*
* Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
* filesystem information.
+ *
+ * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
+ * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
-#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+
+#include "audit.h"
-/* 0 = no checking
- 1 = put_count checking
- 2 = verbose put_count checking
-*/
-#define AUDIT_DEBUG 0
+extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
/* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
extern int audit_enabled;
* path_lookup. */
#define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
-/* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
- a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
- the syscall filter. */
-enum audit_state {
- AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
- * No syscall-specific audit records can
- * be generated. */
- AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
- * but don't necessarily fill it in at
- * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
- * instead). */
- AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
- * and always fill it in at syscall
- * entry time. This makes a full
- * syscall record available if some
- * other part of the kernel decides it
- * should be recorded. */
- AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
- * always fill it in at syscall entry
- * time, and always write out the audit
- * record at syscall exit time. */
-};
-
/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
* we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
* pointers at syscall exit time).
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
+ u32 osid;
};
struct audit_aux_data {
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
mode_t mode;
+ u32 osid;
+};
+
+struct audit_aux_data_execve {
+ struct audit_aux_data d;
+ int argc;
+ int envc;
+ char mem[0];
};
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
/* Save things to print about task_struct */
- pid_t pid;
+ pid_t pid, ppid;
uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
unsigned long personality;
#endif
};
- /* Public API */
-/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
- * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
- * syscall exit time. */
-static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
-#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5
-#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
-#endif
-};
-
-struct audit_entry {
- struct list_head list;
- struct rcu_head rcu;
- struct audit_rule rule;
-};
-
-extern int audit_pid;
-
-/* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called from
- * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD. */
-static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
- && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
- && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
- return -1;
- if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
- return -1;
- if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
- return -1;
-
- d->flags = s->flags;
- d->action = s->action;
- d->field_count = s->field_count;
- for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
- d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
- d->values[i] = s->values[i];
- }
- for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
- * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and
- * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
-static inline int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (a->flags != b->flags)
- return 1;
-
- if (a->action != b->action)
- return 1;
-
- if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
- return 1;
-
- for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
- if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
- || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
- return 1;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
- if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
- * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
- * audit_netlink_sem. */
-static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
- struct list_head *list)
-{
- struct audit_entry *entry;
- int i;
-
- /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
- * addition routine. */
- list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) {
- if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) {
- return -EEXIST;
- }
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS)
- return -EINVAL;
- if ( rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE )
- rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL;
- else if ( (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS) == 0 )
- rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_EQUAL;
- rule->fields[i] &= (~AUDIT_NEGATE);
- }
-
- if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
- return -ENOMEM;
- if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) {
- kfree(entry);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
- entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
- list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
- } else {
- list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
-{
- struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
- kfree(e);
-}
-
-/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
- * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
- * audit_netlink_sem. */
-static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
- struct list_head *list)
-{
- struct audit_entry *e;
-
- /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
- * deletion routine. */
- list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
- if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
- list_del_rcu(&e->list);
- call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */
-}
-
-static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
-{
- int pid, seq;
- int *dest = _dest;
- struct audit_entry *entry;
- int i;
-
- pid = dest[0];
- seq = dest[1];
- kfree(dest);
-
- down(&audit_netlink_sem);
-
- /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
- always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
- for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
- list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
- audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
- &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
- }
- audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
-
- up(&audit_netlink_sem);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type
- * @type: audit message type
- * @pid: target pid for netlink audit messages
- * @uid: target uid for netlink audit messages
- * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number
- * @data: payload data
- * @loginuid: loginuid of sender
- */
-int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
- uid_t loginuid)
-{
- struct task_struct *tsk;
- int *dest;
- int err = 0;
- unsigned listnr;
-
- switch (type) {
- case AUDIT_LIST:
- /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
- * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
- * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
- * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
- * trying to _send_ the stuff */
-
- dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!dest)
- return -ENOMEM;
- dest[0] = pid;
- dest[1] = seq;
-
- tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules");
- if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
- kfree(dest);
- err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
- }
- break;
- case AUDIT_ADD:
- listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
- if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- err = audit_add_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
- if (!err)
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
- break;
- case AUDIT_DEL:
- listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
- if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
- if (!err)
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
- break;
- default:
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- return err;
-}
-
-static int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right)
-{
- switch (op) {
- case AUDIT_EQUAL:
- return (left == right);
- case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
- return (left != right);
- case AUDIT_LESS_THAN:
- return (left < right);
- case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
- return (left <= right);
- case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN:
- return (left > right);
- case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
- return (left >= right);
- default:
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-}
/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
* otherwise. */
static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
- struct audit_rule *rule,
+ struct audit_krule *rule,
struct audit_context *ctx,
enum audit_state *state)
{
- int i, j;
+ int i, j, need_sid = 1;
+ u32 sid;
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS;
- u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
- u32 value = rule->values[i];
+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
int result = 0;
- switch (field) {
+ switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_PPID:
+ if (ctx)
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_UID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_EUID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_SUID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_FSUID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_GID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_EGID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_SGID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_FSGID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_PERS:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_ARCH:
if (ctx)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_EXIT:
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
- if (value)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
+ if (f->val)
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
else
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
}
break;
case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), op, value)) {
+ if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
break;
}
case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), op, value)) {
+ if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
break;
}
case AUDIT_INODE:
if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, op, value) ||
- audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, op, value)) {
+ if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val) ||
+ audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
break;
}
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
result = 0;
if (ctx)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
+ a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
+ match for now to avoid losing information that
+ may be wanted. An error message will also be
+ logged upon error */
+ if (f->se_rule) {
+ if (need_sid) {
+ selinux_task_ctxid(tsk, &sid);
+ need_sid = 0;
+ }
+ result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ f->op,
+ f->se_rule,
+ ctx);
+ }
break;
case AUDIT_ARG0:
case AUDIT_ARG1:
case AUDIT_ARG2:
case AUDIT_ARG3:
if (ctx)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0], op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
break;
}
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}
-static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
- struct audit_rule *rule,
- enum audit_state *state)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS;
- u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
- u32 value = rule->values[i];
- int result = 0;
-
- switch (field) {
- case AUDIT_PID:
- result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.pid, op, value);
- break;
- case AUDIT_UID:
- result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.uid, op, value);
- break;
- case AUDIT_GID:
- result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.gid, op, value);
- break;
- case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
- result = audit_comparator(cb->loginuid, op, value);
- break;
- }
-
- if (!result)
- return 0;
- }
- switch (rule->action) {
- case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
- case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
- case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type)
-{
- struct audit_entry *e;
- enum audit_state state;
- int ret = 1;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
- if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
- if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
- ret = 0;
- break;
- }
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
-
- return ret; /* Audit by default */
-}
-
-/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
int return_valid,
int return_code)
}
context->pid = tsk->pid;
+ context->ppid = sys_getppid(); /* sic. tsk == current in all cases */
context->uid = tsk->uid;
context->gid = tsk->gid;
context->euid = tsk->euid;
context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
context->name_count, context->put_count,
context->ino_count);
- for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
context->names[i].name,
context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
+ }
dump_stack();
return;
}
context->ino_count = 0;
#endif
- for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
if (context->names[i].name)
__putname(context->names[i].name);
+ }
context->name_count = 0;
if (context->pwd)
dput(context->pwd);
dput(axi->dentry);
mntput(axi->mnt);
}
+
context->aux = aux->next;
kfree(aux);
}
printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
}
-static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+{
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ ssize_t len = 0;
+
+ len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ if (len != -EINVAL)
+ goto error_path;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
+ if (len < 0 )
+ goto error_path;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+ return;
+
+error_path:
+ if (ctx)
+ kfree(ctx);
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
+ return;
+}
+
+static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
- struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
+ struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
- get_task_comm(name, current);
+ /* tsk == current */
+
+ get_task_comm(name, tsk);
audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
- if (!mm)
- return;
-
- down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- vma = mm->mmap;
- while (vma) {
- if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
- vma->vm_file) {
- audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
- vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
- vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
- break;
+ if (mm) {
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ vma = mm->mmap;
+ while (vma) {
+ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
+ vma->vm_file) {
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
+ vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
+ vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
+ break;
+ }
+ vma = vma->vm_next;
}
- vma = vma->vm_next;
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ audit_log_task_context(ab);
}
-static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- int i;
+ int i, call_panic = 0;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+ const char *tty;
+
+ /* tsk == current */
- ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
if (!ab)
return; /* audit_panic has been called */
audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
(context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
context->return_code);
+ if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
+ tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
+ else
+ tty = "(none)";
audit_log_format(ab,
" a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
- " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
+ " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
" euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
- " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
+ " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
context->argv[0],
context->argv[1],
context->argv[2],
context->argv[3],
context->name_count,
+ context->ppid,
context->pid,
context->loginuid,
context->uid,
context->gid,
context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
- context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
- audit_log_task_info(ab);
+ context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
+ audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
audit_log_end(ab);
for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
- ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, aux->type);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
if (!ab)
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
case AUDIT_IPC: {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
audit_log_format(ab,
- " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
- axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+ "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
+ axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+ if (axi->osid != 0) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+ axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
+ axi->osid);
+ call_panic = 1;
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ }
+ break; }
+
+ case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
+ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
+ axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+ break; }
+
+ case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
+ struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
+ int i;
+ const char *p;
+ for (i = 0, p = axi->mem; i < axi->argc; i++) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
+ p = audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
+ }
break; }
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
}
if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
- ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_CWD);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
if (ab) {
audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
audit_log_end(ab);
unsigned long ino = context->names[i].ino;
unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
- ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
if (!ab)
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
context->names[i].gid,
MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
+ if (context->names[i].osid != 0) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+ context->names[i].osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
+ context->names[i].osid);
+ call_panic = 2;
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ }
+
audit_log_end(ab);
}
+ if (call_panic)
+ audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
}
/**
* audit_free - free a per-task audit context
* @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
*
- * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct.
+ * Called from copy_process and do_exit
*/
void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct audit_context *context;
- task_lock(tsk);
context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
- task_unlock(tsk);
-
if (likely(!context))
return;
* function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
* We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
* in the context of the idle thread */
+ /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
- audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
audit_free_context(context);
}
* will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
* be written).
*/
-void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
+void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
{
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
enum audit_state state;
*
* i386 no
* x86_64 no
- * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
+ * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
*
* This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
* (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
* message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
* free the names stored from getname().
*/
-void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
+void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
{
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct audit_context *context;
- get_task_struct(tsk);
- task_lock(tsk);
context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
- task_unlock(tsk);
- /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
- * called __put_task_struct. */
if (likely(!context))
- goto out;
+ return;
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
- audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL);
+ audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
context->in_syscall = 0;
context->auditable = 0;
audit_free_aux(context);
tsk->audit_context = context;
}
- out:
- put_task_struct(tsk);
}
/**
#endif
}
+static void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &context->names[idx].osid);
+}
+
+
/**
* audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
* @name: name being audited
context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
+ audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) &&
(strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) {
context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
+ audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
}
}
}
/**
- * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc
+ * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
+ * @ipcp: ipc permissions
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
+int audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+{
+ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ if (likely(!context))
+ return 0;
+
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!ax)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
+ ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
+ ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
+ selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
+
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
+ ax->d.next = context->aux;
+ context->aux = (void *)ax;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
* @qbytes: msgq bytes
* @uid: msgq user id
* @gid: msgq group id
*
* Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
*/
-int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
+int audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
{
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
if (likely(!context))
return 0;
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!ax)
return -ENOMEM;
ax->gid = gid;
ax->mode = mode;
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
context->aux = (void *)ax;
return 0;
}
+int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+ unsigned long p, next;
+ void *to;
+
+ if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context))
+ return 0;
+
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - bprm->p,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ax)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ax->argc = bprm->argc;
+ ax->envc = bprm->envc;
+ for (p = bprm->p, to = ax->mem; p < MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE; p = next) {
+ struct page *page = bprm->page[p / PAGE_SIZE];
+ void *kaddr = kmap(page);
+ next = (p + PAGE_SIZE) & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+ memcpy(to, kaddr + (p & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)), next - p);
+ to += next - p;
+ kunmap(page);
+ }
+
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
+ ax->d.next = context->aux;
+ context->aux = (void *)ax;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
/**
* audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
* @nargs: number of args
* If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
* and uid that is doing that.
*/
-void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+void __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
-
- if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid)) {
- if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
- struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
- audit_sig_pid = current->pid;
- if (ctx)
- audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
- else
- audit_sig_uid = current->uid;
- }
+ extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
+
+ if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1) {
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+ struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
+ audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
+ if (ctx)
+ audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
+ else
+ audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
+ selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
}
}
git://ftp.safe.ca / safe / jmp / linux-2.6 / blobdiff