* This function is used through-out the kernel (including mm and fs)
* to indicate a major problem.
*/
+#include <linux/debug_locks.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/reboot.h>
-#include <linux/notifier.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sysrq.h>
-#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/nmi.h>
-#include <linux/kexec.h>
-#include <linux/debug_locks.h>
-#include <linux/random.h>
-#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
+#include <linux/dmi.h>
int panic_on_oops;
-int tainted;
+static unsigned long tainted_mask;
static int pause_on_oops;
static int pause_on_oops_flag;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_notifier_list);
-static int __init panic_setup(char *str)
-{
- panic_timeout = simple_strtoul(str, NULL, 0);
- return 1;
-}
-__setup("panic=", panic_setup);
-
static long no_blink(long time)
{
return 0;
*
* This function never returns.
*/
-
NORET_TYPE void panic(const char * fmt, ...)
{
- long i;
static char buf[1024];
va_list args;
-#if defined(CONFIG_S390)
- unsigned long caller = (unsigned long) __builtin_return_address(0);
-#endif
+ long i;
/*
- * It's possible to come here directly from a panic-assertion and not
- * have preempt disabled. Some functions called from here want
+ * It's possible to come here directly from a panic-assertion and
+ * not have preempt disabled. Some functions called from here want
* preempt to be disabled. No point enabling it later though...
*/
preempt_disable();
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE
dump_stack();
#endif
- bust_spinlocks(0);
/*
* If we have crashed and we have a crash kernel loaded let it handle
*/
crash_kexec(NULL);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* Note smp_send_stop is the usual smp shutdown function, which
* unfortunately means it may not be hardened to work in a panic
* situation.
*/
smp_send_stop();
-#endif
atomic_notifier_call_chain(&panic_notifier_list, 0, buf);
if (panic_timeout > 0) {
/*
- * Delay timeout seconds before rebooting the machine.
- * We can't use the "normal" timers since we just panicked..
- */
- printk(KERN_EMERG "Rebooting in %d seconds..",panic_timeout);
+ * Delay timeout seconds before rebooting the machine.
+ * We can't use the "normal" timers since we just panicked.
+ */
+ printk(KERN_EMERG "Rebooting in %d seconds..", panic_timeout);
+
for (i = 0; i < panic_timeout*1000; ) {
touch_nmi_watchdog();
i += panic_blink(i);
mdelay(1);
i++;
}
- /* This will not be a clean reboot, with everything
- * shutting down. But if there is a chance of
- * rebooting the system it will be rebooted.
+ /*
+ * This will not be a clean reboot, with everything
+ * shutting down. But if there is a chance of
+ * rebooting the system it will be rebooted.
*/
emergency_restart();
}
}
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_S390)
- disabled_wait(caller);
+ {
+ unsigned long caller;
+
+ caller = (unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(0);
+ disabled_wait(caller);
+ }
#endif
local_irq_enable();
- for (i = 0;;) {
+ for (i = 0; ; ) {
touch_softlockup_watchdog();
i += panic_blink(i);
mdelay(1);
i++;
}
+ bust_spinlocks(0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic);
+
+struct tnt {
+ u8 bit;
+ char true;
+ char false;
+};
+
+static const struct tnt tnts[] = {
+ { TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, 'P', 'G' },
+ { TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, 'F', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP, 'S', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD, 'R', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, 'M', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_BAD_PAGE, 'B', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_USER, 'U', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_DIE, 'D', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, 'A', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_WARN, 'W', ' ' },
+ { TAINT_CRAP, 'C', ' ' },
+};
+
/**
* print_tainted - return a string to represent the kernel taint state.
*
* 'M' - System experienced a machine check exception.
* 'B' - System has hit bad_page.
* 'U' - Userspace-defined naughtiness.
+ * 'D' - Kernel has oopsed before
* 'A' - ACPI table overridden.
* 'W' - Taint on warning.
+ * 'C' - modules from drivers/staging are loaded.
*
* The string is overwritten by the next call to print_taint().
*/
-
const char *print_tainted(void)
{
- static char buf[20];
- if (tainted) {
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Tainted: %c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c",
- tainted & TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE ? 'P' : 'G',
- tainted & TAINT_FORCED_MODULE ? 'F' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP ? 'S' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD ? 'R' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK ? 'M' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_BAD_PAGE ? 'B' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_USER ? 'U' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_DIE ? 'D' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE ? 'A' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_WARN ? 'W' : ' ');
- }
- else
+ static char buf[ARRAY_SIZE(tnts) + sizeof("Tainted: ") + 1];
+
+ if (tainted_mask) {
+ char *s;
+ int i;
+
+ s = buf + sprintf(buf, "Tainted: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tnts); i++) {
+ const struct tnt *t = &tnts[i];
+ *s++ = test_bit(t->bit, &tainted_mask) ?
+ t->true : t->false;
+ }
+ *s = 0;
+ } else
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Not tainted");
- return(buf);
+
+ return buf;
}
-void add_taint(unsigned flag)
+int test_taint(unsigned flag)
{
- debug_locks = 0; /* can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore */
- tainted |= flag;
+ return test_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(test_taint);
+
+unsigned long get_taint(void)
+{
+ return tainted_mask;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_taint);
-static int __init pause_on_oops_setup(char *str)
+void add_taint(unsigned flag)
{
- pause_on_oops = simple_strtoul(str, NULL, 0);
- return 1;
+ /*
+ * Can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore.
+ * We don't call directly debug_locks_off() because the issue
+ * is not necessarily serious enough to set oops_in_progress to 1
+ * Also we want to keep up lockdep for staging development and
+ * post-warning case.
+ */
+ if (flag != TAINT_CRAP && flag != TAINT_WARN && __debug_locks_off())
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n");
+
+ set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
}
-__setup("pause_on_oops=", pause_on_oops_setup);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_taint);
static void spin_msec(int msecs)
{
}
/*
- * Return true if the calling CPU is allowed to print oops-related info. This
- * is a bit racy..
+ * Return true if the calling CPU is allowed to print oops-related info.
+ * This is a bit racy..
*/
int oops_may_print(void)
{
/*
* Called when the architecture enters its oops handler, before it prints
- * anything. If this is the first CPU to oops, and it's oopsing the first time
- * then let it proceed.
+ * anything. If this is the first CPU to oops, and it's oopsing the first
+ * time then let it proceed.
*
- * This is all enabled by the pause_on_oops kernel boot option. We do all this
- * to ensure that oopses don't scroll off the screen. It has the side-effect
- * of preventing later-oopsing CPUs from mucking up the display, too.
+ * This is all enabled by the pause_on_oops kernel boot option. We do all
+ * this to ensure that oopses don't scroll off the screen. It has the
+ * side-effect of preventing later-oopsing CPUs from mucking up the display,
+ * too.
*
- * It turns out that the CPU which is allowed to print ends up pausing for the
- * right duration, whereas all the other CPUs pause for twice as long: once in
- * oops_enter(), once in oops_exit().
+ * It turns out that the CPU which is allowed to print ends up pausing for
+ * the right duration, whereas all the other CPUs pause for twice as long:
+ * once in oops_enter(), once in oops_exit().
*/
void oops_enter(void)
{
- debug_locks_off(); /* can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore */
+ /* can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore: */
+ debug_locks_off();
do_oops_enter_exit();
}
{
if (!oops_id)
get_random_bytes(&oops_id, sizeof(oops_id));
+ else
+ oops_id++;
return 0;
}
}
#ifdef WANT_WARN_ON_SLOWPATH
-void warn_on_slowpath(const char *file, int line)
+struct slowpath_args {
+ const char *fmt;
+ va_list args;
+};
+
+static void warn_slowpath_common(const char *file, int line, void *caller, struct slowpath_args *args)
{
- char function[KSYM_SYMBOL_LEN];
- unsigned long caller = (unsigned long) __builtin_return_address(0);
- sprint_symbol(function, caller);
+ const char *board;
printk(KERN_WARNING "------------[ cut here ]------------\n");
- printk(KERN_WARNING "WARNING: at %s:%d %s()\n", file,
- line, function);
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "WARNING: at %s:%d %pS()\n", file, line, caller);
+ board = dmi_get_system_info(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME);
+ if (board)
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "Hardware name: %s\n", board);
+
+ if (args)
+ vprintk(args->fmt, args->args);
+
print_modules();
dump_stack();
print_oops_end_marker();
add_taint(TAINT_WARN);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(warn_on_slowpath);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
-
-#ifndef GCC_HAS_SP
-#warning You have selected the CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR option, but the gcc used does not support this.
-#endif
-static unsigned long __stack_check_testing;
-
-/*
- * Self test function for the stack-protector feature.
- * This test requires that the local variable absolutely has
- * a stack slot.
- */
-static noinline void __stack_chk_test_func(void)
+void warn_slowpath_fmt(const char *file, int line, const char *fmt, ...)
{
- unsigned long dummy_buffer[64]; /* force gcc to use the canary */
+ struct slowpath_args args;
- current->stack_canary = ~current->stack_canary;
- refresh_stack_canary();
- dummy_buffer[3] = 1; /* fool gcc into keeping the variable */
+ args.fmt = fmt;
+ va_start(args.args, fmt);
+ warn_slowpath_common(file, line, __builtin_return_address(0), &args);
+ va_end(args.args);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(warn_slowpath_fmt);
-static int __stack_chk_test(void)
+void warn_slowpath_null(const char *file, int line)
{
- printk(KERN_INFO "Testing -fstack-protector-all feature\n");
- __stack_check_testing = (unsigned long)&__stack_chk_test_func;
- __stack_chk_test_func();
- if (__stack_check_testing) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "-fstack-protector-all test failed\n");
- WARN_ON(1);
- };
- current->stack_canary = ~current->stack_canary;
- refresh_stack_canary();
- return 0;
+ warn_slowpath_common(file, line, __builtin_return_address(0), NULL);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(warn_slowpath_null);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+
/*
* Called when gcc's -fstack-protector feature is used, and
* gcc detects corruption of the on-stack canary value
*/
void __stack_chk_fail(void)
{
- if (__stack_check_testing == (unsigned long)&__stack_chk_test_func) {
- long delta;
-
- delta = (unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(0) -
- __stack_check_testing;
- /*
- * The test needs to happen inside the test function, so
- * check if the return address is close to that function.
- * The function is only 2 dozen bytes long, but keep a wide
- * safety margin to avoid panic()s for normal users regardless
- * of the quality of the compiler.
- */
- if (delta >= 0 && delta <= 400) {
- __stack_check_testing = 0;
- return;
- }
- }
panic("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: %p\n",
__builtin_return_address(0));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_fail);
-late_initcall(__stack_chk_test);
#endif
+
+core_param(panic, panic_timeout, int, 0644);
+core_param(pause_on_oops, pause_on_oops, int, 0644);