#include <linux/init.h>
#include <asm/types.h>
#include <asm/atomic.h>
-#include <asm/types.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/inotify.h>
#include "audit.h"
struct audit_aux_data d;
int argc;
int envc;
- char mem[0];
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
};
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
int fd[2];
};
-struct audit_aux_data_path {
- struct audit_aux_data d;
- struct dentry *dentry;
- struct vfsmount *mnt;
-};
-
struct audit_aux_data_pids {
struct audit_aux_data d;
pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
int pid_count;
};
+struct audit_tree_refs {
+ struct audit_tree_refs *next;
+ struct audit_chunk *c[31];
+};
+
/* The per-task audit context. */
struct audit_context {
int dummy; /* must be the first element */
enum audit_state state;
unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
- uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
int major; /* syscall number */
unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
int arch;
pid_t target_pid;
+ uid_t target_auid;
+ uid_t target_uid;
+ unsigned int target_sessionid;
u32 target_sid;
+ char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
+
+ struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
+ int tree_count;
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
int put_count;
}
}
+/*
+ * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
+ * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
+ * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
+ * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
+ * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
+ * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
+ * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
+ */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
+{
+ struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
+ int left = ctx->tree_count;
+ if (likely(left)) {
+ p->c[--left] = chunk;
+ ctx->tree_count = left;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (!p)
+ return 0;
+ p = p->next;
+ if (p) {
+ p->c[30] = chunk;
+ ctx->trees = p;
+ ctx->tree_count = 30;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+ struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
+ ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->trees) {
+ ctx->trees = p;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (p)
+ p->next = ctx->trees;
+ else
+ ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
+ ctx->tree_count = 31;
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
+ struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+ struct audit_tree_refs *q;
+ int n;
+ if (!p) {
+ /* we started with empty chain */
+ p = ctx->first_trees;
+ count = 31;
+ /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
+ if (!p)
+ return;
+ }
+ n = count;
+ for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
+ while (n--) {
+ audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
+ q->c[n] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
+ audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
+ q->c[n] = NULL;
+ }
+ ctx->trees = p;
+ ctx->tree_count = count;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+ struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
+ for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
+ q = p->next;
+ kfree(p);
+ }
+}
+
+static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+ struct audit_tree_refs *p;
+ int n;
+ if (!tree)
+ return 0;
+ /* full ones */
+ for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
+ for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
+ if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* partial */
+ if (p) {
+ for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
+ if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
* otherwise. */
result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_ARCH:
- if (ctx)
+ if (ctx)
result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
break;
result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
break;
+ case AUDIT_DIR:
+ if (ctx)
+ result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
+ break;
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
result = 0;
if (ctx)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
if (likely(!context))
return NULL;
context->return_valid = return_valid;
- context->return_code = return_code;
+
+ /*
+ * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
+ * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
+ * signal handlers
+ *
+ * This is actually a test for:
+ * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
+ * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
+ *
+ * but is faster than a bunch of ||
+ */
+ if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
+ (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
+ (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
+ context->return_code = -EINTR;
+ else
+ context->return_code = return_code;
if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
enum audit_state state;
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
while ((aux = context->aux)) {
- if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
- struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
- dput(axi->dentry);
- mntput(axi->mnt);
- }
-
context->aux = aux->next;
kfree(aux);
}
static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
enum audit_state state)
{
- uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
-
memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
context->state = state;
- context->loginuid = loginuid;
}
static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
return -ENOMEM;
}
- /* Preserve login uid */
- context->loginuid = -1;
- if (current->audit_context)
- context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
-
tsk->audit_context = context;
set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
return 0;
context->name_count, count);
}
audit_free_names(context);
+ unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
+ free_tree_refs(context);
audit_free_aux(context);
kfree(context->filterkey);
kfree(context);
}
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
- u32 sid)
+ uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
+ u32 sid, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *s = NULL;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
- return 1;
+ return rc;
+ audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
+ uid, sessionid);
if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &s, &len)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d obj=(none)", pid);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else
- audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d obj=%s", pid, s);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", s);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
audit_log_end(ab);
kfree(s);
return rc;
}
+static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
+{
+ int i;
+ long len, ret;
+ const char __user *p;
+ char *buf;
+
+ if (axi->mm != current->mm)
+ return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
+
+ p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++, p += len) {
+ len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN);
+ /*
+ * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
+ * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
+ * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
+ * any.
+ */
+ if (!len || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN) {
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+ }
+
+ buf = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf) {
+ audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, len);
+ /*
+ * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
+ * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
+ * space yet.
+ */
+ if (ret) {
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+ }
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, buf);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
+
+ kfree(buf);
+ }
+}
+
static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
int i, call_panic = 0;
if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
if (context->return_valid)
- audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
+ audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
(context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
context->return_code);
" a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
" ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
" euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
- " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
+ " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
context->argv[0],
context->argv[1],
context->argv[2],
context->name_count,
context->ppid,
context->pid,
- context->loginuid,
+ tsk->loginuid,
context->uid,
context->gid,
context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
- context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
+ context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
+ tsk->sessionid);
mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
case AUDIT_IPC: {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
audit_log_format(ab,
- "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
+ "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
if (axi->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
audit_log_format(ab,
- "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
+ "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
break; }
case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
- int i;
- const char *p;
- for (i = 0, p = axi->mem; i < axi->argc; i++) {
- audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
- p = audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
- audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
- }
+ audit_log_execve_info(ab, axi);
break; }
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
break; }
- case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
- struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
- audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
- break; }
-
case AUDIT_FD_PAIR: {
struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *axs = (void *)aux;
audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs->fd[0], axs->fd[1]);
for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
- axs->target_sid[i]))
+ axs->target_auid[i],
+ axs->target_uid[i],
+ axs->target_sessionid[i],
+ axs->target_sid[i],
+ axs->target_comm[i]))
call_panic = 1;
}
if (context->target_pid &&
audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
- context->target_sid))
+ context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
+ context->target_sessionid,
+ context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
call_panic = 1;
if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
audit_log_end(ab);
}
+
+ /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
+ if (ab)
+ audit_log_end(ab);
if (call_panic)
audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
}
return;
/* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
- * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
- * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
+ * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
+ * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
* in the context of the idle thread */
/* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
tsk->audit_context = new_context;
} else {
audit_free_names(context);
+ unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
audit_free_aux(context);
context->aux = NULL;
context->aux_pids = NULL;
}
}
+static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+ struct audit_context *context;
+ struct audit_tree_refs *p;
+ struct audit_chunk *chunk;
+ int count;
+ if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
+ return;
+ context = current->audit_context;
+ p = context->trees;
+ count = context->tree_count;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (!chunk)
+ return;
+ if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
+ return;
+ if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference");
+ audit_set_auditable(context);
+ audit_put_chunk(chunk);
+ unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+ return;
+ }
+ put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
+ struct audit_context *context;
+ struct audit_tree_refs *p;
+ const struct dentry *d, *parent;
+ struct audit_chunk *drop;
+ unsigned long seq;
+ int count;
+
+ context = current->audit_context;
+ p = context->trees;
+ count = context->tree_count;
+retry:
+ drop = NULL;
+ d = dentry;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
+ for(;;) {
+ struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
+ if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
+ struct audit_chunk *chunk;
+ chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
+ if (chunk) {
+ if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
+ drop = chunk;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ parent = d->d_parent;
+ if (parent == d)
+ break;
+ d = parent;
+ }
+ if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (!drop) {
+ /* just a race with rename */
+ unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ audit_put_chunk(drop);
+ if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
+ /* OK, got more space */
+ unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ /* too bad */
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference");
+ unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
+ audit_set_auditable(context);
+ return;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+#endif
+}
+
/**
* audit_getname - add a name to the list
* @name: name to add
context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
}
-
+
}
/* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
/**
* audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
* @name: name being audited
- * @inode: inode being audited
+ * @dentry: dentry being audited
*
* Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
*/
-void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
+void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
{
int idx;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+ const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
if (!context->in_syscall)
return;
idx = context->name_count - 1;
context->names[idx].name = NULL;
}
+ handle_path(dentry);
audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
}
/**
* audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
* @dname: inode's dentry name
- * @inode: inode being audited
+ * @dentry: dentry being audited
* @parent: inode of dentry parent
*
* For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
* must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
* unsuccessful attempts.
*/
-void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
+void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
const struct inode *parent)
{
int idx;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
+ const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
int dirlen = 0;
if (!context->in_syscall)
return;
+ if (inode)
+ handle_one(inode);
/* determine matching parent */
if (!dname)
goto add_names;
context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
}
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
/**
* auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
ctx->auditable = 1;
}
+/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
+static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
/**
* audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
* @task: task whose audit context is being modified
*/
int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
{
+ unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
- if (context) {
- /* Only log if audit is enabled */
- if (context->in_syscall) {
- struct audit_buffer *ab;
-
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
- if (ab) {
- audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
- "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
- task->pid, task->uid,
- context->loginuid, loginuid);
- audit_log_end(ab);
- }
+ if (context && context->in_syscall) {
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
+ if (ab) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
+ "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
+ " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
+ task->pid, task->uid,
+ task->loginuid, loginuid,
+ task->sessionid, sessionid);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
}
- context->loginuid = loginuid;
}
+ task->sessionid = sessionid;
+ task->loginuid = loginuid;
return 0;
}
/**
- * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
- * @ctx: the audit_context
- *
- * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
- */
-uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
-{
- return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
-}
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_get_loginuid);
-
-/**
* __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
* @oflag: open flag
* @mode: mode bits
return 0;
}
+int audit_argv_kb = 32;
+
int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- unsigned long p, next;
- void *to;
if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
return 0;
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - bprm->p,
- GFP_KERNEL);
+ /*
+ * Even though the stack code doesn't limit the arg+env size any more,
+ * the audit code requires that _all_ arguments be logged in a single
+ * netlink skb. Hence cap it :-(
+ */
+ if (bprm->argv_len > (audit_argv_kb << 10))
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ax)
return -ENOMEM;
ax->argc = bprm->argc;
ax->envc = bprm->envc;
- for (p = bprm->p, to = ax->mem; p < MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE; p = next) {
- struct page *page = bprm->page[p / PAGE_SIZE];
- void *kaddr = kmap(page);
- next = (p + PAGE_SIZE) & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
- memcpy(to, kaddr + (p & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)), next - p);
- to += next - p;
- kunmap(page);
- }
-
+ ax->mm = bprm->mm;
ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
context->aux = (void *)ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
context->target_pid = t->pid;
+ context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+ context->target_uid = t->uid;
+ context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
selinux_get_task_sid(t, &context->target_sid);
-}
-
-/**
- * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
- * @dentry: dentry to record
- * @mnt: mnt to record
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- *
- * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
- */
-int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{
- struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
- struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-
- if (likely(!context))
- return 0;
-
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!ax)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
- ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
-
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
- ax->d.next = context->aux;
- context->aux = (void *)ax;
- return 0;
+ memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
/**
extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
- if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid &&
- (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1)) {
- audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
- if (ctx)
- audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
- else
- audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
+ if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
+ if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1) {
+ audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
+ if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
+ audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
+ else
+ audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
+ selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
+ }
+ if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
+ return 0;
}
- if (!audit_signals) /* audit_context checked in wrapper */
- return 0;
-
/* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
* in audit_context */
if (!ctx->target_pid) {
ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
+ ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+ ctx->target_uid = t->uid;
+ ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
selinux_get_task_sid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
}
- BUG_ON(axp->pid_count > AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
+ BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
+ axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+ axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t->uid;
+ axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
selinux_get_task_sid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
return 0;
/**
* audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
- * @sig: signal value
+ * @signr: signal value
*
* If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
* should record the event for investigation.
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
u32 sid;
+ uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
+ unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
return;
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
- audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u",
- audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context),
- current->uid, current->gid);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
+ auid, current->uid, current->gid, sessionid);
selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
git://ftp.safe.ca / safe / jmp / linux-2.6 / blobdiff