X-Git-Url: http://ftp.safe.ca/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=kernel%2Fauditsc.c;h=8cbddff6c283a569acb2b1c707b2448f67771e44;hb=819a8f539acf7838d62fec20e88401ff53303cd1;hp=17719b30363870fe9b50f3d44f455fd073b6514b;hpb=fe7752bab26a9ac0651b695ad4f55659761f68f7;p=safe%2Fjmp%2Flinux-2.6

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 17719b3..8cbddff 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  *
  * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
  * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
  * All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@
  * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
  * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
  *
+ * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
+ * 2006.
+ *
  * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
  * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
  *
@@ -42,13 +45,13 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <asm/types.h>
 #include <asm/atomic.h>
-#include <asm/types.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/socket.h>
+#include <linux/mqueue.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/time.h>
@@ -57,22 +60,39 @@
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/inotify.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
 
 #include "audit.h"
 
-extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
-
-/* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
-extern int audit_enabled;
-
 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
  * for saving names from getname(). */
 #define AUDIT_NAMES    20
 
-/* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
- * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
- * path_lookup. */
-#define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
+/* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
+#define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
+
+/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
+#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
+
+/* number of audit rules */
+int audit_n_rules;
+
+/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
+int audit_signals;
+
+struct audit_cap_data {
+	kernel_cap_t		permitted;
+	kernel_cap_t		inheritable;
+	union {
+		unsigned int	fE;		/* effective bit of a file capability */
+		kernel_cap_t	effective;	/* effective set of a process */
+	};
+};
 
 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
  * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
@@ -81,14 +101,17 @@ extern int audit_enabled;
  * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
 struct audit_names {
 	const char	*name;
+	int		name_len;	/* number of name's characters to log */
+	unsigned	name_put;	/* call __putname() for this name */
 	unsigned long	ino;
-	unsigned long	pino;
 	dev_t		dev;
 	umode_t		mode;
 	uid_t		uid;
 	gid_t		gid;
 	dev_t		rdev;
-	char		*ctx;
+	u32		osid;
+	struct audit_cap_data fcap;
+	unsigned int	fcap_ver;
 };
 
 struct audit_aux_data {
@@ -98,134 +121,392 @@ struct audit_aux_data {
 
 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM	0
 
-struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
+/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
+#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS	16
+
+struct audit_aux_data_execve {
 	struct audit_aux_data	d;
-	struct ipc_perm		p;
-	unsigned long		qbytes;
-	uid_t			uid;
-	gid_t			gid;
-	mode_t			mode;
-	char 			*ctx;
+	int argc;
+	int envc;
+	struct mm_struct *mm;
 };
 
-struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
+struct audit_aux_data_pids {
 	struct audit_aux_data	d;
-	int			nargs;
-	unsigned long		args[0];
+	pid_t			target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+	uid_t			target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+	uid_t			target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+	unsigned int		target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+	u32			target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+	char 			target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
+	int			pid_count;
 };
 
-struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
+struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
 	struct audit_aux_data	d;
-	int			len;
-	char			a[0];
+	struct audit_cap_data	fcap;
+	unsigned int		fcap_ver;
+	struct audit_cap_data	old_pcap;
+	struct audit_cap_data	new_pcap;
 };
 
-struct audit_aux_data_path {
+struct audit_aux_data_capset {
 	struct audit_aux_data	d;
-	struct dentry		*dentry;
-	struct vfsmount		*mnt;
+	pid_t			pid;
+	struct audit_cap_data	cap;
+};
+
+struct audit_tree_refs {
+	struct audit_tree_refs *next;
+	struct audit_chunk *c[31];
 };
 
 /* The per-task audit context. */
 struct audit_context {
+	int		    dummy;	/* must be the first element */
 	int		    in_syscall;	/* 1 if task is in a syscall */
-	enum audit_state    state;
+	enum audit_state    state, current_state;
 	unsigned int	    serial;     /* serial number for record */
 	struct timespec	    ctime;      /* time of syscall entry */
-	uid_t		    loginuid;   /* login uid (identity) */
 	int		    major;      /* syscall number */
 	unsigned long	    argv[4];    /* syscall arguments */
 	int		    return_valid; /* return code is valid */
 	long		    return_code;/* syscall return code */
-	int		    auditable;  /* 1 if record should be written */
+	u64		    prio;
 	int		    name_count;
 	struct audit_names  names[AUDIT_NAMES];
-	struct dentry *	    pwd;
-	struct vfsmount *   pwdmnt;
+	char *		    filterkey;	/* key for rule that triggered record */
+	struct path	    pwd;
 	struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
 	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
-
+	struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
+	struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
+	size_t sockaddr_len;
 				/* Save things to print about task_struct */
-	pid_t		    pid;
+	pid_t		    pid, ppid;
 	uid_t		    uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
 	gid_t		    gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
 	unsigned long	    personality;
 	int		    arch;
 
+	pid_t		    target_pid;
+	uid_t		    target_auid;
+	uid_t		    target_uid;
+	unsigned int	    target_sessionid;
+	u32		    target_sid;
+	char		    target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
+
+	struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
+	int tree_count;
+
+	int type;
+	union {
+		struct {
+			int nargs;
+			long args[6];
+		} socketcall;
+		struct {
+			uid_t			uid;
+			gid_t			gid;
+			mode_t			mode;
+			u32			osid;
+			int			has_perm;
+			uid_t			perm_uid;
+			gid_t			perm_gid;
+			mode_t			perm_mode;
+			unsigned long		qbytes;
+		} ipc;
+		struct {
+			mqd_t			mqdes;
+			struct mq_attr 		mqstat;
+		} mq_getsetattr;
+		struct {
+			mqd_t			mqdes;
+			int			sigev_signo;
+		} mq_notify;
+		struct {
+			mqd_t			mqdes;
+			size_t			msg_len;
+			unsigned int		msg_prio;
+			struct timespec		abs_timeout;
+		} mq_sendrecv;
+		struct {
+			int			oflag;
+			mode_t			mode;
+			struct mq_attr		attr;
+		} mq_open;
+		struct {
+			pid_t			pid;
+			struct audit_cap_data	cap;
+		} capset;
+	};
+	int fds[2];
+
 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
 	int		    put_count;
 	int		    ino_count;
 #endif
 };
 
+#define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
+static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
+{
+	int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
+	if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
+		n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
+	return n & mask;
+}
+
+static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
+{
+	unsigned n;
+	if (unlikely(!ctx))
+		return 0;
+	n = ctx->major;
+
+	switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
+	case 0:	/* native */
+		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
+		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
+			return 1;
+		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
+		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
+			return 1;
+		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
+		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
+			return 1;
+		return 0;
+	case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
+		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
+		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
+			return 1;
+		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
+		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
+			return 1;
+		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
+		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
+			return 1;
+		return 0;
+	case 2: /* open */
+		return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
+	case 3: /* openat */
+		return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
+	case 4: /* socketcall */
+		return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
+	case 5: /* execve */
+		return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which)
+{
+	unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT;
+	mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT;
+
+	if (unlikely(!ctx))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (index >= ctx->name_count)
+		return 0;
+	if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1)
+		return 0;
+	if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
+ * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
+ * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
+ * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
+ * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards.  We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
+ * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
+ * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
+ */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
+{
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
+	int left = ctx->tree_count;
+	if (likely(left)) {
+		p->c[--left] = chunk;
+		ctx->tree_count = left;
+		return 1;
+	}
+	if (!p)
+		return 0;
+	p = p->next;
+	if (p) {
+		p->c[30] = chunk;
+		ctx->trees = p;
+		ctx->tree_count = 30;
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
+	ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->trees) {
+		ctx->trees = p;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (p)
+		p->next = ctx->trees;
+	else
+		ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
+	ctx->tree_count = 31;
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
+		      struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+	struct audit_tree_refs *q;
+	int n;
+	if (!p) {
+		/* we started with empty chain */
+		p = ctx->first_trees;
+		count = 31;
+		/* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
+		if (!p)
+			return;
+	}
+	n = count;
+	for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
+		while (n--) {
+			audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
+			q->c[n] = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
+		audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
+		q->c[n] = NULL;
+	}
+	ctx->trees = p;
+	ctx->tree_count = count;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
+	for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
+		q = p->next;
+		kfree(p);
+	}
+}
 
+static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
+	int n;
+	if (!tree)
+		return 0;
+	/* full ones */
+	for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
+		for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
+			if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
+				return 1;
+	}
+	/* partial */
+	if (p) {
+		for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
+			if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
+				return 1;
+	}
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule.  Return 1 on match, 0
  * otherwise. */
 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
-			      struct audit_rule *rule,
+			      struct audit_krule *rule,
 			      struct audit_context *ctx,
+			      struct audit_names *name,
 			      enum audit_state *state)
 {
-	int i, j;
+	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
+	int i, j, need_sid = 1;
+	u32 sid;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
-		u32 field  = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS;
-		u32 op  = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
-		u32 value  = rule->values[i];
+		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
 		int result = 0;
 
-		switch (field) {
+		switch (f->type) {
 		case AUDIT_PID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, op, value);
+			result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_PPID:
+			if (ctx) {
+				if (!ctx->ppid)
+					ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
+				result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
+			}
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_UID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, op, value);
+			result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_EUID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, op, value);
+			result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_SUID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, op, value);
+			result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_FSUID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, op, value);
+			result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_GID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, op, value);
+			result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_EGID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, op, value);
+			result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_SGID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, op, value);
+			result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_FSGID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, op, value);
+			result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_PERS:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, op, value);
+			result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_ARCH:
- 			if (ctx)
-				result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, op, value);
+			if (ctx)
+				result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 
 		case AUDIT_EXIT:
 			if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
-				result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, op, value);
+				result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
 			if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
-				if (value)
-					result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
+				if (f->val)
+					result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
 				else
-					result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
+					result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
 			}
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
-			if (ctx) {
+			if (name)
+				result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
+							  f->op, f->val);
+			else if (ctx) {
 				for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
-					if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev),	op, value)) {
+					if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev),	f->op, f->val)) {
 						++result;
 						break;
 					}
@@ -233,9 +514,12 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			}
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
-			if (ctx) {
+			if (name)
+				result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
+							  f->op, f->val);
+			else if (ctx) {
 				for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
-					if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), op, value)) {
+					if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
 						++result;
 						break;
 					}
@@ -243,38 +527,124 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			}
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_INODE:
-			if (ctx) {
+			if (name)
+				result = (name->ino == f->val);
+			else if (ctx) {
 				for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
-					if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, op, value) ||
-					    audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, op, value)) {
+					if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
 						++result;
 						break;
 					}
 				}
 			}
 			break;
+		case AUDIT_WATCH:
+			if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
+				result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
+					  name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_DIR:
+			if (ctx)
+				result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
+			break;
 		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
 			result = 0;
 			if (ctx)
-				result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, op, value);
+				result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+			/* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
+			   a temporary error.  We simply treat this as a
+			   match for now to avoid losing information that
+			   may be wanted.   An error message will also be
+			   logged upon error */
+			if (f->lsm_rule) {
+				if (need_sid) {
+					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
+					need_sid = 0;
+				}
+				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+				                                  f->op,
+				                                  f->lsm_rule,
+				                                  ctx);
+			}
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+			/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
+			   also applies here */
+			if (f->lsm_rule) {
+				/* Find files that match */
+				if (name) {
+					result = security_audit_rule_match(
+					           name->osid, f->type, f->op,
+					           f->lsm_rule, ctx);
+				} else if (ctx) {
+					for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
+						if (security_audit_rule_match(
+						      ctx->names[j].osid,
+						      f->type, f->op,
+						      f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
+							++result;
+							break;
+						}
+					}
+				}
+				/* Find ipc objects that match */
+				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
+					break;
+				if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+							      f->type, f->op,
+							      f->lsm_rule, ctx))
+					++result;
+			}
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_ARG0:
 		case AUDIT_ARG1:
 		case AUDIT_ARG2:
 		case AUDIT_ARG3:
 			if (ctx)
-				result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0], op, value);
+				result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
 			break;
+		case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+			/* ignore this field for filtering */
+			result = 1;
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_PERM:
+			result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
+			result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (!result) {
+			put_cred(cred);
+			return 0;
 		}
+	}
 
-		if (!result)
+	if (ctx) {
+		if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
 			return 0;
+		if (rule->filterkey) {
+			kfree(ctx->filterkey);
+			ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		}
+		ctx->prio = rule->prio;
 	}
 	switch (rule->action) {
 	case AUDIT_NEVER:    *state = AUDIT_DISABLED;	    break;
-	case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;  break;
 	case AUDIT_ALWAYS:   *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
 	}
+	put_cred(cred);
 	return 1;
 }
 
@@ -282,14 +652,16 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
  * completely disabled for this task.  Since we only have the task
  * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
  */
-static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
+static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
 {
 	struct audit_entry *e;
 	enum audit_state   state;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
-		if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
+		if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
+			if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+				*key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 			return state;
 		}
@@ -319,9 +691,11 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 		int bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
 
 		list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
-			if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
-					&& audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
+			if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+			    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
+					       &state)) {
 				rcu_read_unlock();
+				ctx->current_state = state;
 				return state;
 			}
 		}
@@ -330,7 +704,51 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
 }
 
-/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
+/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
+ * collected during syscall processing.  We only check rules in sublists at hash
+ * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
+ * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
+ */
+void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct audit_entry *e;
+	enum audit_state state;
+
+	if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
+		return;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
+		int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
+		int bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+		struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
+		int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
+		struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
+
+		if (list_empty(list))
+			continue;
+
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+			if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+			    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
+				rcu_read_unlock();
+				ctx->current_state = state;
+				return;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+	if (!ctx->prio) {
+		ctx->prio = 1;
+		ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
+	}
+}
+
 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
 						      int return_valid,
 						      int return_code)
@@ -340,25 +758,30 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	if (likely(!context))
 		return NULL;
 	context->return_valid = return_valid;
-	context->return_code  = return_code;
 
-	if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
-		enum audit_state state;
-		state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
-		if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
-			context->auditable = 1;
+	/*
+	 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
+	 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
+	 * signal handlers
+	 *
+	 * This is actually a test for:
+	 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
+	 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
+	 *
+	 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
+	    (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
+	    (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
+		context->return_code = -EINTR;
+	else
+		context->return_code  = return_code;
+
+	if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
+		audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
+		audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
 	}
 
-	context->pid = tsk->pid;
-	context->uid = tsk->uid;
-	context->gid = tsk->gid;
-	context->euid = tsk->euid;
-	context->suid = tsk->suid;
-	context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
-	context->egid = tsk->egid;
-	context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
-	context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
-	context->personality = tsk->personality;
 	tsk->audit_context = NULL;
 	return context;
 }
@@ -368,8 +791,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
 	int i;
 
 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
-	if (context->auditable
-	    ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
+	if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
 		       " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
 		       " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
@@ -392,19 +814,13 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
 #endif
 
 	for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
-		char *p = context->names[i].ctx;
-		context->names[i].ctx = NULL;
-		kfree(p);
-		if (context->names[i].name)
+		if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
 			__putname(context->names[i].name);
 	}
 	context->name_count = 0;
-	if (context->pwd)
-		dput(context->pwd);
-	if (context->pwdmnt)
-		mntput(context->pwdmnt);
-	context->pwd = NULL;
-	context->pwdmnt = NULL;
+	path_put(&context->pwd);
+	context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
+	context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
 }
 
 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
@@ -412,30 +828,21 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
 	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
 
 	while ((aux = context->aux)) {
-		if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
-			struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
-			dput(axi->dentry);
-			mntput(axi->mnt);
-		}
-		if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) {
-			struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
-			if (axi->ctx)
-				kfree(axi->ctx);
-		}
-
 		context->aux = aux->next;
 		kfree(aux);
 	}
+	while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
+		context->aux_pids = aux->next;
+		kfree(aux);
+	}
 }
 
 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
 				      enum audit_state state)
 {
-	uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
-
 	memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
 	context->state      = state;
-	context->loginuid   = loginuid;
+	context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
 }
 
 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
@@ -461,23 +868,21 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context;
 	enum audit_state     state;
+	char *key = NULL;
 
-	if (likely(!audit_enabled))
+	if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
 		return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
 
-	state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
+	state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
 	if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
+		kfree(key);
 		audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
-
-				/* Preserve login uid */
-	context->loginuid = -1;
-	if (current->audit_context)
-		context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
+	context->filterkey = key;
 
 	tsk->audit_context  = context;
 	set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
@@ -499,7 +904,11 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
 			       context->name_count, count);
 		}
 		audit_free_names(context);
+		unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
+		free_tree_refs(context);
 		audit_free_aux(context);
+		kfree(context->filterkey);
+		kfree(context->sockaddr);
 		kfree(context);
 		context  = previous;
 	} while (context);
@@ -507,76 +916,423 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
 		printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
 }
 
-static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 {
 	char *ctx = NULL;
-	ssize_t len = 0;
+	unsigned len;
+	int error;
+	u32 sid;
 
-	len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
-	if (len < 0) {
-		if (len != -EINVAL)
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
+	if (!sid)
+		return;
+
+	error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+	if (error) {
+		if (error != -EINVAL)
 			goto error_path;
 		return;
 	}
 
-	ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask);
-	if (!ctx)
-		goto error_path;
-
-	len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
-	if (len < 0 )
-		goto error_path;
-
 	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+	security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
 	return;
 
 error_path:
-	if (ctx)
-		kfree(ctx);
 	audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
 	return;
 }
 
-static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
+
+static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-	char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
-	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
+	struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 
-	get_task_comm(name, current);
+	/* tsk == current */
+
+	get_task_comm(name, tsk);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
 
-	if (!mm)
-		return;
+	if (mm) {
+		down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+		vma = mm->mmap;
+		while (vma) {
+			if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
+			    vma->vm_file) {
+				audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
+						 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
+				break;
+			}
+			vma = vma->vm_next;
+		}
+		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	}
+	audit_log_task_context(ab);
+}
+
+static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
+				 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
+				 u32 sid, char *comm)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	char *ctx = NULL;
+	u32 len;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
+	if (!ab)
+		return rc;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
+			 uid, sessionid);
+	if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
+		rc = 1;
+	} else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+		security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates.  We aren't
+ * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
+ * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry)
+ *
+ * why snprintf?  an int is up to 12 digits long.  if we just assumed when
+ * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
+ * space in every audit message.  In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
+ * about 1000 min size arguments.  That comes down to about 50% waste of space
+ * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
+ */
+static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
+					struct audit_buffer **ab,
+					int arg_num,
+					size_t *len_sent,
+					const char __user *p,
+					char *buf)
+{
+	char arg_num_len_buf[12];
+	const char __user *tmp_p = p;
+	/* how many digits are in arg_num? 3 is the length of a=\n */
+	size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 3;
+	size_t len, len_left, to_send;
+	size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
+	unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
+	len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
 
 	/*
-	 * this is brittle; all callers that pass GFP_ATOMIC will have
-	 * NULL current->mm and we won't get here.
+	 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
+	 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
+	 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
+	 * any.
 	 */
-	down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
-	vma = mm->mmap;
-	while (vma) {
-		if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
-		    vma->vm_file) {
-			audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
-					 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
-					 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
+	if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
+		WARN_ON(1);
+		send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
+	do {
+		if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
+			to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
+		else
+			to_send = len_left;
+		ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
+		/*
+		 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
+		 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
+		 * space yet.
+		 */
+		if (ret) {
+			WARN_ON(1);
+			send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		buf[to_send] = '\0';
+		has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
+		if (has_cntl) {
+			/*
+			 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
+			 * send half as much in each message
+			 */
+			max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
 			break;
 		}
-		vma = vma->vm_next;
+		len_left -= to_send;
+		tmp_p += to_send;
+	} while (len_left > 0);
+
+	len_left = len;
+
+	if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
+		too_long = 1;
+
+	/* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
+	for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
+		int room_left;
+
+		if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
+			to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
+		else
+			to_send = len_left;
+
+		/* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
+		room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
+		if (has_cntl)
+			room_left -= (to_send * 2);
+		else
+			room_left -= to_send;
+		if (room_left < 0) {
+			*len_sent = 0;
+			audit_log_end(*ab);
+			*ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
+			if (!*ab)
+				return 0;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
+		 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
+		 */
+		if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
+			audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d_len=%zu ", arg_num,
+					 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
+
+		/*
+		 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
+		 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
+		 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
+		 */
+		if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
+			ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
+		else
+			ret = 0;
+		if (ret) {
+			WARN_ON(1);
+			send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		buf[to_send] = '\0';
+
+		/* actually log it */
+		audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d", arg_num);
+		if (too_long)
+			audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
+		audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
+		if (has_cntl)
+			audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
+		else
+			audit_log_format(*ab, "\"%s\"", buf);
+		audit_log_format(*ab, "\n");
+
+		p += to_send;
+		len_left -= to_send;
+		*len_sent += arg_num_len;
+		if (has_cntl)
+			*len_sent += to_send * 2;
+		else
+			*len_sent += to_send;
+	}
+	/* include the null we didn't log */
+	return len + 1;
+}
+
+static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
+				  struct audit_buffer **ab,
+				  struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
+{
+	int i;
+	size_t len, len_sent = 0;
+	const char __user *p;
+	char *buf;
+
+	if (axi->mm != current->mm)
+		return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
+
+	p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
+
+	audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d ", axi->argc);
+
+	/*
+	 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args.  Just
+	 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
+	 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
+	 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
+	 */
+	buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf) {
+		audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
+		len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
+						  &len_sent, p, buf);
+		if (len <= 0)
+			break;
+		p += len;
 	}
-	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
-	audit_log_task_context(ab, gfp_mask);
+	kfree(buf);
 }
 
-static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
 {
 	int i;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
+	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
+	}
+}
+
+static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
+{
+	kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
+	kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
+	int log = 0;
+
+	if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
+		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
+		log = 1;
+	}
+	if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
+		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
+		log = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (log)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
+}
+
+static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	int i;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
+	if (!ab)
+		return;
+
+	switch (context->type) {
+	case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
+		int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
+		audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
+		for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
+			audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
+				context->socketcall.args[i]);
+		break; }
+	case AUDIT_IPC: {
+		u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
+
+		audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
+			 context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode);
+		if (osid) {
+			char *ctx = NULL;
+			u32 len;
+			if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
+				*call_panic = 1;
+			} else {
+				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+				security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+			}
+		}
+		if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
+			audit_log_end(ab);
+			ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
+					     AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
+			audit_log_format(ab,
+				"qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
+				context->ipc.qbytes,
+				context->ipc.perm_uid,
+				context->ipc.perm_gid,
+				context->ipc.perm_mode);
+			if (!ab)
+				return;
+		}
+		break; }
+	case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
+		audit_log_format(ab,
+			"oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
+			"mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
+			context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
+			context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
+			context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
+			context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
+			context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
+		break; }
+	case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
+		audit_log_format(ab,
+			"mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
+			"abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
+			context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
+			context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
+			context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
+			context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
+			context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
+		break; }
+	case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
+		audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
+				context->mq_notify.mqdes,
+				context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
+		break; }
+	case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
+		struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
+		audit_log_format(ab,
+			"mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
+			"mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
+			context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
+			attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
+			attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
+		break; }
+	case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
+		audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
+		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
+		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
+		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
+		break; }
+	}
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
+static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred;
+	int i, call_panic = 0;
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+	const char *tty;
 
-	ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
+	/* tsk == current */
+	context->pid = tsk->pid;
+	if (!context->ppid)
+		context->ppid = sys_getppid();
+	cred = current_cred();
+	context->uid   = cred->uid;
+	context->gid   = cred->gid;
+	context->euid  = cred->euid;
+	context->suid  = cred->suid;
+	context->fsuid = cred->fsuid;
+	context->egid  = cred->egid;
+	context->sgid  = cred->sgid;
+	context->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
+	context->personality = tsk->personality;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
 	if (!ab)
 		return;		/* audit_panic has been called */
 	audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
@@ -584,142 +1340,221 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 	if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
 	if (context->return_valid)
-		audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", 
+		audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
 				 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
 				 context->return_code);
+
+	spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+	if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
+		tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
+	else
+		tty = "(none)";
+	spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+
 	audit_log_format(ab,
 		  " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
-		  " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
+		  " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
 		  " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
-		  " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
+		  " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
 		  context->argv[0],
 		  context->argv[1],
 		  context->argv[2],
 		  context->argv[3],
 		  context->name_count,
+		  context->ppid,
 		  context->pid,
-		  context->loginuid,
+		  tsk->loginuid,
 		  context->uid,
 		  context->gid,
 		  context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
-		  context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
-	audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask);
+		  context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
+		  tsk->sessionid);
+
+
+	audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
+	if (context->filterkey) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
+	} else
+		audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 
 	for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
 
-		ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, aux->type);
+		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
 		if (!ab)
 			continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
 
 		switch (aux->type) {
-		case AUDIT_IPC: {
-			struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
-			audit_log_format(ab, 
-					 " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s",
-					 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx);
+
+		case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
+			struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
+			audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
 			break; }
 
-		case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
-			int i;
-			struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
-			audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
-			for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
-				audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
+		case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
+			struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
+			audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
 			break; }
 
-		case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
-			struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
+		}
+		audit_log_end(ab);
+	}
 
-			audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
-			audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
-			break; }
+	if (context->type)
+		show_special(context, &call_panic);
 
-		case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
-			struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
-			audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
-			break; }
+	if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
+		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
+		if (ab) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
+					context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
+			audit_log_end(ab);
+		}
+	}
 
+	if (context->sockaddr_len) {
+		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
+		if (ab) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
+			audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
+					context->sockaddr_len);
+			audit_log_end(ab);
 		}
-		audit_log_end(ab);
 	}
 
-	if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
-		ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_CWD);
+	for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
+		struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
+			if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
+						  axs->target_auid[i],
+						  axs->target_uid[i],
+						  axs->target_sessionid[i],
+						  axs->target_sid[i],
+						  axs->target_comm[i]))
+				call_panic = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (context->target_pid &&
+	    audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
+				  context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
+				  context->target_sessionid,
+				  context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
+			call_panic = 1;
+
+	if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
+		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
 		if (ab) {
-			audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
+			audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
 			audit_log_end(ab);
 		}
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
-		unsigned long ino  = context->names[i].ino;
-		unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
+		struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
 
-		ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
+		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
 		if (!ab)
 			continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
 
 		audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
 
-		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-		if (context->names[i].name)
-			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
-		else
-			audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
-
-		if (pino != (unsigned long)-1)
-			audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu",  pino);
-		if (ino != (unsigned long)-1)
-			audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu",  ino);
-		if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1))
-			audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" 
-					 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", 
-					 MAJOR(context->names[i].dev), 
-					 MINOR(context->names[i].dev), 
-					 context->names[i].mode, 
-					 context->names[i].uid, 
-					 context->names[i].gid, 
-					 MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev), 
-					 MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
-		if (context->names[i].ctx) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s",
-					context->names[i].ctx);
+		if (n->name) {
+			switch(n->name_len) {
+			case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
+				/* log the full path */
+				audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+				audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
+				break;
+			case 0:
+				/* name was specified as a relative path and the
+				 * directory component is the cwd */
+				audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
+				break;
+			default:
+				/* log the name's directory component */
+				audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+				audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
+							    n->name_len);
+			}
+		} else
+			audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
+
+		if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
+					 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
+					 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
+					 n->ino,
+					 MAJOR(n->dev),
+					 MINOR(n->dev),
+					 n->mode,
+					 n->uid,
+					 n->gid,
+					 MAJOR(n->rdev),
+					 MINOR(n->rdev));
+		}
+		if (n->osid != 0) {
+			char *ctx = NULL;
+			u32 len;
+			if (security_secid_to_secctx(
+				n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+				call_panic = 2;
+			} else {
+				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+				security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+			}
 		}
 
+		audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
+
 		audit_log_end(ab);
 	}
+
+	/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
+	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
+	if (ab)
+		audit_log_end(ab);
+	if (call_panic)
+		audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
  * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
  *
- * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct.
+ * Called from copy_process and do_exit
  */
 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context;
 
-	task_lock(tsk);
 	context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
-	task_unlock(tsk);
-
 	if (likely(!context))
 		return;
 
 	/* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
-	 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. 
-	 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this 
+	 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
+	 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
 	 * in the context of the idle thread */
-	if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
-		audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	/* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
+	if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+		audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
 
 	audit_free_context(context);
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
- * @tsk: task being audited
  * @arch: architecture type
  * @major: major syscall type (function)
  * @a1: additional syscall register 1
@@ -735,14 +1570,16 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
  * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
  * be written).
  */
-void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
+void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
 			 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
 			 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
 {
+	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 	struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
 	enum audit_state     state;
 
-	BUG_ON(!context);
+	if (unlikely(!context))
+		return;
 
 	/*
 	 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
@@ -753,7 +1590,7 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
 	 *
 	 * i386     no
 	 * x86_64   no
-	 * ppc64    yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
+	 * ppc64    yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
 	 *
 	 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
 	 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
@@ -793,20 +1630,43 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
 	context->argv[3]    = a4;
 
 	state = context->state;
-	if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
+	context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
+	if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
+		context->prio = 0;
 		state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
+	}
 	if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
 		return;
 
 	context->serial     = 0;
 	context->ctime      = CURRENT_TIME;
 	context->in_syscall = 1;
-	context->auditable  = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
+	context->current_state  = state;
+	context->ppid       = 0;
+}
+
+void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child)
+{
+	struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
+	struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context;
+	if (!p || !ctx)
+		return;
+	if (!ctx->in_syscall || ctx->current_state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+		return;
+	p->arch = ctx->arch;
+	p->major = ctx->major;
+	memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv));
+	p->ctime = ctx->ctime;
+	p->dummy = ctx->dummy;
+	p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall;
+	p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
+	p->ppid = current->pid;
+	p->prio = ctx->prio;
+	p->current_state = ctx->current_state;
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
- * @tsk: task being audited
  * @valid: success/failure flag
  * @return_code: syscall return value
  *
@@ -816,25 +1676,21 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
  * message), then write out the syscall information.  In call cases,
  * free the names stored from getname().
  */
-void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
+void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
 {
+	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 	struct audit_context *context;
 
-	get_task_struct(tsk);
-	task_lock(tsk);
 	context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
-	task_unlock(tsk);
 
-	/* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
-	 * called __put_task_struct. */
 	if (likely(!context))
-		goto out;
+		return;
 
-	if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
-		audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+		audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
 
 	context->in_syscall = 0;
-	context->auditable  = 0;
+	context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
 
 	if (context->previous) {
 		struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
@@ -843,11 +1699,110 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
 		tsk->audit_context = new_context;
 	} else {
 		audit_free_names(context);
+		unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
 		audit_free_aux(context);
+		context->aux = NULL;
+		context->aux_pids = NULL;
+		context->target_pid = 0;
+		context->target_sid = 0;
+		context->sockaddr_len = 0;
+		context->type = 0;
+		context->fds[0] = -1;
+		if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
+			kfree(context->filterkey);
+			context->filterkey = NULL;
+		}
 		tsk->audit_context = context;
 	}
- out:
-	put_task_struct(tsk);
+}
+
+static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+	struct audit_context *context;
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
+	struct audit_chunk *chunk;
+	int count;
+	if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
+		return;
+	context = current->audit_context;
+	p = context->trees;
+	count = context->tree_count;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (!chunk)
+		return;
+	if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
+		return;
+	if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
+		audit_set_auditable(context);
+		audit_put_chunk(chunk);
+		unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+		return;
+	}
+	put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+	struct audit_context *context;
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
+	const struct dentry *d, *parent;
+	struct audit_chunk *drop;
+	unsigned long seq;
+	int count;
+
+	context = current->audit_context;
+	p = context->trees;
+	count = context->tree_count;
+retry:
+	drop = NULL;
+	d = dentry;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
+	for(;;) {
+		struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
+		if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
+			struct audit_chunk *chunk;
+			chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
+			if (chunk) {
+				if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
+					drop = chunk;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		parent = d->d_parent;
+		if (parent == d)
+			break;
+		d = parent;
+	}
+	if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) {  /* in this order */
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		if (!drop) {
+			/* just a race with rename */
+			unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		audit_put_chunk(drop);
+		if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
+			/* OK, got more space */
+			unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		/* too bad */
+		printk(KERN_WARNING
+			"out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
+		unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+		audit_set_auditable(context);
+		return;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+#endif
 }
 
 /**
@@ -857,11 +1812,11 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
  * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
  * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
  */
-void audit_getname(const char *name)
+void __audit_getname(const char *name)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
 
-	if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
+	if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
 		return;
 
 	if (!context->in_syscall) {
@@ -874,15 +1829,18 @@ void audit_getname(const char *name)
 	}
 	BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
 	context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
+	context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
+	context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
 	context->names[context->name_count].ino  = (unsigned long)-1;
+	context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
 	++context->name_count;
-	if (!context->pwd) {
+	if (!context->pwd.dentry) {
 		read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
-		context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
-		context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
+		context->pwd = current->fs->pwd;
+		path_get(&current->fs->pwd);
 		read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
 	}
-		
+
 }
 
 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
@@ -928,55 +1886,81 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name)
 #endif
 }
 
-void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
+static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
+				const struct inode *inode)
 {
-	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-	const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix();
-	char *ctx = NULL;
-	int len = 0;
+	if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
+		if (inode)
+			printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
+			       "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n",
+			       MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
+			       MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
+			       inode->i_ino);
 
-	if (!suffix)
-		goto ret;
+		else
+			printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+	context->name_count++;
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
+	context->ino_count++;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
 
-	len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0);
-	if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
-		goto ret;
-	if (len < 0) 
-		goto error_path;
 
-	ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!ctx) 
-		goto error_path;
+static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
+	int rc;
 
-	len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0);
-	if (len < 0)
-		goto error_path;
+	memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
+	memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
+	name->fcap.fE = 0;
+	name->fcap_ver = 0;
 
-	kfree(context->names[idx].ctx);
-	context->names[idx].ctx = ctx;
-	goto ret;
+	if (!dentry)
+		return 0;
 
-error_path:
-	if (ctx)
-		kfree(ctx);
-	audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context");
-ret:
-	return;
+	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
+	name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
+	name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
+	name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 
+/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
+static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
+			     const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
+	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
+	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
+	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
+	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
+	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+	audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
+}
+
 /**
  * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
  * @name: name being audited
- * @inode: inode being audited
- * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup())
+ * @dentry: dentry being audited
  *
  * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
  */
-void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
+void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	int idx;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+	const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 
 	if (!context->in_syscall)
 		return;
@@ -991,35 +1975,20 @@ void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
 	else {
 		/* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
 		 * associated name? */
-		if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
+		if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
 			return;
-		idx = context->name_count++;
+		idx = context->name_count - 1;
 		context->names[idx].name = NULL;
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
-		++context->ino_count;
-#endif
-	}
-	context->names[idx].dev	  = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
-	context->names[idx].mode  = inode->i_mode;
-	context->names[idx].uid   = inode->i_uid;
-	context->names[idx].gid   = inode->i_gid;
-	context->names[idx].rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
-	audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
-	if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) && 
-	    (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) {
-		context->names[idx].ino   = (unsigned long)-1;
-		context->names[idx].pino  = inode->i_ino;
-	} else {
-		context->names[idx].ino   = inode->i_ino;
-		context->names[idx].pino  = (unsigned long)-1;
 	}
+	handle_path(dentry);
+	audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode);
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
  * @dname: inode's dentry name
- * @inode: inode being audited
- * @pino: inode number of dentry parent
+ * @dentry: dentry being audited
+ * @parent: inode of dentry parent
  *
  * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
  * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
@@ -1029,66 +1998,91 @@ void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
  * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
  * unsuccessful attempts.
  */
-void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
-			 unsigned long pino)
+void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
+			 const struct inode *parent)
 {
 	int idx;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+	const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
+	const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	int dirlen = 0;
 
 	if (!context->in_syscall)
 		return;
 
+	if (inode)
+		handle_one(inode);
 	/* determine matching parent */
-	if (dname)
-		for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
-			if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) {
-				const char *n;
-				const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
-				int dlen = strlen(dname);
-				int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
-
-				if (nlen < dlen)
-					continue;
-				
-				/* disregard trailing slashes */
-				n = name + nlen - 1;
-				while ((*n == '/') && (n > name))
-					n--;
-
-				/* find last path component */
-				n = n - dlen + 1;
-				if (n < name)
-					continue;
-				else if (n > name) {
-					if (*--n != '/')
-						continue;
-					else
-						n++;
-				}
+	if (!dname)
+		goto add_names;
 
-				if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0)
-					goto update_context;
-			}
+	/* parent is more likely, look for it first */
+	for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
+		struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
 
-	/* catch-all in case match not found */
-	idx = context->name_count++;
-	context->names[idx].name  = NULL;
-	context->names[idx].pino  = pino;
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
-	context->ino_count++;
-#endif
+		if (!n->name)
+			continue;
+
+		if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
+		    !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
+			n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
+			found_parent = n->name;
+			goto add_names;
+		}
+	}
 
-update_context:
-	if (inode) {
-		context->names[idx].ino   = inode->i_ino;
-		context->names[idx].dev	  = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
-		context->names[idx].mode  = inode->i_mode;
-		context->names[idx].uid   = inode->i_uid;
-		context->names[idx].gid   = inode->i_gid;
-		context->names[idx].rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
-		audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
+	/* no matching parent, look for matching child */
+	for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
+		struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
+
+		if (!n->name)
+			continue;
+
+		/* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
+		if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
+		     !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
+			if (inode)
+				audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
+			else
+				n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
+			found_child = n->name;
+			goto add_names;
+		}
+	}
+
+add_names:
+	if (!found_parent) {
+		if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
+			return;
+		idx = context->name_count - 1;
+		context->names[idx].name = NULL;
+		audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent);
+	}
+
+	if (!found_child) {
+		if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
+			return;
+		idx = context->name_count - 1;
+
+		/* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
+		 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
+		 * audit_free_names() */
+		if (found_parent) {
+			context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
+			context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
+			/* don't call __putname() */
+			context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
+		} else {
+			context->names[idx].name = NULL;
+		}
+
+		if (inode)
+			audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode);
+		else
+			context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
 	}
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
 
 /**
  * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
@@ -1098,17 +2092,26 @@ update_context:
  *
  * Also sets the context as auditable.
  */
-void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
+int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
 		       struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
 {
+	if (!ctx->in_syscall)
+		return 0;
 	if (!ctx->serial)
 		ctx->serial = audit_serial();
 	t->tv_sec  = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
 	t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
 	*serial    = ctx->serial;
-	ctx->auditable = 1;
+	if (!ctx->prio) {
+		ctx->prio = 1;
+		ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
+	}
+	return 1;
 }
 
+/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
+static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
 /**
  * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
  * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
@@ -1120,124 +2123,197 @@ void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
  */
 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
 {
-	if (task->audit_context) {
+	unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
+	struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
+
+	if (context && context->in_syscall) {
 		struct audit_buffer *ab;
 
 		ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
 		if (ab) {
 			audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
-				"old auid=%u new auid=%u",
-				task->pid, task->uid, 
-				task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid);
+				"old auid=%u new auid=%u"
+				" old ses=%u new ses=%u",
+				task->pid, task_uid(task),
+				task->loginuid, loginuid,
+				task->sessionid, sessionid);
 			audit_log_end(ab);
 		}
-		task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid;
 	}
+	task->sessionid = sessionid;
+	task->loginuid = loginuid;
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
- * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
- * @ctx: the audit_context
+ * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
+ * @oflag: open flag
+ * @mode: mode bits
+ * @u_attr: queue attributes
  *
- * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
  */
-uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
+void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
 {
-	return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+	if (attr)
+		memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
+	else
+		memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
+
+	context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
+	context->mq_open.mode = mode;
+
+	context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
 }
 
-static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+/**
+ * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
+ * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
+ * @msg_len: Message length
+ * @msg_prio: Message priority
+ * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
+ *
+ */
+void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
+			const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-	char *ctx = NULL;
-	int len = 0;
+	struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
 
-	if (likely(!context))
-		return NULL;
+	if (abs_timeout)
+		memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
+	else
+		memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
 
-	len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0);
-	if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
-		goto ret;
-	if (len < 0)
-		goto error_path;
+	context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
+	context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
+	context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
 
-	ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (!ctx)
-		goto error_path;
+	context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
+}
 
-	len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len);
-	if (len < 0)
-		goto error_path;
+/**
+ * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
+ * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
+ * @u_notification: Notification event
+ *
+ */
 
-	return ctx;
+void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
 
-error_path:
-	kfree(ctx);
-	audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context");
-ret:
-	return NULL;
+	if (notification)
+		context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
+	else
+		context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
+
+	context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
+	context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
 }
 
 /**
- * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc
+ * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
+ * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
+ * @mqstat: MQ flags
+ *
+ */
+void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+	context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
+	context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
+	context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
+ * @ipcp: ipc permissions
+ *
+ */
+void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+	context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
+	context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
+	context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
+	context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
+	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
+	context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
  * @qbytes: msgq bytes
  * @uid: msgq user id
  * @gid: msgq group id
  * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
  *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
  */
-int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
 {
-	struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
 
-	if (likely(!context))
+	context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
+	context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
+	context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
+	context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
+	context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
+}
+
+int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+	if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
 		return 0;
 
-	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ax)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ax->qbytes = qbytes;
-	ax->uid = uid;
-	ax->gid = gid;
-	ax->mode = mode;
-	ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp);
-
-	ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
+	ax->argc = bprm->argc;
+	ax->envc = bprm->envc;
+	ax->mm = bprm->mm;
+	ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
 	ax->d.next = context->aux;
 	context->aux = (void *)ax;
 	return 0;
 }
 
+
 /**
  * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
  * @nargs: number of args
  * @args: args array
  *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
  */
-int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
+void audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
 {
-	struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
 
-	if (likely(!context))
-		return 0;
-
-	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!ax)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
+		return;
 
-	ax->nargs = nargs;
-	memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
+	context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
+	context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
+	memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
+}
 
-	ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
-	ax->d.next = context->aux;
-	context->aux = (void *)ax;
-	return 0;
+/**
+ * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
+ * @fd1: the first file descriptor
+ * @fd2: the second file descriptor
+ *
+ */
+void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+	context->fds[0] = fd1;
+	context->fds[1] = fd2;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1249,76 +2325,203 @@ int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
  */
 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
 {
-	struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
 
-	if (likely(!context))
+	if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
 		return 0;
 
-	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!ax)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (!context->sockaddr) {
+		void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!p)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		context->sockaddr = p;
+	}
+
+	context->sockaddr_len = len;
+	memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
 
-	ax->len = len;
-	memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
+	context->target_pid = t->pid;
+	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
+	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+	security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
+	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
+ * @sig: signal value
+ * @t: task being signaled
+ *
+ * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
+ * and uid that is doing that.
+ */
+int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+{
+	struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
+	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+	struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
+	uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
+
+	if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
+		if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
+			audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
+			if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
+				audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
+			else
+				audit_sig_uid = uid;
+			security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
+		}
+		if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
+	 * in audit_context */
+	if (!ctx->target_pid) {
+		ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
+		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
+		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+		security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
+	if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
+		axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!axp)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
+		axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
+		ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
+	}
+	BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
+
+	axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
+	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
+	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+	security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+	axp->pid_count++;
 
-	ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
-	ax->d.next = context->aux;
-	context->aux = (void *)ax;
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
- * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
- * @dentry: dentry to record
- * @mnt: mnt to record
+ * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
+ * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
+ * @new: the proposed new credentials
+ * @old: the old credentials
  *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
+ * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
  *
- * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
+ * -Eric
  */
-int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
+int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			   const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
-	struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
+	struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
 
-	if (likely(!context))
-		return 0;
-
-	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ax)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
-	ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
-
-	ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
+	ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
 	ax->d.next = context->aux;
 	context->aux = (void *)ax;
+
+	dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
+	get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
+	dput(dentry);
+
+	ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
+	ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
+	ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
+	ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
+
+	ax->old_pcap.permitted   = old->cap_permitted;
+	ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
+	ax->old_pcap.effective   = old->cap_effective;
+
+	ax->new_pcap.permitted   = new->cap_permitted;
+	ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
+	ax->new_pcap.effective   = new->cap_effective;
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
- * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
- * @sig: signal value
- * @t: task being signaled
+ * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
+ * @pid: target pid of the capset call
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the old (current) credentials
  *
- * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
- * and uid that is doing that.
+ * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
+ * audit system if applicable
  */
-void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
+		       const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
-	extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
-	extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+	context->capset.pid = pid;
+	context->capset.cap.effective   = new->cap_effective;
+	context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
+	context->capset.cap.permitted   = new->cap_permitted;
+	context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
+}
 
-	if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid)) {
-		if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
-			struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
-			audit_sig_pid = current->pid;
-			if (ctx)
-				audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
-			else
-				audit_sig_uid = current->uid;
+/**
+ * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
+ * @signr: signal value
+ *
+ * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
+ * should record the event for investigation.
+ */
+void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	u32 sid;
+	uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid;
+	gid_t gid;
+	unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+
+	if (!audit_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	if (signr == SIGQUIT)	/* don't care for those */
+		return;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
+	current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
+	audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
+			 auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
+	if (sid) {
+		char *ctx = NULL;
+		u32 len;
+
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
+			audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
+		else {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
 		}
 	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
 }