#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include "audit.h"
/*
* Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist
* data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access
* contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque
- * selinux rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
+ * LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
* must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist.
* An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may
* be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held.
#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
#endif
};
+static struct list_head audit_rules_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[0]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[1]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[2]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[3]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[4]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[5]),
+};
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex);
-
-/* Inotify handle */
-extern struct inotify_handle *audit_ih;
+DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex);
/* Inotify events we care about. */
#define AUDIT_IN_WATCH IN_MOVE|IN_CREATE|IN_DELETE|IN_DELETE_SELF|IN_MOVE_SELF
if (e->rule.fields)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
- kfree(f->se_str);
- selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
+ kfree(f->lsm_str);
+ security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
}
kfree(e->rule.fields);
kfree(e->rule.filterkey);
kfree(e);
}
-static inline void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
audit_free_rule(e);
inotify_init_watch(&parent->wdata);
/* grab a ref so inotify watch hangs around until we take audit_filter_mutex */
get_inotify_watch(&parent->wdata);
- wd = inotify_add_watch(audit_ih, &parent->wdata, ndp->dentry->d_inode,
- AUDIT_IN_WATCH);
+ wd = inotify_add_watch(audit_ih, &parent->wdata,
+ ndp->path.dentry->d_inode, AUDIT_IN_WATCH);
if (wd < 0) {
audit_free_parent(&parent->wdata);
return ERR_PTR(wd);
/* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space
* buffer. */
-static char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
+char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
{
char *str;
struct audit_field *f)
{
if (krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT ||
- krule->watch || krule->inode_f)
+ krule->watch || krule->inode_f || krule->tree ||
+ (f->op != Audit_equal && f->op != Audit_not_equal))
return -EINVAL;
krule->inode_f = f;
if (path[0] != '/' || path[len-1] == '/' ||
krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT ||
- op & ~AUDIT_EQUAL ||
- krule->inode_f || krule->watch) /* 1 inode # per rule, for hash */
+ op != Audit_equal ||
+ krule->inode_f || krule->watch || krule->tree)
return -EINVAL;
watch = audit_init_watch(path);
- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(watch)))
+ if (IS_ERR(watch))
return PTR_ERR(watch);
audit_get_watch(watch);
return 0;
}
+int audit_match_class(int class, unsigned syscall)
+{
+ if (unlikely(syscall >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32))
+ return 0;
+ if (unlikely(class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || !classes[class]))
+ return 0;
+ return classes[class][AUDIT_WORD(syscall)] & AUDIT_BIT(syscall);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+static inline int audit_match_class_bits(int class, u32 *mask)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (classes[class]) {
+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
+ if (mask[i] & classes[class][i])
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int audit_match_signal(struct audit_entry *entry)
+{
+ struct audit_field *arch = entry->rule.arch_f;
+
+ if (!arch) {
+ /* When arch is unspecified, we must check both masks on biarch
+ * as syscall number alone is ambiguous. */
+ return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL,
+ entry->rule.mask) &&
+ audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32,
+ entry->rule.mask));
+ }
+
+ switch(audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) {
+ case 0: /* native */
+ return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL,
+ entry->rule.mask));
+ case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
+ return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32,
+ entry->rule.mask));
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
/* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */
static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
{
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
+static u32 audit_ops[] =
+{
+ [Audit_equal] = AUDIT_EQUAL,
+ [Audit_not_equal] = AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL,
+ [Audit_bitmask] = AUDIT_BIT_MASK,
+ [Audit_bittest] = AUDIT_BIT_TEST,
+ [Audit_lt] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN,
+ [Audit_gt] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN,
+ [Audit_le] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL,
+ [Audit_ge] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL,
+};
+
+static u32 audit_to_op(u32 op)
+{
+ u32 n;
+ for (n = Audit_equal; n < Audit_bad && audit_ops[n] != op; n++)
+ ;
+ return n;
+}
+
+
/* Translate struct audit_rule to kernel's rule respresentation.
* Exists for backward compatibility with userspace. */
static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule)
{
struct audit_entry *entry;
- struct audit_field *f;
int err = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
+ u32 n;
+
+ n = rule->fields[i] & (AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
+
+ /* Support for legacy operators where
+ * AUDIT_NEGATE bit signifies != and otherwise assumes == */
+ if (n & AUDIT_NEGATE)
+ f->op = Audit_not_equal;
+ else if (!n)
+ f->op = Audit_equal;
+ else
+ f->op = audit_to_op(n);
+
+ entry->rule.vers_ops = (n & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ? 2 : 1;
- f->op = rule->fields[i] & (AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
f->type = rule->fields[i] & ~(AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
f->val = rule->values[i];
err = -EINVAL;
+ if (f->op == Audit_bad)
+ goto exit_free;
+
switch(f->type) {
default:
goto exit_free;
case AUDIT_FSGID:
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
case AUDIT_PERS:
- case AUDIT_ARCH:
case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
case AUDIT_PPID:
case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
case AUDIT_EXIT:
case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
+ /* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */
+ if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
+ goto exit_free;
+ break;
case AUDIT_ARG0:
case AUDIT_ARG1:
case AUDIT_ARG2:
case AUDIT_ARG3:
break;
+ /* arch is only allowed to be = or != */
+ case AUDIT_ARCH:
+ if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
+ goto exit_free;
+ entry->rule.arch_f = f;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_PERM:
+ if (f->val & ~15)
+ goto exit_free;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
+ if ((f->val & ~S_IFMT) > S_IFMT)
+ goto exit_free;
+ break;
case AUDIT_INODE:
err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f);
if (err)
goto exit_free;
break;
}
-
- entry->rule.vers_ops = (f->op & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ? 2 : 1;
-
- /* Support for legacy operators where
- * AUDIT_NEGATE bit signifies != and otherwise assumes == */
- if (f->op & AUDIT_NEGATE)
- f->op = AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL;
- else if (!f->op)
- f->op = AUDIT_EQUAL;
- else if (f->op == AUDIT_OPERATORS) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto exit_free;
- }
}
- f = entry->rule.inode_f;
- if (f) {
- switch(f->op) {
- case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
- entry->rule.inode_f = NULL;
- case AUDIT_EQUAL:
- break;
- default:
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto exit_free;
- }
- }
+ if (entry->rule.inode_f && entry->rule.inode_f->op == Audit_not_equal)
+ entry->rule.inode_f = NULL;
exit_nofree:
return entry;
{
int err = 0;
struct audit_entry *entry;
- struct audit_field *f;
void *bufp;
size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data);
int i;
struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
err = -EINVAL;
- if (!(data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ||
- data->fieldflags[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS)
+
+ f->op = audit_to_op(data->fieldflags[i]);
+ if (f->op == Audit_bad)
goto exit_free;
- f->op = data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
f->type = data->fields[i];
f->val = data->values[i];
- f->se_str = NULL;
- f->se_rule = NULL;
+ f->lsm_str = NULL;
+ f->lsm_rule = NULL;
switch(f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
case AUDIT_UID:
case AUDIT_FSGID:
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
case AUDIT_PERS:
- case AUDIT_ARCH:
case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
case AUDIT_PPID:
case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
case AUDIT_ARG2:
case AUDIT_ARG3:
break;
+ case AUDIT_ARCH:
+ entry->rule.arch_f = f;
+ break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
goto exit_free;
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
- err = selinux_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- &f->se_rule);
+ err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
+ (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux "
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM "
"\'%s\' is invalid\n", str);
err = 0;
}
kfree(str);
goto exit_free;
} else
- f->se_str = str;
+ f->lsm_str = str;
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
goto exit_free;
}
break;
+ case AUDIT_DIR:
+ str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
+ if (IS_ERR(str))
+ goto exit_free;
+ entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
+
+ err = audit_make_tree(&entry->rule, str, f->op);
+ kfree(str);
+ if (err)
+ goto exit_free;
+ break;
case AUDIT_INODE:
err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f);
if (err)
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
entry->rule.filterkey = str;
break;
- default:
- goto exit_free;
- }
- }
-
- f = entry->rule.inode_f;
- if (f) {
- switch(f->op) {
- case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
- entry->rule.inode_f = NULL;
- case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+ case AUDIT_PERM:
+ if (f->val & ~15)
+ goto exit_free;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
+ if ((f->val & ~S_IFMT) > S_IFMT)
+ goto exit_free;
break;
default:
- err = -EINVAL;
goto exit_free;
}
}
+ if (entry->rule.inode_f && entry->rule.inode_f->op == Audit_not_equal)
+ entry->rule.inode_f = NULL;
+
exit_nofree:
return entry;
}
/* Pack a filter field's string representation into data block. */
-static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, char *str)
+static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, const char *str)
{
size_t len = strlen(str);
struct audit_rule *rule;
int i;
- rule = kmalloc(sizeof(*rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+ rule = kzalloc(sizeof(*rule), GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!rule))
return NULL;
- memset(rule, 0, sizeof(*rule));
rule->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr;
rule->action = krule->action;
rule->fields[i] = krule->fields[i].type;
if (krule->vers_ops == 1) {
- if (krule->fields[i].op & AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
+ if (krule->fields[i].op == Audit_not_equal)
rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NEGATE;
} else {
- rule->fields[i] |= krule->fields[i].op;
+ rule->fields[i] |= audit_ops[krule->fields[i].op];
}
}
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) rule->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
struct audit_field *f = &krule->fields[i];
data->fields[i] = f->type;
- data->fieldflags[i] = f->op;
+ data->fieldflags[i] = audit_ops[f->op];
switch(f->type) {
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
- audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
+ audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->lsm_str);
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->watch->path);
break;
+ case AUDIT_DIR:
+ data->buflen += data->values[i] =
+ audit_pack_string(&bufp,
+ audit_tree_path(krule->tree));
+ break;
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
+ if (strcmp(a->fields[i].lsm_str, b->fields[i].lsm_str))
return 1;
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
if (strcmp(a->watch->path, b->watch->path))
return 1;
break;
+ case AUDIT_DIR:
+ if (strcmp(audit_tree_path(a->tree),
+ audit_tree_path(b->tree)))
+ return 1;
+ break;
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
/* both filterkeys exist based on above type compare */
if (strcmp(a->filterkey, b->filterkey))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
new = audit_init_watch(path);
- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(new))) {
+ if (IS_ERR(new)) {
kfree(path);
goto out;
}
return new;
}
-/* Duplicate selinux field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be
+/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
* re-initialized. */
-static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
+static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
struct audit_field *sf)
{
int ret = 0;
- char *se_str;
+ char *lsm_str;
- /* our own copy of se_str */
- se_str = kstrdup(sf->se_str, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(se_str)))
- return -ENOMEM;
- df->se_str = se_str;
+ /* our own copy of lsm_str */
+ lsm_str = kstrdup(sf->lsm_str, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!lsm_str))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
- /* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */
- ret = selinux_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
- &df->se_rule);
+ /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
+ ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
+ (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux \'%s\' is "
- "invalid\n", df->se_str);
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is "
+ "invalid\n", df->lsm_str);
ret = 0;
}
}
/* Duplicate an audit rule. This will be a deep copy with the exception
- * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The selinux specific fields
+ * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The LSM specific fields
* will be updated in the copy. The point is to be able to replace the old
* rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule.
* The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from
new->action = old->action;
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
new->mask[i] = old->mask[i];
+ new->prio = old->prio;
new->buflen = old->buflen;
new->inode_f = old->inode_f;
new->watch = NULL;
new->field_count = old->field_count;
+ /*
+ * note that we are OK with not refcounting here; audit_match_tree()
+ * never dereferences tree and we can't get false positives there
+ * since we'd have to have rule gone from the list *and* removed
+ * before the chunks found by lookup had been allocated, i.e. before
+ * the beginning of list scan.
+ */
+ new->tree = old->tree;
memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
- /* deep copy this information, updating the se_rule fields, because
+ /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
* the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
switch (new->fields[i].type) {
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
+ err = audit_dupe_lsm_field(&new->fields[i],
&old->fields[i]);
break;
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
struct audit_watch *owatch, *nwatch, *nextw;
struct audit_krule *r, *nextr;
struct audit_entry *oentry, *nentry;
- struct audit_buffer *ab;
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
list_for_each_entry_safe(owatch, nextw, &parent->watches, wlist) {
/* If the update involves invalidating rules, do the inode-based
* filtering now, so we don't omit records. */
- if (invalidating &&
- audit_filter_inodes(current, current->audit_context) == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
- audit_set_auditable(current->audit_context);
+ if (invalidating && current->audit_context)
+ audit_filter_inodes(current, current->audit_context);
nwatch = audit_dupe_watch(owatch);
- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(nwatch))) {
+ if (IS_ERR(nwatch)) {
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
audit_panic("error updating watch, skipping");
return;
list_del_rcu(&oentry->list);
nentry = audit_dupe_rule(&oentry->rule, nwatch);
- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(nentry)))
+ if (IS_ERR(nentry)) {
+ list_del(&oentry->rule.list);
audit_panic("error updating watch, removing");
- else {
+ } else {
int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)ino);
list_add(&nentry->rule.rlist, &nwatch->rules);
list_add_rcu(&nentry->list, &audit_inode_hash[h]);
+ list_replace(&oentry->rule.list,
+ &nentry->rule.list);
}
call_rcu(&oentry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
}
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
- audit_log_format(ab, "audit updated rules specifying watch=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, owatch->path);
- audit_log_format(ab, " with dev=%u ino=%lu\n", dev, ino);
- audit_log_end(ab);
-
+ if (audit_enabled) {
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u",
+ audit_get_loginuid(current),
+ audit_get_sessionid(current));
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ " op=updated rules specifying path=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, owatch->path);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " with dev=%u ino=%lu\n",
+ dev, ino);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", r->listnr);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ }
audit_remove_watch(owatch);
goto add_watch_to_parent; /* event applies to a single watch */
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(w, nextw, &parent->watches, wlist) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(r, nextr, &w->rules, rlist) {
e = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
+ if (audit_enabled) {
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u",
+ audit_get_loginuid(current),
+ audit_get_sessionid(current));
+ audit_log_format(ab, " op=remove rule path=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, w->path);
+ if (r->filterkey) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
+ r->filterkey);
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
+ audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1",
+ r->listnr);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ }
list_del(&r->rlist);
+ list_del(&r->list);
list_del_rcu(&e->list);
call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
-
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "audit implicitly removed rule from list=%d\n",
- AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT);
}
audit_remove_watch(w);
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, in_list, ilist) {
list_del(&p->ilist);
inotify_rm_watch(audit_ih, &p->wdata);
- /* the put matching the get in audit_do_del_rule() */
- put_inotify_watch(&p->wdata);
+ /* the unpin matching the pin in audit_do_del_rule() */
+ unpin_inotify_watch(&p->wdata);
}
}
/* Find an existing audit rule.
* Caller must hold audit_filter_mutex to prevent stale rule data. */
static struct audit_entry *audit_find_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
- struct list_head *list)
+ struct list_head **p)
{
struct audit_entry *e, *found = NULL;
+ struct list_head *list;
int h;
- if (entry->rule.watch) {
+ if (entry->rule.inode_f) {
+ h = audit_hash_ino(entry->rule.inode_f->val);
+ *p = list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
+ } else if (entry->rule.watch) {
/* we don't know the inode number, so must walk entire hash */
for (h = 0; h < AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS; h++) {
list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
}
}
goto out;
+ } else {
+ *p = list = &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr];
}
list_for_each_entry(e, list, list)
static void audit_put_nd(struct nameidata *ndp, struct nameidata *ndw)
{
if (ndp) {
- path_release(ndp);
+ path_put(&ndp->path);
kfree(ndp);
}
if (ndw) {
- path_release(ndw);
+ path_put(&ndw->path);
kfree(ndw);
}
}
/* update watch filter fields */
if (ndw) {
- watch->dev = ndw->dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
- watch->ino = ndw->dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+ watch->dev = ndw->path.dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+ watch->ino = ndw->path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
}
/* The audit_filter_mutex must not be held during inotify calls because
*/
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
- if (inotify_find_watch(audit_ih, ndp->dentry->d_inode, &i_watch) < 0) {
+ if (inotify_find_watch(audit_ih, ndp->path.dentry->d_inode,
+ &i_watch) < 0) {
parent = audit_init_parent(ndp);
if (IS_ERR(parent)) {
/* caller expects mutex locked */
return ret;
}
+static u64 prio_low = ~0ULL/2;
+static u64 prio_high = ~0ULL/2 - 1;
+
/* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate. */
-static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
- struct list_head *list)
+static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
{
struct audit_entry *e;
- struct audit_field *inode_f = entry->rule.inode_f;
struct audit_watch *watch = entry->rule.watch;
- struct nameidata *ndp, *ndw;
- int h, err, putnd_needed = 0;
+ struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
+ struct nameidata *ndp = NULL, *ndw = NULL;
+ struct list_head *list;
+ int h, err;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
int dont_count = 0;
dont_count = 1;
#endif
- if (inode_f) {
- h = audit_hash_ino(inode_f->val);
- list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
- }
-
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
- e = audit_find_rule(entry, list);
+ e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list);
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
if (e) {
err = -EEXIST;
+ /* normally audit_add_tree_rule() will free it on failure */
+ if (tree)
+ audit_put_tree(tree);
goto error;
}
err = audit_get_nd(watch->path, &ndp, &ndw);
if (err)
goto error;
- putnd_needed = 1;
}
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
h = audit_hash_ino((u32)watch->ino);
list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
}
+ if (tree) {
+ err = audit_add_tree_rule(&entry->rule);
+ if (err) {
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ entry->rule.prio = ~0ULL;
+ if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT) {
+ if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND)
+ entry->rule.prio = ++prio_high;
+ else
+ entry->rule.prio = --prio_low;
+ }
if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
+ list_add(&entry->rule.list,
+ &audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
} else {
+ list_add_tail(&entry->rule.list,
+ &audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
if (!dont_count)
audit_n_rules++;
+
+ if (!audit_match_signal(entry))
+ audit_signals++;
#endif
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
- if (putnd_needed)
- audit_put_nd(ndp, ndw);
-
+ audit_put_nd(ndp, ndw); /* NULL args OK */
return 0;
error:
- if (putnd_needed)
- audit_put_nd(ndp, ndw);
+ audit_put_nd(ndp, ndw); /* NULL args OK */
if (watch)
audit_put_watch(watch); /* tmp watch, matches initial get */
return err;
}
/* Remove an existing rule from filterlist. */
-static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
- struct list_head *list)
+static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
{
struct audit_entry *e;
- struct audit_field *inode_f = entry->rule.inode_f;
struct audit_watch *watch, *tmp_watch = entry->rule.watch;
+ struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
+ struct list_head *list;
LIST_HEAD(inotify_list);
- int h, ret = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
int dont_count = 0;
dont_count = 1;
#endif
- if (inode_f) {
- h = audit_hash_ino(inode_f->val);
- list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
- }
-
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
- e = audit_find_rule(entry, list);
+ e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list);
if (!e) {
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
ret = -ENOENT;
/* Put parent on the inotify un-registration
* list. Grab a reference before releasing
* audit_filter_mutex, to be released in
- * audit_inotify_unregister(). */
- list_add(&parent->ilist, &inotify_list);
- get_inotify_watch(&parent->wdata);
+ * audit_inotify_unregister().
+ * If filesystem is going away, just leave
+ * the sucker alone, eviction will take
+ * care of it.
+ */
+ if (pin_inotify_watch(&parent->wdata))
+ list_add(&parent->ilist, &inotify_list);
}
}
}
+ if (e->rule.tree)
+ audit_remove_tree_rule(&e->rule);
+
list_del_rcu(&e->list);
+ list_del(&e->rule.list);
call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
if (!dont_count)
audit_n_rules--;
+
+ if (!audit_match_signal(entry))
+ audit_signals--;
#endif
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
out:
if (tmp_watch)
audit_put_watch(tmp_watch); /* match initial get */
+ if (tree)
+ audit_put_tree(tree); /* that's the temporary one */
return ret;
}
static void audit_list(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
- struct audit_entry *entry;
+ struct audit_krule *r;
int i;
/* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu
* iterator to sync with list writers. */
for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
- list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
- struct audit_rule *rule;
-
- rule = audit_krule_to_rule(&entry->rule);
- if (unlikely(!rule))
- break;
- skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
- rule, sizeof(*rule));
- if (skb)
- skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
- kfree(rule);
- }
- }
- for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS; i++) {
- list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_inode_hash[i], list) {
+ list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
struct audit_rule *rule;
- rule = audit_krule_to_rule(&entry->rule);
+ rule = audit_krule_to_rule(r);
if (unlikely(!rule))
break;
skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
static void audit_list_rules(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
- struct audit_entry *e;
+ struct audit_krule *r;
int i;
/* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu
* iterator to sync with list writers. */
for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
- list_for_each_entry(e, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
- struct audit_rule_data *data;
-
- data = audit_krule_to_data(&e->rule);
- if (unlikely(!data))
- break;
- skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 0, 1,
- data, sizeof(*data) + data->buflen);
- if (skb)
- skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
- kfree(data);
- }
- }
- for (i=0; i< AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS; i++) {
- list_for_each_entry(e, &audit_inode_hash[i], list) {
+ list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
struct audit_rule_data *data;
- data = audit_krule_to_data(&e->rule);
+ data = audit_krule_to_data(r);
if (unlikely(!data))
break;
skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 0, 1,
}
/* Log rule additions and removals */
-static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t loginuid, u32 sid, char *action,
- struct audit_krule *rule, int res)
+static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid,
+ char *action, struct audit_krule *rule,
+ int res)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ if (!audit_enabled)
+ return;
+
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
if (!ab)
return;
- audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u", loginuid);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u", loginuid, sessionid);
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
- else
+ else {
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " %s rule key=", action);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s rule key=", action);
if (rule->filterkey)
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, rule->filterkey);
else
* @data: payload data
* @datasz: size of payload data
* @loginuid: loginuid of sender
+ * @sessionid: sessionid for netlink audit message
* @sid: SE Linux Security ID of sender
*/
int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
- size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
+ size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct audit_netlink_list *dest;
* auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
* happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
* trying to _send_ the stuff */
-
+
dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dest)
return -ENOMEM;
if (IS_ERR(entry))
return PTR_ERR(entry);
- err = audit_add_rule(entry,
- &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
- audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sid, "add", &entry->rule, !err);
+ err = audit_add_rule(entry);
+ audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sessionid, sid, "add",
+ &entry->rule, !err);
if (err)
audit_free_rule(entry);
if (IS_ERR(entry))
return PTR_ERR(entry);
- err = audit_del_rule(entry,
- &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
- audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sid, "remove", &entry->rule,
- !err);
+ err = audit_del_rule(entry);
+ audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sessionid, sid, "remove",
+ &entry->rule, !err);
audit_free_rule(entry);
break;
return err;
}
-int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right)
+int audit_comparator(u32 left, u32 op, u32 right)
{
switch (op) {
- case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_equal:
return (left == right);
- case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_not_equal:
return (left != right);
- case AUDIT_LESS_THAN:
+ case Audit_lt:
return (left < right);
- case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_le:
return (left <= right);
- case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN:
+ case Audit_gt:
return (left > right);
- case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_ge:
return (left >= right);
+ case Audit_bitmask:
+ return (left & right);
+ case Audit_bittest:
+ return ((left & right) == right);
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
}
- BUG();
- return 0;
}
/* Compare given dentry name with last component in given path,
return 1;
}
-int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type)
+int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb)
{
+ enum audit_state state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
struct audit_entry *e;
- enum audit_state state;
int ret = 1;
rcu_read_lock();
{
struct audit_entry *e;
int result = 0;
-
+
rcu_read_lock();
if (list_empty(&audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE]))
goto unlock_and_return;
return result;
}
-/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields. Returns 1 if there
- are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. */
-static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
+static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
{
- int i;
+ struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
+ struct audit_entry *nentry;
+ struct audit_watch *watch;
+ struct audit_tree *tree;
+ int err = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
- switch (f->type) {
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- return 1;
- }
+ if (!security_audit_rule_known(r))
+ return 0;
+
+ watch = r->watch;
+ tree = r->tree;
+ nentry = audit_dupe_rule(r, watch);
+ if (IS_ERR(nentry)) {
+ /* save the first error encountered for the
+ * return value */
+ err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
+ audit_panic("error updating LSM filters");
+ if (watch)
+ list_del(&r->rlist);
+ list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
+ list_del(&r->list);
+ } else {
+ if (watch) {
+ list_add(&nentry->rule.rlist, &watch->rules);
+ list_del(&r->rlist);
+ } else if (tree)
+ list_replace_init(&r->rlist, &nentry->rule.rlist);
+ list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
+ list_replace(&r->list, &nentry->rule.list);
}
+ call_rcu(&entry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
- return 0;
+ return err;
}
-/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules.
- * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain selinux
+/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
+ * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
- * selinux field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
+ * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
* updated rule. */
-int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
+int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
{
- struct audit_entry *entry, *n, *nentry;
- struct audit_watch *watch;
+ struct audit_krule *r, *n;
int i, err = 0;
/* audit_filter_mutex synchronizes the writers */
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
- list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
- if (!audit_rule_has_selinux(&entry->rule))
- continue;
-
- watch = entry->rule.watch;
- nentry = audit_dupe_rule(&entry->rule, watch);
- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(nentry))) {
- /* save the first error encountered for the
- * return value */
- if (!err)
- err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
- audit_panic("error updating selinux filters");
- if (watch)
- list_del(&entry->rule.rlist);
- list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
- } else {
- if (watch) {
- list_add(&nentry->rule.rlist,
- &watch->rules);
- list_del(&entry->rule.rlist);
- }
- list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
- }
- call_rcu(&entry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
+ int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
+ if (!err)
+ err = res;
}
}
-
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
return err;
git://ftp.safe.ca / safe / jmp / linux-2.6 / blobdiff