X-Git-Url: http://ftp.safe.ca/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=kernel%2Fauditsc.c;h=aaaca8a13bbe57cd17f084af9bc29a497fac1e62;hb=6246ccab99093a562044596dd868213caa0b2b4c;hp=105147631753f1b4f68fc17878a0e4531b436593;hpb=eb84a20e9e6b98dcb33023ad22241d79107a08a7;p=safe%2Fjmp%2Flinux-2.6

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 1051476..aaaca8a 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <asm/types.h>
 #include <asm/atomic.h>
-#include <asm/types.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
@@ -64,30 +63,27 @@
 #include <linux/tty.h>
 #include <linux/selinux.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/inotify.h>
 
 #include "audit.h"
 
 extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
 
-/* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
-extern int audit_enabled;
-
 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
  * for saving names from getname(). */
 #define AUDIT_NAMES    20
 
-/* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
- * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
- * path_lookup. */
-#define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
-
 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
 
 /* number of audit rules */
 int audit_n_rules;
 
+/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
+int audit_signals;
+
 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
  * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
  * pointers at syscall exit time).
@@ -113,6 +109,9 @@ struct audit_aux_data {
 
 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM	0
 
+/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
+#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS	16
+
 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open {
 	struct audit_aux_data	d;
 	int			oflag;
@@ -154,7 +153,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_execve {
 	struct audit_aux_data	d;
 	int argc;
 	int envc;
-	char mem[0];
+	struct mm_struct *mm;
 };
 
 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
@@ -169,10 +168,25 @@ struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
 	char			a[0];
 };
 
-struct audit_aux_data_path {
+struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair {
+	struct	audit_aux_data d;
+	int	fd[2];
+};
+
+struct audit_aux_data_pids {
 	struct audit_aux_data	d;
-	struct dentry		*dentry;
-	struct vfsmount		*mnt;
+	pid_t			target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+	uid_t			target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+	uid_t			target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+	unsigned int		target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+	u32			target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+	char 			target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
+	int			pid_count;
+};
+
+struct audit_tree_refs {
+	struct audit_tree_refs *next;
+	struct audit_chunk *c[31];
 };
 
 /* The per-task audit context. */
@@ -182,7 +196,6 @@ struct audit_context {
 	enum audit_state    state;
 	unsigned int	    serial;     /* serial number for record */
 	struct timespec	    ctime;      /* time of syscall entry */
-	uid_t		    loginuid;   /* login uid (identity) */
 	int		    major;      /* syscall number */
 	unsigned long	    argv[4];    /* syscall arguments */
 	int		    return_valid; /* return code is valid */
@@ -195,6 +208,7 @@ struct audit_context {
 	struct vfsmount *   pwdmnt;
 	struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
 	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+	struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
 
 				/* Save things to print about task_struct */
 	pid_t		    pid, ppid;
@@ -203,6 +217,16 @@ struct audit_context {
 	unsigned long	    personality;
 	int		    arch;
 
+	pid_t		    target_pid;
+	uid_t		    target_auid;
+	uid_t		    target_uid;
+	unsigned int	    target_sessionid;
+	u32		    target_sid;
+	char		    target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
+
+	struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
+	int tree_count;
+
 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
 	int		    put_count;
 	int		    ino_count;
@@ -257,6 +281,117 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
+ * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
+ * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
+ * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
+ * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards.  We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
+ * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
+ * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
+ */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
+{
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
+	int left = ctx->tree_count;
+	if (likely(left)) {
+		p->c[--left] = chunk;
+		ctx->tree_count = left;
+		return 1;
+	}
+	if (!p)
+		return 0;
+	p = p->next;
+	if (p) {
+		p->c[30] = chunk;
+		ctx->trees = p;
+		ctx->tree_count = 30;
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
+	ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->trees) {
+		ctx->trees = p;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (p)
+		p->next = ctx->trees;
+	else
+		ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
+	ctx->tree_count = 31;
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
+		      struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+	struct audit_tree_refs *q;
+	int n;
+	if (!p) {
+		/* we started with empty chain */
+		p = ctx->first_trees;
+		count = 31;
+		/* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
+		if (!p)
+			return;
+	}
+	n = count;
+	for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
+		while (n--) {
+			audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
+			q->c[n] = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
+		audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
+		q->c[n] = NULL;
+	}
+	ctx->trees = p;
+	ctx->tree_count = count;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
+	for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
+		q = p->next;
+		kfree(p);
+	}
+}
+
+static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
+	int n;
+	if (!tree)
+		return 0;
+	/* full ones */
+	for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
+		for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
+			if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
+				return 1;
+	}
+	/* partial */
+	if (p) {
+		for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
+			if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
+				return 1;
+	}
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule.  Return 1 on match, 0
  * otherwise. */
@@ -278,8 +413,11 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_PPID:
-			if (ctx)
+			if (ctx) {
+				if (!ctx->ppid)
+					ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
 				result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
+			}
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_UID:
 			result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
@@ -309,7 +447,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_ARCH:
- 			if (ctx)
+			if (ctx)
 				result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 
@@ -368,10 +506,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
 					  name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
 			break;
+		case AUDIT_DIR:
+			if (ctx)
+				result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
+			break;
 		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
 			result = 0;
 			if (ctx)
-				result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
+				result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
@@ -567,7 +709,24 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	if (likely(!context))
 		return NULL;
 	context->return_valid = return_valid;
-	context->return_code  = return_code;
+
+	/*
+	 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
+	 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
+	 * signal handlers
+	 *
+	 * This is actually a test for:
+	 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
+	 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
+	 *
+	 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
+	    (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
+	    (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
+		context->return_code = -EINTR;
+	else
+		context->return_code  = return_code;
 
 	if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
 		enum audit_state state;
@@ -636,25 +795,20 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
 	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
 
 	while ((aux = context->aux)) {
-		if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
-			struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
-			dput(axi->dentry);
-			mntput(axi->mnt);
-		}
-
 		context->aux = aux->next;
 		kfree(aux);
 	}
+	while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
+		context->aux_pids = aux->next;
+		kfree(aux);
+	}
 }
 
 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
 				      enum audit_state state)
 {
-	uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
-
 	memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
 	context->state      = state;
-	context->loginuid   = loginuid;
 }
 
 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
@@ -693,11 +847,6 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-				/* Preserve login uid */
-	context->loginuid = -1;
-	if (current->audit_context)
-		context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
-
 	tsk->audit_context  = context;
 	set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
 	return 0;
@@ -718,6 +867,8 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
 			       context->name_count, count);
 		}
 		audit_free_names(context);
+		unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
+		free_tree_refs(context);
 		audit_free_aux(context);
 		kfree(context->filterkey);
 		kfree(context);
@@ -727,35 +878,35 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
 		printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
 }
 
-static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 {
 	char *ctx = NULL;
-	ssize_t len = 0;
+	unsigned len;
+	int error;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
+	if (!sid)
+		return;
 
-	len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
-	if (len < 0) {
-		if (len != -EINVAL)
+	error = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
+	if (error) {
+		if (error != -EINVAL)
 			goto error_path;
 		return;
 	}
 
-	ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!ctx)
-		goto error_path;
-
-	len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
-	if (len < 0 )
-		goto error_path;
-
 	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+	kfree(ctx);
 	return;
 
 error_path:
-	kfree(ctx);
 	audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
 	return;
 }
 
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
+
 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
@@ -775,8 +926,8 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk
 			if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
 			    vma->vm_file) {
 				audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
-						 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
-						 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
+						 vma->vm_file->f_path.dentry,
+						 vma->vm_file->f_path.mnt);
 				break;
 			}
 			vma = vma->vm_next;
@@ -786,6 +937,85 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk
 	audit_log_task_context(ab);
 }
 
+static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
+				 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
+				 u32 sid, char *comm)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	char *s = NULL;
+	u32 len;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
+	if (!ab)
+		return rc;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
+			 uid, sessionid);
+	if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &s, &len)) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
+		rc = 1;
+	} else
+		audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", s);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+	kfree(s);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+		struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
+{
+	int i;
+	long len, ret;
+	const char __user *p;
+	char *buf;
+
+	if (axi->mm != current->mm)
+		return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
+
+	p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++, p += len) {
+		len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN);
+		/*
+		 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
+		 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
+		 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
+		 * any.
+		 */
+		if (!len || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN) {
+			WARN_ON(1);
+			send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+		}
+
+		buf = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!buf) {
+			audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
+			break;
+		}
+
+		ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, len);
+		/*
+		 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
+		 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
+		 * space yet.
+		 */
+		if (ret) {
+			WARN_ON(1);
+			send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+		}
+
+		audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, buf);
+		audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
+
+		kfree(buf);
+	}
+}
+
 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	int i, call_panic = 0;
@@ -795,7 +1025,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 
 	/* tsk == current */
 	context->pid = tsk->pid;
-	context->ppid = sys_getppid();	/* sic.  tsk == current in all cases */
+	if (!context->ppid)
+		context->ppid = sys_getppid();
 	context->uid = tsk->uid;
 	context->gid = tsk->gid;
 	context->euid = tsk->euid;
@@ -814,20 +1045,22 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 	if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
 	if (context->return_valid)
-		audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", 
+		audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
 				 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
 				 context->return_code);
 
 	mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
+	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
 	if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
 		tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
 	else
 		tty = "(none)";
+	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
 	audit_log_format(ab,
 		  " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
 		  " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
 		  " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
-		  " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
+		  " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
 		  context->argv[0],
 		  context->argv[1],
 		  context->argv[2],
@@ -835,11 +1068,12 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 		  context->name_count,
 		  context->ppid,
 		  context->pid,
-		  context->loginuid,
+		  tsk->loginuid,
 		  context->uid,
 		  context->gid,
 		  context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
-		  context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
+		  context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
+		  tsk->sessionid);
 
 	mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
 
@@ -898,7 +1132,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 		case AUDIT_IPC: {
 			struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
 			audit_log_format(ab, 
-				 "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
+				 "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
 				 axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
 			if (axi->osid != 0) {
 				char *ctx = NULL;
@@ -917,19 +1151,13 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 		case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
 			struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
 			audit_log_format(ab,
-				"qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
+				"qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
 				axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
 			break; }
 
 		case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
 			struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
-			int i;
-			const char *p;
-			for (i = 0, p = axi->mem; i < axi->argc; i++) {
-				audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
-				p = audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
-				audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
-			}
+			audit_log_execve_info(ab, axi);
 			break; }
 
 		case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
@@ -947,15 +1175,36 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 			audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
 			break; }
 
-		case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
-			struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
-			audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
+		case AUDIT_FD_PAIR: {
+			struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *axs = (void *)aux;
+			audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs->fd[0], axs->fd[1]);
 			break; }
 
 		}
 		audit_log_end(ab);
 	}
 
+	for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
+		struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
+		int i;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
+			if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
+						  axs->target_auid[i],
+						  axs->target_uid[i],
+						  axs->target_sessionid[i],
+						  axs->target_sid[i],
+						  axs->target_comm[i]))
+				call_panic = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (context->target_pid &&
+	    audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
+				  context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
+				  context->target_sessionid,
+				  context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
+			call_panic = 1;
+
 	if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
 		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
 		if (ab) {
@@ -1021,6 +1270,11 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 
 		audit_log_end(ab);
 	}
+
+	/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
+	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
+	if (ab)
+		audit_log_end(ab);
 	if (call_panic)
 		audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
 }
@@ -1040,8 +1294,8 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 		return;
 
 	/* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
-	 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. 
-	 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this 
+	 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
+	 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
 	 * in the context of the idle thread */
 	/* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
 	if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
@@ -1137,6 +1391,7 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
 	context->ctime      = CURRENT_TIME;
 	context->in_syscall = 1;
 	context->auditable  = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
+	context->ppid       = 0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1174,13 +1429,107 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
 		tsk->audit_context = new_context;
 	} else {
 		audit_free_names(context);
+		unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
 		audit_free_aux(context);
+		context->aux = NULL;
+		context->aux_pids = NULL;
+		context->target_pid = 0;
+		context->target_sid = 0;
 		kfree(context->filterkey);
 		context->filterkey = NULL;
 		tsk->audit_context = context;
 	}
 }
 
+static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+	struct audit_context *context;
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
+	struct audit_chunk *chunk;
+	int count;
+	if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
+		return;
+	context = current->audit_context;
+	p = context->trees;
+	count = context->tree_count;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (!chunk)
+		return;
+	if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
+		return;
+	if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference");
+		audit_set_auditable(context);
+		audit_put_chunk(chunk);
+		unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+		return;
+	}
+	put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+	struct audit_context *context;
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
+	const struct dentry *d, *parent;
+	struct audit_chunk *drop;
+	unsigned long seq;
+	int count;
+
+	context = current->audit_context;
+	p = context->trees;
+	count = context->tree_count;
+retry:
+	drop = NULL;
+	d = dentry;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
+	for(;;) {
+		struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
+		if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
+			struct audit_chunk *chunk;
+			chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
+			if (chunk) {
+				if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
+					drop = chunk;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		parent = d->d_parent;
+		if (parent == d)
+			break;
+		d = parent;
+	}
+	if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) {  /* in this order */
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		if (!drop) {
+			/* just a race with rename */
+			unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		audit_put_chunk(drop);
+		if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
+			/* OK, got more space */
+			unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		/* too bad */
+		printk(KERN_WARNING
+			"out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference");
+		unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+		audit_set_auditable(context);
+		return;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+#endif
+}
+
 /**
  * audit_getname - add a name to the list
  * @name: name to add
@@ -1208,6 +1557,7 @@ void __audit_getname(const char *name)
 	context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
 	context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
 	context->names[context->name_count].ino  = (unsigned long)-1;
+	context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
 	++context->name_count;
 	if (!context->pwd) {
 		read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
@@ -1215,7 +1565,7 @@ void __audit_getname(const char *name)
 		context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
 		read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
 	}
-		
+
 }
 
 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
@@ -1261,6 +1611,28 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name)
 #endif
 }
 
+static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
+				const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
+		if (inode)
+			printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
+			       "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu",
+			       MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
+			       MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
+			       inode->i_ino);
+
+		else
+			printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data");
+		return 1;
+	}
+	context->name_count++;
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
+	context->ino_count++;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode)
 {
@@ -1276,14 +1648,15 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode
 /**
  * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
  * @name: name being audited
- * @inode: inode being audited
+ * @dentry: dentry being audited
  *
  * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
  */
-void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
+void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	int idx;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+	const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 
 	if (!context->in_syscall)
 		return;
@@ -1298,21 +1671,19 @@ void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
 	else {
 		/* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
 		 * associated name? */
-		if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
+		if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
 			return;
-		idx = context->name_count++;
+		idx = context->name_count - 1;
 		context->names[idx].name = NULL;
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
-		++context->ino_count;
-#endif
 	}
+	handle_path(dentry);
 	audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
  * @dname: inode's dentry name
- * @inode: inode being audited
+ * @dentry: dentry being audited
  * @parent: inode of dentry parent
  *
  * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
@@ -1323,87 +1694,91 @@ void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
  * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
  * unsuccessful attempts.
  */
-void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
+void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
 			 const struct inode *parent)
 {
 	int idx;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-	const char *found_name = NULL;
+	const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
+	const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	int dirlen = 0;
 
 	if (!context->in_syscall)
 		return;
 
+	if (inode)
+		handle_one(inode);
 	/* determine matching parent */
 	if (!dname)
-		goto update_context;
-	for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
-		if (context->names[idx].ino == parent->i_ino) {
-			const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
+		goto add_names;
 
-			if (!name)
-				continue;
+	/* parent is more likely, look for it first */
+	for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
+		struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
 
-			if (audit_compare_dname_path(dname, name, &dirlen) == 0) {
-				context->names[idx].name_len = dirlen;
-				found_name = name;
-				break;
-			}
+		if (!n->name)
+			continue;
+
+		if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
+		    !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
+			n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
+			found_parent = n->name;
+			goto add_names;
 		}
+	}
 
-update_context:
-	idx = context->name_count++;
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
-	context->ino_count++;
-#endif
-	/* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent directory.
-	 * All names for this context are relinquished in audit_free_names() */
-	context->names[idx].name = found_name;
-	context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
-	context->names[idx].name_put = 0;	/* don't call __putname() */
-
-	if (!inode)
-		context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
-	else
-		audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
+	/* no matching parent, look for matching child */
+	for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
+		struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
 
-	/* A parent was not found in audit_names, so copy the inode data for the
-	 * provided parent. */
-	if (!found_name) {
-		idx = context->name_count++;
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
-		context->ino_count++;
-#endif
+		if (!n->name)
+			continue;
+
+		/* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
+		if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
+		     !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
+			if (inode)
+				audit_copy_inode(n, inode);
+			else
+				n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
+			found_child = n->name;
+			goto add_names;
+		}
+	}
+
+add_names:
+	if (!found_parent) {
+		if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
+			return;
+		idx = context->name_count - 1;
+		context->names[idx].name = NULL;
 		audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], parent);
 	}
-}
 
-/**
- * audit_inode_update - update inode info for last collected name
- * @inode: inode being audited
- *
- * When open() is called on an existing object with the O_CREAT flag, the inode
- * data audit initially collects is incorrect.  This additional hook ensures
- * audit has the inode data for the actual object to be opened.
- */
-void __audit_inode_update(const struct inode *inode)
-{
-	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-	int idx;
+	if (!found_child) {
+		if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
+			return;
+		idx = context->name_count - 1;
 
-	if (!context->in_syscall || !inode)
-		return;
+		/* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
+		 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
+		 * audit_free_names() */
+		if (found_parent) {
+			context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
+			context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
+			/* don't call __putname() */
+			context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
+		} else {
+			context->names[idx].name = NULL;
+		}
 
-	if (context->name_count == 0) {
-		context->name_count++;
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
-		context->ino_count++;
-#endif
+		if (inode)
+			audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
+		else
+			context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
 	}
-	idx = context->name_count - 1;
-
-	audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
 
 /**
  * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
@@ -1424,6 +1799,9 @@ void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
 	ctx->auditable = 1;
 }
 
+/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
+static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
 /**
  * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
  * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
@@ -1435,39 +1813,29 @@ void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
  */
 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
 {
+	unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
 	struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
 
-	if (context) {
-		/* Only log if audit is enabled */
-		if (context->in_syscall) {
-			struct audit_buffer *ab;
-
-			ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
-			if (ab) {
-				audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
-					"old auid=%u new auid=%u",
-					task->pid, task->uid,
-					context->loginuid, loginuid);
-				audit_log_end(ab);
-			}
+	if (context && context->in_syscall) {
+		struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+		ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
+		if (ab) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
+				"old auid=%u new auid=%u"
+				" old ses=%u new ses=%u",
+				task->pid, task->uid,
+				task->loginuid, loginuid,
+				task->sessionid, sessionid);
+			audit_log_end(ab);
 		}
-		context->loginuid = loginuid;
 	}
+	task->sessionid = sessionid;
+	task->loginuid = loginuid;
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
- * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
- * @ctx: the audit_context
- *
- * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
- */
-uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
-{
-	return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
-}
-
-/**
  * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
  * @oflag: open flag
  * @mode: mode bits
@@ -1726,32 +2094,31 @@ int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int audit_argv_kb = 32;
+
 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-	unsigned long p, next;
-	void *to;
 
 	if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
 		return 0;
 
-	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - bprm->p,
-				GFP_KERNEL);
+	/*
+	 * Even though the stack code doesn't limit the arg+env size any more,
+	 * the audit code requires that _all_ arguments be logged in a single
+	 * netlink skb. Hence cap it :-(
+	 */
+	if (bprm->argv_len > (audit_argv_kb << 10))
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ax)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	ax->argc = bprm->argc;
 	ax->envc = bprm->envc;
-	for (p = bprm->p, to = ax->mem; p < MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE; p = next) {
-		struct page *page = bprm->page[p / PAGE_SIZE];
-		void *kaddr = kmap(page);
-		next = (p + PAGE_SIZE) & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
-		memcpy(to, kaddr + (p & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)), next - p);
-		to += next - p;
-		kunmap(page);
-	}
-
+	ax->mm = bprm->mm;
 	ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
 	ax->d.next = context->aux;
 	context->aux = (void *)ax;
@@ -1788,63 +2155,75 @@ int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
 }
 
 /**
- * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
- * @len: data length in user space
- * @a: data address in kernel space
+ * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
+ * @fd1: the first file descriptor
+ * @fd2: the second file descriptor
  *
  * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
  */
-int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
+int __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
 {
-	struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+	struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *ax;
 
-	if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
+	if (likely(!context)) {
 		return 0;
+	}
 
-	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!ax)
+	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ax) {
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
-	ax->len = len;
-	memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
+	ax->fd[0] = fd1;
+	ax->fd[1] = fd2;
 
-	ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
+	ax->d.type = AUDIT_FD_PAIR;
 	ax->d.next = context->aux;
 	context->aux = (void *)ax;
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
- * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
- * @dentry: dentry to record
- * @mnt: mnt to record
+ * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
+ * @len: data length in user space
+ * @a: data address in kernel space
  *
  * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- *
- * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
  */
-int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
+int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
 {
-	struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
+	struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
 
-	if (likely(!context))
+	if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
 		return 0;
 
-	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ax)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
-	ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
+	ax->len = len;
+	memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
 
-	ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
+	ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
 	ax->d.next = context->aux;
 	context->aux = (void *)ax;
 	return 0;
 }
 
+void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+	context->target_pid = t->pid;
+	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+	context->target_uid = t->uid;
+	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+	selinux_get_task_sid(t, &context->target_sid);
+	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+}
+
 /**
  * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
  * @sig: signal value
@@ -1853,20 +2232,99 @@ int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
  * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
  * and uid that is doing that.
  */
-void __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 {
+	struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
+	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+	struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
 	extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
 	extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
 	extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
 
-	if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1) {
-		struct task_struct *tsk = current;
-		struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
-		audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
-		if (ctx)
-			audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
+	if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
+		if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1) {
+			audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
+			if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
+				audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
+			else
+				audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
+			selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
+		}
+		if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
+	 * in audit_context */
+	if (!ctx->target_pid) {
+		ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
+		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+		ctx->target_uid = t->uid;
+		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+		selinux_get_task_sid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
+	if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
+		axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!axp)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
+		axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
+		ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
+	}
+	BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
+
+	axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
+	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t->uid;
+	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+	selinux_get_task_sid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+	axp->pid_count++;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
+ * @signr: signal value
+ *
+ * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
+ * should record the event for investigation.
+ */
+void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	u32 sid;
+	uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
+	unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+
+	if (!audit_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	if (signr == SIGQUIT)	/* don't care for those */
+		return;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
+	audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
+			auid, current->uid, current->gid, sessionid);
+	selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
+	if (sid) {
+		char *ctx = NULL;
+		u32 len;
+
+		if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
+			audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
 		else
-			audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
-		selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+		kfree(ctx);
 	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
 }