*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
-#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/parser.h>
} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
};
-/* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
+/*
+ * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
* written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid
*/
+
+/*
+ * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage. Measures all files
+ * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root. Dangerous because
+ * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
+ * and running executables.
+ */
static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,
- .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,
- .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = 0xF97CFF8C,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
{.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
- {.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
- .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}
+ {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
};
static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);
+static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
+static int __init default_policy_setup(char *str)
+{
+ ima_use_tcb = 1;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup);
+
/**
* ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
* @rule: a pointer to a rule
if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != tsk->cred->uid)
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- int rc;
+ int rc = 0;
u32 osid, sid;
if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
rule->lsm[i].type,
- AUDIT_EQUAL,
+ Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule,
NULL);
break;
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
rule->lsm[i].type,
- AUDIT_EQUAL,
+ Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule,
NULL);
default:
* ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the
* the new measure_policy_rules.
*/
-void ima_init_policy(void)
+void __init ima_init_policy(void)
{
- int i;
+ int i, entries;
+
+ /* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
+ if (ima_use_tcb)
+ entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules);
+ else
+ entries = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules); i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < entries; i++)
list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
}
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
- AUDIT_EQUAL, args,
+ Audit_equal, args,
&entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
return result;
}
char *p;
int result = 0;
- ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
- AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS);
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
entry->action = -1;
while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \n")) != NULL) {
break;
case Opt_func:
audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from);
- if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
- entry->func = PATH_CHECK;
+ if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
+ entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
+ /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
+ entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
break;
case Opt_err:
- printk(KERN_INFO "%s: unknown token: %s\n",
- __FUNCTION__, p);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "UNKNOWN=%s ", p);
break;
}
}
if (entry->action == UNKNOWN)
result = -EINVAL;
- audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", result);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1);
audit_log_end(ab);
return result;
}
*/
int ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
{
- const char *op = "add_rule";
+ const char *op = "update_policy";
struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
int result = 0;
int audit_info = 0;
mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules);
mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
- } else
+ } else {
kfree(entry);
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
+ NULL, op, "invalid policy", result,
+ audit_info);
+ }
return result;
}
/* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
-void ima_delete_rules()
+void ima_delete_rules(void)
{
struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;