2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
134 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
141 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
159 * initialise the security for the init task
161 static void cred_init_security(void)
163 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
164 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
166 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
168 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
170 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
171 cred->security = tsec;
175 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
177 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
179 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
181 tsec = cred->security;
186 * get the objective security ID of a task
188 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
193 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
199 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
201 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
203 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
208 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
210 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
212 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
213 u32 sid = current_sid();
215 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
219 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
220 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
222 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
223 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
224 isec->task_sid = sid;
225 inode->i_security = isec;
230 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
232 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
233 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
235 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
236 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
237 list_del_init(&isec->list);
238 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
240 inode->i_security = NULL;
241 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
244 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
246 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
247 u32 sid = current_sid();
249 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
254 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
255 file->f_security = fsec;
260 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
262 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
263 file->f_security = NULL;
267 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
269 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
271 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
275 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
276 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
278 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
280 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
282 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
283 sb->s_security = sbsec;
288 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
290 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
292 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
293 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
294 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
295 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
297 sb->s_security = NULL;
301 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
303 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
305 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
309 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
310 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 sk->sk_security = ssec;
313 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec);
318 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
320 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
322 sk->sk_security = NULL;
323 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
327 /* The security server must be initialized before
328 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
329 extern int ss_initialized;
331 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
333 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
335 "uses transition SIDs",
337 "uses genfs_contexts",
338 "not configured for labeling",
339 "uses mountpoint labeling",
342 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
344 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
346 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
355 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
358 static const match_table_t tokens = {
359 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
367 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
369 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
370 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
371 const struct cred *cred)
373 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
376 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
377 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
381 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
382 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
386 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
387 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
388 const struct cred *cred)
390 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
392 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
393 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
397 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
398 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
402 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
404 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
405 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
406 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
409 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
410 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
411 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
412 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
413 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
414 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
415 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
416 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
417 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
421 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
422 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
423 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
424 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
425 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
426 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
428 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
429 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
430 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
435 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
437 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
438 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
439 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
441 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
442 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
443 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
445 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
446 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
448 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
449 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
451 /* Initialize the root inode. */
452 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
454 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
455 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
456 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
458 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
460 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
461 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
462 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
463 struct inode_security_struct, list);
464 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
465 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
466 inode = igrab(inode);
468 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
472 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
473 list_del_init(&isec->list);
476 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
482 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
483 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
484 * mount options, or whatever.
486 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
487 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
490 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
491 char *context = NULL;
495 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
497 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
503 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
504 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
505 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
507 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
510 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
511 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
512 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
514 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
515 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
520 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
521 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
527 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
528 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
531 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
532 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
534 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
535 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
538 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
539 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
541 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
542 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
545 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
546 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
548 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
549 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
550 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
552 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
555 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
556 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
558 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
559 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
560 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
563 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
568 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
572 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
573 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
575 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
577 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
578 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
579 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
580 (old_sid != new_sid))
583 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
584 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
586 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
587 if (mnt_flags & flag)
593 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
594 * labeling information.
596 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
597 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
599 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
601 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
602 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
603 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
604 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
605 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
606 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
607 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
608 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
609 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
611 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
613 if (!ss_initialized) {
615 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
616 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
617 server is ready to handle calls. */
618 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
619 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
620 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
621 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
625 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
626 "before the security server is initialized\n");
631 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
632 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
633 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
634 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
636 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
637 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
638 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
639 * will be used for both mounts)
641 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
646 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
647 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
648 * than once with different security options.
650 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
653 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
655 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
656 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
658 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
659 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
660 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
667 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
669 goto out_double_mount;
671 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
676 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
678 goto out_double_mount;
680 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
682 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
683 rootcontext_sid = sid;
685 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
687 goto out_double_mount;
689 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
693 defcontext_sid = sid;
695 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
697 goto out_double_mount;
699 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
708 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
709 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
710 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
711 goto out_double_mount;
716 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
717 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
719 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
720 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
722 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
723 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
727 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
729 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
733 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
737 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
738 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
739 * the superblock context if not already set.
742 if (!fscontext_sid) {
743 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
747 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
749 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
754 if (!rootcontext_sid)
755 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
757 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
758 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
761 if (rootcontext_sid) {
762 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
767 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
768 root_isec->initialized = 1;
771 if (defcontext_sid) {
772 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
774 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
775 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
779 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
780 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
786 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
789 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
791 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
795 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
796 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
800 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
801 struct super_block *newsb)
803 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
804 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
806 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
807 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
808 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
811 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
812 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
815 if (!ss_initialized) {
816 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
817 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
818 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
819 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
823 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
824 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
826 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
827 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
830 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
832 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
834 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
835 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
836 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
839 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
843 if (!set_rootcontext) {
844 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
845 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
848 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
850 if (set_rootcontext) {
851 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
852 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
853 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
854 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
856 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
859 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
860 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
863 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
864 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
867 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
868 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
869 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
871 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
873 /* Standard string-based options. */
874 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
876 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
881 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
885 if (context || defcontext) {
887 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
890 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
900 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
903 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
910 case Opt_rootcontext:
913 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
916 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
924 if (context || defcontext) {
926 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
929 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
935 case Opt_labelsupport:
939 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
946 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
950 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
951 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
952 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
957 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
958 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
961 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
962 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
965 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
966 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
969 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
970 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
973 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
984 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
986 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
989 char *options = data;
990 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
992 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
997 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
999 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1004 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1007 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1011 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1012 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1017 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1020 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1021 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1025 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1027 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1030 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1032 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1033 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1035 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1036 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1038 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1040 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1045 /* we need a comma before each option */
1047 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1050 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1056 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1058 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1061 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1063 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1069 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1071 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1076 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1078 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1080 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1082 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1084 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1086 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1088 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1090 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1092 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1096 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1099 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1101 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1104 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1106 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1109 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1115 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1116 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1118 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1125 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1126 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1128 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1130 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1131 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1133 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1135 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1137 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1143 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1144 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1145 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1146 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1147 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1149 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1151 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1152 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1153 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1155 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1156 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1157 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1158 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1159 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1160 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1161 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1163 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1166 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1168 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1170 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1173 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1176 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1177 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1182 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1184 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1189 end = buffer+buflen;
1194 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1195 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1199 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1204 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1205 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1209 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1217 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1218 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1220 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1221 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1223 struct dentry *dentry;
1224 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1225 char *context = NULL;
1229 if (isec->initialized)
1232 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1233 if (isec->initialized)
1236 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1237 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1238 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1239 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1240 server is ready to handle calls. */
1241 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1242 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1243 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1244 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1248 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1249 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1250 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1251 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1255 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1256 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1258 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1259 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1261 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1262 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1266 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1267 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1268 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1269 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1270 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1271 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1272 * be used again by userspace.
1277 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1278 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1284 context[len] = '\0';
1285 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1287 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1290 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1291 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1298 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1304 context[len] = '\0';
1305 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1311 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1312 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1313 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1314 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1318 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1319 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1322 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1326 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1327 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1329 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1330 if (printk_ratelimit())
1331 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1332 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1333 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1335 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1336 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1337 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1340 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1348 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1349 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1351 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1352 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1353 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1355 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1356 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1357 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1365 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1366 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1369 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1370 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1372 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1373 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1375 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1376 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1387 isec->initialized = 1;
1390 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1392 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1393 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1397 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1398 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1404 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1405 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1408 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1409 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1412 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1413 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1416 /* All other signals. */
1417 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1425 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1426 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1428 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1429 const struct cred *target,
1432 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1434 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1438 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1439 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1440 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1441 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1443 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1444 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1447 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1451 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1452 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1454 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1458 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1459 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1460 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1461 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1463 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1468 sid = current_sid();
1469 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1470 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1473 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1474 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1477 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1478 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1479 const struct cred *cred,
1482 struct common_audit_data ad;
1483 struct av_decision avd;
1485 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1486 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1489 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1493 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1495 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1498 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1502 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1506 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1507 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1508 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1512 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1513 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1516 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1518 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1519 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1522 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1523 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1524 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1525 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1526 struct inode *inode,
1528 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1530 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1531 struct common_audit_data ad;
1534 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1537 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1538 isec = inode->i_security;
1542 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1543 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1546 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1549 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1550 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1551 pathname if needed. */
1552 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1553 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1554 struct dentry *dentry,
1557 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1558 struct common_audit_data ad;
1560 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1561 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1562 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1563 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1566 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1567 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1568 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1569 check a particular permission to the file.
1570 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1571 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1572 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1573 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1574 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1578 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1579 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1580 struct common_audit_data ad;
1581 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1584 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1585 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1587 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1588 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1596 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1599 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1605 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1606 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1607 struct dentry *dentry,
1610 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1611 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1612 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1613 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1615 struct common_audit_data ad;
1618 dsec = dir->i_security;
1619 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1622 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1624 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1625 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1627 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1628 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1633 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1634 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1639 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1643 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1644 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1645 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1648 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1649 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1650 struct task_struct *ctx)
1652 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1654 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1658 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1661 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1662 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1663 struct dentry *dentry,
1667 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1668 struct common_audit_data ad;
1669 u32 sid = current_sid();
1673 dsec = dir->i_security;
1674 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1676 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1677 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1680 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1681 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1696 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1701 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1705 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1706 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1707 struct inode *new_dir,
1708 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1710 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1711 struct common_audit_data ad;
1712 u32 sid = current_sid();
1714 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1717 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1718 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1719 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1720 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1722 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1724 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1725 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1726 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1729 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1730 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1733 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1734 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1735 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1740 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1741 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1742 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1743 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1744 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1747 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1748 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1749 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1750 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1752 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1760 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1761 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1762 struct super_block *sb,
1764 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1766 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1767 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1769 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1770 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1773 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1774 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1778 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1779 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1780 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1781 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1784 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1786 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1790 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1792 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1794 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1801 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1802 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1806 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1808 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1809 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1816 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1825 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1828 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1830 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1832 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1833 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1835 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1839 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1840 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1841 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1842 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1843 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1844 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1845 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1847 else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
1848 av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
1850 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1851 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1856 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1858 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1863 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1867 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1868 u32 sid = current_sid();
1869 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1870 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1873 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1876 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1880 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1884 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1887 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1888 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1892 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1896 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1899 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1900 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1901 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1902 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1906 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1907 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1911 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1915 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1916 * which was removed).
1918 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1919 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1920 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1921 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1924 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1929 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1933 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1936 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1939 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1942 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1947 end = buffer+buflen;
1953 const char *name = table->procname;
1954 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1955 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1959 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1962 table = table->parent;
1968 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1970 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1972 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1977 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1984 sid = current_sid();
1986 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1987 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1989 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1990 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1993 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1994 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1996 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1997 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
2005 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
2006 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
2012 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2014 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2026 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2031 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2034 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2040 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2042 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2044 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2047 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2051 rc = cap_syslog(type);
2056 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2057 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2058 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2060 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2061 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2062 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2063 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2065 case 0: /* Close log */
2066 case 1: /* Open log */
2067 case 2: /* Read from log */
2068 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2069 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2071 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2078 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2079 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2080 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2082 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2083 * processes that allocate mappings.
2085 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2087 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2089 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2090 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2094 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2097 /* binprm security operations */
2099 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2101 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2102 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2103 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2104 struct common_audit_data ad;
2105 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2108 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2112 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2113 * the script interpreter */
2114 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2117 old_tsec = current_security();
2118 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2119 isec = inode->i_security;
2121 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2122 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2123 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2125 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2126 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2127 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2128 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2130 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2131 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2132 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2133 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2135 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2136 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2137 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2142 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2143 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2145 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2146 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2148 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2149 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2150 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2154 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2155 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2156 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2160 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2161 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2165 /* Check for shared state */
2166 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2167 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2168 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2174 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2175 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2177 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2178 struct task_struct *tracer;
2179 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2183 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2184 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2185 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2191 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2193 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2199 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2200 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2206 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2208 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2209 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2217 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2218 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2219 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2220 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2222 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2225 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2228 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2229 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2231 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2232 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2233 struct files_struct *files)
2235 struct common_audit_data ad;
2236 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2237 struct tty_struct *tty;
2238 struct fdtable *fdt;
2242 tty = get_current_tty();
2245 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2246 struct inode *inode;
2248 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2249 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2250 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2251 file may belong to another process and we are only
2252 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2253 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2254 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2255 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2256 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2263 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2267 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2269 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2271 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2273 unsigned long set, i;
2278 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2279 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2281 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2284 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2285 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2290 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2292 file_to_av(file))) {
2294 fd = get_unused_fd();
2304 devnull = dentry_open(
2306 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2308 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2315 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2320 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2323 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2327 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2329 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2331 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2332 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2335 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2336 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2339 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2340 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2342 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2343 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2345 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2346 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2347 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2349 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2350 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2351 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2352 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2353 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2355 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2356 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2358 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2359 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2360 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2361 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2363 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2368 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2371 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2373 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2374 struct itimerval itimer;
2384 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2385 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2386 * flush and unblock signals.
2388 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2389 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2391 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2393 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2394 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2395 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2396 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2397 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2398 __flush_signals(current);
2399 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2400 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2402 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2405 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2406 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2407 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2408 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->real_parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2409 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2412 /* superblock security operations */
2414 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2416 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2419 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2421 superblock_free_security(sb);
2424 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2429 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2432 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2434 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2435 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2436 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2437 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2438 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2441 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2448 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2452 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2455 int current_size = 0;
2463 while (current_size < len) {
2473 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2475 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2476 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2477 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2483 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2491 in_save = in_end = orig;
2495 open_quote = !open_quote;
2496 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2498 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2500 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2501 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2503 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2505 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2507 } while (*in_end++);
2509 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2510 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2515 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2517 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2518 struct common_audit_data ad;
2521 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2525 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2526 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2529 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2530 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2531 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2534 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2536 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2537 struct common_audit_data ad;
2539 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2540 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2541 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2544 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2547 unsigned long flags,
2550 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2552 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2553 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2554 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2556 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2560 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2562 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2564 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2565 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2568 /* inode security operations */
2570 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2572 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2575 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2577 inode_free_security(inode);
2580 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2581 char **name, void **value,
2584 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2585 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2586 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2587 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2588 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2590 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2592 dsec = dir->i_security;
2593 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2596 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2598 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2599 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2600 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2603 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2604 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2607 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2612 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2613 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2614 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2615 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2617 isec->initialized = 1;
2620 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2624 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2631 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2643 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2645 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2648 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2650 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2653 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2655 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2658 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2660 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2663 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2665 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2668 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2670 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2673 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2675 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2678 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2679 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2681 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2684 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2686 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2688 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2691 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2693 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2695 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2698 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2700 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2703 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2707 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2708 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2711 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2713 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2715 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2718 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2719 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2720 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2722 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2725 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2727 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2729 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2732 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2734 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2736 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2737 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2738 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2739 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2741 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2742 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2743 Restrict to administrator. */
2748 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2749 ordinary setattr permission. */
2750 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2753 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2754 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2756 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2757 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2758 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2759 struct common_audit_data ad;
2760 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2763 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2764 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2766 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2767 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2770 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2773 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2774 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2776 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2777 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2781 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2782 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2783 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2785 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2790 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2791 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2795 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2800 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2802 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2803 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2807 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2808 const void *value, size_t size,
2811 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2812 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2816 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2817 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2821 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2823 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2824 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2825 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2833 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2835 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2837 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2840 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2842 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2844 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2847 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2849 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2850 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2852 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2853 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2858 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2860 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2862 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2866 char *context = NULL;
2867 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2869 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2873 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2874 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2875 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2876 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2877 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2878 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2879 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2881 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2882 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2884 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2887 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2900 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2901 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2903 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2907 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2910 if (!value || !size)
2913 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2921 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2923 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2924 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2925 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2929 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2931 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2935 /* file security operations */
2937 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2939 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2940 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2942 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2943 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2946 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2947 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2950 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2952 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2953 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2954 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2955 u32 sid = current_sid();
2958 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2961 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2962 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2963 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2966 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2969 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2971 return file_alloc_security(file);
2974 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2976 file_free_security(file);
2979 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2982 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2985 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2987 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2992 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
2995 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2997 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3000 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3001 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3003 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3004 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3005 * This has an additional check.
3007 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3014 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3015 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3017 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3018 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3021 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3022 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3024 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3031 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3032 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3033 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3036 u32 sid = current_sid();
3039 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3040 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3041 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3042 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3044 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3045 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3046 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3051 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3052 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
3053 if (rc || addr_only)
3056 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3059 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3060 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3063 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3064 unsigned long reqprot,
3067 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3069 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3072 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3073 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3075 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3076 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3077 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3078 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3079 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3080 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3081 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3082 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3084 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3085 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3086 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3087 * modified content. This typically should only
3088 * occur for text relocations.
3090 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3097 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3100 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3102 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3104 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3107 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3110 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3115 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3120 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3121 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3130 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3131 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3136 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3141 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3145 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3152 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3154 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3156 fsec = file->f_security;
3157 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3162 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3163 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3166 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3168 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3170 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3171 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3173 fsec = file->f_security;
3176 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3178 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3180 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3181 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3184 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3186 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3188 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3191 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3193 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3194 struct inode *inode;
3195 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3197 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3198 fsec = file->f_security;
3199 isec = inode->i_security;
3201 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3202 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3203 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3204 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3205 * struct as its SID.
3207 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3208 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3210 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3211 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3212 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3213 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3214 * new inode label or new policy.
3215 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3217 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3220 /* task security operations */
3222 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3224 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3228 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3230 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3232 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3233 cred->security = NULL;
3238 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3240 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3243 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3244 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3246 old_tsec = old->security;
3248 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3252 new->security = tsec;
3257 * set the security data for a kernel service
3258 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3260 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3262 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3263 u32 sid = current_sid();
3266 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3267 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3268 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3272 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3273 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3274 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3280 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3281 * objective context of the specified inode
3283 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3285 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3286 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3287 u32 sid = current_sid();
3290 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3291 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3292 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3296 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3300 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(void)
3302 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST);
3305 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3307 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3310 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3312 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3315 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3317 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3320 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3322 *secid = task_sid(p);
3325 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3329 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3333 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3336 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3340 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3344 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3347 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3349 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3352 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3354 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3356 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3357 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3358 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3359 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3360 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3361 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3366 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3370 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3374 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3377 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3379 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3382 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3384 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3387 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3394 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3396 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3398 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3399 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3401 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3405 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3407 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3410 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3411 struct inode *inode)
3413 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3414 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3417 isec->initialized = 1;
3420 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3421 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3422 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3424 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3425 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3427 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3428 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3432 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3433 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3436 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3437 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3441 *proto = ih->protocol;
3443 switch (ih->protocol) {
3445 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3447 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3451 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3455 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3456 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3461 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3463 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3467 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3471 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3472 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3476 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3477 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3479 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3483 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3487 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3488 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3499 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3501 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3502 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3503 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3506 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3507 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3509 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3510 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3514 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3515 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3518 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3519 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3520 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3529 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3531 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3535 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3536 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3541 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3543 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3547 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3548 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3552 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3553 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3555 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3559 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3560 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3564 /* includes fragments */
3574 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3575 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3580 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3582 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3585 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3586 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3589 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3591 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3594 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3595 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3605 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3606 " unable to parse packet\n");
3616 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3618 * @family: protocol family
3619 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3622 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3623 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3624 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3625 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3626 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3630 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3637 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3638 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3640 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3641 if (unlikely(err)) {
3643 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3644 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3651 /* socket security operations */
3652 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3655 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3656 struct common_audit_data ad;
3660 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3662 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3664 sid = task_sid(task);
3666 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3667 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3668 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3674 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3675 int protocol, int kern)
3677 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3678 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3687 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3689 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3690 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3696 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3697 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3699 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3700 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3701 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3702 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3707 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3709 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3712 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3718 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3719 isec->initialized = 1;
3722 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3723 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3724 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3725 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3731 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3732 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3733 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3735 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3740 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3745 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3746 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3747 * check the first address now.
3749 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3750 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3752 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3753 struct common_audit_data ad;
3754 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3755 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3756 unsigned short snum;
3757 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3760 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3762 if (family == PF_INET) {
3763 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3764 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3765 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3767 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3768 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3769 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3775 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3777 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3778 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3782 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3783 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3784 ad.u.net.family = family;
3785 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3787 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3793 switch (isec->sclass) {
3794 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3795 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3798 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3799 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3802 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3803 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3807 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3811 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3815 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3816 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3817 ad.u.net.family = family;
3819 if (family == PF_INET)
3820 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3822 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3824 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3825 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3833 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3835 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3836 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3839 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3844 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3846 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3847 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3848 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3849 struct common_audit_data ad;
3850 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3851 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3852 unsigned short snum;
3855 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3856 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3857 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3859 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3861 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3862 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3864 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3867 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3871 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3872 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3874 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3875 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3876 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3877 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3882 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3888 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3890 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3893 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3896 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3897 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3899 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3903 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3905 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3906 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3907 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3908 newisec->initialized = 1;
3913 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3916 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3919 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3920 int size, int flags)
3922 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3925 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3927 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3930 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3932 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3935 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3939 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3943 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3946 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3949 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3952 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3954 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3957 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3958 struct socket *other,
3961 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3962 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3963 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3964 struct common_audit_data ad;
3967 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3968 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3970 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3971 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3973 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3975 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3979 /* connecting socket */
3980 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3981 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3983 /* server child socket */
3984 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3985 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3986 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3991 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3992 struct socket *other)
3994 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3995 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3996 struct common_audit_data ad;
3999 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4000 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4002 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4003 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4005 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4006 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4013 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4015 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4021 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4024 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4025 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4029 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4032 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4033 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4036 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4040 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4042 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4043 struct common_audit_data ad;
4046 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4047 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4048 ad.u.net.family = family;
4049 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4053 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4054 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4060 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4061 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4064 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4065 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4067 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4069 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4072 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4078 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4081 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4082 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4083 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4084 struct common_audit_data ad;
4089 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4092 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4093 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4096 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4097 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4098 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4099 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4100 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4101 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4103 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4104 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4105 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4108 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4109 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4110 ad.u.net.family = family;
4111 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4115 if (peerlbl_active) {
4118 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4121 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4124 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4127 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4130 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4133 if (secmark_active) {
4134 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4143 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4144 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4149 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4150 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4151 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4153 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4155 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4156 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4157 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4158 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4160 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4165 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4170 if (scontext_len > len) {
4175 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4179 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4187 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4189 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4192 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4194 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4197 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4201 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4202 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4204 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4207 *secid = peer_secid;
4208 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4213 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4215 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4218 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4220 sk_free_security(sk);
4223 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4225 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4226 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4228 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4229 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4230 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4232 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec);
4235 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4238 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4240 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4242 *secid = sksec->sid;
4246 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4248 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4249 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4251 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4252 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4253 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4254 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4257 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4258 struct request_sock *req)
4260 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4262 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4266 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4267 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4270 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4273 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4274 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4275 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4277 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4280 req->secid = newsid;
4281 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4284 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4287 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4288 const struct request_sock *req)
4290 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4292 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4293 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4294 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4295 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4296 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4297 time it will have been created and available. */
4299 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4300 * thread with access to newsksec */
4301 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4304 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4306 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4307 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4309 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4310 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4313 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4316 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4319 fl->secid = req->secid;
4322 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4326 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4327 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4328 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4330 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4334 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4336 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4338 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4339 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4340 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4341 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4342 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4343 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4353 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4358 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4360 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4366 struct common_audit_data ad;
4371 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4374 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4375 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4376 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4377 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4380 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4383 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4384 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4385 ad.u.net.family = family;
4386 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4389 if (peerlbl_active) {
4390 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4393 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4399 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4400 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4404 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4405 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4406 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4408 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4414 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4415 struct sk_buff *skb,
4416 const struct net_device *in,
4417 const struct net_device *out,
4418 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4420 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4423 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4424 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4425 struct sk_buff *skb,
4426 const struct net_device *in,
4427 const struct net_device *out,
4428 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4430 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4434 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4439 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4442 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4443 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4444 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4446 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4449 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4450 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4456 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4457 struct sk_buff *skb,
4458 const struct net_device *in,
4459 const struct net_device *out,
4460 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4462 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4465 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4469 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4470 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4471 struct common_audit_data ad;
4477 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4479 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4480 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4481 ad.u.net.family = family;
4482 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4485 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4486 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4487 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4490 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4491 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4497 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4503 struct common_audit_data ad;
4508 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4509 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4510 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4511 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4512 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4513 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4515 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4516 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4517 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4518 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4519 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4520 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4521 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4524 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4525 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4526 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4529 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4530 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4531 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4532 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4537 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4538 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4540 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4543 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4544 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4546 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4551 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4552 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4555 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4557 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4558 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4559 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4562 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4563 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4564 ad.u.net.family = family;
4565 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4569 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4570 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4573 if (peerlbl_active) {
4577 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4579 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4580 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4583 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4585 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4586 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4593 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4594 struct sk_buff *skb,
4595 const struct net_device *in,
4596 const struct net_device *out,
4597 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4599 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4602 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4603 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4604 struct sk_buff *skb,
4605 const struct net_device *in,
4606 const struct net_device *out,
4607 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4609 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4613 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4615 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4619 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4623 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4624 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4629 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4632 struct common_audit_data ad;
4634 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4638 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4639 ad.u.cap = capability;
4641 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4642 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4645 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4646 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4649 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4652 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4656 sid = task_sid(task);
4657 isec->sclass = sclass;
4659 perm->security = isec;
4664 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4666 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4667 perm->security = NULL;
4671 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4673 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4675 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4679 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4680 msg->security = msec;
4685 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4687 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4689 msg->security = NULL;
4693 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4696 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4697 struct common_audit_data ad;
4698 u32 sid = current_sid();
4700 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4702 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4703 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4705 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4708 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4710 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4713 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4715 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4718 /* message queue security operations */
4719 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4721 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4722 struct common_audit_data ad;
4723 u32 sid = current_sid();
4726 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4730 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4732 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4733 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4735 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4738 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4744 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4746 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4749 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4751 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4752 struct common_audit_data ad;
4753 u32 sid = current_sid();
4755 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4757 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4758 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4760 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4761 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4764 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4772 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4773 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4776 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4779 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4782 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4788 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4792 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4794 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4795 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4796 struct common_audit_data ad;
4797 u32 sid = current_sid();
4800 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4801 msec = msg->security;
4804 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4806 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4808 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4809 * message queue this message will be stored in
4811 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4817 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4818 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4820 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4821 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4824 /* Can this process send the message */
4825 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4828 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4829 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4830 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4835 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4836 struct task_struct *target,
4837 long type, int mode)
4839 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4840 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4841 struct common_audit_data ad;
4842 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4845 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4846 msec = msg->security;
4848 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4849 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4851 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4852 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4854 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4855 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4859 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4860 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4862 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4863 struct common_audit_data ad;
4864 u32 sid = current_sid();
4867 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4871 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4873 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4874 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4876 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4879 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4885 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4887 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4890 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4892 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4893 struct common_audit_data ad;
4894 u32 sid = current_sid();
4896 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4898 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4899 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4901 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4902 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4905 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4906 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4914 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4915 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4918 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4921 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4928 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4934 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4938 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4939 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4943 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4946 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4948 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4951 /* Semaphore security operations */
4952 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4954 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4955 struct common_audit_data ad;
4956 u32 sid = current_sid();
4959 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4963 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4965 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4966 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4968 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4971 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4977 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4979 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4982 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4984 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4985 struct common_audit_data ad;
4986 u32 sid = current_sid();
4988 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4990 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4991 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4993 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4994 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4997 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4998 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5006 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5007 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5011 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5022 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5025 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5029 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5035 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5039 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5040 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5045 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5049 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5052 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5058 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5060 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5065 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5068 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5070 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5074 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5077 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5080 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5081 char *name, char **value)
5083 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5089 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5095 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5097 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5099 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5101 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5102 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5103 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5104 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5105 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5106 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5107 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5108 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5116 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5126 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5127 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5129 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5130 struct task_struct *tracer;
5137 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5138 security attributes. */
5143 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5144 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5145 * above restriction is ever removed.
5147 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5148 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5149 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5150 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5151 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5152 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5153 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5154 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5155 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5156 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5162 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5163 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5164 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5168 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5169 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5170 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5172 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5179 new = prepare_creds();
5183 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5184 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5185 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5186 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5187 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5188 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5189 tsec = new->security;
5190 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5191 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5192 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5193 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5194 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5195 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5198 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5199 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5200 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5201 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5206 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5208 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5209 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5214 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5215 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5216 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5220 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5221 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5224 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5226 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5230 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5231 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5250 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5252 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5255 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5257 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5260 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5267 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5268 unsigned long flags)
5270 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5271 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5273 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5277 tsec = cred->security;
5278 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5279 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5281 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5287 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5289 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5295 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5296 const struct cred *cred,
5300 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5303 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5304 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5305 appear to be created. */
5309 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5311 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5312 ksec = key->security;
5314 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5317 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5319 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5320 char *context = NULL;
5324 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5333 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5336 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5337 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5338 .capget = selinux_capget,
5339 .capset = selinux_capset,
5340 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5341 .capable = selinux_capable,
5342 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5343 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5344 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5345 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5347 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5348 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5350 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5351 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5352 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5353 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5355 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5356 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5357 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5358 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5359 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5360 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5361 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5362 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5363 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5364 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5365 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5368 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5369 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5370 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5371 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5372 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5373 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5374 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5375 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5376 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5377 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5378 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5379 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5380 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5381 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5382 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5383 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5384 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5385 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5386 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5387 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5388 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5389 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5390 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5391 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5392 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5394 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5395 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5396 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5397 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5398 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5399 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5400 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5401 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5402 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5403 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5404 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5406 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5408 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5409 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5410 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5411 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5412 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5413 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5414 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5415 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5416 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5417 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5418 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5419 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5420 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5421 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5422 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5423 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5424 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5425 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5426 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5427 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5429 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5430 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5432 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5433 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5435 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5436 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5437 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5438 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5439 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5440 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5442 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5443 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5444 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5445 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5446 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5448 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5449 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5450 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5451 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5452 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5454 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5456 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5457 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5459 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5460 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5461 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5463 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5464 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5466 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5467 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5468 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5469 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5470 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5471 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5472 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5473 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5474 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5475 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5476 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5477 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5478 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5479 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5480 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5481 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5482 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5483 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5484 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5485 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5486 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5487 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5488 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5489 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5490 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5492 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5493 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5494 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5495 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5496 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5497 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5498 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5499 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5500 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5501 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5502 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5506 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5507 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5508 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5509 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5513 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5514 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5515 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5516 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5520 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5522 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5523 selinux_enabled = 0;
5527 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5528 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5532 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5534 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5535 cred_init_security();
5537 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5538 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5539 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5542 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5544 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5545 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5546 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5548 if (selinux_enforcing)
5549 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5551 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5556 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5558 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5560 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5561 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5562 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5563 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5565 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5566 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5567 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5568 struct superblock_security_struct,
5570 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5572 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5573 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5574 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5576 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5578 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5579 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5580 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5583 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5584 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5587 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5588 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5589 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5591 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5593 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5595 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5596 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5598 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5599 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5602 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5603 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5605 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5606 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5609 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5610 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5612 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5613 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5617 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5619 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5621 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5622 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5624 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5625 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5628 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5629 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5631 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5632 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5638 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5642 if (!selinux_enabled)
5645 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5647 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5649 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5651 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5652 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5654 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5661 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5663 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5664 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5666 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5668 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5669 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5670 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5675 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5677 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5678 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5681 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5683 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5684 static int selinux_disabled;
5686 int selinux_disable(void)
5688 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5690 if (ss_initialized) {
5691 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5695 if (selinux_disabled) {
5696 /* Only do this once. */
5700 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5702 selinux_disabled = 1;
5703 selinux_enabled = 0;
5705 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5708 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5709 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5711 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5712 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5714 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */