2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
159 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
161 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
163 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
165 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
170 task->security = tsec;
175 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
177 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
178 task->security = NULL;
182 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
184 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
185 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
187 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
191 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
192 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
194 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
195 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
196 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
197 inode->i_security = isec;
202 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
204 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
205 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
207 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
208 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
209 list_del_init(&isec->list);
210 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
212 inode->i_security = NULL;
213 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
216 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
218 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
219 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
221 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
225 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
226 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
227 file->f_security = fsec;
232 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
234 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
235 file->f_security = NULL;
239 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
241 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
243 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
247 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
249 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
250 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
252 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
253 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
254 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
255 sb->s_security = sbsec;
260 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
262 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
264 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
265 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
266 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
267 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
269 sb->s_security = NULL;
273 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
275 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
277 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
281 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
283 sk->sk_security = ssec;
285 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
290 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
292 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
294 sk->sk_security = NULL;
298 /* The security server must be initialized before
299 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
300 extern int ss_initialized;
302 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
304 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
306 "uses transition SIDs",
308 "uses genfs_contexts",
309 "not configured for labeling",
310 "uses mountpoint labeling",
313 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
315 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
317 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
328 static match_table_t tokens = {
329 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
331 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
332 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
336 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
338 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
340 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
344 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
345 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
349 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
350 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
354 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
355 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
356 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
359 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
360 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
364 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
365 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
369 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
372 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
373 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
376 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
377 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
378 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
379 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
380 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
381 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
382 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
383 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
384 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
388 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
389 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
390 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
391 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
392 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
393 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
395 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
396 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
397 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
402 sbsec->initialized = 1;
404 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
405 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
406 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
408 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
409 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
410 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
412 /* Initialize the root inode. */
413 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
415 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
416 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
417 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
419 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
421 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
422 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
423 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
424 struct inode_security_struct, list);
425 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
426 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
427 inode = igrab(inode);
429 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
433 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
434 list_del_init(&isec->list);
437 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
443 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
444 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
445 * mount options, or whatever.
447 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
448 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
451 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
452 char *context = NULL;
456 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
458 if (!sbsec->initialized)
465 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
466 * settings this is going to need a mask
469 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
470 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
472 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
476 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
477 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
482 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
483 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
489 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
490 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
493 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
494 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
496 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
497 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
500 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
501 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
503 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
504 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
507 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
508 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
510 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
511 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
512 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
514 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
517 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
518 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
521 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
526 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
530 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
531 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
533 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
534 if (sbsec->initialized)
535 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
536 (old_sid != new_sid))
539 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
540 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
542 if (!sbsec->initialized)
543 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
549 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
550 * labeling information.
552 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
553 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
556 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
557 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
558 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
559 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
560 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
561 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
562 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
563 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
564 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
565 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
567 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
569 if (!ss_initialized) {
571 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
572 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
573 server is ready to handle calls. */
574 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
575 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
576 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
577 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
581 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
582 "before the security server is initialized\n");
587 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
588 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
589 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
590 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
592 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
593 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
594 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
595 * will be used for both mounts)
597 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
602 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
603 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
604 * than once with different security options.
606 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
608 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
609 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
611 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
620 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
622 goto out_double_mount;
624 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
629 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
631 goto out_double_mount;
633 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
636 rootcontext_sid = sid;
638 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
640 goto out_double_mount;
642 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
646 defcontext_sid = sid;
648 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
650 goto out_double_mount;
652 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (sbsec->initialized) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
664 goto out_double_mount;
669 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
675 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
683 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
687 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
691 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
692 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
693 * the superblock context if not already set.
696 if (!fscontext_sid) {
697 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
700 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
702 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
706 if (!rootcontext_sid)
707 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
709 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
713 if (rootcontext_sid) {
714 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
718 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
719 root_isec->initialized = 1;
722 if (defcontext_sid) {
723 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
725 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
726 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
730 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
731 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
737 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
740 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
742 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
746 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
747 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
751 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
752 struct super_block *newsb)
754 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
755 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
757 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
758 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
759 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
762 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
763 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
766 if (!ss_initialized) {
767 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
768 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
769 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
770 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
774 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
775 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
777 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
778 if (newsbsec->initialized)
781 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
783 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
785 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
786 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
787 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
790 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
794 if (!set_rootcontext) {
795 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
796 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
799 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
801 if (set_rootcontext) {
802 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
803 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
804 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
805 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
807 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
810 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
811 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
814 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
815 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
818 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
819 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
820 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
822 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
824 /* Standard string-based options. */
825 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
827 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
832 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
836 if (context || defcontext) {
838 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
841 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
851 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
854 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
861 case Opt_rootcontext:
864 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
867 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
875 if (context || defcontext) {
877 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
880 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
889 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
896 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
900 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
901 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
902 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
907 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
908 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
911 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
912 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
915 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
916 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
919 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
920 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
923 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
934 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
936 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
939 char *options = data;
940 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
942 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
947 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
949 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
954 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
957 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
961 void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
966 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
967 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
969 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
971 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
974 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
976 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
977 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
980 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
985 /* we need a comma before each option */
990 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
996 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
998 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1001 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1003 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1009 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1011 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1016 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1018 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1020 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1022 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1024 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1026 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1028 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1030 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1032 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1036 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1039 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1041 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1044 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1046 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1049 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1055 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1056 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1058 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1065 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1066 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1068 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1070 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1071 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1073 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1075 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1077 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1083 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1084 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1085 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1086 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1087 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1089 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1092 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1096 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1098 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1106 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1108 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1110 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1113 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1116 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1117 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1122 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1124 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1129 end = buffer+buflen;
1134 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1135 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1139 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1144 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1145 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1149 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1157 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1158 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1160 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1161 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1163 struct dentry *dentry;
1164 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1165 char *context = NULL;
1169 if (isec->initialized)
1172 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1173 if (isec->initialized)
1176 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1177 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1178 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1179 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1180 server is ready to handle calls. */
1181 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1182 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1183 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1184 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1188 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1189 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1190 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1191 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1195 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1196 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1198 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1199 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1201 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1202 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1205 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1206 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1211 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1212 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1218 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1220 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1221 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1222 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1230 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1236 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1242 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1243 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1244 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1245 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1249 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1250 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1253 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1257 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1258 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1259 __func__, context, -rc,
1260 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1262 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1270 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1271 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1273 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1274 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1275 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1277 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1278 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1279 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1287 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1288 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1291 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1292 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1295 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1297 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1298 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1309 isec->initialized = 1;
1312 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1314 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1315 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1319 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1320 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1326 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1327 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1330 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1331 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1334 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1335 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1338 /* All other signals. */
1339 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1346 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1347 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1348 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1349 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1352 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1354 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1355 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1356 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1357 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1360 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1361 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1364 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1365 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1368 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1369 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1371 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1373 tsec = tsk->security;
1375 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1379 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1381 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1384 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1388 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1391 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1394 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1395 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1398 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1400 tsec = tsk->security;
1402 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1403 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1406 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1407 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1408 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1409 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1410 struct inode *inode,
1412 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1414 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1415 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1416 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1418 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1421 tsec = tsk->security;
1422 isec = inode->i_security;
1426 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1427 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1430 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1433 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1434 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1435 pathname if needed. */
1436 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1437 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1438 struct dentry *dentry,
1441 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1442 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1443 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1444 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1445 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1446 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1449 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1450 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1451 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1452 check a particular permission to the file.
1453 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1454 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1455 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1456 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1457 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1461 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1462 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1463 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1464 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1467 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1468 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1470 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1471 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1479 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1481 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1486 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1487 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1488 struct dentry *dentry,
1491 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1492 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1493 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1495 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1498 tsec = current->security;
1499 dsec = dir->i_security;
1500 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1502 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1503 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1505 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1506 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1511 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1512 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1514 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1520 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1524 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1525 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1526 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1529 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1530 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1531 struct task_struct *ctx)
1533 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1535 tsec = ctx->security;
1537 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1541 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1544 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1545 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1546 struct dentry *dentry,
1550 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1551 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1552 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1556 tsec = current->security;
1557 dsec = dir->i_security;
1558 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1560 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1561 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1564 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1565 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1580 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1585 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1589 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1590 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1591 struct inode *new_dir,
1592 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1594 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1595 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1596 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1598 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1601 tsec = current->security;
1602 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1603 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1604 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1605 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1607 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1609 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1610 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1611 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1614 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1615 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1618 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1619 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1620 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1625 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1626 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1627 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1628 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1629 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1632 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1633 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1634 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1635 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1637 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1645 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1646 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1647 struct super_block *sb,
1649 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1651 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1652 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1654 tsec = tsk->security;
1655 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1656 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1660 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1661 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1665 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1666 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1667 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1668 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1671 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1673 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1677 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1679 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1681 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1689 * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1692 static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1694 u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
1696 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1698 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1702 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1703 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1704 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1705 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1706 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1707 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1708 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1711 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1712 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
1717 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1718 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1722 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1724 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1725 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1732 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1740 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1742 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1747 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1751 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1752 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1753 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1754 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
1755 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1758 return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1761 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1765 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1769 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1772 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1773 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1777 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1781 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1784 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1785 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1789 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1793 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1796 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1797 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1799 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1802 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1806 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1810 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1813 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1816 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1819 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1824 end = buffer+buflen;
1830 const char *name = table->procname;
1831 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1832 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1836 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1839 table = table->parent;
1845 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1847 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1849 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1854 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1858 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1862 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1866 tsec = current->security;
1868 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1869 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1871 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1872 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1875 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1876 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1878 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1879 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1887 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1888 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1894 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1907 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1913 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1917 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1923 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1925 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1928 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1932 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1937 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1938 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1939 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1941 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1942 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1943 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1944 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1946 case 0: /* Close log */
1947 case 1: /* Open log */
1948 case 2: /* Read from log */
1949 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1950 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1952 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1959 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1960 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1961 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1963 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1964 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1965 * the capability is granted.
1967 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1968 * processes that allocate mappings.
1970 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1972 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1973 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1975 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1977 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1978 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1979 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1986 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1989 /* binprm security operations */
1991 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1993 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1995 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1999 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2002 bprm->security = bsec;
2006 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2008 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2009 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2010 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2011 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2013 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2016 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
2020 bsec = bprm->security;
2025 tsec = current->security;
2026 isec = inode->i_security;
2028 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2029 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
2031 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2032 tsec->create_sid = 0;
2033 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2034 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2036 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
2037 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
2038 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2041 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2042 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2043 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
2048 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2049 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2051 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2054 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2055 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2056 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2060 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2061 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2062 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2066 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2067 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2071 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2072 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2074 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2082 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2084 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2088 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2090 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2093 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2094 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2095 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2096 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2097 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2099 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2102 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2105 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2107 kfree(bprm->security);
2108 bprm->security = NULL;
2111 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2112 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2114 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2115 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2117 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2118 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2119 struct tty_struct *tty;
2120 struct fdtable *fdt;
2124 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
2125 tty = get_current_tty();
2128 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
2130 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2131 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2132 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2133 file may belong to another process and we are only
2134 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2135 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2136 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2137 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2143 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
2144 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2148 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2150 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2152 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2154 unsigned long set, i;
2159 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2160 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2162 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2165 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2166 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2171 if (file_has_perm(current,
2173 file_to_av(file))) {
2175 fd = get_unused_fd();
2185 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2186 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2193 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2198 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2201 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2204 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2206 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2207 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2211 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2213 tsec = current->security;
2215 bsec = bprm->security;
2218 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2220 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2221 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2222 unchanged and kill. */
2223 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2224 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2225 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2232 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2233 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2234 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2235 struct task_struct *tracer;
2236 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2240 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2241 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2242 sec = tracer->security;
2248 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2249 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2261 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2263 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2265 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2266 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2267 struct itimerval itimer;
2268 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2271 tsec = current->security;
2272 bsec = bprm->security;
2275 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2278 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2281 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2282 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2284 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2285 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2286 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2287 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2288 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2289 will be checked against the new SID. */
2290 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2291 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2293 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2294 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2295 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2296 flush_signals(current);
2297 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2298 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2299 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2300 recalc_sigpending();
2301 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2304 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2305 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2307 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2308 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2309 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2310 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2311 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2312 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2313 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2314 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2315 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2317 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2318 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2320 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2321 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2322 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2323 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2325 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2328 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2329 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2330 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2333 /* superblock security operations */
2335 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2337 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2340 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2342 superblock_free_security(sb);
2345 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2350 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2353 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2355 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2356 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2357 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2358 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2361 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2368 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2372 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2375 int current_size = 0;
2383 while (current_size < len) {
2393 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2395 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2396 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2397 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2403 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2411 in_save = in_end = orig;
2415 open_quote = !open_quote;
2416 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2418 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2420 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2421 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2423 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2425 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2427 } while (*in_end++);
2429 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2430 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2435 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2437 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2440 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2444 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2445 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2446 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2449 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2451 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2453 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2454 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2455 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2458 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2461 unsigned long flags,
2466 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2470 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2471 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2472 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2474 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2478 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2482 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2486 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2487 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2490 /* inode security operations */
2492 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2494 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2497 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2499 inode_free_security(inode);
2502 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2503 char **name, void **value,
2506 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2507 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2508 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2511 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2513 tsec = current->security;
2514 dsec = dir->i_security;
2515 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2517 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2518 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2520 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2521 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2524 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2525 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2528 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2533 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2534 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2535 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2536 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2538 isec->initialized = 1;
2541 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2545 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2552 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2564 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2566 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2569 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2573 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2576 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2579 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2583 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2586 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2589 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2591 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2594 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2596 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2599 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2601 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2604 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2608 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2612 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2615 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2616 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2618 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2621 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2623 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2626 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2630 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2633 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2636 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2640 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2645 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2649 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2650 open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2653 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2657 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2661 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2664 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2665 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2666 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2668 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2671 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2673 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2676 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2678 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2679 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2680 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2681 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2683 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2684 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2685 Restrict to administrator. */
2690 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2691 ordinary setattr permission. */
2692 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2695 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2696 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2698 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2699 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2700 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2701 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2702 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2706 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2707 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2709 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2710 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2713 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2716 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2717 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2719 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2720 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2724 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2725 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2726 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2728 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2733 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2734 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2738 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2743 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2745 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2746 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2750 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2751 const void *value, size_t size,
2754 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2755 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2759 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2760 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2764 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2766 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2767 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2768 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2776 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2778 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2781 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2783 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2786 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2788 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2789 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2791 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2792 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2797 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2799 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2801 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2805 char *context = NULL;
2806 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2807 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2809 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2813 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2814 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2815 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2816 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2817 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2818 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2819 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2821 error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
2823 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2824 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
2825 CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
2829 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2832 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2845 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2846 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2848 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2852 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2855 if (!value || !size)
2858 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2866 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2868 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2869 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2870 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2874 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2876 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2879 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2881 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2884 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2886 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2890 /* file security operations */
2892 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2895 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2898 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2902 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2903 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2906 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2907 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2911 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2914 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2916 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2917 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2918 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2919 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2922 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2926 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2927 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2928 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2930 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2933 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2935 return file_alloc_security(file);
2938 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2940 file_free_security(file);
2943 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2948 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2950 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2955 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2958 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2960 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2961 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2963 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2964 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2965 * This has an additional check.
2967 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2974 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2975 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2977 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2978 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2981 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2982 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2984 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2989 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2990 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2991 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2994 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
2996 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
2997 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
2998 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
2999 if (rc || addr_only)
3002 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3005 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3006 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3009 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3010 unsigned long reqprot,
3015 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3019 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3022 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3023 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3025 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3026 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3027 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
3029 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3030 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3031 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3032 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3033 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3035 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3036 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3037 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3038 * modified content. This typically should only
3039 * occur for text relocations.
3041 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3049 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3052 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3054 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3057 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3064 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3069 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3070 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3079 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3080 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3085 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3090 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3094 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3101 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3103 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3104 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3106 tsec = current->security;
3107 fsec = file->f_security;
3108 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3113 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3114 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3118 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3119 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3121 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3122 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3124 tsec = tsk->security;
3125 fsec = file->f_security;
3128 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3130 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3132 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3133 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3136 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3138 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3141 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3143 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3144 struct inode *inode;
3145 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3146 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3147 fsec = file->f_security;
3148 isec = inode->i_security;
3150 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3151 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3152 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3153 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3154 * struct as its SID.
3156 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3157 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3159 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3160 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3161 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3162 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3163 * new inode label or new policy.
3164 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3166 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
3169 /* task security operations */
3171 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3175 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3179 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3182 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3184 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3187 tsec1 = current->security;
3189 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3192 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3194 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3195 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3197 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3198 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3199 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3200 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3201 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3206 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3208 task_free_security(tsk);
3211 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3213 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3214 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3215 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3216 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3217 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3222 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3224 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3227 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3229 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3233 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3235 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3238 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3240 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3243 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3245 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3248 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3250 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3254 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3256 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3260 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3264 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3268 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3271 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3275 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3279 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3282 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3284 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3287 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3289 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3292 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3296 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3297 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3298 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3299 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3300 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3301 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3306 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3310 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3314 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3317 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3319 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3322 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3324 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3327 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3332 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3334 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3339 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3341 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3344 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3346 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3350 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3357 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3358 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3359 the state of the current process. */
3360 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3363 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3365 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3368 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3370 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3372 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3375 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3376 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3380 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3381 struct inode *inode)
3383 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3384 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3386 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3387 isec->initialized = 1;
3391 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3392 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3393 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3395 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3396 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3398 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3399 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3403 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3404 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3407 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3408 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3412 *proto = ih->protocol;
3414 switch (ih->protocol) {
3416 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3418 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3422 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3426 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3427 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3432 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3434 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3438 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3442 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3443 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3447 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3448 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3450 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3454 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3458 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3459 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3470 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3472 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3473 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3474 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3477 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3478 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3480 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3481 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3485 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3486 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3489 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3490 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3491 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3500 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3502 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3506 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3507 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3512 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3514 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3518 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3519 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3523 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3524 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3526 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3530 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3531 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3535 /* includes fragments */
3545 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3546 char **addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3550 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3552 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3555 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3556 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3559 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3561 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3564 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3565 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3574 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3575 " unable to parse packet\n");
3581 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3583 * @family: protocol family
3584 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3587 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3588 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3589 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3590 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3591 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3595 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3602 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3603 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3605 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3606 if (unlikely(err)) {
3608 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3609 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3616 /* socket security operations */
3617 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3620 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3621 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3622 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3625 tsec = task->security;
3626 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3628 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3631 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3632 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3633 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3639 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3640 int protocol, int kern)
3643 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3649 tsec = current->security;
3650 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3651 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3652 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3653 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3659 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3660 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3663 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3664 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3665 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3668 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3670 tsec = current->security;
3671 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3672 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3673 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3674 isec->initialized = 1;
3677 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3678 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3679 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3680 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3686 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3687 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3688 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3690 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3695 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3700 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3701 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3702 * check the first address now.
3704 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3705 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3707 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3708 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3709 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3710 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3711 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3712 unsigned short snum;
3713 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3716 tsec = current->security;
3717 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3719 if (family == PF_INET) {
3720 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3721 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3722 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3724 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3725 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3726 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3732 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3734 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3735 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3739 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3740 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3741 ad.u.net.family = family;
3742 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3744 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3750 switch (isec->sclass) {
3751 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3752 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3755 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3756 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3759 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3760 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3764 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3768 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3772 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3773 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3774 ad.u.net.family = family;
3776 if (family == PF_INET)
3777 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3779 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3781 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3782 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3790 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3792 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3795 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3800 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3802 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3803 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3804 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3805 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3806 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3807 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3808 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3809 unsigned short snum;
3812 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3813 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3814 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3816 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3818 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3819 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3821 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3824 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3828 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3829 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3831 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3832 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3833 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3834 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3843 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3845 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3848 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3851 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3852 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3854 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3858 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3860 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3861 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3862 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3863 newisec->initialized = 1;
3868 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3873 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3877 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3880 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3881 int size, int flags)
3883 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3886 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3888 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3891 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3893 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3896 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3900 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3904 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3907 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3910 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3913 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3915 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3918 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3919 struct socket *other,
3922 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3923 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3924 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3925 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3928 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3932 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3933 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3935 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3936 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3938 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3940 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3944 /* connecting socket */
3945 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3946 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3948 /* server child socket */
3949 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3950 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3951 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3956 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3957 struct socket *other)
3959 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3960 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3961 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3964 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3965 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3967 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3968 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3970 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3971 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3978 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3980 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3986 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
3989 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
3990 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
3994 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
3997 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
3998 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4001 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4002 struct sk_buff *skb,
4003 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4008 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4010 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4011 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4013 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4014 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4017 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4018 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4019 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4020 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4022 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4023 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4024 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4025 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4027 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4028 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4029 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4030 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4033 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4034 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4039 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4042 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4046 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4049 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4055 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4056 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4057 if (unlikely(err)) {
4059 "SELinux: failure in"
4060 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4061 " network port label not found\n");
4064 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4067 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4068 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4069 u16 family, char *addrp)
4072 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4074 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4076 if (selinux_compat_net)
4077 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
4080 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4085 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4086 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4089 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4090 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
4092 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
4095 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
4101 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4104 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4105 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4106 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4107 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4110 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4113 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4114 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4117 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4118 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4119 ad.u.net.family = family;
4120 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4124 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4125 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4126 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4127 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4128 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4129 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4132 if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
4135 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4138 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4142 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4146 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4147 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4156 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4157 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4162 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4163 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4164 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4166 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4168 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4169 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4170 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4171 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4173 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4178 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4183 if (scontext_len > len) {
4188 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4192 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4200 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4202 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4206 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4207 else if (skb && skb->sk)
4208 family = skb->sk->sk_family;
4212 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4213 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4215 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4218 *secid = peer_secid;
4219 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4224 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4226 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4229 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4231 sk_free_security(sk);
4234 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4236 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4237 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4239 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4240 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4241 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4243 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4246 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4249 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4251 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4253 *secid = sksec->sid;
4257 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4259 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4260 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4262 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4263 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4264 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4265 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4267 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
4270 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4271 struct request_sock *req)
4273 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4278 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
4281 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4282 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4283 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4287 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4291 req->secid = newsid;
4292 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4296 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4297 const struct request_sock *req)
4299 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4301 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4302 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4303 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4304 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4305 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4306 time it will have been created and available. */
4308 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4309 * thread with access to newsksec */
4310 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4313 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
4314 struct sk_buff *skb)
4316 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4318 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4321 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4324 fl->secid = req->secid;
4327 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4331 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4332 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4333 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4335 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4339 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4341 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4343 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4344 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4345 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4346 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4347 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4348 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4358 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4363 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4365 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4370 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4374 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4377 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4378 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4379 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4382 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4383 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4384 ad.u.net.family = family;
4385 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4388 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4392 if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4393 peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
4397 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4398 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4404 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4405 struct sk_buff *skb,
4406 const struct net_device *in,
4407 const struct net_device *out,
4408 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4410 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4413 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4414 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4415 struct sk_buff *skb,
4416 const struct net_device *in,
4417 const struct net_device *out,
4418 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4420 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4424 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4426 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4427 u16 family, char *addrp)
4430 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4432 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4433 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4435 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4436 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4439 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4440 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4441 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4442 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4444 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4445 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4446 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4447 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4449 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4450 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4451 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4452 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4455 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4456 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4461 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4464 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4467 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4470 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4477 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4478 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4479 if (unlikely(err)) {
4481 "SELinux: failure in"
4482 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4483 " network port label not found\n");
4486 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4489 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4491 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4496 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4497 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4501 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4503 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4504 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4508 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4509 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad))
4513 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4514 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto))
4520 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4526 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4532 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4533 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4534 ad.u.net.family = family;
4535 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4538 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4539 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4540 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4541 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4542 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4543 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad,
4544 family, addrp, proto);
4546 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4547 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4548 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4549 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4550 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4551 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4552 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4555 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4556 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4557 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4560 /* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the
4561 * socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being
4562 * forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label
4563 * directly from the packet */
4566 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4567 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4568 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4570 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4572 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4576 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4577 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4580 if (peerlbl_active) {
4584 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4586 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4587 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4590 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4592 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4593 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4600 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4601 struct sk_buff *skb,
4602 const struct net_device *in,
4603 const struct net_device *out,
4604 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4606 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4609 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4610 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4611 struct sk_buff *skb,
4612 const struct net_device *in,
4613 const struct net_device *out,
4614 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4616 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4620 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4622 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4626 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4630 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4631 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4636 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4639 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4641 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4645 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4646 ad.u.cap = capability;
4648 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4649 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4652 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4653 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4656 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4657 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4659 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4663 isec->sclass = sclass;
4664 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4665 perm->security = isec;
4670 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4672 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4673 perm->security = NULL;
4677 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4679 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4681 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4685 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4686 msg->security = msec;
4691 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4693 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4695 msg->security = NULL;
4699 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4702 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4703 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4704 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4706 tsec = current->security;
4707 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4709 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4710 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4712 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4715 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4717 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4720 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4722 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4725 /* message queue security operations */
4726 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4728 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4729 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4730 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4733 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4737 tsec = current->security;
4738 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4740 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4741 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4743 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4746 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4752 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4754 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4757 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4759 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4760 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4761 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4763 tsec = current->security;
4764 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4766 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4767 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4769 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4770 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4773 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4781 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4782 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4785 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4788 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4791 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4797 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4801 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4803 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4804 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4805 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4806 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4809 tsec = current->security;
4810 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4811 msec = msg->security;
4814 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4816 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4818 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4819 * message queue this message will be stored in
4821 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4829 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4830 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4832 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4833 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4836 /* Can this process send the message */
4837 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4838 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4840 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4841 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4842 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4847 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4848 struct task_struct *target,
4849 long type, int mode)
4851 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4852 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4853 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4854 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4857 tsec = target->security;
4858 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4859 msec = msg->security;
4861 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4862 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4864 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4865 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4867 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4868 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4872 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4873 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4875 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4876 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4877 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4880 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4884 tsec = current->security;
4885 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4887 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4888 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4890 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4893 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4899 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4901 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4904 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4906 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4907 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4908 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4910 tsec = current->security;
4911 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4913 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4914 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4916 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4917 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4920 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4921 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4929 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4930 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4933 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4936 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4943 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4949 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4953 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4954 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4959 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4963 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4966 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4968 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4971 /* Semaphore security operations */
4972 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4974 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4975 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4976 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4979 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4983 tsec = current->security;
4984 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4986 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4987 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4989 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4992 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4998 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5000 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5003 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5005 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5006 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5007 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5009 tsec = current->security;
5010 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5012 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5013 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5015 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5016 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5019 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5020 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5028 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5029 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5033 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5044 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5047 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5051 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5057 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5061 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5062 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5067 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5071 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5074 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5080 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5082 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5087 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5090 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5092 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5096 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5099 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5102 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5103 char *name, char **value)
5105 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5111 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5118 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5120 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5122 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5123 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5124 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5125 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5126 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5127 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5128 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5129 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5136 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5142 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5143 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5145 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5146 struct task_struct *tracer;
5152 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5153 security attributes. */
5158 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5159 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5160 * above restriction is ever removed.
5162 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5163 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5164 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5165 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5166 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5167 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5168 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5169 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5170 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5171 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5177 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5178 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5179 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5183 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5184 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5185 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5187 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5194 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5195 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5196 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5197 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5198 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5199 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5201 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5202 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5203 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5204 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5205 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5206 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5209 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5210 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5211 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5212 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5213 struct av_decision avd;
5218 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5219 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5220 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5221 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5222 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5223 do_each_thread(g, t) {
5224 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5225 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5228 } while_each_thread(g, t);
5229 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5232 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5233 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5234 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5238 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5239 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5242 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5243 if (tracer != NULL) {
5244 struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5245 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5247 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5249 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5253 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5254 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5268 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5270 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5273 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5275 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5278 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5285 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5286 unsigned long flags)
5288 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5289 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5291 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5295 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5296 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5298 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5304 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5306 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5312 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5313 struct task_struct *ctx,
5317 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5318 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5320 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5322 tsec = ctx->security;
5323 ksec = key->security;
5325 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5326 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5327 appear to be created. */
5331 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5332 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5335 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5337 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5338 char *context = NULL;
5342 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5351 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5354 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5355 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5356 .capget = selinux_capget,
5357 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5358 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5359 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5360 .capable = selinux_capable,
5361 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5362 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5363 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5364 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5366 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5367 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5369 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5370 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5371 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5372 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5373 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5374 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5375 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5377 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5378 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5379 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5380 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5381 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5382 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5383 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5384 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5385 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5386 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5387 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5390 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5391 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5392 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5393 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5394 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5395 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5396 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5397 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5398 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5399 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5400 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5401 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5402 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5403 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5404 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5405 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5406 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5407 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5408 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5409 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5410 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5411 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5412 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5413 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5414 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5415 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5416 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5418 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5419 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5420 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5421 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5422 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5423 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5424 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5425 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5426 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5427 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5428 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5430 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5432 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5433 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5434 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5435 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5436 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5437 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5438 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5439 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5440 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5441 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5442 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5443 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5444 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5445 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5446 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5447 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5448 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5449 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5450 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5451 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5452 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5453 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5454 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5456 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5457 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5459 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5460 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5462 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5463 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5464 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5465 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5466 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5467 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5469 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5470 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5471 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5472 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5473 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5475 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5476 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5477 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5478 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5479 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5481 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5483 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5484 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5486 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5487 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5488 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5490 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5491 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5493 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5494 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5495 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5496 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5497 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5498 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5499 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5500 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5501 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5502 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5503 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5504 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5505 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5506 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5507 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5508 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5509 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5510 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5511 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5512 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5513 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5514 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5515 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5516 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5517 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5519 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5520 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5521 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5522 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5523 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5524 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5525 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5526 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5527 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5528 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5529 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5533 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5534 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5535 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5536 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5540 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5541 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5542 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5543 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5547 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5549 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5551 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5552 selinux_enabled = 0;
5556 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5557 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5561 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5563 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5564 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5565 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5566 tsec = current->security;
5567 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5569 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5570 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5571 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5574 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5576 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5577 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5578 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5580 if (selinux_enforcing)
5581 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5583 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5588 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5590 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5592 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5593 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5594 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5595 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5597 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5598 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5599 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5600 struct superblock_security_struct,
5602 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5604 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5605 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5606 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5608 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5610 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5611 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5612 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5615 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5616 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5619 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5620 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5621 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5623 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5625 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5627 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5628 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5630 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5631 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5634 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5635 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5637 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5638 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5642 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5644 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5646 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5647 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5649 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5650 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5653 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5654 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5656 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5657 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5663 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5667 if (!selinux_enabled)
5670 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5672 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5674 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5676 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5677 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5679 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5686 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5688 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5689 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5691 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5693 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5694 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5695 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5700 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5702 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5703 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5706 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5708 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5709 static int selinux_disabled;
5711 int selinux_disable(void)
5713 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5715 if (ss_initialized) {
5716 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5720 if (selinux_disabled) {
5721 /* Only do this once. */
5725 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5727 selinux_disabled = 1;
5728 selinux_enabled = 0;
5730 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5731 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5733 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5734 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5736 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */