* 2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines
* 3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt
*/
-#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/netfilter.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#include <net/checksum.h>
#include <net/udp.h>
-#include <asm/semaphore.h>
+#include <asm/atomic.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
#include "xfrm.h"
+/* Labeled XFRM instance counter */
+atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
/*
* Returns true if an LSM/SELinux context
* LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use
* a xfrm policy rule.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
{
- int rc = 0;
- u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
+ int rc;
+ u32 sel_sid;
/* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
- if ((ctx = xp->security)) {
+ if (ctx) {
if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
return -EINVAL;
sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
- }
+ } else
+ /*
+ * All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an
+ * otherwise applicable "non-labeled" policy. This
+ * would prevent inadvertent "leaks".
+ */
+ return 0;
rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
NULL);
+ if (rc == -EACCES)
+ return -ESRCH;
+
return rc;
}
struct flowi *fl)
{
u32 state_sid;
- u32 pol_sid;
- int err;
+ int rc;
- if (x->security)
- state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
- else
- state_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-
- if (xp->security)
- pol_sid = xp->security->ctx_sid;
+ if (!xp->security)
+ if (x->security)
+ /* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */
+ return 0;
+ else
+ /* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */
+ return 1;
else
- pol_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ if (!x->security)
+ /* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
+ return 0;
+ else
+ if (!selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+ /* Not a SELinux-labeled SA */
+ return 0;
- err = avc_has_perm(state_sid, pol_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
- ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
- NULL);
+ state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
- if (err)
+ if (fl->secid != state_sid)
return 0;
- return selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(fl, x);
-}
-
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a particular outgoing flow
- * can use a given security association.
- */
-
-int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm)
-{
- int rc = 0;
- u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
-
- /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
- if ((ctx = xfrm->security)) {
- if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
- return 0;
-
- sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
- }
-
- rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
NULL)? 0:1;
+ /*
+ * We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check
+ * since the SA is now of the same label as the flow and
+ * a flow Vs. policy polmatch check had already happened
+ * in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above.
+ */
+
return rc;
}
/*
- * LSM hook implementation that determines the sid for the session.
+ * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
+ * incoming packet.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
if (!ckall)
break;
- }
- else if (*sid != ctx->ctx_sid)
+ } else if (*sid != ctx->ctx_sid)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
* CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
*/
static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
- struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 sid)
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, u32 sid)
{
int rc = 0;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
char *ctx_str = NULL;
u32 str_len;
- u32 ctx_sid;
-
- BUG_ON(uctx && pol);
- if (pol)
- goto from_policy;
+ BUG_ON(uctx && sid);
- BUG_ON(!uctx);
+ if (!uctx)
+ goto not_from_user;
if (uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
return -EINVAL;
- if (uctx->ctx_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ str_len = uctx->ctx_len;
+ if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
*ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
- uctx->ctx_len,
+ str_len + 1,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
ctx->ctx_doi = uctx->ctx_doi;
- ctx->ctx_len = uctx->ctx_len;
+ ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
ctx->ctx_alg = uctx->ctx_alg;
memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
uctx+1,
- ctx->ctx_len);
+ str_len);
+ ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = 0;
rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str,
- ctx->ctx_len,
+ str_len,
&ctx->ctx_sid);
if (rc)
return rc;
-from_policy:
- BUG_ON(!pol);
- rc = security_sid_mls_copy(pol->ctx_sid, sid, &ctx_sid);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- rc = security_sid_to_context(ctx_sid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
+not_from_user:
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
if (rc)
goto out;
goto out;
}
-
ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
- ctx->ctx_sid = ctx_sid;
+ ctx->ctx_sid = sid;
ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
ctx_str,
* LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to
* xfrm_policy.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
{
int err;
- BUG_ON(!xp);
+ BUG_ON(!uctx);
+
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(ctxp, uctx, 0);
+ if (err == 0)
+ atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
- err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, NULL, 0);
return err;
}
* LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to
* new for policy cloning.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new)
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
{
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, *new_ctx;
-
- old_ctx = old->security;
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *new_ctx;
if (old_ctx) {
- new_ctx = new->security = kmalloc(sizeof(*new_ctx) +
- old_ctx->ctx_len,
- GFP_KERNEL);
-
+ new_ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*new_ctx));
memcpy(new_ctx->ctx_str, old_ctx->ctx_str, new_ctx->ctx_len);
+ *new_ctxp = new_ctx;
}
return 0;
}
/*
- * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_policy security information.
+ * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_sec_ctx security information.
*/
-void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
- if (ctx)
- kfree(ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
}
/*
* LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled policies.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
int rc = 0;
- if (ctx)
+ if (ctx) {
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+ }
return rc;
}
* xfrm_state.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 secid)
+ u32 secid)
{
int err;
BUG_ON(!x);
- err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, pol, secid);
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, secid);
+ if (err == 0)
+ atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
return err;
}
void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
- if (ctx)
- kfree(ctx);
-}
-
-/*
- * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a connected
- * (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket based on its security
- * association used to connect to the remote socket.
- *
- * Retrieve via getsockopt SO_PEERSEC.
- */
-u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
-{
- struct dst_entry *dst, *dst_test;
- u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
-
- if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
- goto out;
-
- dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
- if (!dst)
- goto out;
-
- for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
- dst_test = dst_test->child) {
- struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
-
- if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
- peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
- break;
- }
- }
- dst_release(dst);
-
-out:
- return peer_sid;
-}
-
-/*
- * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a UDP packet
- * based on its security association used to connect to the remote socket.
- *
- * Retrieve via setsockopt IP_PASSSEC and recvmsg with control message
- * type SCM_SECURITY.
- */
-u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
- struct sec_path *sp;
-
- if (skb == NULL)
- return SECSID_NULL;
-
- if (skb->sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP)
- return SECSID_NULL;
-
- sp = skb->sp;
- if (sp) {
- int i;
-
- for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
- struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
- if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
- return ctx->ctx_sid;
- }
- }
- }
-
- return SECSID_NULL;
+ kfree(ctx);
}
/*
*/
int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
int rc = 0;
- if (ctx)
+ if (ctx) {
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+ }
return rc;
}
* gone thru the IPSec process.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
{
int i, rc = 0;
struct sec_path *sp;
}
}
+ /*
+ * This check even when there's no association involved is
+ * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
+ * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
+ * explicitly allowed by policy.
+ */
+
rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
* If we have no security association, then we need to determine
* whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination.
* If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
- * checked in xfrm_policy_lookup hook.
+ * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+ struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
{
struct dst_entry *dst;
int rc = 0;
- dst = skb->dst;
+ dst = skb_dst(skb);
if (dst) {
struct dst_entry *dst_test;
- for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
+ for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != NULL;
dst_test = dst_test->child) {
struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
}
}
+ switch (proto) {
+ case IPPROTO_AH:
+ case IPPROTO_ESP:
+ case IPPROTO_COMP:
+ /*
+ * We should have already seen this packet once before
+ * it underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the
+ * unlabeled check.
+ */
+ goto out;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This check even when there's no association involved is
+ * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
+ * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
+ * explicitly allowed by policy.
+ */
+
rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
out:
git://ftp.safe.ca / safe / jmp / linux-2.6 / blobdiff