X-Git-Url: http://ftp.safe.ca/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=net%2Fipv4%2Fesp4.c;h=18bb383ea39354c52ceb593a78f462d839fba5e4;hb=cbf77c1bd9c79d1742976862d0b2bebaff1ea14d;hp=e87377e1d6b64cd299a215ee32d60a9d139a317d;hpb=7e49e6de30efa716614e280d97963c570f3acf29;p=safe%2Fjmp%2Flinux-2.6

diff --git a/net/ipv4/esp4.c b/net/ipv4/esp4.c
index e87377e..18bb383 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/esp4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/esp4.c
@@ -1,34 +1,125 @@
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/authenc.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
 #include <net/esp.h>
-#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
-#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/pfkeyv2.h>
-#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
 #include <net/icmp.h>
 #include <net/protocol.h>
 #include <net/udp.h>
 
+struct esp_skb_cb {
+	struct xfrm_skb_cb xfrm;
+	void *tmp;
+};
+
+#define ESP_SKB_CB(__skb) ((struct esp_skb_cb *)&((__skb)->cb[0]))
+
+/*
+ * Allocate an AEAD request structure with extra space for SG and IV.
+ *
+ * For alignment considerations the IV is placed at the front, followed
+ * by the request and finally the SG list.
+ *
+ * TODO: Use spare space in skb for this where possible.
+ */
+static void *esp_alloc_tmp(struct crypto_aead *aead, int nfrags)
+{
+	unsigned int len;
+
+	len = crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
+	if (len) {
+		len += crypto_aead_alignmask(aead) &
+		       ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1);
+		len = ALIGN(len, crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
+	}
+
+	len += sizeof(struct aead_givcrypt_request) + crypto_aead_reqsize(aead);
+	len = ALIGN(len, __alignof__(struct scatterlist));
+
+	len += sizeof(struct scatterlist) * nfrags;
+
+	return kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+}
+
+static inline u8 *esp_tmp_iv(struct crypto_aead *aead, void *tmp)
+{
+	return crypto_aead_ivsize(aead) ?
+	       PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)tmp, crypto_aead_alignmask(aead) + 1) : tmp;
+}
+
+static inline struct aead_givcrypt_request *esp_tmp_givreq(
+	struct crypto_aead *aead, u8 *iv)
+{
+	struct aead_givcrypt_request *req;
+
+	req = (void *)PTR_ALIGN(iv + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead),
+				crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
+	aead_givcrypt_set_tfm(req, aead);
+	return req;
+}
+
+static inline struct aead_request *esp_tmp_req(struct crypto_aead *aead, u8 *iv)
+{
+	struct aead_request *req;
+
+	req = (void *)PTR_ALIGN(iv + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead),
+				crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
+	aead_request_set_tfm(req, aead);
+	return req;
+}
+
+static inline struct scatterlist *esp_req_sg(struct crypto_aead *aead,
+					     struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return (void *)ALIGN((unsigned long)(req + 1) +
+			     crypto_aead_reqsize(aead),
+			     __alignof__(struct scatterlist));
+}
+
+static inline struct scatterlist *esp_givreq_sg(
+	struct crypto_aead *aead, struct aead_givcrypt_request *req)
+{
+	return (void *)ALIGN((unsigned long)(req + 1) +
+			     crypto_aead_reqsize(aead),
+			     __alignof__(struct scatterlist));
+}
+
+static void esp_output_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb = base->data;
+
+	kfree(ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp);
+	xfrm_output_resume(skb, err);
+}
+
 static int esp_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err;
-	struct iphdr *top_iph;
 	struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
-	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
-	struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+	struct crypto_aead *aead;
+	struct aead_givcrypt_request *req;
+	struct scatterlist *sg;
+	struct scatterlist *asg;
 	struct esp_data *esp;
 	struct sk_buff *trailer;
+	void *tmp;
+	u8 *iv;
+	u8 *tail;
 	int blksize;
 	int clen;
 	int alen;
 	int nfrags;
 
-	/* Strip IP+ESP header. */
-	__skb_pull(skb, skb->h.raw - skb->data);
-	/* Now skb is pure payload to encrypt */
+	/* skb is pure payload to encrypt */
 
 	err = -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -36,188 +127,140 @@ static int esp_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	clen = skb->len;
 
 	esp = x->data;
-	alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
-	tfm = esp->conf.tfm;
-	desc.tfm = tfm;
-	desc.flags = 0;
-	blksize = ALIGN(crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm), 4);
+	aead = esp->aead;
+	alen = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
+
+	blksize = ALIGN(crypto_aead_blocksize(aead), 4);
 	clen = ALIGN(clen + 2, blksize);
-	if (esp->conf.padlen)
-		clen = ALIGN(clen, esp->conf.padlen);
+	if (esp->padlen)
+		clen = ALIGN(clen, esp->padlen);
+
+	if ((err = skb_cow_data(skb, clen - skb->len + alen, &trailer)) < 0)
+		goto error;
+	nfrags = err;
 
-	if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, clen-skb->len+alen, &trailer)) < 0)
+	tmp = esp_alloc_tmp(aead, nfrags + 1);
+	if (!tmp)
 		goto error;
 
+	iv = esp_tmp_iv(aead, tmp);
+	req = esp_tmp_givreq(aead, iv);
+	asg = esp_givreq_sg(aead, req);
+	sg = asg + 1;
+
 	/* Fill padding... */
+	tail = skb_tail_pointer(trailer);
 	do {
 		int i;
 		for (i=0; i<clen-skb->len - 2; i++)
-			*(u8*)(trailer->tail + i) = i+1;
+			tail[i] = i + 1;
 	} while (0);
-	*(u8*)(trailer->tail + clen-skb->len - 2) = (clen - skb->len)-2;
-	pskb_put(skb, trailer, clen - skb->len);
+	tail[clen - skb->len - 2] = (clen - skb->len) - 2;
+	tail[clen - skb->len - 1] = *skb_mac_header(skb);
+	pskb_put(skb, trailer, clen - skb->len + alen);
 
-	__skb_push(skb, skb->data - skb->nh.raw);
-	top_iph = skb->nh.iph;
-	esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(skb->nh.raw + top_iph->ihl*4);
-	top_iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len + alen);
-	*(u8*)(trailer->tail - 1) = top_iph->protocol;
+	skb_push(skb, -skb_network_offset(skb));
+	esph = ip_esp_hdr(skb);
+	*skb_mac_header(skb) = IPPROTO_ESP;
 
 	/* this is non-NULL only with UDP Encapsulation */
 	if (x->encap) {
 		struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
 		struct udphdr *uh;
-		u32 *udpdata32;
+		__be32 *udpdata32;
+		__be16 sport, dport;
+		int encap_type;
+
+		spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
+		sport = encap->encap_sport;
+		dport = encap->encap_dport;
+		encap_type = encap->encap_type;
+		spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
 
 		uh = (struct udphdr *)esph;
-		uh->source = encap->encap_sport;
-		uh->dest = encap->encap_dport;
-		uh->len = htons(skb->len + alen - top_iph->ihl*4);
+		uh->source = sport;
+		uh->dest = dport;
+		uh->len = htons(skb->len - skb_transport_offset(skb));
 		uh->check = 0;
 
-		switch (encap->encap_type) {
+		switch (encap_type) {
 		default:
 		case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
 			esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(uh + 1);
 			break;
 		case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
-			udpdata32 = (u32 *)(uh + 1);
+			udpdata32 = (__be32 *)(uh + 1);
 			udpdata32[0] = udpdata32[1] = 0;
 			esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(udpdata32 + 2);
 			break;
 		}
 
-		top_iph->protocol = IPPROTO_UDP;
-	} else
-		top_iph->protocol = IPPROTO_ESP;
+		*skb_mac_header(skb) = IPPROTO_UDP;
+	}
 
 	esph->spi = x->id.spi;
-	esph->seq_no = htonl(++x->replay.oseq);
-	xfrm_aevent_doreplay(x);
-
-	if (esp->conf.ivlen)
-		crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
-
-	do {
-		struct scatterlist *sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
-
-		if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
-			sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
-			if (!sg)
-				goto error;
-		}
-		skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, esph->enc_data+esp->conf.ivlen-skb->data, clen);
-		err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, sg, sg, clen);
-		if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
-			kfree(sg);
-	} while (0);
-
-	if (unlikely(err))
+	esph->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);
+
+	sg_init_table(sg, nfrags);
+	skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg,
+		     esph->enc_data + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead) - skb->data,
+		     clen + alen);
+	sg_init_one(asg, esph, sizeof(*esph));
+
+	aead_givcrypt_set_callback(req, 0, esp_output_done, skb);
+	aead_givcrypt_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, clen, iv);
+	aead_givcrypt_set_assoc(req, asg, sizeof(*esph));
+	aead_givcrypt_set_giv(req, esph->enc_data,
+			      XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);
+
+	ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp = tmp;
+	err = crypto_aead_givencrypt(req);
+	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
 		goto error;
 
-	if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
-		memcpy(esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
-		crypto_blkcipher_get_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
-	}
-
-	if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
-		err = esp_mac_digest(esp, skb, (u8 *)esph - skb->data,
-				     sizeof(*esph) + esp->conf.ivlen + clen);
-		memcpy(pskb_put(skb, trailer, alen), esp->auth.work_icv, alen);
-	}
+	if (err == -EBUSY)
+		err = NET_XMIT_DROP;
 
-	ip_send_check(top_iph);
+	kfree(tmp);
 
 error:
 	return err;
 }
 
-/*
- * Note: detecting truncated vs. non-truncated authentication data is very
- * expensive, so we only support truncated data, which is the recommended
- * and common case.
- */
-static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int esp_input_done2(struct sk_buff *skb, int err)
 {
 	struct iphdr *iph;
-	struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
+	struct xfrm_state *x = xfrm_input_state(skb);
 	struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
-	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = esp->conf.tfm;
-	struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = tfm };
-	struct sk_buff *trailer;
-	int blksize = ALIGN(crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm), 4);
-	int alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
-	int elen = skb->len - sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) - esp->conf.ivlen - alen;
-	int nfrags;
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = esp->aead;
+	int alen = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
+	int hlen = sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
+	int elen = skb->len - hlen;
 	int ihl;
 	u8 nexthdr[2];
-	struct scatterlist *sg;
 	int padlen;
-	int err;
-
-	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr)))
-		goto out;
-
-	if (elen <= 0 || (elen & (blksize-1)))
-		goto out;
-
-	/* If integrity check is required, do this. */
-	if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
-		u8 sum[alen];
-
-		err = esp_mac_digest(esp, skb, 0, skb->len - alen);
-		if (err)
-			goto out;
-
-		if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len - alen, sum, alen))
-			BUG();
-
-		if (unlikely(memcmp(esp->auth.work_icv, sum, alen))) {
-			x->stats.integrity_failed++;
-			goto out;
-		}
-	}
 
-	if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer)) < 0)
-		goto out;
-
-	skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
-
-	esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr*)skb->data;
-
-	/* Get ivec. This can be wrong, check against another impls. */
-	if (esp->conf.ivlen)
-		crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(tfm, esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivlen);
-
-	sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
+	kfree(ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp);
 
-	if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
-		sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
-		if (!sg)
-			goto out;
-	}
-	skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen, elen);
-	err = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, sg, sg, elen);
-	if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
-		kfree(sg);
 	if (unlikely(err))
-		return err;
+		goto out;
 
 	if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen-2, nexthdr, 2))
 		BUG();
 
+	err = -EINVAL;
 	padlen = nexthdr[0];
-	if (padlen+2 >= elen)
+	if (padlen + 2 + alen >= elen)
 		goto out;
 
-	/* ... check padding bits here. Silly. :-) */ 
+	/* ... check padding bits here. Silly. :-) */
 
-	iph = skb->nh.iph;
+	iph = ip_hdr(skb);
 	ihl = iph->ihl * 4;
 
 	if (x->encap) {
 		struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
-		struct udphdr *uh = (void *)(skb->nh.raw + ihl);
+		struct udphdr *uh = (void *)(skb_network_header(skb) + ihl);
 
 		/*
 		 * 1) if the NAT-T peer's IP or port changed then
@@ -231,7 +274,7 @@ static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 			ipaddr.a4 = iph->saddr;
 			km_new_mapping(x, &ipaddr, uh->source);
-				
+
 			/* XXX: perhaps add an extra
 			 * policy check here, to see
 			 * if we should allow or
@@ -240,7 +283,7 @@ static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			 * address/port.
 			 */
 		}
-	
+
 		/*
 		 * 2) ignore UDP/TCP checksums in case
 		 *    of NAT-T in Transport Mode, or
@@ -252,44 +295,134 @@ static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
 	}
 
-	iph->protocol = nexthdr[1];
 	pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - alen - padlen - 2);
-	skb->h.raw = __skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*esph) + esp->conf.ivlen) - ihl;
+	__skb_pull(skb, hlen);
+	skb_set_transport_header(skb, -ihl);
 
-	return 0;
+	err = nexthdr[1];
+
+	/* RFC4303: Drop dummy packets without any error */
+	if (err == IPPROTO_NONE)
+		err = -EINVAL;
 
 out:
-	return -EINVAL;
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void esp_input_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb = base->data;
+
+	xfrm_input_resume(skb, esp_input_done2(skb, err));
 }
 
-static u32 esp4_get_max_size(struct xfrm_state *x, int mtu)
+/*
+ * Note: detecting truncated vs. non-truncated authentication data is very
+ * expensive, so we only support truncated data, which is the recommended
+ * and common case.
+ */
+static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
+	struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
 	struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
-	u32 blksize = ALIGN(crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(esp->conf.tfm), 4);
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = esp->aead;
+	struct aead_request *req;
+	struct sk_buff *trailer;
+	int elen = skb->len - sizeof(*esph) - crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
+	int nfrags;
+	void *tmp;
+	u8 *iv;
+	struct scatterlist *sg;
+	struct scatterlist *asg;
+	int err = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*esph) + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (elen <= 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((err = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer)) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	nfrags = err;
+
+	err = -ENOMEM;
+	tmp = esp_alloc_tmp(aead, nfrags + 1);
+	if (!tmp)
+		goto out;
+
+	ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp = tmp;
+	iv = esp_tmp_iv(aead, tmp);
+	req = esp_tmp_req(aead, iv);
+	asg = esp_req_sg(aead, req);
+	sg = asg + 1;
+
+	skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
+
+	esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)skb->data;
+
+	/* Get ivec. This can be wrong, check against another impls. */
+	iv = esph->enc_data;
+
+	sg_init_table(sg, nfrags);
+	skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(*esph) + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead), elen);
+	sg_init_one(asg, esph, sizeof(*esph));
+
+	aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, esp_input_done, skb);
+	aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, elen, iv);
+	aead_request_set_assoc(req, asg, sizeof(*esph));
+
+	err = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
+	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = esp_input_done2(skb, err);
+
+out:
+	return err;
+}
 
-	if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL) {
-		mtu = ALIGN(mtu + 2, blksize);
-	} else {
+static u32 esp4_get_mtu(struct xfrm_state *x, int mtu)
+{
+	struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
+	u32 blksize = ALIGN(crypto_aead_blocksize(esp->aead), 4);
+	u32 align = max_t(u32, blksize, esp->padlen);
+	u32 rem;
+
+	mtu -= x->props.header_len + crypto_aead_authsize(esp->aead);
+	rem = mtu & (align - 1);
+	mtu &= ~(align - 1);
+
+	switch (x->props.mode) {
+	case XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL:
+		break;
+	default:
+	case XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT:
+		/* The worst case */
+		mtu -= blksize - 4;
+		mtu += min_t(u32, blksize - 4, rem);
+		break;
+	case XFRM_MODE_BEET:
 		/* The worst case. */
-		mtu = ALIGN(mtu + 2, 4) + blksize - 4;
+		mtu += min_t(u32, IPV4_BEET_PHMAXLEN, rem);
+		break;
 	}
-	if (esp->conf.padlen)
-		mtu = ALIGN(mtu, esp->conf.padlen);
 
-	return mtu + x->props.header_len + esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
+	return mtu - 2;
 }
 
 static void esp4_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info)
 {
-	struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr*)skb->data;
-	struct ip_esp_hdr *esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr*)(skb->data+(iph->ihl<<2));
+	struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
+	struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)skb->data;
+	struct ip_esp_hdr *esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(skb->data+(iph->ihl<<2));
 	struct xfrm_state *x;
 
-	if (skb->h.icmph->type != ICMP_DEST_UNREACH ||
-	    skb->h.icmph->code != ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED)
+	if (icmp_hdr(skb)->type != ICMP_DEST_UNREACH ||
+	    icmp_hdr(skb)->code != ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED)
 		return;
 
-	x = xfrm_state_lookup((xfrm_address_t *)&iph->daddr, esph->spi, IPPROTO_ESP, AF_INET);
+	x = xfrm_state_lookup(net, (xfrm_address_t *)&iph->daddr, esph->spi, IPPROTO_ESP, AF_INET);
 	if (!x)
 		return;
 	NETDEBUG(KERN_DEBUG "pmtu discovery on SA ESP/%08x/%08x\n",
@@ -304,87 +437,147 @@ static void esp_destroy(struct xfrm_state *x)
 	if (!esp)
 		return;
 
-	crypto_free_blkcipher(esp->conf.tfm);
-	esp->conf.tfm = NULL;
-	kfree(esp->conf.ivec);
-	esp->conf.ivec = NULL;
-	crypto_free_hash(esp->auth.tfm);
-	esp->auth.tfm = NULL;
-	kfree(esp->auth.work_icv);
-	esp->auth.work_icv = NULL;
+	crypto_free_aead(esp->aead);
 	kfree(esp);
 }
 
-static int esp_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
+static int esp_init_aead(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
-	struct esp_data *esp = NULL;
-	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+	struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
+	struct crypto_aead *aead;
+	int err;
 
-	/* null auth and encryption can have zero length keys */
-	if (x->aalg) {
-		if (x->aalg->alg_key_len > 512)
-			goto error;
-	}
+	aead = crypto_alloc_aead(x->aead->alg_name, 0, 0);
+	err = PTR_ERR(aead);
+	if (IS_ERR(aead))
+		goto error;
+
+	esp->aead = aead;
+
+	err = crypto_aead_setkey(aead, x->aead->alg_key,
+				 (x->aead->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+	if (err)
+		goto error;
+
+	err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(aead, x->aead->alg_icv_len / 8);
+	if (err)
+		goto error;
+
+error:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int esp_init_authenc(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+	struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
+	struct crypto_aead *aead;
+	struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param;
+	struct rtattr *rta;
+	char *key;
+	char *p;
+	char authenc_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+	unsigned int keylen;
+	int err;
+
+	err = -EINVAL;
 	if (x->ealg == NULL)
 		goto error;
 
-	esp = kzalloc(sizeof(*esp), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (esp == NULL)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+	if (snprintf(authenc_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "authenc(%s,%s)",
+		     x->aalg ? x->aalg->alg_name : "digest_null",
+		     x->ealg->alg_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto error;
+
+	aead = crypto_alloc_aead(authenc_name, 0, 0);
+	err = PTR_ERR(aead);
+	if (IS_ERR(aead))
+		goto error;
+
+	esp->aead = aead;
+
+	keylen = (x->aalg ? (x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8 : 0) +
+		 (x->ealg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8 + RTA_SPACE(sizeof(*param));
+	err = -ENOMEM;
+	key = kmalloc(keylen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key)
+		goto error;
+
+	p = key;
+	rta = (void *)p;
+	rta->rta_type = CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM;
+	rta->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(*param));
+	param = RTA_DATA(rta);
+	p += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(*param));
 
 	if (x->aalg) {
 		struct xfrm_algo_desc *aalg_desc;
-		struct crypto_hash *hash;
 
-		esp->auth.key = x->aalg->alg_key;
-		esp->auth.key_len = (x->aalg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
-		hash = crypto_alloc_hash(x->aalg->alg_name, 0,
-					 CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
-		if (IS_ERR(hash))
-			goto error;
-
-		esp->auth.tfm = hash;
-		if (crypto_hash_setkey(hash, esp->auth.key, esp->auth.key_len))
-			goto error;
+		memcpy(p, x->aalg->alg_key, (x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+		p += (x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8;
 
 		aalg_desc = xfrm_aalg_get_byname(x->aalg->alg_name, 0);
 		BUG_ON(!aalg_desc);
 
+		err = -EINVAL;
 		if (aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8 !=
-		    crypto_hash_digestsize(hash)) {
+		    crypto_aead_authsize(aead)) {
 			NETDEBUG(KERN_INFO "ESP: %s digestsize %u != %hu\n",
 				 x->aalg->alg_name,
-				 crypto_hash_digestsize(hash),
+				 crypto_aead_authsize(aead),
 				 aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8);
-			goto error;
+			goto free_key;
 		}
 
-		esp->auth.icv_full_len = aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8;
-		esp->auth.icv_trunc_len = aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_truncbits/8;
-
-		esp->auth.work_icv = kmalloc(esp->auth.icv_full_len, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!esp->auth.work_icv)
-			goto error;
-	}
-	esp->conf.key = x->ealg->alg_key;
-	esp->conf.key_len = (x->ealg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
-	tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(x->ealg->alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
-	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
-		goto error;
-	esp->conf.tfm = tfm;
-	esp->conf.ivlen = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
-	esp->conf.padlen = 0;
-	if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
-		esp->conf.ivec = kmalloc(esp->conf.ivlen, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (unlikely(esp->conf.ivec == NULL))
-			goto error;
-		get_random_bytes(esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
+		err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(
+			aead, aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_truncbits / 8);
+		if (err)
+			goto free_key;
 	}
-	if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, esp->conf.key, esp->conf.key_len))
+
+	param->enckeylen = cpu_to_be32((x->ealg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+	memcpy(p, x->ealg->alg_key, (x->ealg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+
+	err = crypto_aead_setkey(aead, key, keylen);
+
+free_key:
+	kfree(key);
+
+error:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int esp_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+	struct esp_data *esp;
+	struct crypto_aead *aead;
+	u32 align;
+	int err;
+
+	esp = kzalloc(sizeof(*esp), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (esp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	x->data = esp;
+
+	if (x->aead)
+		err = esp_init_aead(x);
+	else
+		err = esp_init_authenc(x);
+
+	if (err)
 		goto error;
-	x->props.header_len = sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen;
+
+	aead = esp->aead;
+
+	esp->padlen = 0;
+
+	x->props.header_len = sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) +
+			      crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
 	if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL)
 		x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct iphdr);
+	else if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_BEET && x->sel.family != AF_INET6)
+		x->props.header_len += IPV4_BEET_PHMAXLEN;
 	if (x->encap) {
 		struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
 
@@ -399,25 +592,25 @@ static int esp_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
 			break;
 		}
 	}
-	x->data = esp;
-	x->props.trailer_len = esp4_get_max_size(x, 0) - x->props.header_len;
-	return 0;
+
+	align = ALIGN(crypto_aead_blocksize(aead), 4);
+	if (esp->padlen)
+		align = max_t(u32, align, esp->padlen);
+	x->props.trailer_len = align + 1 + crypto_aead_authsize(esp->aead);
 
 error:
-	x->data = esp;
-	esp_destroy(x);
-	x->data = NULL;
-	return -EINVAL;
+	return err;
 }
 
-static struct xfrm_type esp_type =
+static const struct xfrm_type esp_type =
 {
 	.description	= "ESP4",
 	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
 	.proto	     	= IPPROTO_ESP,
+	.flags		= XFRM_TYPE_REPLAY_PROT,
 	.init_state	= esp_init_state,
 	.destructor	= esp_destroy,
-	.get_max_size	= esp4_get_max_size,
+	.get_mtu	= esp4_get_mtu,
 	.input		= esp_input,
 	.output		= esp_output
 };
@@ -426,6 +619,7 @@ static struct net_protocol esp4_protocol = {
 	.handler	=	xfrm4_rcv,
 	.err_handler	=	esp4_err,
 	.no_policy	=	1,
+	.netns_ok	=	1,
 };
 
 static int __init esp4_init(void)
@@ -453,3 +647,4 @@ static void __exit esp4_fini(void)
 module_init(esp4_init);
 module_exit(esp4_fini);
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_ALIAS_XFRM_TYPE(AF_INET, XFRM_PROTO_ESP);