/*
* This is <linux/capability.h>
*
- * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@transmeta.com>
+ * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
* Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
* with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
*
* See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
*
- * ftp://linux.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.2/
- */
+ * ftp://linux.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
+ */
#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/compiler.h>
+
+struct task_struct;
/* User-level do most of the mapping between kernel and user
capabilities based on the version tag given by the kernel. The
kernel might be somewhat backwards compatible, but don't bet on
it. */
-/* XXX - Note, cap_t, is defined by POSIX to be an "opaque" pointer to
+/* Note, cap_t, is defined by POSIX (draft) to be an "opaque" pointer to
a set of three capability sets. The transposition of 3*the
following structure to such a composite is better handled in a user
library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free
etc.. */
-
-#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION 0x19980330
+
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1 0x19980330
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1 1
+
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2 0x20071026 /* deprecated - use v3 */
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2 2
+
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3 0x20080522
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3 2
typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct {
__u32 version;
int pid;
} __user *cap_user_header_t;
-
+
typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
__u32 effective;
__u32 permitted;
__u32 inheritable;
} __user *cap_user_data_t;
-
-#ifdef __KERNEL__
-#include <linux/spinlock.h>
-/* #define STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS */
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
+#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
-#ifdef STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS
+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK 0xFF000000
+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT 24
+#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
+#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE 0x000001
-typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
- __u32 cap;
-} kernel_cap_t;
+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_1 0x01000000
+#define VFS_CAP_U32_1 1
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_1))
+
+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 0x02000000
+#define VFS_CAP_U32_2 2
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_2))
+
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2
+#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_2
+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_2
+
+struct vfs_cap_data {
+ __le32 magic_etc; /* Little endian */
+ struct {
+ __le32 permitted; /* Little endian */
+ __le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */
+ } data[VFS_CAP_U32];
+};
+
+#ifndef __KERNEL__
+
+/*
+ * Backwardly compatible definition for source code - trapped in a
+ * 32-bit world. If you find you need this, please consider using
+ * libcap to untrap yourself...
+ */
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1
#else
-typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
+#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
+#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
+extern int file_caps_enabled;
#endif
-
-#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (2*sizeof(__u32))
+
+typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
+ __u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
+} kernel_cap_t;
+
+/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
+struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
+ __u32 magic_etc;
+ kernel_cap_t permitted;
+ kernel_cap_t inheritable;
+};
+
+#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
#endif
/**
- ** POSIX-draft defined capabilities.
+ ** POSIX-draft defined capabilities.
**/
/* In a system with the [_POSIX_CHOWN_RESTRICTED] option defined, this
defined. Excluding DAC access covered by CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
#define CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH 2
-
+
/* Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where
file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where CAP_FSETID
is applicable. It doesn't override MAC and DAC restrictions. */
#define CAP_FSETID 4
-/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
-
-#define CAP_FS_MASK 0x1f
-
/* Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a
process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID
of the process receiving the signal. */
** Linux-specific capabilities
**/
-/* Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid,
- remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid */
+/* Without VFS support for capabilities:
+ * Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid,
+ * remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid
+ * With VFS support for capabilities (neither of above, but)
+ * Add any capability from current's capability bounding set
+ * to the current process' inheritable set
+ * Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set
+ * Allow modification of the securebits for a process
+ */
#define CAP_SETPCAP 8
#define CAP_IPC_OWNER 15
/* Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit */
-/* Modify cap_bset */
#define CAP_SYS_MODULE 16
/* Allow ioperm/iopl access */
/* Allow enabling/disabling tagged queuing on SCSI controllers and sending
arbitrary SCSI commands */
/* Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem */
+/* Allow setting zone reclaim policy */
#define CAP_SYS_ADMIN 21
/* Override reserved space on ext2 filesystem */
/* Modify data journaling mode on ext3 filesystem (uses journaling
resources) */
-/* NOTE: ext2 honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so
+/* NOTE: ext2 honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so
you can override using fsuid too */
/* Override size restrictions on IPC message queues */
/* Allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock */
#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30
-#ifdef __KERNEL__
-/*
- * Bounding set
+#define CAP_SETFCAP 31
+
+/* Override MAC access.
+ The base kernel enforces no MAC policy.
+ An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
+ to implement capability based overrides of that policy, this is
+ the capability it should use to do so. */
+
+#define CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE 32
+
+/* Allow MAC configuration or state changes.
+ The base kernel requires no MAC configuration.
+ An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
+ to implement capability based checks on modifications to that
+ policy or the data required to maintain it, this is the
+ capability it should use to do so. */
+
+#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN 33
+
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+
+#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
+
+/*
+ * Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)
*/
-extern kernel_cap_t cap_bset;
+
+#define CAP_TO_INDEX(x) ((x) >> 5) /* 1 << 5 == bits in __u32 */
+#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for indexed __u32 */
+
+#ifdef __KERNEL__
/*
* Internal kernel functions only
*/
-
-#ifdef STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS
-#define to_cap_t(x) { x }
-#define cap_t(x) (x).cap
+#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \
+ for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
+
+# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \
+ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \
+ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \
+ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \
+ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
+
+# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+
+#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
+# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
+#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
+
+# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
+# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
+# define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }})
+# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0, CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
+# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
+ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) \
+ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD), \
+ CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
+
+#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
+
+#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET CAP_EMPTY_SET
+
+# define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
+# define cap_set_full(c) do { (c) = __cap_full_set; } while (0)
+# define cap_set_init_eff(c) do { (c) = __cap_init_eff_set; } while (0)
+
+#define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+#define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+
+#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \
+do { \
+ unsigned __capi; \
+ CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
+ c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \
+do { \
+ unsigned __capi; \
+ CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
+ c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
+ const kernel_cap_t b)
+{
+ kernel_cap_t dest;
+ CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
+ return dest;
+}
-#else
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
+ const kernel_cap_t b)
+{
+ kernel_cap_t dest;
+ CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
+ return dest;
+}
-#define to_cap_t(x) (x)
-#define cap_t(x) (x)
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
+ const kernel_cap_t drop)
+{
+ kernel_cap_t dest;
+ CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
+ return dest;
+}
-#endif
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
+{
+ kernel_cap_t dest;
+ CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
+ return dest;
+}
+
+static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
+{
+ unsigned __capi;
+ CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
+ if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
+ * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
+ * cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
+ * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
+ * cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
+ */
+static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
+{
+ kernel_cap_t dest;
+ dest = cap_drop(a, set);
+ return cap_isclear(dest);
+}
-#define CAP_EMPTY_SET to_cap_t(0)
-#define CAP_FULL_SET to_cap_t(~0)
-#define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET to_cap_t(~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP))
-#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET to_cap_t(0)
+/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
-#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << (x))
-#define cap_raise(c, flag) (cap_t(c) |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
-#define cap_lower(c, flag) (cap_t(c) &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
-#define cap_raised(c, flag) (cap_t(c) & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
+{
+ const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
+ return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
+}
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(kernel_cap_t a, kernel_cap_t b)
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
{
- kernel_cap_t dest;
- cap_t(dest) = cap_t(a) | cap_t(b);
- return dest;
+ const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
+ return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
}
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(kernel_cap_t a, kernel_cap_t b)
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
+ const kernel_cap_t permitted)
{
- kernel_cap_t dest;
- cap_t(dest) = cap_t(a) & cap_t(b);
- return dest;
+ const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
+ return cap_combine(a,
+ cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
}
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(kernel_cap_t a, kernel_cap_t drop)
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
{
- kernel_cap_t dest;
- cap_t(dest) = cap_t(a) & ~cap_t(drop);
- return dest;
+ const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
+ return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
}
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(kernel_cap_t c)
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
+ const kernel_cap_t permitted)
{
- kernel_cap_t dest;
- cap_t(dest) = ~cap_t(c);
- return dest;
+ const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
+ return cap_combine(a,
+ cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
}
-#define cap_isclear(c) (!cap_t(c))
-#define cap_issubset(a,set) (!(cap_t(a) & ~cap_t(set)))
+extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
+extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set;
+extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
+
+/**
+ * has_capability - Determine if a task has a superior capability available
+ * @t: The task in question
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect, false if not.
+ *
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
+ */
+#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), (cap)) == 0)
+
+/**
+ * has_capability_noaudit - Determine if a task has a superior capability available (unaudited)
+ * @t: The task in question
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect, false if not, but don't write an audit message for the
+ * check.
+ *
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
+ */
+#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) \
+ (security_real_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)
-#define cap_clear(c) do { cap_t(c) = 0; } while(0)
-#define cap_set_full(c) do { cap_t(c) = ~0; } while(0)
-#define cap_mask(c,mask) do { cap_t(c) &= cap_t(mask); } while(0)
+extern int capable(int cap);
-#define cap_is_fs_cap(c) (CAP_TO_MASK(c) & CAP_FS_MASK)
+/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
+struct dentry;
+extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
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