*
* Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
* Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
* All Rights Reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
* okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
*
+ * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
+ * 2006.
+ *
* The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
* added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
*
* Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
* filesystem information.
+ *
+ * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
+ * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
+#include <linux/mqueue.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
-#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
-/* 0 = no checking
- 1 = put_count checking
- 2 = verbose put_count checking
-*/
-#define AUDIT_DEBUG 0
+#include "audit.h"
+
+extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
/* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
extern int audit_enabled;
* path_lookup. */
#define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
-/* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
- a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
- the syscall filter. */
-enum audit_state {
- AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
- * No syscall-specific audit records can
- * be generated. */
- AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
- * but don't necessarily fill it in at
- * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
- * instead). */
- AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
- * and always fill it in at syscall
- * entry time. This makes a full
- * syscall record available if some
- * other part of the kernel decides it
- * should be recorded. */
- AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
- * always fill it in at syscall entry
- * time, and always write out the audit
- * record at syscall exit time. */
-};
+/* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
+#define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
* we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
* Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
struct audit_names {
const char *name;
+ int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
+ unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
unsigned long ino;
- unsigned long pino;
dev_t dev;
umode_t mode;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
+ u32 osid;
};
struct audit_aux_data {
#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
+struct audit_aux_data_mq_open {
+ struct audit_aux_data d;
+ int oflag;
+ mode_t mode;
+ struct mq_attr attr;
+};
+
+struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv {
+ struct audit_aux_data d;
+ mqd_t mqdes;
+ size_t msg_len;
+ unsigned int msg_prio;
+ struct timespec abs_timeout;
+};
+
+struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify {
+ struct audit_aux_data d;
+ mqd_t mqdes;
+ struct sigevent notification;
+};
+
+struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr {
+ struct audit_aux_data d;
+ mqd_t mqdes;
+ struct mq_attr mqstat;
+};
+
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
struct audit_aux_data d;
struct ipc_perm p;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
mode_t mode;
+ u32 osid;
+};
+
+struct audit_aux_data_execve {
+ struct audit_aux_data d;
+ int argc;
+ int envc;
+ char mem[0];
};
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
int name_count;
struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
+ char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
struct dentry * pwd;
struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
/* Save things to print about task_struct */
- pid_t pid;
+ pid_t pid, ppid;
uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
unsigned long personality;
#endif
};
- /* Public API */
-/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
- * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
- * syscall exit time. */
-static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
-#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5
-#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
-#endif
-};
-
-struct audit_entry {
- struct list_head list;
- struct rcu_head rcu;
- struct audit_rule rule;
-};
-
-extern int audit_pid;
-
-/* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called from
- * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD. */
-static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
- && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
- && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
- return -1;
- if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
- return -1;
- if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
- return -1;
-
- d->flags = s->flags;
- d->action = s->action;
- d->field_count = s->field_count;
- for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
- d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
- d->values[i] = s->values[i];
- }
- for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
- * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and
- * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
-static inline int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (a->flags != b->flags)
- return 1;
-
- if (a->action != b->action)
- return 1;
-
- if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
- return 1;
-
- for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
- if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
- || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
- return 1;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
- if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
- * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
- * audit_netlink_sem. */
-static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
- struct list_head *list)
-{
- struct audit_entry *entry;
- int i;
-
- /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
- * addition routine. */
- list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) {
- if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) {
- return -EEXIST;
- }
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS)
- return -EINVAL;
- if ( rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE )
- rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL;
- else if ( (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS) == 0 )
- rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_EQUAL;
- rule->fields[i] &= (~AUDIT_NEGATE);
- }
-
- if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
- return -ENOMEM;
- if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) {
- kfree(entry);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
- entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
- list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
- } else {
- list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
-{
- struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
- kfree(e);
-}
-
-/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
- * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
- * audit_netlink_sem. */
-static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
- struct list_head *list)
-{
- struct audit_entry *e;
-
- /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
- * deletion routine. */
- list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
- if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
- list_del_rcu(&e->list);
- call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */
-}
-
-static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
-{
- int pid, seq;
- int *dest = _dest;
- struct audit_entry *entry;
- int i;
-
- pid = dest[0];
- seq = dest[1];
- kfree(dest);
-
- down(&audit_netlink_sem);
-
- /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
- always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
- for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
- list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
- audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
- &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
- }
- audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
-
- up(&audit_netlink_sem);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type
- * @type: audit message type
- * @pid: target pid for netlink audit messages
- * @uid: target uid for netlink audit messages
- * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number
- * @data: payload data
- * @loginuid: loginuid of sender
- */
-int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
- uid_t loginuid)
-{
- struct task_struct *tsk;
- int *dest;
- int err = 0;
- unsigned listnr;
-
- switch (type) {
- case AUDIT_LIST:
- /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
- * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
- * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
- * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
- * trying to _send_ the stuff */
-
- dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!dest)
- return -ENOMEM;
- dest[0] = pid;
- dest[1] = seq;
-
- tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules");
- if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
- kfree(dest);
- err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
- }
- break;
- case AUDIT_ADD:
- listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
- if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- err = audit_add_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
- if (!err)
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
- break;
- case AUDIT_DEL:
- listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
- if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
- if (!err)
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
- break;
- default:
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- return err;
-}
-
-static int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right)
-{
- switch (op) {
- case AUDIT_EQUAL:
- return (left == right);
- case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
- return (left != right);
- case AUDIT_LESS_THAN:
- return (left < right);
- case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
- return (left <= right);
- case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN:
- return (left > right);
- case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
- return (left >= right);
- default:
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-}
-
+/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
* otherwise. */
static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
- struct audit_rule *rule,
+ struct audit_krule *rule,
struct audit_context *ctx,
+ struct audit_names *name,
enum audit_state *state)
{
- int i, j;
+ int i, j, need_sid = 1;
+ u32 sid;
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS;
- u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
- u32 value = rule->values[i];
+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
int result = 0;
- switch (field) {
+ switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_PPID:
+ if (ctx)
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_UID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_EUID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_SUID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_FSUID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_GID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_EGID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_SGID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_FSGID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_PERS:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_ARCH:
if (ctx)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_EXIT:
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
- if (value)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
+ if (f->val)
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
else
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
}
break;
case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
- if (ctx) {
+ if (name)
+ result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
+ f->op, f->val);
+ else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), op, value)) {
+ if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
break;
}
}
break;
case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
- if (ctx) {
+ if (name)
+ result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
+ f->op, f->val);
+ else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), op, value)) {
+ if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
break;
}
}
break;
case AUDIT_INODE:
- if (ctx) {
+ if (name)
+ result = (name->ino == f->val);
+ else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, op, value) ||
- audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, op, value)) {
+ if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
break;
}
}
}
break;
+ case AUDIT_WATCH:
+ if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
+ result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
+ name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
+ break;
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
result = 0;
if (ctx)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
+ a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
+ match for now to avoid losing information that
+ may be wanted. An error message will also be
+ logged upon error */
+ if (f->se_rule) {
+ if (need_sid) {
+ selinux_task_ctxid(tsk, &sid);
+ need_sid = 0;
+ }
+ result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ f->op,
+ f->se_rule,
+ ctx);
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
+ also applies here */
+ if (f->se_rule) {
+ /* Find files that match */
+ if (name) {
+ result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ name->osid, f->type, f->op,
+ f->se_rule, ctx);
+ } else if (ctx) {
+ for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
+ if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ ctx->names[j].osid,
+ f->type, f->op,
+ f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+ ++result;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* Find ipc objects that match */
+ if (ctx) {
+ struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+ for (aux = ctx->aux; aux;
+ aux = aux->next) {
+ if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
+ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
+ if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+ ++result;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
break;
case AUDIT_ARG0:
case AUDIT_ARG1:
case AUDIT_ARG2:
case AUDIT_ARG3:
if (ctx)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0], op, value);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+ /* ignore this field for filtering */
+ result = 1;
break;
}
if (!result)
return 0;
}
+ if (rule->filterkey)
+ ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
switch (rule->action) {
case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
- case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
}
return 1;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
- if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
+ if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return state;
}
int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
- && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
+ if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
+ &state)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return state;
}
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}
-static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
- struct audit_rule *rule,
- enum audit_state *state)
+/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
+ * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
+ * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
+ * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
+ */
+enum audit_state audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct audit_context *ctx)
{
int i;
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+ enum audit_state state;
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS;
- u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
- u32 value = rule->values[i];
- int result = 0;
-
- switch (field) {
- case AUDIT_PID:
- result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.pid, op, value);
- break;
- case AUDIT_UID:
- result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.uid, op, value);
- break;
- case AUDIT_GID:
- result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.gid, op, value);
- break;
- case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
- result = audit_comparator(cb->loginuid, op, value);
- break;
- }
+ if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
+ return AUDIT_DISABLED;
- if (!result)
- return 0;
- }
- switch (rule->action) {
- case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
- case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
- case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
- }
- return 1;
-}
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
+ int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
+ int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+ struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
+ int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
+ struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
-int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type)
-{
- struct audit_entry *e;
- enum audit_state state;
- int ret = 1;
+ if (list_empty(list))
+ continue;
- rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
- if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
- if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
- ret = 0;
- break;
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+ if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return state;
+ }
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
+ return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
+}
- return ret; /* Audit by default */
+void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->auditable = 1;
}
-/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
int return_valid,
int return_code)
if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
enum audit_state state;
+
state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
+ if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
+ context->auditable = 1;
+ goto get_context;
+ }
+
+ state = audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
context->auditable = 1;
+
}
+get_context:
context->pid = tsk->pid;
+ context->ppid = sys_getppid(); /* sic. tsk == current in all cases */
context->uid = tsk->uid;
context->gid = tsk->gid;
context->euid = tsk->euid;
context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
context->name_count, context->put_count,
context->ino_count);
- for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
context->names[i].name,
context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
+ }
dump_stack();
return;
}
context->ino_count = 0;
#endif
- for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
- if (context->names[i].name)
+ for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
+ if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
__putname(context->names[i].name);
+ }
context->name_count = 0;
if (context->pwd)
dput(context->pwd);
dput(axi->dentry);
mntput(axi->mnt);
}
+
context->aux = aux->next;
kfree(aux);
}
}
audit_free_names(context);
audit_free_aux(context);
+ kfree(context->filterkey);
kfree(context);
context = previous;
} while (context);
printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
}
-static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
- char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
- struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ ssize_t len = 0;
+
+ len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ if (len != -EINVAL)
+ goto error_path;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
+ if (len < 0 )
+ goto error_path;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+ return;
+
+error_path:
+ kfree(ctx);
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
+ return;
+}
+
+static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
+ struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
- get_task_comm(name, current);
+ /* tsk == current */
+
+ get_task_comm(name, tsk);
audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
- if (!mm)
- return;
-
- down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- vma = mm->mmap;
- while (vma) {
- if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
- vma->vm_file) {
- audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
- vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
- vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
- break;
+ if (mm) {
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ vma = mm->mmap;
+ while (vma) {
+ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
+ vma->vm_file) {
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
+ vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
+ vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
+ break;
+ }
+ vma = vma->vm_next;
}
- vma = vma->vm_next;
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ audit_log_task_context(ab);
}
-static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- int i;
+ int i, call_panic = 0;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+ const char *tty;
+
+ /* tsk == current */
- ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
if (!ab)
return; /* audit_panic has been called */
audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
(context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
context->return_code);
+ if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
+ tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
+ else
+ tty = "(none)";
audit_log_format(ab,
" a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
- " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
+ " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
" euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
- " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
+ " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
context->argv[0],
context->argv[1],
context->argv[2],
context->argv[3],
context->name_count,
+ context->ppid,
context->pid,
context->loginuid,
context->uid,
context->gid,
context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
- context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
- audit_log_task_info(ab);
+ context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
+ audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
+ if (context->filterkey) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
audit_log_end(ab);
for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
- ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, aux->type);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
if (!ab)
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
switch (aux->type) {
+ case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
+ struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *axi = (void *)aux;
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
+ "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
+ axi->oflag, axi->mode, axi->attr.mq_flags,
+ axi->attr.mq_maxmsg, axi->attr.mq_msgsize,
+ axi->attr.mq_curmsgs);
+ break; }
+
+ case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
+ struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *axi = (void *)aux;
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
+ "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
+ axi->mqdes, axi->msg_len, axi->msg_prio,
+ axi->abs_timeout.tv_sec, axi->abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
+ break; }
+
+ case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
+ struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *axi = (void *)aux;
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
+ axi->mqdes,
+ axi->notification.sigev_signo);
+ break; }
+
+ case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
+ struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *axi = (void *)aux;
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
+ "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
+ axi->mqdes,
+ axi->mqstat.mq_flags, axi->mqstat.mq_maxmsg,
+ axi->mqstat.mq_msgsize, axi->mqstat.mq_curmsgs);
+ break; }
+
case AUDIT_IPC: {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
audit_log_format(ab,
- " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
- axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+ "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
+ axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+ if (axi->osid != 0) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+ axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
+ axi->osid);
+ call_panic = 1;
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ }
+ break; }
+
+ case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
+ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
+ axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+ break; }
+
+ case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
+ struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
+ int i;
+ const char *p;
+ for (i = 0, p = axi->mem; i < axi->argc; i++) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
+ p = audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
+ }
break; }
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
}
if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
- ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_CWD);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
if (ab) {
audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
- unsigned long ino = context->names[i].ino;
- unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
+ struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
- ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
if (!ab)
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
- if (context->names[i].name)
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
- else
- audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
-
- if (pino != (unsigned long)-1)
- audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu", pino);
- if (ino != (unsigned long)-1)
- audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu", ino);
- if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1))
- audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
- " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
- MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
- MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
- context->names[i].mode,
- context->names[i].uid,
- context->names[i].gid,
- MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
- MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
+ if (n->name) {
+ switch(n->name_len) {
+ case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
+ /* log the full path */
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ /* name was specified as a relative path and the
+ * directory component is the cwd */
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", context->pwd,
+ context->pwdmnt);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* log the name's directory component */
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name_len,
+ n->name);
+ }
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
+
+ if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
+ " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
+ " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
+ n->ino,
+ MAJOR(n->dev),
+ MINOR(n->dev),
+ n->mode,
+ n->uid,
+ n->gid,
+ MAJOR(n->rdev),
+ MINOR(n->rdev));
+ }
+ if (n->osid != 0) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+ n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+ call_panic = 2;
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ }
+
audit_log_end(ab);
}
+ if (call_panic)
+ audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
}
/**
* audit_free - free a per-task audit context
* @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
*
- * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct.
+ * Called from copy_process and do_exit
*/
void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct audit_context *context;
- task_lock(tsk);
context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
- task_unlock(tsk);
-
if (likely(!context))
return;
* function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
* We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
* in the context of the idle thread */
+ /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
- audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
audit_free_context(context);
}
* will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
* be written).
*/
-void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
+void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
{
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
enum audit_state state;
*
* i386 no
* x86_64 no
- * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
+ * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
*
* This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
* (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
* message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
* free the names stored from getname().
*/
-void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
+void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
{
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct audit_context *context;
- get_task_struct(tsk);
- task_lock(tsk);
context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
- task_unlock(tsk);
- /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
- * called __put_task_struct. */
if (likely(!context))
- goto out;
+ return;
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
- audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL);
+ audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
context->in_syscall = 0;
context->auditable = 0;
} else {
audit_free_names(context);
audit_free_aux(context);
+ kfree(context->filterkey);
+ context->filterkey = NULL;
tsk->audit_context = context;
}
- out:
- put_task_struct(tsk);
}
/**
* Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
* Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
*/
-void audit_getname(const char *name)
+void __audit_getname(const char *name)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
+ if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
return;
if (!context->in_syscall) {
}
BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
+ context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
+ context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
++context->name_count;
if (!context->pwd) {
#endif
}
+/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
+static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ name->ino = inode->i_ino;
+ name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+ name->mode = inode->i_mode;
+ name->uid = inode->i_uid;
+ name->gid = inode->i_gid;
+ name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
+ selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &name->osid);
+}
+
/**
* audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
* @name: name being audited
* @inode: inode being audited
- * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup())
*
* Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
*/
-void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
+void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
{
int idx;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
++context->ino_count;
#endif
}
- context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
- context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
- context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
- context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
- context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) &&
- (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) {
- context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
- context->names[idx].pino = inode->i_ino;
- } else {
- context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
- context->names[idx].pino = (unsigned long)-1;
- }
+ audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
}
/**
* audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
* @dname: inode's dentry name
* @inode: inode being audited
- * @pino: inode number of dentry parent
+ * @parent: inode of dentry parent
*
* For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
* can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
* unsuccessful attempts.
*/
void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
- unsigned long pino)
+ const struct inode *parent)
{
int idx;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+ const char *found_name = NULL;
+ int dirlen = 0;
if (!context->in_syscall)
return;
/* determine matching parent */
- if (dname)
- for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
- if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) {
- const char *n;
- const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
- int dlen = strlen(dname);
- int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
-
- if (nlen < dlen)
- continue;
-
- /* disregard trailing slashes */
- n = name + nlen - 1;
- while ((*n == '/') && (n > name))
- n--;
-
- /* find last path component */
- n = n - dlen + 1;
- if (n < name)
- continue;
- else if (n > name) {
- if (*--n != '/')
- continue;
- else
- n++;
- }
-
- if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0)
- goto update_context;
+ if (!dname)
+ goto update_context;
+ for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
+ if (context->names[idx].ino == parent->i_ino) {
+ const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
+
+ if (!name)
+ continue;
+
+ if (audit_compare_dname_path(dname, name, &dirlen) == 0) {
+ context->names[idx].name_len = dirlen;
+ found_name = name;
+ break;
}
+ }
- /* catch-all in case match not found */
+update_context:
idx = context->name_count++;
- context->names[idx].name = NULL;
- context->names[idx].pino = pino;
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
context->ino_count++;
#endif
+ /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent directory.
+ * All names for this context are relinquished in audit_free_names() */
+ context->names[idx].name = found_name;
+ context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
+ context->names[idx].name_put = 0; /* don't call __putname() */
+
+ if (!inode)
+ context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
+ else
+ audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
+
+ /* A parent was not found in audit_names, so copy the inode data for the
+ * provided parent. */
+ if (!found_name) {
+ idx = context->name_count++;
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
+ context->ino_count++;
+#endif
+ audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], parent);
+ }
+}
-update_context:
- if (inode) {
- context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
- context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
- context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
- context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
- context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
- context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
+/**
+ * audit_inode_update - update inode info for last collected name
+ * @inode: inode being audited
+ *
+ * When open() is called on an existing object with the O_CREAT flag, the inode
+ * data audit initially collects is incorrect. This additional hook ensures
+ * audit has the inode data for the actual object to be opened.
+ */
+void __audit_inode_update(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+ int idx;
+
+ if (!context->in_syscall || !inode)
+ return;
+
+ if (context->name_count == 0) {
+ context->name_count++;
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
+ context->ino_count++;
+#endif
}
+ idx = context->name_count - 1;
+
+ audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
}
/**
*/
int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
{
- if (task->audit_context) {
- struct audit_buffer *ab;
-
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
- if (ab) {
- audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
- "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
- task->pid, task->uid,
- task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid);
- audit_log_end(ab);
+ struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
+
+ if (context) {
+ /* Only log if audit is enabled */
+ if (context->in_syscall) {
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
+ if (ab) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
+ "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
+ task->pid, task->uid,
+ context->loginuid, loginuid);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ }
}
- task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid;
+ context->loginuid = loginuid;
}
return 0;
}
}
/**
- * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc
+ * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
+ * @oflag: open flag
+ * @mode: mode bits
+ * @u_attr: queue attributes
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
+int __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr __user *u_attr)
+{
+ struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *ax;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ if (!audit_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (likely(!context))
+ return 0;
+
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!ax)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (u_attr != NULL) {
+ if (copy_from_user(&ax->attr, u_attr, sizeof(ax->attr))) {
+ kfree(ax);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ } else
+ memset(&ax->attr, 0, sizeof(ax->attr));
+
+ ax->oflag = oflag;
+ ax->mode = mode;
+
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
+ ax->d.next = context->aux;
+ context->aux = (void *)ax;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __audit_mq_timedsend - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send
+ * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
+ * @msg_len: Message length
+ * @msg_prio: Message priority
+ * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
+int __audit_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
+ const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
+{
+ struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ if (!audit_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (likely(!context))
+ return 0;
+
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!ax)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
+ if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
+ kfree(ax);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ } else
+ memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
+
+ ax->mqdes = mqdes;
+ ax->msg_len = msg_len;
+ ax->msg_prio = msg_prio;
+
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
+ ax->d.next = context->aux;
+ context->aux = (void *)ax;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __audit_mq_timedreceive - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed receive
+ * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
+ * @msg_len: Message length
+ * @u_msg_prio: Message priority
+ * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
+int __audit_mq_timedreceive(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len,
+ unsigned int __user *u_msg_prio,
+ const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
+{
+ struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ if (!audit_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (likely(!context))
+ return 0;
+
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!ax)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (u_msg_prio != NULL) {
+ if (get_user(ax->msg_prio, u_msg_prio)) {
+ kfree(ax);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ } else
+ ax->msg_prio = 0;
+
+ if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
+ if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
+ kfree(ax);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ } else
+ memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
+
+ ax->mqdes = mqdes;
+ ax->msg_len = msg_len;
+
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
+ ax->d.next = context->aux;
+ context->aux = (void *)ax;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
+ * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
+ * @u_notification: Notification event
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
+
+int __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent __user *u_notification)
+{
+ struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *ax;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ if (!audit_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (likely(!context))
+ return 0;
+
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!ax)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (u_notification != NULL) {
+ if (copy_from_user(&ax->notification, u_notification, sizeof(ax->notification))) {
+ kfree(ax);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ } else
+ memset(&ax->notification, 0, sizeof(ax->notification));
+
+ ax->mqdes = mqdes;
+
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
+ ax->d.next = context->aux;
+ context->aux = (void *)ax;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
+ * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
+ * @mqstat: MQ flags
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
+int __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
+{
+ struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *ax;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ if (!audit_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (likely(!context))
+ return 0;
+
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!ax)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ax->mqdes = mqdes;
+ ax->mqstat = *mqstat;
+
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
+ ax->d.next = context->aux;
+ context->aux = (void *)ax;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
+ * @ipcp: ipc permissions
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
+int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+{
+ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!ax)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
+ ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
+ ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
+ selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
+
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
+ ax->d.next = context->aux;
+ context->aux = (void *)ax;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
* @qbytes: msgq bytes
* @uid: msgq user id
* @gid: msgq group id
*
* Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
*/
-int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
+int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
{
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- if (likely(!context))
- return 0;
-
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!ax)
return -ENOMEM;
ax->gid = gid;
ax->mode = mode;
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
context->aux = (void *)ax;
return 0;
}
+int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+ unsigned long p, next;
+ void *to;
+
+ if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context))
+ return 0;
+
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - bprm->p,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ax)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ax->argc = bprm->argc;
+ ax->envc = bprm->envc;
+ for (p = bprm->p, to = ax->mem; p < MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE; p = next) {
+ struct page *page = bprm->page[p / PAGE_SIZE];
+ void *kaddr = kmap(page);
+ next = (p + PAGE_SIZE) & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+ memcpy(to, kaddr + (p & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)), next - p);
+ to += next - p;
+ kunmap(page);
+ }
+
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
+ ax->d.next = context->aux;
+ context->aux = (void *)ax;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
/**
* audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
* @nargs: number of args
* If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
* and uid that is doing that.
*/
-void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+void __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
-
- if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid)) {
- if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
- struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
- audit_sig_pid = current->pid;
- if (ctx)
- audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
- else
- audit_sig_uid = current->uid;
- }
+ extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
+
+ if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1) {
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+ struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
+ audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
+ if (ctx)
+ audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
+ else
+ audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
+ selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
}
}
git://ftp.safe.ca / safe / jmp / linux-2.6 / blobdiff