+ if (!ctx->in_syscall || ctx->current_state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+ return;
+ p->arch = ctx->arch;
+ p->major = ctx->major;
+ memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv));
+ p->ctime = ctx->ctime;
+ p->dummy = ctx->dummy;
+ p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall;
+ p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
+ p->ppid = current->pid;
+ p->prio = ctx->prio;
+ p->current_state = ctx->current_state;
}
/**
* audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
- * @tsk: task being audited
* @valid: success/failure flag
* @return_code: syscall return value
*
* message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
* free the names stored from getname().
*/
-void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
+void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
{
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct audit_context *context;
- get_task_struct(tsk);
- task_lock(tsk);
context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
- task_unlock(tsk);
- /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
- * called __put_task_struct. */
if (likely(!context))
- goto out;
+ return;
- if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
- audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+ audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
context->in_syscall = 0;
- context->auditable = 0;
+ context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
+
+ if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
+ audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
if (context->previous) {
struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
tsk->audit_context = new_context;
} else {
audit_free_names(context);
+ unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
audit_free_aux(context);
+ context->aux = NULL;
+ context->aux_pids = NULL;
+ context->target_pid = 0;
+ context->target_sid = 0;
+ context->sockaddr_len = 0;
+ context->type = 0;
+ context->fds[0] = -1;
+ if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
+ kfree(context->filterkey);
+ context->filterkey = NULL;
+ }
tsk->audit_context = context;
}
- out:
- put_task_struct(tsk);
+}
+
+static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+ struct audit_context *context;
+ struct audit_tree_refs *p;
+ struct audit_chunk *chunk;
+ int count;
+ if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
+ return;
+ context = current->audit_context;
+ p = context->trees;
+ count = context->tree_count;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (!chunk)
+ return;
+ if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
+ return;
+ if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
+ audit_set_auditable(context);
+ audit_put_chunk(chunk);
+ unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+ return;
+ }
+ put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+ struct audit_context *context;
+ struct audit_tree_refs *p;
+ const struct dentry *d, *parent;
+ struct audit_chunk *drop;
+ unsigned long seq;
+ int count;
+
+ context = current->audit_context;
+ p = context->trees;
+ count = context->tree_count;
+retry:
+ drop = NULL;
+ d = dentry;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
+ for(;;) {
+ struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
+ if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
+ struct audit_chunk *chunk;
+ chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
+ if (chunk) {
+ if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
+ drop = chunk;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ parent = d->d_parent;
+ if (parent == d)
+ break;
+ d = parent;
+ }
+ if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (!drop) {
+ /* just a race with rename */
+ unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ audit_put_chunk(drop);
+ if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
+ /* OK, got more space */
+ unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ /* too bad */
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
+ unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+ audit_set_auditable(context);
+ return;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+#endif
}
/**
* Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
* Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
*/
-void audit_getname(const char *name)
+void __audit_getname(const char *name)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
+ if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
return;
if (!context->in_syscall) {
}
BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
+ context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
+ context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
+ context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
++context->name_count;
- if (!context->pwd) {
+ if (!context->pwd.dentry) {
read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
- context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
- context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
+ context->pwd = current->fs->pwd;
+ path_get(¤t->fs->pwd);
read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
}
-
+
}
/* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
#endif
}
-void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
+static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
+ const struct inode *inode)
{
- struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix();
- char *ctx = NULL;
- int len = 0;
+ if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
+ if (inode)
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
+ "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n",
+ MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
+ MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
+ inode->i_ino);
- if (!suffix)
- goto ret;
+ else
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ context->name_count++;
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
+ context->ino_count++;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
- len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0);
- if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
- goto ret;
- if (len < 0)
- goto error_path;
- ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ctx)
- goto error_path;
+static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
+ int rc;
- len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0);
- if (len < 0)
- goto error_path;
+ memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
+ memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
+ name->fcap.fE = 0;
+ name->fcap_ver = 0;
- kfree(context->names[idx].ctx);
- context->names[idx].ctx = ctx;
- goto ret;
+ if (!dentry)
+ return 0;
-error_path:
- if (ctx)
- kfree(ctx);
- audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context");
-ret:
- return;
+ rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
+ name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
+ name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
+ name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
+
+ return 0;
}
+/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
+static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
+ const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ name->ino = inode->i_ino;
+ name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+ name->mode = inode->i_mode;
+ name->uid = inode->i_uid;
+ name->gid = inode->i_gid;
+ name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+ audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
+}
+
/**
* audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
* @name: name being audited
- * @inode: inode being audited
- * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup())
+ * @dentry: dentry being audited
*
* Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
*/
-void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
+void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
{
int idx;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+ const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
if (!context->in_syscall)
return;
else {
/* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
* associated name? */
- if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
+ if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
return;
- idx = context->name_count++;
+ idx = context->name_count - 1;
context->names[idx].name = NULL;
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
- ++context->ino_count;
-#endif
- }
- context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
- context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
- context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
- context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
- context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
- if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) &&
- (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) {
- context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
- context->names[idx].pino = inode->i_ino;
- } else {
- context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
- context->names[idx].pino = (unsigned long)-1;
}
+ handle_path(dentry);
+ audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode);
}
/**
* audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
* @dname: inode's dentry name
- * @inode: inode being audited
- * @pino: inode number of dentry parent
+ * @dentry: dentry being audited
+ * @parent: inode of dentry parent
*
* For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
* can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
* must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
* unsuccessful attempts.
*/
-void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
- unsigned long pino)
+void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
+ const struct inode *parent)
{
int idx;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+ const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
+ const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ int dirlen = 0;
if (!context->in_syscall)
return;
+ if (inode)
+ handle_one(inode);
/* determine matching parent */
- if (dname)
- for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
- if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) {
- const char *n;
- const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
- int dlen = strlen(dname);
- int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
-
- if (nlen < dlen)
- continue;
-
- /* disregard trailing slashes */
- n = name + nlen - 1;
- while ((*n == '/') && (n > name))
- n--;
-
- /* find last path component */
- n = n - dlen + 1;
- if (n < name)
- continue;
- else if (n > name) {
- if (*--n != '/')
- continue;
- else
- n++;
- }
+ if (!dname)
+ goto add_names;
- if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0)
- goto update_context;
- }
+ /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
+ for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
+ struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
- /* catch-all in case match not found */
- idx = context->name_count++;
- context->names[idx].name = NULL;
- context->names[idx].pino = pino;
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
- context->ino_count++;
-#endif
+ if (!n->name)
+ continue;
-update_context:
- if (inode) {
- context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
- context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
- context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
- context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
- context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
- context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
+ if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
+ !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
+ n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
+ found_parent = n->name;
+ goto add_names;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
+ for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
+ struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
+
+ if (!n->name)
+ continue;
+
+ /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
+ if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
+ !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
+ if (inode)
+ audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
+ else
+ n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
+ found_child = n->name;
+ goto add_names;
+ }
+ }
+
+add_names:
+ if (!found_parent) {
+ if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
+ return;
+ idx = context->name_count - 1;
+ context->names[idx].name = NULL;
+ audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent);
+ }
+
+ if (!found_child) {
+ if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
+ return;
+ idx = context->name_count - 1;
+
+ /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
+ * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
+ * audit_free_names() */
+ if (found_parent) {
+ context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
+ context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
+ /* don't call __putname() */
+ context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
+ } else {
+ context->names[idx].name = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (inode)
+ audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode);
+ else
+ context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
}
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
/**
* auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
*
* Also sets the context as auditable.
*/
-void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
+int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
{
+ if (!ctx->in_syscall)
+ return 0;
if (!ctx->serial)
ctx->serial = audit_serial();
t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
*serial = ctx->serial;
- ctx->auditable = 1;
+ if (!ctx->prio) {
+ ctx->prio = 1;
+ ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
+ }
+ return 1;
}
+/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
+static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
/**
* audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
* @task: task whose audit context is being modified
*/
int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
{
- if (task->audit_context) {
+ unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
+ struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
+
+ if (context && context->in_syscall) {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
if (ab) {
audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
- "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
- task->pid, task->uid,
- task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid);
+ "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
+ " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
+ task->pid, task_uid(task),
+ task->loginuid, loginuid,
+ task->sessionid, sessionid);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
- task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid;
}
+ task->sessionid = sessionid;
+ task->loginuid = loginuid;
return 0;
}
/**
- * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
- * @ctx: the audit_context
+ * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
+ * @oflag: open flag
+ * @mode: mode bits
+ * @attr: queue attributes
*
- * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
*/
-uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
+void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
{
- return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ if (attr)
+ memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
+ else
+ memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
+
+ context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
+ context->mq_open.mode = mode;
+
+ context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
}
-static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+/**
+ * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
+ * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
+ * @msg_len: Message length
+ * @msg_prio: Message priority
+ * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
+ *
+ */
+void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
+ const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- int len = 0;
+ struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
- if (likely(!context))
- return NULL;
+ if (abs_timeout)
+ memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
+ else
+ memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
- len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0);
- if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
- goto ret;
- if (len < 0)
- goto error_path;
+ context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
+ context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
+ context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
- ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!ctx)
- goto error_path;
+ context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
+}
- len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len);
- if (len < 0)
- goto error_path;
+/**
+ * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
+ * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
+ * @notification: Notification event
+ *
+ */
- return ctx;
+void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
+{
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-error_path:
- kfree(ctx);
- audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context");
-ret:
- return NULL;
+ if (notification)
+ context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
+ else
+ context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
+
+ context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
+ context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
+ * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
+ * @mqstat: MQ flags
+ *
+ */
+void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
+{
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+ context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
+ context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
+ context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
}
/**
- * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc
+ * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
+ * @ipcp: ipc permissions
+ *
+ */
+void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+{
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+ context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
+ context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
+ context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
+ context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
+ context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
* @qbytes: msgq bytes
* @uid: msgq user id
* @gid: msgq group id
* @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
*
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
*/
-int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
{
- struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- if (likely(!context))
+ context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
+ context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
+ context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
+ context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
+ context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
+}
+
+int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
return 0;
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ax)
return -ENOMEM;
- ax->qbytes = qbytes;
- ax->uid = uid;
- ax->gid = gid;
- ax->mode = mode;
- ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp);
-
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
+ ax->argc = bprm->argc;
+ ax->envc = bprm->envc;
+ ax->mm = bprm->mm;
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
context->aux = (void *)ax;
return 0;
}
+
/**
* audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
* @nargs: number of args
* @args: args array
*
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
*/
-int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
+void audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
{
- struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- if (likely(!context))
- return 0;
-
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ax)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
+ return;
- ax->nargs = nargs;
- memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
+ context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
+ context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
+ memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
+}
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
- ax->d.next = context->aux;
- context->aux = (void *)ax;
- return 0;
+/**
+ * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
+ * @fd1: the first file descriptor
+ * @fd2: the second file descriptor
+ *
+ */
+void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
+{
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+ context->fds[0] = fd1;
+ context->fds[1] = fd2;
}
/**
*/
int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
{
- struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- if (likely(!context))
+ if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
return 0;
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ax)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!context->sockaddr) {
+ void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ context->sockaddr = p;
+ }
- ax->len = len;
- memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
+ context->sockaddr_len = len;
+ memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
+{
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ context->target_pid = t->pid;
+ context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+ context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
+ context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
+ memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
+ * @sig: signal value
+ * @t: task being signaled
+ *
+ * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
+ * and uid that is doing that.
+ */
+int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+{
+ struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+ struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
+ uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
+
+ if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
+ if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
+ audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
+ if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
+ audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
+ else
+ audit_sig_uid = uid;
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
+ }
+ if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
+ * in audit_context */
+ if (!ctx->target_pid) {
+ ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
+ ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+ ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
+ ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
+ if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
+ axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!axp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
+ axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
+ ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
+ }
+ BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
+
+ axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
+ axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+ axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
+ axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+ axp->pid_count++;
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
- ax->d.next = context->aux;
- context->aux = (void *)ax;
return 0;
}
/**
- * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
- * @dentry: dentry to record
- * @mnt: mnt to record
+ * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
+ * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
+ * @new: the proposed new credentials
+ * @old: the old credentials
*
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
+ * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
*
- * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
+ * -Eric
*/
-int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
+int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+ const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
+ struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
- if (likely(!context))
- return 0;
-
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ax)
return -ENOMEM;
- ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
- ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
-
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
context->aux = (void *)ax;
+
+ dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
+ get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
+ dput(dentry);
+
+ ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
+ ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
+ ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
+ ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
+
+ ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
+ ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
+ ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
+
+ ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
+ ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
+ ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
return 0;
}
/**
- * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
- * @sig: signal value
- * @t: task being signaled
+ * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
+ * @pid: target pid of the capset call
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the old (current) credentials
*
- * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
- * and uid that is doing that.
+ * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
+ * audit system if applicable
*/
-void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
+ const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
- extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+ context->capset.pid = pid;
+ context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
+ context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
+ context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
+ context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
+}
- if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid)) {
- if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
- struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
- audit_sig_pid = current->pid;
- if (ctx)
- audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
- else
- audit_sig_uid = current->uid;
+/**
+ * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
+ * @signr: signal value
+ *
+ * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
+ * should record the event for investigation.
+ */
+void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ u32 sid;
+ uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid;
+ gid_t gid;
+ unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+
+ if (!audit_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
+ return;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
+ current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
+ auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
+ else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
}
+ audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
+struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
+{
+ struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
+ if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
+ return NULL;
+ return &ctx->killed_trees;
}
git://ftp.safe.ca / safe / jmp / linux-2.6 / blobdiff