If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
- bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which all keys may be viewed"
+ bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
depends on KEYS
help
- This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file through which
- all the keys on the system can be listed.
+ This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which
+ can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the
+ reading process.
- This option is a slight security risk in that it makes it possible
- for anyone to see all the keys on the system. Normally the manager
- pretends keys that are inaccessible to a process don't exist as far
- as that process is concerned.
+ The only keys included in the list are those that grant View
+ permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them.
+ Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further
+ filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view.
+
+ Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in
+ the resulting table.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
config SECURITY
bool "Enable different security models"
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+config SECURITYFS
+ bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
+ help
+ This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
+ the TPM bios character driver. It is not used by SELinux or SMACK.
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
config SECURITY_NETWORK
bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
depends on SECURITY
implement socket and networking access controls.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-config SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
- tristate "Default Linux Capabilities"
+config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+ bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
+ depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
+ help
+ This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
+ If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+ implement per-packet access controls based on labels
+ derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
+ designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
+ to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
+ IPSec.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_PATH
+ bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
depends on SECURITY
help
- This enables the "default" Linux capabilities functionality.
- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y.
+ This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
+ If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+ implement pathname based access controls.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
+ bool "File POSIX Capabilities"
+ default n
+ help
+ This enables filesystem capabilities, allowing you to give
+ binaries a subset of root's powers without using setuid 0.
+
+ If in doubt, answer N.
config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
- tristate "Root Plug Support"
- depends on USB && SECURITY
+ bool "Root Plug Support"
+ depends on USB=y && SECURITY
help
This is a sample LSM module that should only be used as such.
It prevents any programs running with egid == 0 if a specific
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-config SECURITY_SECLVL
- tristate "BSD Secure Levels"
- depends on SECURITY
- select CRYPTO
- select CRYPTO_SHA1
- help
- Implements BSD Secure Levels as an LSM. See
- <file:Documentation/seclvl.txt> for instructions on how to use this
- module.
+config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
+ int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
+ depends on SECURITY
+ default 0
+ help
+ This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
+ from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
+ can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
+
+ For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
+ a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
+ On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
+ Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional
+ permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have
+ this protection disabled.
+
+ This value can be changed after boot using the
+ /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.
- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
source security/selinux/Kconfig
+source security/smack/Kconfig
endmenu