X-Git-Url: http://ftp.safe.ca/?a=blobdiff_plain;ds=inline;f=kernel%2Fauditsc.c;h=4819f3711973f746207aa15a60b45126546ffc9e;hb=eeb4613436f0f19a38f667ea3078821040559c68;hp=5276b7ef05f1c212a575677b391b080859238584;hpb=5712e88f2b0f626a4857c24128810bbf8ce09537;p=safe%2Fjmp%2Flinux-2.6

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 5276b7e..4819f37 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <asm/types.h>
 #include <asm/atomic.h>
-#include <asm/types.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
@@ -62,18 +61,14 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/tty.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/inotify.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
 
 #include "audit.h"
 
-extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
-
-/* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
-extern int audit_enabled;
-
 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
  * for saving names from getname(). */
 #define AUDIT_NAMES    20
@@ -81,12 +76,24 @@ extern int audit_enabled;
 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
 
+/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
+#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
+
 /* number of audit rules */
 int audit_n_rules;
 
 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
 int audit_signals;
 
+struct audit_cap_data {
+	kernel_cap_t		permitted;
+	kernel_cap_t		inheritable;
+	union {
+		unsigned int	fE;		/* effective bit of a file capability */
+		kernel_cap_t	effective;	/* effective set of a process */
+	};
+};
+
 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
  * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
  * pointers at syscall exit time).
@@ -103,6 +110,8 @@ struct audit_names {
 	gid_t		gid;
 	dev_t		rdev;
 	u32		osid;
+	struct audit_cap_data fcap;
+	unsigned int	fcap_ver;
 };
 
 struct audit_aux_data {
@@ -156,7 +165,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_execve {
 	struct audit_aux_data	d;
 	int argc;
 	int envc;
-	char mem[0];
+	struct mm_struct *mm;
 };
 
 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
@@ -176,19 +185,36 @@ struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair {
 	int	fd[2];
 };
 
-struct audit_aux_data_path {
-	struct audit_aux_data	d;
-	struct dentry		*dentry;
-	struct vfsmount		*mnt;
-};
-
 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
 	struct audit_aux_data	d;
 	pid_t			target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+	uid_t			target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+	uid_t			target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+	unsigned int		target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
 	u32			target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+	char 			target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
 	int			pid_count;
 };
 
+struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
+	struct audit_aux_data	d;
+	struct audit_cap_data	fcap;
+	unsigned int		fcap_ver;
+	struct audit_cap_data	old_pcap;
+	struct audit_cap_data	new_pcap;
+};
+
+struct audit_aux_data_capset {
+	struct audit_aux_data	d;
+	pid_t			pid;
+	struct audit_cap_data	cap;
+};
+
+struct audit_tree_refs {
+	struct audit_tree_refs *next;
+	struct audit_chunk *c[31];
+};
+
 /* The per-task audit context. */
 struct audit_context {
 	int		    dummy;	/* must be the first element */
@@ -196,7 +222,6 @@ struct audit_context {
 	enum audit_state    state;
 	unsigned int	    serial;     /* serial number for record */
 	struct timespec	    ctime;      /* time of syscall entry */
-	uid_t		    loginuid;   /* login uid (identity) */
 	int		    major;      /* syscall number */
 	unsigned long	    argv[4];    /* syscall arguments */
 	int		    return_valid; /* return code is valid */
@@ -205,8 +230,7 @@ struct audit_context {
 	int		    name_count;
 	struct audit_names  names[AUDIT_NAMES];
 	char *		    filterkey;	/* key for rule that triggered record */
-	struct dentry *	    pwd;
-	struct vfsmount *   pwdmnt;
+	struct path	    pwd;
 	struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
 	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
 	struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
@@ -219,7 +243,14 @@ struct audit_context {
 	int		    arch;
 
 	pid_t		    target_pid;
+	uid_t		    target_auid;
+	uid_t		    target_uid;
+	unsigned int	    target_sessionid;
 	u32		    target_sid;
+	char		    target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
+
+	struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
+	int tree_count;
 
 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
 	int		    put_count;
@@ -238,7 +269,11 @@ static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
 
 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
 {
-	unsigned n = ctx->major;
+	unsigned n;
+	if (unlikely(!ctx))
+		return 0;
+	n = ctx->major;
+
 	switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
 	case 0:	/* native */
 		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
@@ -275,6 +310,134 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
 	}
 }
 
+static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which)
+{
+	unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT;
+	mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT;
+
+	if (unlikely(!ctx))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (index >= ctx->name_count)
+		return 0;
+	if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1)
+		return 0;
+	if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
+ * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
+ * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
+ * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
+ * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards.  We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
+ * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
+ * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
+ */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
+{
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
+	int left = ctx->tree_count;
+	if (likely(left)) {
+		p->c[--left] = chunk;
+		ctx->tree_count = left;
+		return 1;
+	}
+	if (!p)
+		return 0;
+	p = p->next;
+	if (p) {
+		p->c[30] = chunk;
+		ctx->trees = p;
+		ctx->tree_count = 30;
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
+	ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->trees) {
+		ctx->trees = p;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (p)
+		p->next = ctx->trees;
+	else
+		ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
+	ctx->tree_count = 31;
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
+		      struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+	struct audit_tree_refs *q;
+	int n;
+	if (!p) {
+		/* we started with empty chain */
+		p = ctx->first_trees;
+		count = 31;
+		/* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
+		if (!p)
+			return;
+	}
+	n = count;
+	for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
+		while (n--) {
+			audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
+			q->c[n] = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
+		audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
+		q->c[n] = NULL;
+	}
+	ctx->trees = p;
+	ctx->tree_count = count;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
+	for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
+		q = p->next;
+		kfree(p);
+	}
+}
+
+static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
+	int n;
+	if (!tree)
+		return 0;
+	/* full ones */
+	for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
+		for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
+			if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
+				return 1;
+	}
+	/* partial */
+	if (p) {
+		for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
+			if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
+				return 1;
+	}
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule.  Return 1 on match, 0
  * otherwise. */
@@ -284,6 +447,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			      struct audit_names *name,
 			      enum audit_state *state)
 {
+	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
 	int i, j, need_sid = 1;
 	u32 sid;
 
@@ -303,34 +467,34 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			}
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_UID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
+			result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_EUID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
+			result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_SUID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
+			result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_FSUID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
+			result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_GID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
+			result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_EGID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
+			result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_SGID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
+			result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_FSGID:
-			result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
+			result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_PERS:
 			result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_ARCH:
- 			if (ctx)
+			if (ctx)
 				result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 
@@ -389,10 +553,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
 					  name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
 			break;
+		case AUDIT_DIR:
+			if (ctx)
+				result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
+			break;
 		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
 			result = 0;
 			if (ctx)
-				result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
+				result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
@@ -404,14 +572,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			   match for now to avoid losing information that
 			   may be wanted.   An error message will also be
 			   logged upon error */
-			if (f->se_rule) {
+			if (f->lsm_rule) {
 				if (need_sid) {
-					selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &sid);
+					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
 					need_sid = 0;
 				}
-				result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
 				                                  f->op,
-				                                  f->se_rule,
+				                                  f->lsm_rule,
 				                                  ctx);
 			}
 			break;
@@ -422,18 +590,18 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
 			/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
 			   also applies here */
-			if (f->se_rule) {
+			if (f->lsm_rule) {
 				/* Find files that match */
 				if (name) {
-					result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
+					result = security_audit_rule_match(
 					           name->osid, f->type, f->op,
-					           f->se_rule, ctx);
+					           f->lsm_rule, ctx);
 				} else if (ctx) {
 					for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
-						if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
+						if (security_audit_rule_match(
 						      ctx->names[j].osid,
 						      f->type, f->op,
-						      f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+						      f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
 							++result;
 							break;
 						}
@@ -446,7 +614,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 					     aux = aux->next) {
 						if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
 							struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
-							if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+							if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
 								++result;
 								break;
 							}
@@ -469,17 +637,23 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 		case AUDIT_PERM:
 			result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
 			break;
+		case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
+			result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
+			break;
 		}
 
-		if (!result)
+		if (!result) {
+			put_cred(cred);
 			return 0;
+		}
 	}
-	if (rule->filterkey)
+	if (rule->filterkey && ctx)
 		ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	switch (rule->action) {
 	case AUDIT_NEVER:    *state = AUDIT_DISABLED;	    break;
 	case AUDIT_ALWAYS:   *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
 	}
+	put_cred(cred);
 	return 1;
 }
 
@@ -588,7 +762,24 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	if (likely(!context))
 		return NULL;
 	context->return_valid = return_valid;
-	context->return_code  = return_code;
+
+	/*
+	 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
+	 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
+	 * signal handlers
+	 *
+	 * This is actually a test for:
+	 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
+	 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
+	 *
+	 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
+	    (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
+	    (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
+		context->return_code = -EINTR;
+	else
+		context->return_code  = return_code;
 
 	if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
 		enum audit_state state;
@@ -644,12 +835,9 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
 			__putname(context->names[i].name);
 	}
 	context->name_count = 0;
-	if (context->pwd)
-		dput(context->pwd);
-	if (context->pwdmnt)
-		mntput(context->pwdmnt);
-	context->pwd = NULL;
-	context->pwdmnt = NULL;
+	path_put(&context->pwd);
+	context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
+	context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
 }
 
 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
@@ -657,12 +845,6 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
 	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
 
 	while ((aux = context->aux)) {
-		if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
-			struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
-			dput(axi->dentry);
-			mntput(axi->mnt);
-		}
-
 		context->aux = aux->next;
 		kfree(aux);
 	}
@@ -675,11 +857,8 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
 				      enum audit_state state)
 {
-	uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
-
 	memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
 	context->state      = state;
-	context->loginuid   = loginuid;
 }
 
 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
@@ -706,7 +885,7 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	struct audit_context *context;
 	enum audit_state     state;
 
-	if (likely(!audit_enabled))
+	if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
 		return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
 
 	state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
@@ -718,11 +897,6 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-				/* Preserve login uid */
-	context->loginuid = -1;
-	if (current->audit_context)
-		context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
-
 	tsk->audit_context  = context;
 	set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
 	return 0;
@@ -743,6 +917,8 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
 			       context->name_count, count);
 		}
 		audit_free_names(context);
+		unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
+		free_tree_refs(context);
 		audit_free_aux(context);
 		kfree(context->filterkey);
 		kfree(context);
@@ -759,11 +935,11 @@ void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 	int error;
 	u32 sid;
 
-	selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
 	if (!sid)
 		return;
 
-	error = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
+	error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
 	if (error) {
 		if (error != -EINVAL)
 			goto error_path;
@@ -771,7 +947,7 @@ void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 	}
 
 	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
-	kfree(ctx);
+	security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
 	return;
 
 error_path:
@@ -800,8 +976,7 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk
 			if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
 			    vma->vm_file) {
 				audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
-						 vma->vm_file->f_path.dentry,
-						 vma->vm_file->f_path.mnt);
+						 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
 				break;
 			}
 			vma = vma->vm_next;
@@ -812,30 +987,252 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk
 }
 
 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
-				 u32 sid)
+				 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
+				 u32 sid, char *comm)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
-	char *s = NULL;
+	char *ctx = NULL;
 	u32 len;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
 	if (!ab)
-		return 1;
+		return rc;
 
-	if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &s, &len)) {
-		audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d obj=(none)", pid);
+	audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
+			 uid, sessionid);
+	if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
 		rc = 1;
-	} else
-		audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d  obj=%s", pid, s);
+	} else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+		security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
-	kfree(s);
 
 	return rc;
 }
 
+/*
+ * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates.  We aren't
+ * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
+ * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry)
+ *
+ * why snprintf?  an int is up to 12 digits long.  if we just assumed when
+ * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
+ * space in every audit message.  In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
+ * about 1000 min size arguments.  That comes down to about 50% waste of space
+ * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
+ */
+static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
+					struct audit_buffer **ab,
+					int arg_num,
+					size_t *len_sent,
+					const char __user *p,
+					char *buf)
+{
+	char arg_num_len_buf[12];
+	const char __user *tmp_p = p;
+	/* how many digits are in arg_num? 3 is the length of a=\n */
+	size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 3;
+	size_t len, len_left, to_send;
+	size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
+	unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
+	len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
+	 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
+	 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
+	 * any.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
+		WARN_ON(1);
+		send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
+	do {
+		if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
+			to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
+		else
+			to_send = len_left;
+		ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
+		/*
+		 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
+		 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
+		 * space yet.
+		 */
+		if (ret) {
+			WARN_ON(1);
+			send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		buf[to_send] = '\0';
+		has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
+		if (has_cntl) {
+			/*
+			 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
+			 * send half as much in each message
+			 */
+			max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
+			break;
+		}
+		len_left -= to_send;
+		tmp_p += to_send;
+	} while (len_left > 0);
+
+	len_left = len;
+
+	if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
+		too_long = 1;
+
+	/* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
+	for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
+		int room_left;
+
+		if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
+			to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
+		else
+			to_send = len_left;
+
+		/* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
+		room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
+		if (has_cntl)
+			room_left -= (to_send * 2);
+		else
+			room_left -= to_send;
+		if (room_left < 0) {
+			*len_sent = 0;
+			audit_log_end(*ab);
+			*ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
+			if (!*ab)
+				return 0;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
+		 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
+		 */
+		if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
+			audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d_len=%zu ", arg_num,
+					 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
+
+		/*
+		 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
+		 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
+		 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
+		 */
+		if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
+			ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
+		else
+			ret = 0;
+		if (ret) {
+			WARN_ON(1);
+			send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		buf[to_send] = '\0';
+
+		/* actually log it */
+		audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d", arg_num);
+		if (too_long)
+			audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
+		audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
+		if (has_cntl)
+			audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
+		else
+			audit_log_format(*ab, "\"%s\"", buf);
+		audit_log_format(*ab, "\n");
+
+		p += to_send;
+		len_left -= to_send;
+		*len_sent += arg_num_len;
+		if (has_cntl)
+			*len_sent += to_send * 2;
+		else
+			*len_sent += to_send;
+	}
+	/* include the null we didn't log */
+	return len + 1;
+}
+
+static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
+				  struct audit_buffer **ab,
+				  struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
+{
+	int i;
+	size_t len, len_sent = 0;
+	const char __user *p;
+	char *buf;
+
+	if (axi->mm != current->mm)
+		return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
+
+	p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
+
+	audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d ", axi->argc);
+
+	/*
+	 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args.  Just
+	 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
+	 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
+	 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
+	 */
+	buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf) {
+		audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
+		len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
+						  &len_sent, p, buf);
+		if (len <= 0)
+			break;
+		p += len;
+	}
+	kfree(buf);
+}
+
+static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
+	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
+	}
+}
+
+static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
+{
+	kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
+	kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
+	int log = 0;
+
+	if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
+		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
+		log = 1;
+	}
+	if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
+		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
+		log = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (log)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
+}
+
 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
+	const struct cred *cred;
 	int i, call_panic = 0;
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
@@ -845,14 +1242,15 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 	context->pid = tsk->pid;
 	if (!context->ppid)
 		context->ppid = sys_getppid();
-	context->uid = tsk->uid;
-	context->gid = tsk->gid;
-	context->euid = tsk->euid;
-	context->suid = tsk->suid;
-	context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
-	context->egid = tsk->egid;
-	context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
-	context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
+	cred = current_cred();
+	context->uid   = cred->uid;
+	context->gid   = cred->gid;
+	context->euid  = cred->euid;
+	context->suid  = cred->suid;
+	context->fsuid = cred->fsuid;
+	context->egid  = cred->egid;
+	context->sgid  = cred->sgid;
+	context->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
 	context->personality = tsk->personality;
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
@@ -863,22 +1261,22 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 	if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
 	if (context->return_valid)
-		audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", 
+		audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
 				 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
 				 context->return_code);
 
-	mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
-	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+	spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
 	if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
 		tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
 	else
 		tty = "(none)";
-	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+	spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+
 	audit_log_format(ab,
 		  " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
 		  " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
 		  " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
-		  " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
+		  " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
 		  context->argv[0],
 		  context->argv[1],
 		  context->argv[2],
@@ -886,13 +1284,13 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 		  context->name_count,
 		  context->ppid,
 		  context->pid,
-		  context->loginuid,
+		  tsk->loginuid,
 		  context->uid,
 		  context->gid,
 		  context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
-		  context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
+		  context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
+		  tsk->sessionid);
 
-	mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
 
 	audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
 	if (context->filterkey) {
@@ -949,42 +1347,36 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 		case AUDIT_IPC: {
 			struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
 			audit_log_format(ab, 
-				 "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
+				 "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
 				 axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
 			if (axi->osid != 0) {
 				char *ctx = NULL;
 				u32 len;
-				if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+				if (security_secid_to_secctx(
 						axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
 					audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
 							axi->osid);
 					call_panic = 1;
-				} else
+				} else {
 					audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
-				kfree(ctx);
+					security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+				}
 			}
 			break; }
 
 		case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
 			struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
 			audit_log_format(ab,
-				"qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
+				"qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
 				axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
 			break; }
 
 		case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
 			struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
-			int i;
-			const char *p;
-			for (i = 0, p = axi->mem; i < axi->argc; i++) {
-				audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
-				p = audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
-				audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
-			}
+			audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
 			break; }
 
 		case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
-			int i;
 			struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
 			audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
 			for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
@@ -995,12 +1387,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 			struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
 
 			audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
-			audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
-			break; }
-
-		case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
-			struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
-			audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
+			audit_log_n_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
 			break; }
 
 		case AUDIT_FD_PAIR: {
@@ -1008,29 +1395,56 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 			audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs->fd[0], axs->fd[1]);
 			break; }
 
+		case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
+			struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
+			audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
+			break; }
+
+		case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
+			struct audit_aux_data_capset *axs = (void *)aux;
+			audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", axs->pid);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &axs->cap.inheritable);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &axs->cap.permitted);
+			audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &axs->cap.effective);
+			break; }
+
 		}
 		audit_log_end(ab);
 	}
 
 	for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
 		struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
-		int i;
 
 		for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
 			if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
-						  axs->target_sid[i]))
+						  axs->target_auid[i],
+						  axs->target_uid[i],
+						  axs->target_sessionid[i],
+						  axs->target_sid[i],
+						  axs->target_comm[i]))
 				call_panic = 1;
 	}
 
 	if (context->target_pid &&
 	    audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
-				  context->target_sid))
+				  context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
+				  context->target_sessionid,
+				  context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
 			call_panic = 1;
 
-	if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
+	if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
 		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
 		if (ab) {
-			audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
+			audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
 			audit_log_end(ab);
 		}
 	}
@@ -1053,14 +1467,13 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 			case 0:
 				/* name was specified as a relative path and the
 				 * directory component is the cwd */
-				audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", context->pwd,
-						 context->pwdmnt);
+				audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
 				break;
 			default:
 				/* log the name's directory component */
 				audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-				audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name_len,
-							    n->name);
+				audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
+							    n->name_len);
 			}
 		} else
 			audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
@@ -1081,17 +1494,25 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 		if (n->osid != 0) {
 			char *ctx = NULL;
 			u32 len;
-			if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+			if (security_secid_to_secctx(
 				n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
 				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
 				call_panic = 2;
-			} else
+			} else {
 				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
-			kfree(ctx);
+				security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+			}
 		}
 
+		audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
+
 		audit_log_end(ab);
 	}
+
+	/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
+	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
+	if (ab)
+		audit_log_end(ab);
 	if (call_panic)
 		audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
 }
@@ -1111,8 +1532,8 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 		return;
 
 	/* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
-	 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. 
-	 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this 
+	 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
+	 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
 	 * in the context of the idle thread */
 	/* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
 	if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
@@ -1123,7 +1544,6 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 /**
  * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
- * @tsk: task being audited
  * @arch: architecture type
  * @major: major syscall type (function)
  * @a1: additional syscall register 1
@@ -1147,7 +1567,8 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
 	struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
 	enum audit_state     state;
 
-	BUG_ON(!context);
+	if (unlikely(!context))
+		return;
 
 	/*
 	 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
@@ -1211,9 +1632,25 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
 	context->ppid       = 0;
 }
 
+void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child)
+{
+	struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
+	struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context;
+	if (!p || !ctx || !ctx->auditable)
+		return;
+	p->arch = ctx->arch;
+	p->major = ctx->major;
+	memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv));
+	p->ctime = ctx->ctime;
+	p->dummy = ctx->dummy;
+	p->auditable = ctx->auditable;
+	p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall;
+	p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
+	p->ppid = current->pid;
+}
+
 /**
  * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
- * @tsk: task being audited
  * @valid: success/failure flag
  * @return_code: syscall return value
  *
@@ -1246,6 +1683,7 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
 		tsk->audit_context = new_context;
 	} else {
 		audit_free_names(context);
+		unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
 		audit_free_aux(context);
 		context->aux = NULL;
 		context->aux_pids = NULL;
@@ -1257,6 +1695,95 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
 	}
 }
 
+static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+	struct audit_context *context;
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
+	struct audit_chunk *chunk;
+	int count;
+	if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
+		return;
+	context = current->audit_context;
+	p = context->trees;
+	count = context->tree_count;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (!chunk)
+		return;
+	if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
+		return;
+	if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
+		audit_set_auditable(context);
+		audit_put_chunk(chunk);
+		unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+		return;
+	}
+	put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+	struct audit_context *context;
+	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
+	const struct dentry *d, *parent;
+	struct audit_chunk *drop;
+	unsigned long seq;
+	int count;
+
+	context = current->audit_context;
+	p = context->trees;
+	count = context->tree_count;
+retry:
+	drop = NULL;
+	d = dentry;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
+	for(;;) {
+		struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
+		if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
+			struct audit_chunk *chunk;
+			chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
+			if (chunk) {
+				if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
+					drop = chunk;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		parent = d->d_parent;
+		if (parent == d)
+			break;
+		d = parent;
+	}
+	if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) {  /* in this order */
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		if (!drop) {
+			/* just a race with rename */
+			unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		audit_put_chunk(drop);
+		if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
+			/* OK, got more space */
+			unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		/* too bad */
+		printk(KERN_WARNING
+			"out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
+		unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+		audit_set_auditable(context);
+		return;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+#endif
+}
+
 /**
  * audit_getname - add a name to the list
  * @name: name to add
@@ -1286,13 +1813,13 @@ void __audit_getname(const char *name)
 	context->names[context->name_count].ino  = (unsigned long)-1;
 	context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
 	++context->name_count;
-	if (!context->pwd) {
+	if (!context->pwd.dentry) {
 		read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
-		context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
-		context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
+		context->pwd = current->fs->pwd;
+		path_get(&current->fs->pwd);
 		read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
 	}
-		
+
 }
 
 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
@@ -1344,13 +1871,13 @@ static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
 	if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
 		if (inode)
 			printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
-			       "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu",
+			       "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n",
 			       MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
 			       MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
 			       inode->i_ino);
 
 		else
-			printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data");
+			printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n");
 		return 1;
 	}
 	context->name_count++;
@@ -1360,8 +1887,36 @@ static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+
+static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
+	int rc;
+
+	memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
+	memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
+	name->fcap.fE = 0;
+	name->fcap_ver = 0;
+
+	if (!dentry)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
+	name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
+	name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
+	name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
-static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode)
+static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
+			     const struct inode *inode)
 {
 	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
 	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
@@ -1369,20 +1924,22 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode
 	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
 	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
 	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
-	selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &name->osid);
+	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+	audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
  * @name: name being audited
- * @inode: inode being audited
+ * @dentry: dentry being audited
  *
  * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
  */
-void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
+void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	int idx;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+	const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 
 	if (!context->in_syscall)
 		return;
@@ -1402,13 +1959,14 @@ void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
 		idx = context->name_count - 1;
 		context->names[idx].name = NULL;
 	}
-	audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
+	handle_path(dentry);
+	audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode);
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
  * @dname: inode's dentry name
- * @inode: inode being audited
+ * @dentry: dentry being audited
  * @parent: inode of dentry parent
  *
  * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
@@ -1419,17 +1977,20 @@ void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
  * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
  * unsuccessful attempts.
  */
-void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
+void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
 			 const struct inode *parent)
 {
 	int idx;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
 	const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
+	const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	int dirlen = 0;
 
 	if (!context->in_syscall)
 		return;
 
+	if (inode)
+		handle_one(inode);
 	/* determine matching parent */
 	if (!dname)
 		goto add_names;
@@ -1460,7 +2021,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
 		if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
 		     !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
 			if (inode)
-				audit_copy_inode(n, inode);
+				audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
 			else
 				n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
 			found_child = n->name;
@@ -1474,7 +2035,7 @@ add_names:
 			return;
 		idx = context->name_count - 1;
 		context->names[idx].name = NULL;
-		audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], parent);
+		audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent);
 	}
 
 	if (!found_child) {
@@ -1495,11 +2056,12 @@ add_names:
 		}
 
 		if (inode)
-			audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
+			audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode);
 		else
 			context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
 	}
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
 
 /**
  * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
@@ -1509,17 +2071,23 @@ add_names:
  *
  * Also sets the context as auditable.
  */
-void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
+int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
 		       struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
 {
+	if (!ctx->in_syscall)
+		return 0;
 	if (!ctx->serial)
 		ctx->serial = audit_serial();
 	t->tv_sec  = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
 	t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
 	*serial    = ctx->serial;
 	ctx->auditable = 1;
+	return 1;
 }
 
+/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
+static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
 /**
  * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
  * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
@@ -1531,41 +2099,29 @@ void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
  */
 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
 {
+	unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
 	struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
 
-	if (context) {
-		/* Only log if audit is enabled */
-		if (context->in_syscall) {
-			struct audit_buffer *ab;
-
-			ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
-			if (ab) {
-				audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
-					"old auid=%u new auid=%u",
-					task->pid, task->uid,
-					context->loginuid, loginuid);
-				audit_log_end(ab);
-			}
+	if (context && context->in_syscall) {
+		struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+		ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
+		if (ab) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
+				"old auid=%u new auid=%u"
+				" old ses=%u new ses=%u",
+				task->pid, task_uid(task),
+				task->loginuid, loginuid,
+				task->sessionid, sessionid);
+			audit_log_end(ab);
 		}
-		context->loginuid = loginuid;
 	}
+	task->sessionid = sessionid;
+	task->loginuid = loginuid;
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
- * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
- * @ctx: the audit_context
- *
- * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
- */
-uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
-{
-	return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
-}
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_get_loginuid);
-
-/**
  * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
  * @oflag: open flag
  * @mode: mode bits
@@ -1787,8 +2343,7 @@ int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 	ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
 	ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
 	ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
-	selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
-
+	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
 	ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
 	ax->d.next = context->aux;
 	context->aux = (void *)ax;
@@ -1828,28 +2383,17 @@ int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-	unsigned long p, next;
-	void *to;
 
 	if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
 		return 0;
 
-	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - bprm->p,
-				GFP_KERNEL);
+	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ax)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	ax->argc = bprm->argc;
 	ax->envc = bprm->envc;
-	for (p = bprm->p, to = ax->mem; p < MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE; p = next) {
-		struct page *page = bprm->page[p / PAGE_SIZE];
-		void *kaddr = kmap(page);
-		next = (p + PAGE_SIZE) & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
-		memcpy(to, kaddr + (p & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)), next - p);
-		to += next - p;
-		kunmap(page);
-	}
-
+	ax->mm = bprm->mm;
 	ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
 	ax->d.next = context->aux;
 	context->aux = (void *)ax;
@@ -1948,37 +2492,11 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
 
 	context->target_pid = t->pid;
-	selinux_get_task_sid(t, &context->target_sid);
-}
-
-/**
- * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
- * @dentry: dentry to record
- * @mnt: mnt to record
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- *
- * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
- */
-int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{
-	struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
-	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-
-	if (likely(!context))
-		return 0;
-
-	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (!ax)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
-	ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
-
-	ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
-	ax->d.next = context->aux;
-	context->aux = (void *)ax;
-	return 0;
+	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
+	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+	security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
+	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1994,28 +2512,30 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 	struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 	struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
-	extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
-	extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
-	extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
-
-	if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid &&
-	    (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1)) {
-		audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
-		if (ctx)
-			audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
-		else
-			audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
-		selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
-	}
+	uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
 
-	if (!audit_signals) /* audit_context checked in wrapper */
-		return 0;
+	if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
+		if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
+			audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
+			if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
+				audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
+			else
+				audit_sig_uid = uid;
+			security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
+		}
+		if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
+			return 0;
+	}
 
 	/* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
 	 * in audit_context */
 	if (!ctx->target_pid) {
 		ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
-		selinux_get_task_sid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
+		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+		security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -2029,11 +2549,138 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 		axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
 		ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
 	}
-	BUG_ON(axp->pid_count > AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
+	BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
 
 	axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
-	selinux_get_task_sid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
+	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+	security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 	axp->pid_count++;
 
 	return 0;
 }
+
+/**
+ * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
+ * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
+ * @new: the proposed new credentials
+ * @old: the old credentials
+ *
+ * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
+ * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
+ *
+ * -Eric
+ */
+int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			   const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+
+	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ax)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
+	ax->d.next = context->aux;
+	context->aux = (void *)ax;
+
+	dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
+	get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
+	dput(dentry);
+
+	ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
+	ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
+	ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
+	ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
+
+	ax->old_pcap.permitted   = old->cap_permitted;
+	ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
+	ax->old_pcap.effective   = old->cap_effective;
+
+	ax->new_pcap.permitted   = new->cap_permitted;
+	ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
+	ax->new_pcap.effective   = new->cap_effective;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
+ * @pid: target pid of the capset call
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the old (current) credentials
+ *
+ * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
+ * audit system if applicable
+ */
+int __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
+		       const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	struct audit_aux_data_capset *ax;
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+	if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
+		return 0;
+
+	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ax)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ax->d.type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
+	ax->d.next = context->aux;
+	context->aux = (void *)ax;
+
+	ax->pid = pid;
+	ax->cap.effective   = new->cap_effective;
+	ax->cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
+	ax->cap.permitted   = new->cap_permitted;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
+ * @signr: signal value
+ *
+ * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
+ * should record the event for investigation.
+ */
+void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	u32 sid;
+	uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid;
+	gid_t gid;
+	unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+
+	if (!audit_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	if (signr == SIGQUIT)	/* don't care for those */
+		return;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
+	current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
+	audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
+			 auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
+	if (sid) {
+		char *ctx = NULL;
+		u32 len;
+
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
+			audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
+		else {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+		}
+	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+}