-#include <linux/config.h>
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/authenc.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#include <net/esp.h>
-#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
-#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/pfkeyv2.h>
-#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <net/protocol.h>
#include <net/udp.h>
-/* decapsulation data for use when post-processing */
-struct esp_decap_data {
- xfrm_address_t saddr;
- __u16 sport;
- __u8 proto;
+struct esp_skb_cb {
+ struct xfrm_skb_cb xfrm;
+ void *tmp;
};
+#define ESP_SKB_CB(__skb) ((struct esp_skb_cb *)&((__skb)->cb[0]))
+
+/*
+ * Allocate an AEAD request structure with extra space for SG and IV.
+ *
+ * For alignment considerations the IV is placed at the front, followed
+ * by the request and finally the SG list.
+ *
+ * TODO: Use spare space in skb for this where possible.
+ */
+static void *esp_alloc_tmp(struct crypto_aead *aead, int nfrags)
+{
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ len = crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
+ if (len) {
+ len += crypto_aead_alignmask(aead) &
+ ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1);
+ len = ALIGN(len, crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
+ }
+
+ len += sizeof(struct aead_givcrypt_request) + crypto_aead_reqsize(aead);
+ len = ALIGN(len, __alignof__(struct scatterlist));
+
+ len += sizeof(struct scatterlist) * nfrags;
+
+ return kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+}
+
+static inline u8 *esp_tmp_iv(struct crypto_aead *aead, void *tmp)
+{
+ return crypto_aead_ivsize(aead) ?
+ PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)tmp, crypto_aead_alignmask(aead) + 1) : tmp;
+}
+
+static inline struct aead_givcrypt_request *esp_tmp_givreq(
+ struct crypto_aead *aead, u8 *iv)
+{
+ struct aead_givcrypt_request *req;
+
+ req = (void *)PTR_ALIGN(iv + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead),
+ crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
+ aead_givcrypt_set_tfm(req, aead);
+ return req;
+}
+
+static inline struct aead_request *esp_tmp_req(struct crypto_aead *aead, u8 *iv)
+{
+ struct aead_request *req;
+
+ req = (void *)PTR_ALIGN(iv + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead),
+ crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
+ aead_request_set_tfm(req, aead);
+ return req;
+}
+
+static inline struct scatterlist *esp_req_sg(struct crypto_aead *aead,
+ struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ return (void *)ALIGN((unsigned long)(req + 1) +
+ crypto_aead_reqsize(aead),
+ __alignof__(struct scatterlist));
+}
+
+static inline struct scatterlist *esp_givreq_sg(
+ struct crypto_aead *aead, struct aead_givcrypt_request *req)
+{
+ return (void *)ALIGN((unsigned long)(req + 1) +
+ crypto_aead_reqsize(aead),
+ __alignof__(struct scatterlist));
+}
+
+static void esp_output_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb = base->data;
+
+ kfree(ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp);
+ xfrm_output_resume(skb, err);
+}
+
static int esp_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
- struct iphdr *top_iph;
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
- struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
+ struct crypto_aead *aead;
+ struct aead_givcrypt_request *req;
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ struct scatterlist *asg;
struct esp_data *esp;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
+ void *tmp;
+ u8 *iv;
+ u8 *tail;
int blksize;
int clen;
int alen;
int nfrags;
- /* Strip IP+ESP header. */
- __skb_pull(skb, skb->h.raw - skb->data);
- /* Now skb is pure payload to encrypt */
+ /* skb is pure payload to encrypt */
err = -ENOMEM;
clen = skb->len;
esp = x->data;
- alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
- tfm = esp->conf.tfm;
- blksize = ALIGN(crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(tfm), 4);
+ aead = esp->aead;
+ alen = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
+
+ blksize = ALIGN(crypto_aead_blocksize(aead), 4);
clen = ALIGN(clen + 2, blksize);
- if (esp->conf.padlen)
- clen = ALIGN(clen, esp->conf.padlen);
+ if (esp->padlen)
+ clen = ALIGN(clen, esp->padlen);
- if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, clen-skb->len+alen, &trailer)) < 0)
+ if ((err = skb_cow_data(skb, clen - skb->len + alen, &trailer)) < 0)
goto error;
+ nfrags = err;
+
+ tmp = esp_alloc_tmp(aead, nfrags + 1);
+ if (!tmp)
+ goto error;
+
+ iv = esp_tmp_iv(aead, tmp);
+ req = esp_tmp_givreq(aead, iv);
+ asg = esp_givreq_sg(aead, req);
+ sg = asg + 1;
/* Fill padding... */
+ tail = skb_tail_pointer(trailer);
do {
int i;
for (i=0; i<clen-skb->len - 2; i++)
- *(u8*)(trailer->tail + i) = i+1;
+ tail[i] = i + 1;
} while (0);
- *(u8*)(trailer->tail + clen-skb->len - 2) = (clen - skb->len)-2;
- pskb_put(skb, trailer, clen - skb->len);
+ tail[clen - skb->len - 2] = (clen - skb->len) - 2;
+ tail[clen - skb->len - 1] = *skb_mac_header(skb);
+ pskb_put(skb, trailer, clen - skb->len + alen);
- __skb_push(skb, skb->data - skb->nh.raw);
- top_iph = skb->nh.iph;
- esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(skb->nh.raw + top_iph->ihl*4);
- top_iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len + alen);
- *(u8*)(trailer->tail - 1) = top_iph->protocol;
+ skb_push(skb, -skb_network_offset(skb));
+ esph = ip_esp_hdr(skb);
+ *skb_mac_header(skb) = IPPROTO_ESP;
/* this is non-NULL only with UDP Encapsulation */
if (x->encap) {
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
struct udphdr *uh;
- u32 *udpdata32;
+ __be32 *udpdata32;
+ __be16 sport, dport;
+ int encap_type;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
+ sport = encap->encap_sport;
+ dport = encap->encap_dport;
+ encap_type = encap->encap_type;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
uh = (struct udphdr *)esph;
- uh->source = encap->encap_sport;
- uh->dest = encap->encap_dport;
- uh->len = htons(skb->len + alen - top_iph->ihl*4);
+ uh->source = sport;
+ uh->dest = dport;
+ uh->len = htons(skb->len - skb_transport_offset(skb));
uh->check = 0;
- switch (encap->encap_type) {
+ switch (encap_type) {
default:
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(uh + 1);
break;
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
- udpdata32 = (u32 *)(uh + 1);
+ udpdata32 = (__be32 *)(uh + 1);
udpdata32[0] = udpdata32[1] = 0;
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(udpdata32 + 2);
break;
}
- top_iph->protocol = IPPROTO_UDP;
- } else
- top_iph->protocol = IPPROTO_ESP;
+ *skb_mac_header(skb) = IPPROTO_UDP;
+ }
esph->spi = x->id.spi;
- esph->seq_no = htonl(++x->replay.oseq);
+ esph->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);
+
+ sg_init_table(sg, nfrags);
+ skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg,
+ esph->enc_data + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead) - skb->data,
+ clen + alen);
+ sg_init_one(asg, esph, sizeof(*esph));
+
+ aead_givcrypt_set_callback(req, 0, esp_output_done, skb);
+ aead_givcrypt_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, clen, iv);
+ aead_givcrypt_set_assoc(req, asg, sizeof(*esph));
+ aead_givcrypt_set_giv(req, esph->enc_data,
+ XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);
+
+ ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp = tmp;
+ err = crypto_aead_givencrypt(req);
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+ goto error;
- if (esp->conf.ivlen)
- crypto_cipher_set_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
+ if (err == -EBUSY)
+ err = NET_XMIT_DROP;
- do {
- struct scatterlist *sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
+ kfree(tmp);
- if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
- sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!sg)
- goto error;
+error:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int esp_input_done2(struct sk_buff *skb, int err)
+{
+ struct iphdr *iph;
+ struct xfrm_state *x = xfrm_input_state(skb);
+ struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
+ struct crypto_aead *aead = esp->aead;
+ int alen = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
+ int hlen = sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
+ int elen = skb->len - hlen;
+ int ihl;
+ u8 nexthdr[2];
+ int padlen;
+
+ kfree(ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp);
+
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen-2, nexthdr, 2))
+ BUG();
+
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ padlen = nexthdr[0];
+ if (padlen + 2 + alen >= elen)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* ... check padding bits here. Silly. :-) */
+
+ iph = ip_hdr(skb);
+ ihl = iph->ihl * 4;
+
+ if (x->encap) {
+ struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
+ struct udphdr *uh = (void *)(skb_network_header(skb) + ihl);
+
+ /*
+ * 1) if the NAT-T peer's IP or port changed then
+ * advertize the change to the keying daemon.
+ * This is an inbound SA, so just compare
+ * SRC ports.
+ */
+ if (iph->saddr != x->props.saddr.a4 ||
+ uh->source != encap->encap_sport) {
+ xfrm_address_t ipaddr;
+
+ ipaddr.a4 = iph->saddr;
+ km_new_mapping(x, &ipaddr, uh->source);
+
+ /* XXX: perhaps add an extra
+ * policy check here, to see
+ * if we should allow or
+ * reject a packet from a
+ * different source
+ * address/port.
+ */
}
- skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, esph->enc_data+esp->conf.ivlen-skb->data, clen);
- crypto_cipher_encrypt(tfm, sg, sg, clen);
- if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
- kfree(sg);
- } while (0);
- if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
- memcpy(esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
- crypto_cipher_get_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
+ /*
+ * 2) ignore UDP/TCP checksums in case
+ * of NAT-T in Transport Mode, or
+ * perform other post-processing fixes
+ * as per draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-06,
+ * section 3.1.2
+ */
+ if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT)
+ skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
}
- if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
- esp->auth.icv(esp, skb, (u8*)esph-skb->data,
- sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen+clen, trailer->tail);
- pskb_put(skb, trailer, alen);
- }
+ pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - alen - padlen - 2);
+ __skb_pull(skb, hlen);
+ skb_set_transport_header(skb, -ihl);
- ip_send_check(top_iph);
+ err = nexthdr[1];
- err = 0;
+ /* RFC4303: Drop dummy packets without any error */
+ if (err == IPPROTO_NONE)
+ err = -EINVAL;
-error:
+out:
return err;
}
+static void esp_input_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb = base->data;
+
+ xfrm_input_resume(skb, esp_input_done2(skb, err));
+}
+
/*
* Note: detecting truncated vs. non-truncated authentication data is very
* expensive, so we only support truncated data, which is the recommended
* and common case.
*/
-static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_decap_state *decap, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct iphdr *iph;
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
+ struct crypto_aead *aead = esp->aead;
+ struct aead_request *req;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
- int blksize = ALIGN(crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(esp->conf.tfm), 4);
- int alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
- int elen = skb->len - sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) - esp->conf.ivlen - alen;
+ int elen = skb->len - sizeof(*esph) - crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
int nfrags;
- int encap_len = 0;
+ void *tmp;
+ u8 *iv;
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ struct scatterlist *asg;
+ int err = -EINVAL;
- if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr)))
+ if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*esph) + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead)))
goto out;
- if (elen <= 0 || (elen & (blksize-1)))
+ if (elen <= 0)
goto out;
- /* If integrity check is required, do this. */
- if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
- u8 sum[esp->auth.icv_full_len];
- u8 sum1[alen];
-
- esp->auth.icv(esp, skb, 0, skb->len-alen, sum);
-
- if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen, sum1, alen))
- BUG();
-
- if (unlikely(memcmp(sum, sum1, alen))) {
- x->stats.integrity_failed++;
- goto out;
- }
- }
+ if ((err = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ nfrags = err;
- if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer)) < 0)
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ tmp = esp_alloc_tmp(aead, nfrags + 1);
+ if (!tmp)
goto out;
+ ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp = tmp;
+ iv = esp_tmp_iv(aead, tmp);
+ req = esp_tmp_req(aead, iv);
+ asg = esp_req_sg(aead, req);
+ sg = asg + 1;
+
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
- esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr*)skb->data;
- iph = skb->nh.iph;
+ esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)skb->data;
/* Get ivec. This can be wrong, check against another impls. */
- if (esp->conf.ivlen)
- crypto_cipher_set_iv(esp->conf.tfm, esph->enc_data, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(esp->conf.tfm));
-
- {
- u8 nexthdr[2];
- struct scatterlist *sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
- u8 workbuf[60];
- int padlen;
-
- if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
- sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!sg)
- goto out;
- }
- skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen, elen);
- crypto_cipher_decrypt(esp->conf.tfm, sg, sg, elen);
- if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
- kfree(sg);
-
- if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen-2, nexthdr, 2))
- BUG();
-
- padlen = nexthdr[0];
- if (padlen+2 >= elen)
- goto out;
-
- /* ... check padding bits here. Silly. :-) */
-
- if (x->encap && decap && decap->decap_type) {
- struct esp_decap_data *encap_data;
- struct udphdr *uh = (struct udphdr *) (iph+1);
-
- encap_data = (struct esp_decap_data *) (decap->decap_data);
- encap_data->proto = 0;
-
- switch (decap->decap_type) {
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
- encap_data->proto = AF_INET;
- encap_data->saddr.a4 = iph->saddr;
- encap_data->sport = uh->source;
- encap_len = (void*)esph - (void*)uh;
- break;
-
- default:
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- iph->protocol = nexthdr[1];
- pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - alen - padlen - 2);
- memcpy(workbuf, skb->nh.raw, iph->ihl*4);
- skb->h.raw = skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen);
- skb->nh.raw += encap_len + sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen;
- memcpy(skb->nh.raw, workbuf, iph->ihl*4);
- skb->nh.iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len);
- }
+ iv = esph->enc_data;
- return 0;
+ sg_init_table(sg, nfrags);
+ skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(*esph) + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead), elen);
+ sg_init_one(asg, esph, sizeof(*esph));
-out:
- return -EINVAL;
-}
+ aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, esp_input_done, skb);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, elen, iv);
+ aead_request_set_assoc(req, asg, sizeof(*esph));
-static int esp_post_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_decap_state *decap, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-
- if (x->encap) {
- struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap;
- struct esp_decap_data *decap_data;
-
- encap = x->encap;
- decap_data = (struct esp_decap_data *)(decap->decap_data);
+ err = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+ goto out;
- /* first, make sure that the decap type == the encap type */
- if (encap->encap_type != decap->decap_type)
- return -EINVAL;
+ err = esp_input_done2(skb, err);
- switch (encap->encap_type) {
- default:
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
- /*
- * 1) if the NAT-T peer's IP or port changed then
- * advertize the change to the keying daemon.
- * This is an inbound SA, so just compare
- * SRC ports.
- */
- if (decap_data->proto == AF_INET &&
- (decap_data->saddr.a4 != x->props.saddr.a4 ||
- decap_data->sport != encap->encap_sport)) {
- xfrm_address_t ipaddr;
-
- ipaddr.a4 = decap_data->saddr.a4;
- km_new_mapping(x, &ipaddr, decap_data->sport);
-
- /* XXX: perhaps add an extra
- * policy check here, to see
- * if we should allow or
- * reject a packet from a
- * different source
- * address/port.
- */
- }
-
- /*
- * 2) ignore UDP/TCP checksums in case
- * of NAT-T in Transport Mode, or
- * perform other post-processing fixes
- * as per * draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-06,
- * section 3.1.2
- */
- if (!x->props.mode)
- skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
-
- break;
- }
- }
- return 0;
+out:
+ return err;
}
-static u32 esp4_get_max_size(struct xfrm_state *x, int mtu)
+static u32 esp4_get_mtu(struct xfrm_state *x, int mtu)
{
struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
- u32 blksize = ALIGN(crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(esp->conf.tfm), 4);
-
- if (x->props.mode) {
- mtu = ALIGN(mtu + 2, blksize);
- } else {
+ u32 blksize = ALIGN(crypto_aead_blocksize(esp->aead), 4);
+ u32 align = max_t(u32, blksize, esp->padlen);
+ u32 rem;
+
+ mtu -= x->props.header_len + crypto_aead_authsize(esp->aead);
+ rem = mtu & (align - 1);
+ mtu &= ~(align - 1);
+
+ switch (x->props.mode) {
+ case XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL:
+ break;
+ default:
+ case XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT:
+ /* The worst case */
+ mtu -= blksize - 4;
+ mtu += min_t(u32, blksize - 4, rem);
+ break;
+ case XFRM_MODE_BEET:
/* The worst case. */
- mtu = ALIGN(mtu + 2, 4) + blksize - 4;
+ mtu += min_t(u32, IPV4_BEET_PHMAXLEN, rem);
+ break;
}
- if (esp->conf.padlen)
- mtu = ALIGN(mtu, esp->conf.padlen);
- return mtu + x->props.header_len + esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
+ return mtu - 2;
}
static void esp4_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info)
{
- struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr*)skb->data;
- struct ip_esp_hdr *esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr*)(skb->data+(iph->ihl<<2));
+ struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
+ struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)skb->data;
+ struct ip_esp_hdr *esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(skb->data+(iph->ihl<<2));
struct xfrm_state *x;
- if (skb->h.icmph->type != ICMP_DEST_UNREACH ||
- skb->h.icmph->code != ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED)
+ if (icmp_hdr(skb)->type != ICMP_DEST_UNREACH ||
+ icmp_hdr(skb)->code != ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED)
return;
- x = xfrm_state_lookup((xfrm_address_t *)&iph->daddr, esph->spi, IPPROTO_ESP, AF_INET);
+ x = xfrm_state_lookup(net, (xfrm_address_t *)&iph->daddr, esph->spi, IPPROTO_ESP, AF_INET);
if (!x)
return;
NETDEBUG(KERN_DEBUG "pmtu discovery on SA ESP/%08x/%08x\n",
if (!esp)
return;
- crypto_free_tfm(esp->conf.tfm);
- esp->conf.tfm = NULL;
- kfree(esp->conf.ivec);
- esp->conf.ivec = NULL;
- crypto_free_tfm(esp->auth.tfm);
- esp->auth.tfm = NULL;
- kfree(esp->auth.work_icv);
- esp->auth.work_icv = NULL;
+ crypto_free_aead(esp->aead);
kfree(esp);
}
-static int esp_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
+static int esp_init_aead(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
- struct esp_data *esp = NULL;
+ struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
+ struct crypto_aead *aead;
+ int err;
- /* null auth and encryption can have zero length keys */
- if (x->aalg) {
- if (x->aalg->alg_key_len > 512)
- goto error;
- }
+ aead = crypto_alloc_aead(x->aead->alg_name, 0, 0);
+ err = PTR_ERR(aead);
+ if (IS_ERR(aead))
+ goto error;
+
+ esp->aead = aead;
+
+ err = crypto_aead_setkey(aead, x->aead->alg_key,
+ (x->aead->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+ if (err)
+ goto error;
+
+ err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(aead, x->aead->alg_icv_len / 8);
+ if (err)
+ goto error;
+
+error:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int esp_init_authenc(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+ struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
+ struct crypto_aead *aead;
+ struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param;
+ struct rtattr *rta;
+ char *key;
+ char *p;
+ char authenc_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ unsigned int keylen;
+ int err;
+
+ err = -EINVAL;
if (x->ealg == NULL)
goto error;
- esp = kmalloc(sizeof(*esp), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (esp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ if (snprintf(authenc_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "authenc(%s,%s)",
+ x->aalg ? x->aalg->alg_name : "digest_null",
+ x->ealg->alg_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ goto error;
+
+ aead = crypto_alloc_aead(authenc_name, 0, 0);
+ err = PTR_ERR(aead);
+ if (IS_ERR(aead))
+ goto error;
- memset(esp, 0, sizeof(*esp));
+ esp->aead = aead;
+
+ keylen = (x->aalg ? (x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8 : 0) +
+ (x->ealg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8 + RTA_SPACE(sizeof(*param));
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ key = kmalloc(keylen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key)
+ goto error;
+
+ p = key;
+ rta = (void *)p;
+ rta->rta_type = CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM;
+ rta->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(*param));
+ param = RTA_DATA(rta);
+ p += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(*param));
if (x->aalg) {
struct xfrm_algo_desc *aalg_desc;
- esp->auth.key = x->aalg->alg_key;
- esp->auth.key_len = (x->aalg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
- esp->auth.tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(x->aalg->alg_name, 0);
- if (esp->auth.tfm == NULL)
- goto error;
- esp->auth.icv = esp_hmac_digest;
+ memcpy(p, x->aalg->alg_key, (x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+ p += (x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8;
aalg_desc = xfrm_aalg_get_byname(x->aalg->alg_name, 0);
BUG_ON(!aalg_desc);
+ err = -EINVAL;
if (aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8 !=
- crypto_tfm_alg_digestsize(esp->auth.tfm)) {
+ crypto_aead_authsize(aead)) {
NETDEBUG(KERN_INFO "ESP: %s digestsize %u != %hu\n",
x->aalg->alg_name,
- crypto_tfm_alg_digestsize(esp->auth.tfm),
+ crypto_aead_authsize(aead),
aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8);
- goto error;
+ goto free_key;
}
- esp->auth.icv_full_len = aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8;
- esp->auth.icv_trunc_len = aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_truncbits/8;
-
- esp->auth.work_icv = kmalloc(esp->auth.icv_full_len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!esp->auth.work_icv)
- goto error;
+ err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(
+ aead, x->aalg->alg_trunc_len / 8);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_key;
}
- esp->conf.key = x->ealg->alg_key;
- esp->conf.key_len = (x->ealg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
- if (x->props.ealgo == SADB_EALG_NULL)
- esp->conf.tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(x->ealg->alg_name, CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_ECB);
+
+ param->enckeylen = cpu_to_be32((x->ealg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+ memcpy(p, x->ealg->alg_key, (x->ealg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+
+ err = crypto_aead_setkey(aead, key, keylen);
+
+free_key:
+ kfree(key);
+
+error:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int esp_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+ struct esp_data *esp;
+ struct crypto_aead *aead;
+ u32 align;
+ int err;
+
+ esp = kzalloc(sizeof(*esp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (esp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ x->data = esp;
+
+ if (x->aead)
+ err = esp_init_aead(x);
else
- esp->conf.tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(x->ealg->alg_name, CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_CBC);
- if (esp->conf.tfm == NULL)
- goto error;
- esp->conf.ivlen = crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(esp->conf.tfm);
- esp->conf.padlen = 0;
- if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
- esp->conf.ivec = kmalloc(esp->conf.ivlen, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (unlikely(esp->conf.ivec == NULL))
- goto error;
- get_random_bytes(esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
- }
- if (crypto_cipher_setkey(esp->conf.tfm, esp->conf.key, esp->conf.key_len))
+ err = esp_init_authenc(x);
+
+ if (err)
goto error;
- x->props.header_len = sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen;
- if (x->props.mode)
+
+ aead = esp->aead;
+
+ esp->padlen = 0;
+
+ x->props.header_len = sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) +
+ crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
+ if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL)
x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct iphdr);
+ else if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_BEET && x->sel.family != AF_INET6)
+ x->props.header_len += IPV4_BEET_PHMAXLEN;
if (x->encap) {
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
break;
}
}
- x->data = esp;
- x->props.trailer_len = esp4_get_max_size(x, 0) - x->props.header_len;
- return 0;
+
+ align = ALIGN(crypto_aead_blocksize(aead), 4);
+ if (esp->padlen)
+ align = max_t(u32, align, esp->padlen);
+ x->props.trailer_len = align + 1 + crypto_aead_authsize(esp->aead);
error:
- x->data = esp;
- esp_destroy(x);
- x->data = NULL;
- return -EINVAL;
+ return err;
}
-static struct xfrm_type esp_type =
+static const struct xfrm_type esp_type =
{
.description = "ESP4",
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.proto = IPPROTO_ESP,
+ .flags = XFRM_TYPE_REPLAY_PROT,
.init_state = esp_init_state,
.destructor = esp_destroy,
- .get_max_size = esp4_get_max_size,
+ .get_mtu = esp4_get_mtu,
.input = esp_input,
- .post_input = esp_post_input,
.output = esp_output
};
-static struct net_protocol esp4_protocol = {
+static const struct net_protocol esp4_protocol = {
.handler = xfrm4_rcv,
.err_handler = esp4_err,
.no_policy = 1,
+ .netns_ok = 1,
};
static int __init esp4_init(void)
{
- struct xfrm_decap_state decap;
-
- if (sizeof(struct esp_decap_data) >
- sizeof(decap.decap_data)) {
- extern void decap_data_too_small(void);
-
- decap_data_too_small();
- }
-
if (xfrm_register_type(&esp_type, AF_INET) < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO "ip esp init: can't add xfrm type\n");
return -EAGAIN;
module_init(esp4_init);
module_exit(esp4_fini);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_ALIAS_XFRM_TYPE(AF_INET, XFRM_PROTO_ESP);