2 * Implementation of the security services.
4 * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
5 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
7 * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
9 * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
10 * Support for context based audit filters.
12 * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
14 * Added conditional policy language extensions
16 * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Added support for NetLabel
19 * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
21 * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
23 * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
25 * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
27 * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
29 * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
31 * Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
33 * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
34 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
35 * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
36 * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
37 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
38 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
39 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
40 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
42 #include <linux/kernel.h>
43 #include <linux/slab.h>
44 #include <linux/string.h>
45 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
46 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
47 #include <linux/errno.h>
49 #include <linux/sched.h>
50 #include <linux/audit.h>
51 #include <linux/mutex.h>
52 #include <linux/selinux.h>
53 #include <net/netlabel.h>
63 #include "conditional.h"
71 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
73 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
74 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
76 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
78 static struct sidtab sidtab;
79 struct policydb policydb;
83 * The largest sequence number that has been used when
84 * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
85 * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
88 static u32 latest_granting;
90 /* Forward declaration. */
91 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
94 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
95 struct context *tcontext,
97 struct av_decision *avd);
99 struct selinux_mapping {
100 u16 value; /* policy value */
102 u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8];
105 static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
106 static u16 current_mapping_size;
108 static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
109 struct security_class_mapping *map,
110 struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p,
113 struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL;
114 size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
117 bool print_unknown_handle = false;
119 /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
126 /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
127 out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
131 /* Store the raw class and permission values */
133 while (map[j].name) {
134 struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
135 struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j;
137 /* An empty class string skips ahead */
138 if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
139 p_out->num_perms = 0;
143 p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
146 "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
148 if (pol->reject_unknown)
150 p_out->num_perms = 0;
151 print_unknown_handle = true;
156 while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) {
157 /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
158 if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
162 p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
164 if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
166 "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
167 p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
168 if (pol->reject_unknown)
170 print_unknown_handle = true;
175 p_out->num_perms = k;
178 if (print_unknown_handle)
179 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
180 pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
182 *out_map_p = out_map;
191 * Get real, policy values from mapped values
194 static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
196 if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
197 return current_mapping[tclass].value;
202 static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
205 if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
206 unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms;
209 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
210 if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
212 if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
215 avd->allowed = result;
217 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
218 if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
220 avd->auditallow = result;
222 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
223 if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
225 if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
229 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
230 * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
231 * should audit that denial
233 for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
235 avd->auditdeny = result;
239 int security_mls_enabled(void)
241 return policydb.mls_enabled;
245 * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
246 * when it is applied to the specified source and target
249 * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
250 * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
251 * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
252 * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
253 * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
255 static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
256 struct context *tcontext,
257 struct context *xcontext,
258 struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
262 struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
263 struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
264 struct constraint_expr *e;
265 int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
268 for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
269 switch (e->expr_type) {
285 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
289 val1 = scontext->user;
290 val2 = tcontext->user;
293 val1 = scontext->type;
294 val2 = tcontext->type;
297 val1 = scontext->role;
298 val2 = tcontext->role;
299 r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
300 r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
303 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
307 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
311 s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
313 !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
321 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
322 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
325 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
326 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
329 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
330 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
333 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
334 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
337 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
338 l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
341 l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
342 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
347 s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
350 s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
353 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
356 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
359 s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
373 s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
376 s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
384 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
387 if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
389 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
396 if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
398 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
400 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
409 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
412 s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
430 * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
431 * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
433 static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
435 struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
436 char **permission_names = args;
438 BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
440 permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
445 static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
446 struct context *tcontext,
451 struct common_datum *common_dat;
452 struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
453 struct audit_buffer *ab;
455 char *scontext_name = NULL;
456 char *tcontext_name = NULL;
457 char *permission_names[32];
460 bool need_comma = false;
465 tclass_name = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
466 tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
467 common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
469 /* init permission_names */
471 hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
472 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
475 if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
476 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
479 /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
480 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
481 &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
484 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
485 &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
488 /* audit a message */
489 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
490 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
494 audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
495 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
496 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
498 for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
499 u32 mask = (1 << index);
501 if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
504 audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
505 need_comma ? "," : "",
506 permission_names[index]
507 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
512 /* release scontext/tcontext */
513 kfree(tcontext_name);
514 kfree(scontext_name);
520 * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
521 * on boundary constraint.
523 static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
524 struct context *tcontext,
526 struct av_decision *avd)
528 struct context lo_scontext;
529 struct context lo_tcontext;
530 struct av_decision lo_avd;
531 struct type_datum *source
532 = policydb.type_val_to_struct[scontext->type - 1];
533 struct type_datum *target
534 = policydb.type_val_to_struct[tcontext->type - 1];
537 if (source->bounds) {
538 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
540 memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
541 lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
543 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
547 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
548 return; /* no masked permission */
549 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
552 if (target->bounds) {
553 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
555 memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
556 lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
558 context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
562 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
563 return; /* no masked permission */
564 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
567 if (source->bounds && target->bounds) {
568 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
570 * lo_scontext and lo_tcontext are already
574 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
578 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
579 return; /* no masked permission */
580 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
584 /* mask violated permissions */
585 avd->allowed &= ~masked;
587 /* audit masked permissions */
588 security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
589 tclass, masked, "bounds");
594 * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
595 * the permissions in a particular class.
597 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
598 struct context *tcontext,
600 struct av_decision *avd)
602 struct constraint_node *constraint;
603 struct role_allow *ra;
604 struct avtab_key avkey;
605 struct avtab_node *node;
606 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
607 struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
608 struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
613 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
615 if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
616 if (printk_ratelimit())
617 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
621 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
624 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
625 * this permission check, then use it.
627 avkey.target_class = tclass;
628 avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
629 sattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[scontext->type - 1];
630 tattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[tcontext->type - 1];
631 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
632 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
633 avkey.source_type = i + 1;
634 avkey.target_type = j + 1;
635 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
637 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
638 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
639 avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
640 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
641 avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
642 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
643 avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
646 /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
647 cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
653 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
656 constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
658 if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
659 !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
661 avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
663 constraint = constraint->next;
667 * If checking process transition permission and the
668 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
671 if (tclass == policydb.process_class &&
672 (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) &&
673 scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
674 for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
675 if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
676 tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
680 avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms;
684 * If the given source and target types have boundary
685 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
686 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
688 type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
692 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
693 struct context *ncontext,
694 struct context *tcontext,
697 char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
698 u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
700 if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen) < 0)
702 if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
704 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
706 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
707 "security_validate_transition: denied for"
708 " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
709 o, n, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
715 if (!selinux_enforcing)
720 int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
723 struct context *ocontext;
724 struct context *ncontext;
725 struct context *tcontext;
726 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
727 struct constraint_node *constraint;
734 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
736 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
738 if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
739 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n",
744 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
746 ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
748 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
754 ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
756 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
762 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
764 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
770 constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
772 if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
774 rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
778 constraint = constraint->next;
782 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
787 * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
788 * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
789 * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
790 * Otherwise, it returns error code.
792 * @oldsid : current security identifier
793 * @newsid : destinated security identifier
795 int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
797 struct context *old_context, *new_context;
798 struct type_datum *type;
802 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
804 old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
806 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
811 new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
813 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
818 /* type/domain unchanged */
819 if (old_context->type == new_context->type) {
824 index = new_context->type;
826 type = policydb.type_val_to_struct[index - 1];
829 /* not bounded anymore */
835 /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
836 if (type->bounds == old_context->type) {
840 index = type->bounds;
844 char *old_name = NULL;
845 char *new_name = NULL;
848 if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
849 &old_name, &length) &&
850 !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
851 &new_name, &length)) {
852 audit_log(current->audit_context,
853 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
854 "op=security_bounded_transition "
856 "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
863 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
868 static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
872 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
873 avd->seqno = latest_granting;
879 * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
880 * @ssid: source security identifier
881 * @tsid: target security identifier
882 * @tclass: target security class
883 * @avd: access vector decisions
885 * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
886 * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
888 void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
891 struct av_decision *avd)
894 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
896 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
901 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
903 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
908 /* permissive domain? */
909 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
910 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
912 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
914 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
919 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
920 if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
921 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
925 context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
926 map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
928 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
931 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
935 void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
938 struct av_decision *avd)
940 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
942 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
947 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
949 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
954 /* permissive domain? */
955 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
956 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
958 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
960 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
965 if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
966 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
971 context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
973 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
976 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
981 * Write the security context string representation of
982 * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
983 * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
984 * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
985 * the length of the string.
987 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
995 *scontext_len = context->len;
996 *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
1002 /* Compute the size of the context. */
1003 *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) + 1;
1004 *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) + 1;
1005 *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]) + 1;
1006 *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
1008 /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
1009 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1012 *scontext = scontextp;
1015 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
1017 sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
1018 policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1],
1019 policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1],
1020 policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
1021 scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) +
1022 1 + strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) +
1023 1 + strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
1025 mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
1032 #include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
1034 const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
1036 if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
1038 return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
1041 static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
1042 u32 *scontext_len, int force)
1044 struct context *context;
1050 if (!ss_initialized) {
1051 if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
1054 *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
1055 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1060 strcpy(scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]);
1061 *scontext = scontextp;
1064 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: called before initial "
1065 "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
1069 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1071 context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
1073 context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
1075 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1080 rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
1082 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1089 * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
1090 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1091 * @scontext: security context
1092 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1094 * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
1095 * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
1096 * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
1098 int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1100 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0);
1103 int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1105 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
1109 * Caveat: Mutates scontext.
1111 static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
1112 struct sidtab *sidtabp,
1115 struct context *ctx,
1118 struct role_datum *role;
1119 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1120 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1121 char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
1126 /* Parse the security context. */
1129 scontextp = (char *) scontext;
1131 /* Extract the user. */
1133 while (*p && *p != ':')
1141 usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
1145 ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
1149 while (*p && *p != ':')
1157 role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
1160 ctx->role = role->value;
1164 while (*p && *p != ':')
1169 typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
1170 if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
1173 ctx->type = typdatum->value;
1175 rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
1179 if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len) {
1184 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1185 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx)) {
1192 context_destroy(ctx);
1196 static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1197 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
1200 char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
1201 struct context context;
1204 if (!ss_initialized) {
1207 for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
1208 if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
1213 *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
1218 /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
1219 scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len + 1, gfp_flags);
1222 memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
1223 scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
1226 /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
1227 str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
1234 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1235 rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab,
1236 scontext2, scontext_len,
1238 if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
1240 context.len = scontext_len;
1244 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
1245 context_destroy(&context);
1247 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1254 * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
1255 * @scontext: security context
1256 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1257 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1259 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1260 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1261 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1262 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1264 int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
1266 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1267 sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
1271 * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
1272 * falling back to specified default if needed.
1274 * @scontext: security context
1275 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1276 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1277 * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
1279 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1280 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1281 * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
1282 * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
1283 * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
1284 * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
1285 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1286 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1288 int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1289 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
1291 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1292 sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
1295 int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1298 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1299 sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
1302 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
1303 struct context *scontext,
1304 struct context *tcontext,
1306 struct context *newcontext)
1308 char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
1309 u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
1311 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen) < 0)
1313 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
1315 if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
1317 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
1318 "security_compute_sid: invalid context %s"
1322 n, s, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
1327 if (!selinux_enforcing)
1332 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
1339 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
1340 struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
1341 struct avtab_key avkey;
1342 struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
1343 struct avtab_node *node;
1347 if (!ss_initialized) {
1348 switch (orig_tclass) {
1349 case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
1359 context_init(&newcontext);
1361 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1364 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1366 tclass = orig_tclass;
1368 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1370 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1375 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1377 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1383 /* Set the user identity. */
1384 switch (specified) {
1385 case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
1387 /* Use the process user identity. */
1388 newcontext.user = scontext->user;
1391 /* Use the related object owner. */
1392 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1396 /* Set the role and type to default values. */
1397 if (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
1398 /* Use the current role and type of process. */
1399 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1400 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1402 /* Use the well-defined object role. */
1403 newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
1404 /* Use the type of the related object. */
1405 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1408 /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
1409 avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
1410 avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
1411 avkey.target_class = tclass;
1412 avkey.specified = specified;
1413 avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
1415 /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
1417 node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
1418 for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
1419 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
1420 avdatum = &node->datum;
1427 /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
1428 newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
1431 /* Check for class-specific changes. */
1432 if (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
1433 if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
1434 /* Look for a role transition rule. */
1435 for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr;
1436 roletr = roletr->next) {
1437 if (roletr->role == scontext->role &&
1438 roletr->type == tcontext->type) {
1439 /* Use the role transition rule. */
1440 newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
1447 /* Set the MLS attributes.
1448 This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
1449 rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, &newcontext);
1453 /* Check the validity of the context. */
1454 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
1455 rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
1462 /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
1463 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
1465 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1466 context_destroy(&newcontext);
1472 * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
1473 * @ssid: source security identifier
1474 * @tsid: target security identifier
1475 * @tclass: target security class
1476 * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
1478 * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
1479 * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1480 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1481 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
1482 * computed successfully.
1484 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid,
1489 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1493 int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid,
1498 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1503 * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
1504 * @ssid: source security identifier
1505 * @tsid: target security identifier
1506 * @tclass: target security class
1507 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1509 * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
1510 * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1511 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1512 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1513 * computed successfully.
1515 int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
1520 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid,
1525 * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
1526 * @ssid: source security identifier
1527 * @tsid: target security identifier
1528 * @tclass: target security class
1529 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1531 * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
1532 * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1533 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1534 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1535 * computed successfully.
1537 int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
1542 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid,
1546 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
1547 static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
1548 struct context *context,
1551 struct sidtab *s = arg;
1553 if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
1554 return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
1559 static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
1563 if (selinux_enforcing) {
1569 if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
1571 "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n",
1579 struct convert_context_args {
1580 struct policydb *oldp;
1581 struct policydb *newp;
1585 * Convert the values in the security context
1586 * structure `c' from the values specified
1587 * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
1588 * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
1589 * context is valid under the new policy.
1591 static int convert_context(u32 key,
1595 struct convert_context_args *args;
1596 struct context oldc;
1597 struct ocontext *oc;
1598 struct mls_range *range;
1599 struct role_datum *role;
1600 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1601 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1606 if (key <= SECINITSID_NUM)
1613 s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
1618 rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
1619 c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
1623 "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
1625 /* Replace string with mapped representation. */
1627 memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
1629 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1630 /* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
1634 /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
1636 "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
1642 rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
1648 /* Convert the user. */
1649 usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
1650 args->oldp->p_user_val_to_name[c->user - 1]);
1653 c->user = usrdatum->value;
1655 /* Convert the role. */
1656 role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
1657 args->oldp->p_role_val_to_name[c->role - 1]);
1660 c->role = role->value;
1662 /* Convert the type. */
1663 typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
1664 args->oldp->p_type_val_to_name[c->type - 1]);
1667 c->type = typdatum->value;
1669 /* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
1670 if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1671 rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
1674 } else if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && !args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1676 * Switching between MLS and non-MLS policy:
1677 * free any storage used by the MLS fields in the
1678 * context for all existing entries in the sidtab.
1680 mls_context_destroy(c);
1681 } else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1683 * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
1684 * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
1685 * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
1686 * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
1689 oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
1690 while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
1693 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to look up"
1694 " the initial SIDs list\n");
1697 range = &oc->context[0].range;
1698 rc = mls_range_set(c, range);
1703 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1704 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
1705 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
1710 context_destroy(&oldc);
1715 /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
1716 if (context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len))
1718 context_destroy(&oldc);
1723 "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
1729 static void security_load_policycaps(void)
1731 selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1732 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
1733 selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1734 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
1737 extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
1738 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
1741 * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
1742 * @data: binary policy data
1743 * @len: length of data in bytes
1745 * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
1746 * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
1747 * This function will flush the access vector cache after
1748 * loading the new policy.
1750 int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
1752 struct policydb oldpolicydb, newpolicydb;
1753 struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
1754 struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
1755 struct convert_context_args args;
1759 struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
1761 if (!ss_initialized) {
1763 rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
1765 avtab_cache_destroy();
1769 rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
1771 ¤t_mapping_size);
1773 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
1774 avtab_cache_destroy();
1778 rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab);
1780 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
1781 avtab_cache_destroy();
1785 security_load_policycaps();
1787 seqno = ++latest_granting;
1788 selinux_complete_init();
1789 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
1790 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
1791 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
1792 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
1797 sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
1800 rc = policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp);
1804 /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
1805 if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb.mls_enabled)
1806 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
1807 else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb.mls_enabled)
1808 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
1810 rc = policydb_load_isids(&newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
1812 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
1813 policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
1817 rc = selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
1821 rc = security_preserve_bools(&newpolicydb);
1823 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
1827 /* Clone the SID table. */
1828 sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
1830 rc = sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
1835 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
1836 * in the new SID table.
1838 args.oldp = &policydb;
1839 args.newp = &newpolicydb;
1840 rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
1842 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
1843 " representation of contexts in the new SID"
1848 /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
1849 memcpy(&oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb);
1850 sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
1852 /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
1853 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
1854 memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
1855 sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
1856 security_load_policycaps();
1857 oldmap = current_mapping;
1858 current_mapping = map;
1859 current_mapping_size = map_size;
1860 seqno = ++latest_granting;
1861 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
1863 /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
1864 policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb);
1865 sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
1868 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
1869 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
1870 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
1871 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
1877 sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
1878 policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
1884 * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
1885 * @protocol: protocol number
1886 * @port: port number
1887 * @out_sid: security identifier
1889 int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
1894 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1896 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
1898 if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
1899 c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
1900 c->u.port.high_port >= port)
1907 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1913 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
1915 *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
1919 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1924 * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
1925 * @name: interface name
1926 * @if_sid: interface SID
1928 int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
1933 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1935 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
1937 if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
1943 if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
1944 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1949 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1955 *if_sid = c->sid[0];
1957 *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
1960 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1964 static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
1968 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
1969 if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
1978 * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
1979 * @domain: communication domain aka address family
1981 * @addrlen: address length in bytes
1982 * @out_sid: security identifier
1984 int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
1992 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1998 if (addrlen != sizeof(u32)) {
2003 addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
2005 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
2007 if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
2015 if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2) {
2019 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
2021 if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
2029 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2035 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2041 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2043 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2047 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2054 * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
2055 * @fromsid: starting SID
2056 * @username: username
2057 * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
2058 * @nel: number of elements in @sids
2060 * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
2061 * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
2062 * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
2063 * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
2064 * number of elements in the array.
2067 int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
2072 struct context *fromcon, usercon;
2073 u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
2074 u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
2075 struct user_datum *user;
2076 struct role_datum *role;
2077 struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
2083 if (!ss_initialized)
2086 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2088 context_init(&usercon);
2090 fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
2096 user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
2101 usercon.user = user->value;
2103 mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
2109 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
2110 role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
2111 usercon.role = i + 1;
2112 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
2113 usercon.type = j + 1;
2115 if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
2118 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
2121 if (mynel < maxnel) {
2122 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2125 mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
2130 memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
2133 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2139 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2145 mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
2151 for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
2152 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
2153 SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
2154 PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
2157 mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
2169 * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2170 * @fstype: filesystem type
2171 * @path: path from root of mount
2172 * @sclass: file security class
2173 * @sid: SID for path
2175 * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
2176 * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
2177 * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
2179 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
2186 struct genfs *genfs;
2188 int rc = 0, cmp = 0;
2190 while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
2193 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2195 sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
2197 for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
2198 cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
2203 if (!genfs || cmp) {
2204 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2209 for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
2210 len = strlen(c->u.name);
2211 if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
2212 (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
2217 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2223 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2232 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2237 * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
2238 * @fstype: filesystem type
2239 * @behavior: labeling behavior
2240 * @sid: SID for filesystem (superblock)
2242 int security_fs_use(
2244 unsigned int *behavior,
2250 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2252 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
2254 if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
2260 *behavior = c->v.behavior;
2262 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2270 rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid);
2272 *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
2275 *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
2280 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2284 int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
2286 int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
2288 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2292 *len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2298 *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
2302 *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
2306 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
2308 (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
2309 name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
2310 (*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
2313 strncpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len);
2314 (*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
2318 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2322 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
2330 int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
2333 int lenp, seqno = 0;
2334 struct cond_node *cur;
2336 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2338 lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2344 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
2345 if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
2346 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
2347 AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
2348 "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
2349 policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
2351 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
2352 audit_get_loginuid(current),
2353 audit_get_sessionid(current));
2356 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
2358 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
2361 for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2362 rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
2367 seqno = ++latest_granting;
2370 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2372 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2373 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2374 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2379 int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
2384 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2386 len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2392 rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
2394 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2398 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p)
2400 int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
2401 char **bnames = NULL;
2402 struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
2403 struct cond_node *cur;
2405 rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
2408 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
2409 booldatum = hashtab_search(p->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
2411 booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
2413 for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2414 rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
2421 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
2430 * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
2431 * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
2433 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
2435 struct context *context1;
2436 struct context *context2;
2437 struct context newcon;
2442 if (!ss_initialized || !policydb.mls_enabled) {
2447 context_init(&newcon);
2449 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2450 context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2452 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2458 context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
2460 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2466 newcon.user = context1->user;
2467 newcon.role = context1->role;
2468 newcon.type = context1->type;
2469 rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
2473 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
2474 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
2475 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
2480 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
2484 if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
2485 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2486 "security_sid_mls_copy: invalid context %s", s);
2491 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2492 context_destroy(&newcon);
2498 * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
2499 * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
2500 * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
2501 * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
2504 * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
2505 * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
2506 * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
2507 * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
2509 * | function return | @sid
2510 * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
2511 * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
2512 * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
2513 * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
2514 * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
2517 int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
2522 struct context *nlbl_ctx;
2523 struct context *xfrm_ctx;
2525 /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
2526 * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
2527 * single or absent peer SID/label */
2528 if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
2529 *peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
2532 /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
2533 * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
2535 if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
2536 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2540 /* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
2541 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
2542 * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
2543 if (!policydb.mls_enabled) {
2544 *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
2548 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2550 nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
2552 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2553 __func__, nlbl_sid);
2557 xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
2559 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2560 __func__, xfrm_sid);
2564 rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
2567 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2569 /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
2570 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
2571 * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
2572 * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
2574 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2576 *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
2580 static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2582 struct class_datum *datum = d;
2583 char *name = k, **classes = args;
2584 int value = datum->value - 1;
2586 classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
2587 if (!classes[value])
2593 int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
2597 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2599 *nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
2600 *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
2604 rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
2608 for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
2609 kfree((*classes)[i]);
2614 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2618 static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2620 struct perm_datum *datum = d;
2621 char *name = k, **perms = args;
2622 int value = datum->value - 1;
2624 perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
2631 int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
2633 int rc = -ENOMEM, i;
2634 struct class_datum *match;
2636 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2638 match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
2640 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
2646 *nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
2647 *perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
2651 if (match->comdatum) {
2652 rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
2653 get_permissions_callback, *perms);
2658 rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
2664 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2668 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2669 for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
2675 int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
2677 return policydb.reject_unknown;
2680 int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
2682 return policydb.allow_unknown;
2686 * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
2687 * @req_cap: capability
2690 * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
2691 * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is
2692 * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
2695 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
2699 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2700 rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
2701 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2706 struct selinux_audit_rule {
2708 struct context au_ctxt;
2711 void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
2713 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
2716 context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
2721 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
2723 struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
2724 struct role_datum *roledatum;
2725 struct type_datum *typedatum;
2726 struct user_datum *userdatum;
2727 struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
2732 if (!ss_initialized)
2736 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2737 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2738 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2739 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2740 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2741 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2742 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
2743 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
2746 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2747 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2748 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2749 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2750 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
2751 if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
2755 /* only the above fields are valid */
2759 tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
2763 context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
2765 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2767 tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
2770 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2771 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2772 userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
2776 tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
2778 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2779 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2780 roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
2784 tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
2786 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2787 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2788 typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
2792 tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
2794 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2795 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2796 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2797 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2798 rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
2802 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2805 selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
2814 /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
2815 int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
2819 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
2820 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
2822 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2823 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2824 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2825 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2826 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2827 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2828 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2829 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2830 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2831 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2839 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
2840 struct audit_context *actx)
2842 struct context *ctxt;
2843 struct mls_level *level;
2844 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
2848 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2849 "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
2853 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2855 if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
2856 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2857 "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n");
2862 ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2864 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2865 "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2871 /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
2874 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2875 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2878 match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
2880 case Audit_not_equal:
2881 match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
2885 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2886 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2889 match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
2891 case Audit_not_equal:
2892 match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
2896 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2897 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2900 match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
2902 case Audit_not_equal:
2903 match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
2907 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2908 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2909 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2910 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2911 level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
2912 field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
2913 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
2916 match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2919 case Audit_not_equal:
2920 match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2924 match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2926 !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2930 match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2934 match = (mls_level_dom(level,
2935 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
2936 !mls_level_eq(level,
2937 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
2940 match = mls_level_dom(level,
2941 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
2947 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2951 static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
2953 static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
2954 u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
2958 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback)
2959 err = aurule_callback();
2963 static int __init aurule_init(void)
2967 err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
2968 SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
2970 panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
2974 __initcall(aurule_init);
2976 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
2978 * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
2979 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
2980 * @sid: the SELinux SID
2983 * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
2984 * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. This function assumes @secattr has
2985 * already been initialized.
2988 static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
2993 sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
2994 if (sid_cache == NULL)
2996 secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
2997 if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
3003 secattr->cache->free = kfree;
3004 secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
3005 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
3009 * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
3010 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3011 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3014 * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
3015 * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
3016 * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possibile the
3017 * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
3018 * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
3019 * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
3023 int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3027 struct context *ctx;
3028 struct context ctx_new;
3030 if (!ss_initialized) {
3035 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3037 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) {
3038 *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
3040 } else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) {
3041 *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
3043 } else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
3044 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
3046 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
3048 context_init(&ctx_new);
3049 ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
3050 ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
3051 ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
3052 mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
3053 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
3054 if (ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
3055 secattr->attr.mls.cat) != 0)
3056 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
3057 memcpy(&ctx_new.range.level[1].cat,
3058 &ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
3059 sizeof(ctx_new.range.level[0].cat));
3061 if (mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new) != 1)
3062 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
3064 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
3066 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
3068 security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
3070 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3076 netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return:
3077 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3079 netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup:
3080 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3081 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
3085 * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
3086 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3087 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3090 * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
3091 * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3094 int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
3097 struct context *ctx;
3099 if (!ss_initialized)
3102 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3103 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
3106 goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
3108 secattr->domain = kstrdup(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[ctx->type - 1],
3110 if (secattr->domain == NULL) {
3112 goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
3114 secattr->attr.secid = sid;
3115 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
3116 mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
3117 rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
3119 goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
3120 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3124 netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure:
3125 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3128 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */