SAFE public projects git trees. - safe/jmp/linux-2.6/blob - security/selinux/hooks.c

   1 /*
   2  *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
   3  *
   4  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
   5  *
   6  *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
   7  *            Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
   8  *            Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
   9  *            James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  10  *
  11  *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
  12  *  Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  13  *                                         Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
  14  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  15  *                          <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
  16  *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  17  *              Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
  18  *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
  19  *                     Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
  20  *
  21  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  22  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
  23  *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
  24  */
  25
  26 #include <linux/init.h>
  27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
  29 #include <linux/errno.h>
  30 #include <linux/sched.h>
  31 #include <linux/security.h>
  32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  33 #include <linux/capability.h>
  34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
  35 #include <linux/mm.h>
  36 #include <linux/mman.h>
  37 #include <linux/slab.h>
  38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  39 #include <linux/swap.h>
  40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
  41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
  42 #include <linux/file.h>
  43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
  44 #include <linux/namei.h>
  45 #include <linux/mount.h>
  46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
  47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
  48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
  49 #include <linux/tty.h>
  50 #include <net/icmp.h>
  51 #include <net/ip.h>             /* for local_port_range[] */
  52 #include <net/tcp.h>            /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
  53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
  54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
  55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
  56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
  57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
  58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
  59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
  60 #include <linux/netdevice.h>    /* for network interface checks */
  61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
  62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
  63 #include <linux/udp.h>
  64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
  65 #include <linux/quota.h>
  66 #include <linux/un.h>           /* for Unix socket types */
  67 #include <net/af_unix.h>        /* for Unix socket types */
  68 #include <linux/parser.h>
  69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
  70 #include <net/ipv6.h>
  71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  72 #include <linux/personality.h>
  73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
  74 #include <linux/audit.h>
  75 #include <linux/string.h>
  76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
  77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
  78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
  79
  80 #include "avc.h"
  81 #include "objsec.h"
  82 #include "netif.h"
  83 #include "netnode.h"
  84 #include "netport.h"
  85 #include "xfrm.h"
  86 #include "netlabel.h"
  87 #include "audit.h"
  88
  89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
  90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
  91
  92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
  93
  94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
  95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
  96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
  97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
  98
  99 /* SECMARK reference count */
 100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 101
 102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
 103 int selinux_enforcing;
 104
 105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
 106 {
 107         unsigned long enforcing;
 108         if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
 109                 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
 110         return 1;
 111 }
 112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
 113 #endif
 114
 115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
 116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
 117
 118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 119 {
 120         unsigned long enabled;
 121         if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
 122                 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
 123         return 1;
 124 }
 125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 126 #else
 127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
 128 #endif
 129
 130
 131 /*
 132  * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
 133  * just to allow the use of the capability module.
 134  */
 135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
 136
 137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
 138    before the policy was loaded. */
 139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
 140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
 141
 142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
 143
 144 /**
 145  * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
 146  *
 147  * Description:
 148  * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
 149  * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
 150  * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled.  Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
 151  * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
 152  *
 153  */
 154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
 155 {
 156         return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
 157 }
 158
 159 /*
 160  * initialise the security for the init task
 161  */
 162 static void cred_init_security(void)
 163 {
 164         struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
 165         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 166
 167         tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 168         if (!tsec)
 169                 panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
 170
 171         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
 172         cred->security = tsec;
 173 }
 174
 175 /*
 176  * get the security ID of a set of credentials
 177  */
 178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
 179 {
 180         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 181
 182         tsec = cred->security;
 183         return tsec->sid;
 184 }
 185
 186 /*
 187  * get the objective security ID of a task
 188  */
 189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
 190 {
 191         u32 sid;
 192
 193         rcu_read_lock();
 194         sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
 195         rcu_read_unlock();
 196         return sid;
 197 }
 198
 199 /*
 200  * get the subjective security ID of the current task
 201  */
 202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
 203 {
 204         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
 205
 206         return tsec->sid;
 207 }
 208
 209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
 210
 211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 212 {
 213         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 214         u32 sid = current_sid();
 215
 216         isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
 217         if (!isec)
 218                 return -ENOMEM;
 219
 220         mutex_init(&isec->lock);
 221         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
 222         isec->inode = inode;
 223         isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 224         isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
 225         isec->task_sid = sid;
 226         inode->i_security = isec;
 227
 228         return 0;
 229 }
 230
 231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 232 {
 233         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 234         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 235
 236         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 237         if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
 238                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 239         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 240
 241         inode->i_security = NULL;
 242         kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
 243 }
 244
 245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 246 {
 247         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
 248         u32 sid = current_sid();
 249
 250         fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 251         if (!fsec)
 252                 return -ENOMEM;
 253
 254         fsec->sid = sid;
 255         fsec->fown_sid = sid;
 256         file->f_security = fsec;
 257
 258         return 0;
 259 }
 260
 261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
 262 {
 263         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 264         file->f_security = NULL;
 265         kfree(fsec);
 266 }
 267
 268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 269 {
 270         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 271
 272         sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 273         if (!sbsec)
 274                 return -ENOMEM;
 275
 276         mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
 277         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
 278         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
 279         spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 280         sbsec->sb = sb;
 281         sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 282         sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
 283         sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 284         sb->s_security = sbsec;
 285
 286         return 0;
 287 }
 288
 289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 290 {
 291         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 292
 293         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 294         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 295                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
 296         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 297
 298         sb->s_security = NULL;
 299         kfree(sbsec);
 300 }
 301
 302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 303 {
 304         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 305
 306         ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
 307         if (!ssec)
 308                 return -ENOMEM;
 309
 310         ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 311         ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 312         sk->sk_security = ssec;
 313
 314         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
 315
 316         return 0;
 317 }
 318
 319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 320 {
 321         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
 322
 323         sk->sk_security = NULL;
 324         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
 325         kfree(ssec);
 326 }
 327
 328 /* The security server must be initialized before
 329    any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
 330 extern int ss_initialized;
 331
 332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
 333
 334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
 335         "uses xattr",
 336         "uses transition SIDs",
 337         "uses task SIDs",
 338         "uses genfs_contexts",
 339         "not configured for labeling",
 340         "uses mountpoint labeling",
 341 };
 342
 343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
 344
 345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
 346 {
 347         return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
 348 }
 349
 350 enum {
 351         Opt_error = -1,
 352         Opt_context = 1,
 353         Opt_fscontext = 2,
 354         Opt_defcontext = 3,
 355         Opt_rootcontext = 4,
 356         Opt_labelsupport = 5,
 357 };
 358
 359 static const match_table_t tokens = {
 360         {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 361         {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 362         {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 363         {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 364         {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
 365         {Opt_error, NULL},
 366 };
 367
 368 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
 369
 370 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
 371                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 372                         const struct cred *cred)
 373 {
 374         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
 375         int rc;
 376
 377         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 378                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 379         if (rc)
 380                 return rc;
 381
 382         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 383                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
 384         return rc;
 385 }
 386
 387 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
 388                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 389                         const struct cred *cred)
 390 {
 391         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
 392         int rc;
 393         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 394                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 395         if (rc)
 396                 return rc;
 397
 398         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 399                           FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
 400         return rc;
 401 }
 402
 403 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 404 {
 405         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 406         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 407         struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
 408         int rc = 0;
 409
 410         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 411                 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
 412                    error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
 413                    the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
 414                    the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
 415                    assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
 416                 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
 417                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
 418                                "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 419                         rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 420                         goto out;
 421                 }
 422                 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
 423                 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
 424                         if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 425                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 426                                        "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
 427                                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 428                         else
 429                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 430                                        "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
 431                                        sb->s_type->name, -rc);
 432                         goto out;
 433                 }
 434         }
 435
 436         sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
 437
 438         if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
 439                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
 440                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 441         else
 442                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
 443                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
 444                        labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 445
 446         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
 447             sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
 448             sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
 449             sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
 450                 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
 451
 452         /* Initialize the root inode. */
 453         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 454
 455         /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
 456            inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
 457            during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
 458            populates itself. */
 459         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 460 next_inode:
 461         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
 462                 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
 463                                 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
 464                                            struct inode_security_struct, list);
 465                 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
 466                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 467                 inode = igrab(inode);
 468                 if (inode) {
 469                         if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
 470                                 inode_doinit(inode);
 471                         iput(inode);
 472                 }
 473                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 474                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 475                 goto next_inode;
 476         }
 477         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 478 out:
 479         return rc;
 480 }
 481
 482 /*
 483  * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
 484  * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
 485  * mount options, or whatever.
 486  */
 487 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 488                                 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 489 {
 490         int rc = 0, i;
 491         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 492         char *context = NULL;
 493         u32 len;
 494         char tmp;
 495
 496         security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
 497
 498         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 499                 return -EINVAL;
 500
 501         if (!ss_initialized)
 502                 return -EINVAL;
 503
 504         tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 505         /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
 506         for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
 507                 if (tmp & 0x01)
 508                         opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 509                 tmp >>= 1;
 510         }
 511         /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
 512         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
 513                 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 514
 515         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
 516         if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
 517                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 518                 goto out_free;
 519         }
 520
 521         opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
 522         if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
 523                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 524                 goto out_free;
 525         }
 526
 527         i = 0;
 528         if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
 529                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
 530                 if (rc)
 531                         goto out_free;
 532                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 533                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 534         }
 535         if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
 536                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
 537                 if (rc)
 538                         goto out_free;
 539                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 540                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
 541         }
 542         if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
 543                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
 544                 if (rc)
 545                         goto out_free;
 546                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 547                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 548         }
 549         if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
 550                 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
 551                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
 552
 553                 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
 554                 if (rc)
 555                         goto out_free;
 556                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 557                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 558         }
 559         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
 560                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
 561                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
 562         }
 563
 564         BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
 565
 566         return 0;
 567
 568 out_free:
 569         security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
 570         return rc;
 571 }
 572
 573 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
 574                       u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 575 {
 576         char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 577
 578         /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
 579         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
 580                 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
 581                     (old_sid != new_sid))
 582                         return 1;
 583
 584         /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
 585          * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
 586          */
 587         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 588                 if (mnt_flags & flag)
 589                         return 1;
 590         return 0;
 591 }
 592
 593 /*
 594  * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
 595  * labeling information.
 596  */
 597 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 598                                 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 599 {
 600         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 601         int rc = 0, i;
 602         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 603         const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
 604         struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
 605         struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
 606         u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
 607         u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
 608         char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
 609         int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
 610         int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
 611
 612         mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 613
 614         if (!ss_initialized) {
 615                 if (!num_opts) {
 616                         /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 617                            after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 618                            server is ready to handle calls. */
 619                         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 620                         if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 621                                 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
 622                         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 623                         goto out;
 624                 }
 625                 rc = -EINVAL;
 626                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
 627                         "before the security server is initialized\n");
 628                 goto out;
 629         }
 630
 631         /*
 632          * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice.  Once
 633          * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
 634          * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
 635          * we need to skip the double mount verification.
 636          *
 637          * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
 638          * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
 639          * this sb does not set any security options.  (The first options
 640          * will be used for both mounts)
 641          */
 642         if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
 643             && (num_opts == 0))
 644                 goto out;
 645
 646         /*
 647          * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
 648          * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
 649          * than once with different security options.
 650          */
 651         for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
 652                 u32 sid;
 653
 654                 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
 655                         continue;
 656                 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
 657                                              strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
 658                 if (rc) {
 659                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 660                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 661                                mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
 662                         goto out;
 663                 }
 664                 switch (flags[i]) {
 665                 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
 666                         fscontext_sid = sid;
 667
 668                         if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
 669                                         fscontext_sid))
 670                                 goto out_double_mount;
 671
 672                         sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 673                         break;
 674                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
 675                         context_sid = sid;
 676
 677                         if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
 678                                         context_sid))
 679                                 goto out_double_mount;
 680
 681                         sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
 682                         break;
 683                 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
 684                         rootcontext_sid = sid;
 685
 686                         if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
 687                                         rootcontext_sid))
 688                                 goto out_double_mount;
 689
 690                         sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 691
 692                         break;
 693                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
 694                         defcontext_sid = sid;
 695
 696                         if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
 697                                         defcontext_sid))
 698                                 goto out_double_mount;
 699
 700                         sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 701
 702                         break;
 703                 default:
 704                         rc = -EINVAL;
 705                         goto out;
 706                 }
 707         }
 708
 709         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
 710                 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
 711                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
 712                         goto out_double_mount;
 713                 rc = 0;
 714                 goto out;
 715         }
 716
 717         if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
 718                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
 719
 720         /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
 721         rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
 722         if (rc) {
 723                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 724                        __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
 725                 goto out;
 726         }
 727
 728         /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
 729         if (fscontext_sid) {
 730                 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
 731                 if (rc)
 732                         goto out;
 733
 734                 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
 735         }
 736
 737         /*
 738          * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
 739          * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
 740          * the superblock context if not already set.
 741          */
 742         if (context_sid) {
 743                 if (!fscontext_sid) {
 744                         rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
 745                                                           cred);
 746                         if (rc)
 747                                 goto out;
 748                         sbsec->sid = context_sid;
 749                 } else {
 750                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
 751                                                              cred);
 752                         if (rc)
 753                                 goto out;
 754                 }
 755                 if (!rootcontext_sid)
 756                         rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
 757
 758                 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
 759                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
 760         }
 761
 762         if (rootcontext_sid) {
 763                 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
 764                                                      cred);
 765                 if (rc)
 766                         goto out;
 767
 768                 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
 769                 root_isec->initialized = 1;
 770         }
 771
 772         if (defcontext_sid) {
 773                 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 774                         rc = -EINVAL;
 775                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
 776                                "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
 777                         goto out;
 778                 }
 779
 780                 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
 781                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
 782                                                              sbsec, cred);
 783                         if (rc)
 784                                 goto out;
 785                 }
 786
 787                 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
 788         }
 789
 790         rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
 791 out:
 792         mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
 793         return rc;
 794 out_double_mount:
 795         rc = -EINVAL;
 796         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different "
 797                "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
 798         goto out;
 799 }
 800
 801 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 802                                         struct super_block *newsb)
 803 {
 804         const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
 805         struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
 806
 807         int set_fscontext =     (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
 808         int set_context =       (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
 809         int set_rootcontext =   (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
 810
 811         /*
 812          * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
 813          * mount options.  thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
 814          * with it later
 815          */
 816         if (!ss_initialized) {
 817                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 818                 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
 819                         list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
 820                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 821                 return;
 822         }
 823
 824         /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
 825         BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
 826
 827         /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
 828         if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
 829                 return;
 830
 831         mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
 832
 833         newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
 834
 835         newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
 836         newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
 837         newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
 838
 839         if (set_context) {
 840                 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
 841
 842                 if (!set_fscontext)
 843                         newsbsec->sid = sid;
 844                 if (!set_rootcontext) {
 845                         struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
 846                         struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
 847                         newisec->sid = sid;
 848                 }
 849                 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
 850         }
 851         if (set_rootcontext) {
 852                 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
 853                 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
 854                 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
 855                 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
 856
 857                 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
 858         }
 859
 860         sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
 861         mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
 862 }
 863
 864 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
 865                                   struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 866 {
 867         char *p;
 868         char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
 869         char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
 870         int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
 871
 872         opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
 873
 874         /* Standard string-based options. */
 875         while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
 876                 int token;
 877                 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 878
 879                 if (!*p)
 880                         continue;
 881
 882                 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
 883
 884                 switch (token) {
 885                 case Opt_context:
 886                         if (context || defcontext) {
 887                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 888                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 889                                 goto out_err;
 890                         }
 891                         context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 892                         if (!context) {
 893                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 894                                 goto out_err;
 895                         }
 896                         break;
 897
 898                 case Opt_fscontext:
 899                         if (fscontext) {
 900                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 901                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 902                                 goto out_err;
 903                         }
 904                         fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 905                         if (!fscontext) {
 906                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 907                                 goto out_err;
 908                         }
 909                         break;
 910
 911                 case Opt_rootcontext:
 912                         if (rootcontext) {
 913                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 914                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 915                                 goto out_err;
 916                         }
 917                         rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 918                         if (!rootcontext) {
 919                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 920                                 goto out_err;
 921                         }
 922                         break;
 923
 924                 case Opt_defcontext:
 925                         if (context || defcontext) {
 926                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 927                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 928                                 goto out_err;
 929                         }
 930                         defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 931                         if (!defcontext) {
 932                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 933                                 goto out_err;
 934                         }
 935                         break;
 936                 case Opt_labelsupport:
 937                         break;
 938                 default:
 939                         rc = -EINVAL;
 940                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown mount option\n");
 941                         goto out_err;
 942
 943                 }
 944         }
 945
 946         rc = -ENOMEM;
 947         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
 948         if (!opts->mnt_opts)
 949                 goto out_err;
 950
 951         opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
 952         if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
 953                 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
 954                 goto out_err;
 955         }
 956
 957         if (fscontext) {
 958                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
 959                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 960         }
 961         if (context) {
 962                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
 963                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
 964         }
 965         if (rootcontext) {
 966                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
 967                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 968         }
 969         if (defcontext) {
 970                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
 971                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 972         }
 973
 974         opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
 975         return 0;
 976
 977 out_err:
 978         kfree(context);
 979         kfree(defcontext);
 980         kfree(fscontext);
 981         kfree(rootcontext);
 982         return rc;
 983 }
 984 /*
 985  * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
 986  */
 987 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 988 {
 989         int rc = 0;
 990         char *options = data;
 991         struct security_mnt_opts opts;
 992
 993         security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
 994
 995         if (!data)
 996                 goto out;
 997
 998         BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
 999
1000         rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1001         if (rc)
1002                 goto out_err;
1003
1004 out:
1005         rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1006
1007 out_err:
1008         security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1009         return rc;
1010 }
1011
1012 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1013                                struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1014 {
1015         int i;
1016         char *prefix;
1017
1018         for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1019                 char *has_comma;
1020
1021                 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1022                         has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1023                 else
1024                         has_comma = NULL;
1025
1026                 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1027                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
1028                         prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1029                         break;
1030                 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
1031                         prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1032                         break;
1033                 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1034                         prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1035                         break;
1036                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1037                         prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1038                         break;
1039                 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1040                         seq_putc(m, ',');
1041                         seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1042                         continue;
1043                 default:
1044                         BUG();
1045                 };
1046                 /* we need a comma before each option */
1047                 seq_putc(m, ',');
1048                 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1049                 if (has_comma)
1050                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
1051                 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1052                 if (has_comma)
1053                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
1054         }
1055 }
1056
1057 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1058 {
1059         struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1060         int rc;
1061
1062         rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1063         if (rc) {
1064                 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1065                 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1066                         rc = 0;
1067                 return rc;
1068         }
1069
1070         selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1071
1072         security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1073
1074         return rc;
1075 }
1076
1077 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1078 {
1079         switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1080         case S_IFSOCK:
1081                 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1082         case S_IFLNK:
1083                 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1084         case S_IFREG:
1085                 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1086         case S_IFBLK:
1087                 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1088         case S_IFDIR:
1089                 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1090         case S_IFCHR:
1091                 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1092         case S_IFIFO:
1093                 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1094
1095         }
1096
1097         return SECCLASS_FILE;
1098 }
1099
1100 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1101 {
1102         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1103 }
1104
1105 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1106 {
1107         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1108 }
1109
1110 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1111 {
1112         switch (family) {
1113         case PF_UNIX:
1114                 switch (type) {
1115                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1116                 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1117                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1118                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1119                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1120                 }
1121                 break;
1122         case PF_INET:
1123         case PF_INET6:
1124                 switch (type) {
1125                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1126                         if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1127                                 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1128                         else
1129                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1130                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1131                         if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1132                                 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1133                         else
1134                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1135                 case SOCK_DCCP:
1136                         return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1137                 default:
1138                         return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1139                 }
1140                 break;
1141         case PF_NETLINK:
1142                 switch (protocol) {
1143                 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1144                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1145                 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1146                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1147                 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1148                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1149                 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1150                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1151                 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1152                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1153                 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1154                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1155                 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1156                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1157                 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1158                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1159                 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1160                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1161                 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1162                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1163                 default:
1164                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1165                 }
1166         case PF_PACKET:
1167                 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1168         case PF_KEY:
1169                 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1170         case PF_APPLETALK:
1171                 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1172         }
1173
1174         return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1175 }
1176
1177 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1178 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1179                                 u16 tclass,
1180                                 u32 *sid)
1181 {
1182         int buflen, rc;
1183         char *buffer, *path, *end;
1184
1185         buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1186         if (!buffer)
1187                 return -ENOMEM;
1188
1189         buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1190         end = buffer+buflen;
1191         *--end = '\0';
1192         buflen--;
1193         path = end-1;
1194         *path = '/';
1195         while (de && de != de->parent) {
1196                 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1197                 if (buflen < 0)
1198                         break;
1199                 end -= de->namelen;
1200                 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1201                 *--end = '/';
1202                 path = end;
1203                 de = de->parent;
1204         }
1205         rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1206         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1207         return rc;
1208 }
1209 #else
1210 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1211                                 u16 tclass,
1212                                 u32 *sid)
1213 {
1214         return -EINVAL;
1215 }
1216 #endif
1217
1218 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1219 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1220 {
1221         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1222         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1223         u32 sid;
1224         struct dentry *dentry;
1225 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1226         char *context = NULL;
1227         unsigned len = 0;
1228         int rc = 0;
1229
1230         if (isec->initialized)
1231                 goto out;
1232
1233         mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1234         if (isec->initialized)
1235                 goto out_unlock;
1236
1237         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1238         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1239                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1240                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1241                    server is ready to handle calls. */
1242                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1243                 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1244                         list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1245                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1246                 goto out_unlock;
1247         }
1248
1249         switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1250         case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1251                 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1252                         isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1253                         break;
1254                 }
1255
1256                 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1257                    Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1258                 if (opt_dentry) {
1259                         /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1260                         dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1261                 } else {
1262                         /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1263                         dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1264                 }
1265                 if (!dentry) {
1266                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  no dentry for dev=%s "
1267                                "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1268                                inode->i_ino);
1269                         goto out_unlock;
1270                 }
1271
1272                 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1273                 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1274                 if (!context) {
1275                         rc = -ENOMEM;
1276                         dput(dentry);
1277                         goto out_unlock;
1278                 }
1279                 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1280                                            context, len);
1281                 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1282                         /* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
1283                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1284                                                    NULL, 0);
1285                         if (rc < 0) {
1286                                 dput(dentry);
1287                                 goto out_unlock;
1288                         }
1289                         kfree(context);
1290                         len = rc;
1291                         context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1292                         if (!context) {
1293                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1294                                 dput(dentry);
1295                                 goto out_unlock;
1296                         }
1297                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1298                                                    XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1299                                                    context, len);
1300                 }
1301                 dput(dentry);
1302                 if (rc < 0) {
1303                         if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1304                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  getxattr returned "
1305                                        "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1306                                        -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1307                                 kfree(context);
1308                                 goto out_unlock;
1309                         }
1310                         /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1311                         sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1312                         rc = 0;
1313                 } else {
1314                         rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1315                                                              sbsec->def_sid,
1316                                                              GFP_NOFS);
1317                         if (rc) {
1318                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
1319                                        "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1320                                        __func__, context, -rc,
1321                                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1322                                 kfree(context);
1323                                 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1324                                 rc = 0;
1325                                 break;
1326                         }
1327                 }
1328                 kfree(context);
1329                 isec->sid = sid;
1330                 break;
1331         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1332                 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1333                 break;
1334         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1335                 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1336                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1337
1338                 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1339                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1340                 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1341                                              sbsec->sid,
1342                                              isec->sclass,
1343                                              &sid);
1344                 if (rc)
1345                         goto out_unlock;
1346                 isec->sid = sid;
1347                 break;
1348         case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1349                 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1350                 break;
1351         default:
1352                 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1353                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1354
1355                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1356                         struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1357                         if (proci->pde) {
1358                                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1359                                 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1360                                                           isec->sclass,
1361                                                           &sid);
1362                                 if (rc)
1363                                         goto out_unlock;
1364                                 isec->sid = sid;
1365                         }
1366                 }
1367                 break;
1368         }
1369
1370         isec->initialized = 1;
1371
1372 out_unlock:
1373         mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1374 out:
1375         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1376                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1377         return rc;
1378 }
1379
1380 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1381 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1382 {
1383         u32 perm = 0;
1384
1385         switch (sig) {
1386         case SIGCHLD:
1387                 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1388                 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1389                 break;
1390         case SIGKILL:
1391                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1392                 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1393                 break;
1394         case SIGSTOP:
1395                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1396                 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1397                 break;
1398         default:
1399                 /* All other signals. */
1400                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1401                 break;
1402         }
1403
1404         return perm;
1405 }
1406
1407 /*
1408  * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1409  * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1410  */
1411 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1412                          const struct cred *target,
1413                          u32 perms)
1414 {
1415         u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1416
1417         return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1418 }
1419
1420 /*
1421  * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1422  * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1423  * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1424  * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1425  */
1426 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1427                          const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1428                          u32 perms)
1429 {
1430         const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1431         u32 sid1, sid2;
1432
1433         rcu_read_lock();
1434         __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security;  sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1435         __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security;  sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1436         rcu_read_unlock();
1437         return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1438 }
1439
1440 /*
1441  * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1442  * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1443  * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1444  * - this uses current's subjective creds
1445  */
1446 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1447                             u32 perms)
1448 {
1449         u32 sid, tsid;
1450
1451         sid = current_sid();
1452         tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1453         return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1454 }
1455
1456 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1457 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1458 #endif
1459
1460 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1461 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1462                                const struct cred *cred,
1463                                int cap, int audit)
1464 {
1465         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1466         struct av_decision avd;
1467         u16 sclass;
1468         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1469         u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1470         int rc;
1471
1472         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1473         ad.tsk = tsk;
1474         ad.u.cap = cap;
1475
1476         switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1477         case 0:
1478                 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1479                 break;
1480         case 1:
1481                 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1482                 break;
1483         default:
1484                 printk(KERN_ERR
1485                        "SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1486                 BUG();
1487         }
1488
1489         rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1490         if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1491                 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1492         return rc;
1493 }
1494
1495 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1496 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1497                            u32 perms)
1498 {
1499         u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1500
1501         return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1502                             SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1503 }
1504
1505 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1506    The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1507    data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1508 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1509                           struct inode *inode,
1510                           u32 perms,
1511                           struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1512 {
1513         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1514         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1515         u32 sid;
1516
1517         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1518                 return 0;
1519
1520         sid = cred_sid(cred);
1521         isec = inode->i_security;
1522
1523         if (!adp) {
1524                 adp = &ad;
1525                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1526                 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1527         }
1528
1529         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1530 }
1531
1532 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1533    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1534    pathname if needed. */
1535 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1536                                   struct vfsmount *mnt,
1537                                   struct dentry *dentry,
1538                                   u32 av)
1539 {
1540         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1541         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1542
1543         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1544         ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1545         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1546         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1547 }
1548
1549 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1550    access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
1551    descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1552    check a particular permission to the file.
1553    Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1554    has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
1555    access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1556    where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1557 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1558                          struct file *file,
1559                          u32 av)
1560 {
1561         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1562         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1563         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1564         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1565         int rc;
1566
1567         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1568         ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1569
1570         if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1571                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1572                                   SECCLASS_FD,
1573                                   FD__USE,
1574                                   &ad);
1575                 if (rc)
1576                         goto out;
1577         }
1578
1579         /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1580         rc = 0;
1581         if (av)
1582                 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1583
1584 out:
1585         return rc;
1586 }
1587
1588 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1589 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1590                       struct dentry *dentry,
1591                       u16 tclass)
1592 {
1593         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1594         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1595         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1596         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1597         u32 sid, newsid;
1598         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1599         int rc;
1600
1601         dsec = dir->i_security;
1602         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1603
1604         sid = tsec->sid;
1605         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1606
1607         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1608         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1609
1610         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1611                           DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1612                           &ad);
1613         if (rc)
1614                 return rc;
1615
1616         if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1617                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1618                 if (rc)
1619                         return rc;
1620         }
1621
1622         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1623         if (rc)
1624                 return rc;
1625
1626         return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1627                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1628                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1629 }
1630
1631 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1632 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1633                           struct task_struct *ctx)
1634 {
1635         u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1636
1637         return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1638 }
1639
1640 #define MAY_LINK        0
1641 #define MAY_UNLINK      1
1642 #define MAY_RMDIR       2
1643
1644 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1645 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1646                     struct dentry *dentry,
1647                     int kind)
1648
1649 {
1650         struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1651         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1652         u32 sid = current_sid();
1653         u32 av;
1654         int rc;
1655
1656         dsec = dir->i_security;
1657         isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1658
1659         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1660         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1661
1662         av = DIR__SEARCH;
1663         av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1664         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1665         if (rc)
1666                 return rc;
1667
1668         switch (kind) {
1669         case MAY_LINK:
1670                 av = FILE__LINK;
1671                 break;
1672         case MAY_UNLINK:
1673                 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1674                 break;
1675         case MAY_RMDIR:
1676                 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1677                 break;
1678         default:
1679                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized kind %d\n",
1680                         __func__, kind);
1681                 return 0;
1682         }
1683
1684         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1685         return rc;
1686 }
1687
1688 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1689                              struct dentry *old_dentry,
1690                              struct inode *new_dir,
1691                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
1692 {
1693         struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1694         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1695         u32 sid = current_sid();
1696         u32 av;
1697         int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1698         int rc;
1699
1700         old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1701         old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1702         old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1703         new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1704
1705         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1706
1707         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1708         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1709                           DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1710         if (rc)
1711                 return rc;
1712         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1713                           old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1714         if (rc)
1715                 return rc;
1716         if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1717                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1718                                   old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1719                 if (rc)
1720                         return rc;
1721         }
1722
1723         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1724         av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1725         if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1726                 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1727         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1728         if (rc)
1729                 return rc;
1730         if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1731                 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1732                 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1733                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1734                                   new_isec->sclass,
1735                                   (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1736                 if (rc)
1737                         return rc;
1738         }
1739
1740         return 0;
1741 }
1742
1743 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1744 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1745                                struct super_block *sb,
1746                                u32 perms,
1747                                struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1748 {
1749         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1750         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1751
1752         sbsec = sb->s_security;
1753         return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1754 }
1755
1756 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1757 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1758 {
1759         u32 av = 0;
1760
1761         if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1762                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1763                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1764                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1765                         av |= FILE__READ;
1766
1767                 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1768                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1769                 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1770                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1771
1772         } else {
1773                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1774                         av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1775                 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1776                         av |= DIR__WRITE;
1777                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1778                         av |= DIR__READ;
1779         }
1780
1781         return av;
1782 }
1783
1784 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1785 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1786 {
1787         u32 av = 0;
1788
1789         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1790                 av |= FILE__READ;
1791         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1792                 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1793                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1794                 else
1795                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1796         }
1797         if (!av) {
1798                 /*
1799                  * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1800                  */
1801                 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1802         }
1803
1804         return av;
1805 }
1806
1807 /*
1808  * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1809  * open permission.
1810  */
1811 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1812 {
1813         u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1814
1815         if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1816                 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1817                 /*
1818                  * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1819                  */
1820                 if (S_ISREG(mode))
1821                         av |= FILE__OPEN;
1822                 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1823                         av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1824                 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1825                         av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1826                 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1827                         av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1828                 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1829                         av |= DIR__OPEN;
1830                 else
1831                         printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1832                                 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1833         }
1834         return av;
1835 }
1836
1837 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1838
1839 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1840                                      unsigned int mode)
1841 {
1842         int rc;
1843
1844         rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1845         if (rc)
1846                 return rc;
1847
1848         if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1849                 u32 sid = current_sid();
1850                 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1851                 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1852         }
1853
1854         return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1855 }
1856
1857 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1858 {
1859         int rc;
1860
1861         rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1862         if (rc)
1863                 return rc;
1864
1865         return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1866 }
1867
1868 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1869                           kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1870 {
1871         int error;
1872
1873         error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1874         if (error)
1875                 return error;
1876
1877         return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1878 }
1879
1880 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1881                           const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1882                           const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1883                           const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1884 {
1885         int error;
1886
1887         error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
1888                                       effective, inheritable, permitted);
1889         if (error)
1890                 return error;
1891
1892         return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1893 }
1894
1895 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1896                            int cap, int audit)
1897 {
1898         int rc;
1899
1900         rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1901         if (rc)
1902                 return rc;
1903
1904         return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1905 }
1906
1907 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1908 {
1909         int buflen, rc;
1910         char *buffer, *path, *end;
1911
1912         rc = -ENOMEM;
1913         buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1914         if (!buffer)
1915                 goto out;
1916
1917         buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1918         end = buffer+buflen;
1919         *--end = '\0';
1920         buflen--;
1921         path = end-1;
1922         *path = '/';
1923         while (table) {
1924                 const char *name = table->procname;
1925                 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1926                 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1927                 if (buflen < 0)
1928                         goto out_free;
1929                 end -= namelen;
1930                 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1931                 *--end = '/';
1932                 path = end;
1933                 table = table->parent;
1934         }
1935         buflen -= 4;
1936         if (buflen < 0)
1937                 goto out_free;
1938         end -= 4;
1939         memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1940         path = end;
1941         rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1942 out_free:
1943         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1944 out:
1945         return rc;
1946 }
1947
1948 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1949 {
1950         int error = 0;
1951         u32 av;
1952         u32 tsid, sid;
1953         int rc;
1954
1955         rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1956         if (rc)
1957                 return rc;
1958
1959         sid = current_sid();
1960
1961         rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1962                                     SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1963         if (rc) {
1964                 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1965                 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1966         }
1967
1968         /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1969          * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1970         if (op == 001) {
1971                 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1972                                      SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1973         } else {
1974                 av = 0;
1975                 if (op & 004)
1976                         av |= FILE__READ;
1977                 if (op & 002)
1978                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1979                 if (av)
1980                         error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1981                                              SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1982         }
1983
1984         return error;
1985 }
1986
1987 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1988 {
1989         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1990         int rc = 0;
1991
1992         if (!sb)
1993                 return 0;
1994
1995         switch (cmds) {
1996         case Q_SYNC:
1997         case Q_QUOTAON:
1998         case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1999         case Q_SETINFO:
2000         case Q_SETQUOTA:
2001                 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2002                 break;
2003         case Q_GETFMT:
2004         case Q_GETINFO:
2005         case Q_GETQUOTA:
2006                 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2007                 break;
2008         default:
2009                 rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2010                 break;
2011         }
2012         return rc;
2013 }
2014
2015 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2016 {
2017         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2018
2019         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2020 }
2021
2022 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2023 {
2024         int rc;
2025
2026         rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
2027         if (rc)
2028                 return rc;
2029
2030         switch (type) {
2031         case 3:         /* Read last kernel messages */
2032         case 10:        /* Return size of the log buffer */
2033                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2034                 break;
2035         case 6:         /* Disable logging to console */
2036         case 7:         /* Enable logging to console */
2037         case 8:         /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2038                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2039                 break;
2040         case 0:         /* Close log */
2041         case 1:         /* Open log */
2042         case 2:         /* Read from log */
2043         case 4:         /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2044         case 5:         /* Clear ring buffer */
2045         default:
2046                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2047                 break;
2048         }
2049         return rc;
2050 }
2051
2052 /*
2053  * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2054  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2055  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2056  *
2057  * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
2058  * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
2059  * the capability is granted.
2060  *
2061  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2062  * processes that allocate mappings.
2063  */
2064 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2065 {
2066         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2067
2068         rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2069                              SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2070         if (rc == 0)
2071                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2072
2073         return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2074 }
2075
2076 /* binprm security operations */
2077
2078 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2079 {
2080         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2081         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2082         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2083         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2084         struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2085         int rc;
2086
2087         rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2088         if (rc)
2089                 return rc;
2090
2091         /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2092          * the script interpreter */
2093         if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2094                 return 0;
2095
2096         old_tsec = current_security();
2097         new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2098         isec = inode->i_security;
2099
2100         /* Default to the current task SID. */
2101         new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2102         new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2103
2104         /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2105         new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2106         new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2107         new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2108
2109         if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2110                 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2111                 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2112                 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2113         } else {
2114                 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2115                 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2116                                              SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2117                 if (rc)
2118                         return rc;
2119         }
2120
2121         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2122         ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2123
2124         if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2125                 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2126
2127         if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2128                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2129                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2130                 if (rc)
2131                         return rc;
2132         } else {
2133                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2134                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2135                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2136                 if (rc)
2137                         return rc;
2138
2139                 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2140                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2141                 if (rc)
2142                         return rc;
2143
2144                 /* Check for shared state */
2145                 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2146                         rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2147                                           SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2148                                           NULL);
2149                         if (rc)
2150                                 return -EPERM;
2151                 }
2152
2153                 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2154                  * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2155                 if (bprm->unsafe &
2156                     (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2157                         struct task_struct *tracer;
2158                         struct task_security_struct *sec;
2159                         u32 ptsid = 0;
2160
2161                         rcu_read_lock();
2162                         tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2163                         if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2164                                 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2165                                 ptsid = sec->sid;
2166                         }
2167                         rcu_read_unlock();
2168
2169                         if (ptsid != 0) {
2170                                 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2171                                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2172                                                   PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2173                                 if (rc)
2174                                         return -EPERM;
2175                         }
2176                 }
2177
2178                 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2179                 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2180         }
2181
2182         return 0;
2183 }
2184
2185 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2186 {
2187         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2188         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2189         u32 sid, osid;
2190         int atsecure = 0;
2191
2192         sid = tsec->sid;
2193         osid = tsec->osid;
2194
2195         if (osid != sid) {
2196                 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2197                    the noatsecure permission is granted between
2198                    the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2199                 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2200                                         SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2201                                         PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2202         }
2203
2204         return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2205 }
2206
2207 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2208 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2209
2210 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2211 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2212                                             struct files_struct *files)
2213 {
2214         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2215         struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2216         struct tty_struct *tty;
2217         struct fdtable *fdt;
2218         long j = -1;
2219         int drop_tty = 0;
2220
2221         tty = get_current_tty();
2222         if (tty) {
2223                 file_list_lock();
2224                 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2225                         struct inode *inode;
2226
2227                         /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2228                            Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2229                            than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2230                            file may belong to another process and we are only
2231                            interested in the inode-based check here. */
2232                         file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2233                         inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2234                         if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2235                                            FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2236                                 drop_tty = 1;
2237                         }
2238                 }
2239                 file_list_unlock();
2240                 tty_kref_put(tty);
2241         }
2242         /* Reset controlling tty. */
2243         if (drop_tty)
2244                 no_tty();
2245
2246         /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2247
2248         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2249
2250         spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2251         for (;;) {
2252                 unsigned long set, i;
2253                 int fd;
2254
2255                 j++;
2256                 i = j * __NFDBITS;
2257                 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2258                 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2259                         break;
2260                 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2261                 if (!set)
2262                         continue;
2263                 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2264                 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2265                         if (set & 1) {
2266                                 file = fget(i);
2267                                 if (!file)
2268                                         continue;
2269                                 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2270                                                   file,
2271                                                   file_to_av(file))) {
2272                                         sys_close(i);
2273                                         fd = get_unused_fd();
2274                                         if (fd != i) {
2275                                                 if (fd >= 0)
2276                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
2277                                                 fput(file);
2278                                                 continue;
2279                                         }
2280                                         if (devnull) {
2281                                                 get_file(devnull);
2282                                         } else {
2283                                                 devnull = dentry_open(
2284                                                         dget(selinux_null),
2285                                                         mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2286                                                         O_RDWR, cred);
2287                                                 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2288                                                         devnull = NULL;
2289                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
2290                                                         fput(file);
2291                                                         continue;
2292                                                 }
2293                                         }
2294                                         fd_install(fd, devnull);
2295                                 }
2296                                 fput(file);
2297                         }
2298                 }
2299                 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2300
2301         }
2302         spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2303 }
2304
2305 /*
2306  * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2307  */
2308 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2309 {
2310         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2311         struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2312         int rc, i;
2313
2314         new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2315         if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2316                 return;
2317
2318         /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2319         flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2320
2321         /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2322         current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2323
2324         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2325          * SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2326          * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2327          *
2328          * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2329          * controlled by the setrlimit check.  The inclusion of the init task's
2330          * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2331          * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2332          * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2333          */
2334         rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2335                           PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2336         if (rc) {
2337                 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2338                         rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2339                         initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2340                         rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2341                 }
2342                 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2343         }
2344 }
2345
2346 /*
2347  * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2348  * due to exec
2349  */
2350 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2351 {
2352         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2353         struct itimerval itimer;
2354         struct sighand_struct *psig;
2355         u32 osid, sid;
2356         int rc, i;
2357         unsigned long flags;
2358
2359         osid = tsec->osid;
2360         sid = tsec->sid;
2361
2362         if (sid == osid)
2363                 return;
2364
2365         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2366          * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2367          * flush and unblock signals.
2368          *
2369          * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2370          * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2371          */
2372         rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2373         if (rc) {
2374                 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2375                 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2376                         do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2377                 flush_signals(current);
2378                 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2379                 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2380                 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2381                 recalc_sigpending();
2382                 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2383         }
2384
2385         /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2386          * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2387         read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2388         psig = current->parent->sighand;
2389         spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2390         wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2391         spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2392         read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2393 }
2394
2395 /* superblock security operations */
2396
2397 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2398 {
2399         return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2400 }
2401
2402 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2403 {
2404         superblock_free_security(sb);
2405 }
2406
2407 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2408 {
2409         if (plen > olen)
2410                 return 0;
2411
2412         return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2413 }
2414
2415 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2416 {
2417         return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2418                 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2419                 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2420                 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2421                 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2422 }
2423
2424 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2425 {
2426         if (!*first) {
2427                 **to = ',';
2428                 *to += 1;
2429         } else
2430                 *first = 0;
2431         memcpy(*to, from, len);
2432         *to += len;
2433 }
2434
2435 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2436                                        int len)
2437 {
2438         int current_size = 0;
2439
2440         if (!*first) {
2441                 **to = '|';
2442                 *to += 1;
2443         } else
2444                 *first = 0;
2445
2446         while (current_size < len) {
2447                 if (*from != '"') {
2448                         **to = *from;
2449                         *to += 1;
2450                 }
2451                 from += 1;
2452                 current_size += 1;
2453         }
2454 }
2455
2456 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2457 {
2458         int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2459         char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2460         char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2461         int open_quote = 0;
2462
2463         in_curr = orig;
2464         sec_curr = copy;
2465
2466         nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2467         if (!nosec) {
2468                 rc = -ENOMEM;
2469                 goto out;
2470         }
2471
2472         nosec_save = nosec;
2473         fnosec = fsec = 1;
2474         in_save = in_end = orig;
2475
2476         do {
2477                 if (*in_end == '"')
2478                         open_quote = !open_quote;
2479                 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2480                                 *in_end == '\0') {
2481                         int len = in_end - in_curr;
2482
2483                         if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2484                                 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2485                         else
2486                                 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2487
2488                         in_curr = in_end + 1;
2489                 }
2490         } while (*in_end++);
2491
2492         strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2493         free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2494 out:
2495         return rc;
2496 }
2497
2498 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2499 {
2500         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2501         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2502         int rc;
2503
2504         rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2505         if (rc)
2506                 return rc;
2507
2508         /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2509         if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2510                 return 0;
2511
2512         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2513         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2514         return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2515 }
2516
2517 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2518 {
2519         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2520         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2521
2522         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2523         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2524         return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2525 }
2526
2527 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2528                          struct path *path,
2529                          char *type,
2530                          unsigned long flags,
2531                          void *data)
2532 {
2533         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2534
2535         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2536                 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2537                                            FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2538         else
2539                 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2540                                        FILE__MOUNTON);
2541 }
2542
2543 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2544 {
2545         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2546
2547         return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2548                                    FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2549 }
2550
2551 /* inode security operations */
2552
2553 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2554 {
2555         return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2556 }
2557
2558 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2559 {
2560         inode_free_security(inode);
2561 }
2562
2563 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2564                                        char **name, void **value,
2565                                        size_t *len)
2566 {
2567         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2568         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2569         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2570         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2571         u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2572         int rc;
2573         char *namep = NULL, *context;
2574
2575         dsec = dir->i_security;
2576         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2577
2578         sid = tsec->sid;
2579         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2580
2581         if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2582                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2583                                              inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2584                                              &newsid);
2585                 if (rc) {
2586                         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  "
2587                                "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2588                                "ino=%ld)\n",
2589                                __func__,
2590                                -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2591                         return rc;
2592                 }
2593         }
2594
2595         /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2596         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2597                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2598                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2599                 isec->sid = newsid;
2600                 isec->initialized = 1;
2601         }
2602
2603         if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2604                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2605
2606         if (name) {
2607                 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2608                 if (!namep)
2609                         return -ENOMEM;
2610                 *name = namep;
2611         }
2612
2613         if (value && len) {
2614                 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2615                 if (rc) {
2616                         kfree(namep);
2617                         return rc;
2618                 }
2619                 *value = context;
2620                 *len = clen;
2621         }
2622
2623         return 0;
2624 }
2625
2626 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2627 {
2628         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2629 }
2630
2631 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2632 {
2633         return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2634 }
2635
2636 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2637 {
2638         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2639 }
2640
2641 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2642 {
2643         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2644 }
2645
2646 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2647 {
2648         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2649 }
2650
2651 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2652 {
2653         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2654 }
2655
2656 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2657 {
2658         return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2659 }
2660
2661 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2662                                 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2663 {
2664         return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2665 }
2666
2667 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2668 {
2669         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2670
2671         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2672 }
2673
2674 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2675 {
2676         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2677         int rc;
2678
2679         rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2680         if (rc)
2681                 return rc;
2682         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2683 }
2684
2685 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2686 {
2687         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2688         int rc;
2689
2690         rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2691         if (rc)
2692                 return rc;
2693
2694         if (!mask) {
2695                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2696                 return 0;
2697         }
2698
2699         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2700                               file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2701 }
2702
2703 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2704 {
2705         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2706         int rc;
2707
2708         rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2709         if (rc)
2710                 return rc;
2711
2712         if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2713                 return 0;
2714
2715         if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2716                                ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2717                 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2718
2719         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2720 }
2721
2722 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2723 {
2724         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2725
2726         return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2727 }
2728
2729 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2730 {
2731         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2732
2733         if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2734                      sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2735                 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2736                         if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2737                                 return -EPERM;
2738                 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2739                         /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2740                            Restrict to administrator. */
2741                         return -EPERM;
2742                 }
2743         }
2744
2745         /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2746            ordinary setattr permission. */
2747         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2748 }
2749
2750 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2751                                   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2752 {
2753         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2754         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2755         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2756         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2757         u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2758         int rc = 0;
2759
2760         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2761                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2762
2763         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2764         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2765                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2766
2767         if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2768                 return -EPERM;
2769
2770         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2771         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2772
2773         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2774                           FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2775         if (rc)
2776                 return rc;
2777
2778         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2779         if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2780                 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2781                         return rc;
2782                 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2783         }
2784         if (rc)
2785                 return rc;
2786
2787         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2788                           FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2789         if (rc)
2790                 return rc;
2791
2792         rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2793                                           isec->sclass);
2794         if (rc)
2795                 return rc;
2796
2797         return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2798                             sbsec->sid,
2799                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2800                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2801                             &ad);
2802 }
2803
2804 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2805                                         const void *value, size_t size,
2806                                         int flags)
2807 {
2808         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2809         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2810         u32 newsid;
2811         int rc;
2812
2813         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2814                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2815                 return;
2816         }
2817
2818         rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2819         if (rc) {
2820                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to map context to SID"
2821                        "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2822                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2823                 return;
2824         }
2825
2826         isec->sid = newsid;
2827         return;
2828 }
2829
2830 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2831 {
2832         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2833
2834         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2835 }
2836
2837 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2838 {
2839         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2840
2841         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2842 }
2843
2844 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2845 {
2846         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2847                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2848
2849         /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2850            You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2851         return -EACCES;
2852 }
2853
2854 /*
2855  * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2856  *
2857  * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2858  */
2859 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2860 {
2861         u32 size;
2862         int error;
2863         char *context = NULL;
2864         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2865
2866         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2867                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2868
2869         /*
2870          * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2871          * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2872          * use the in-core value under current policy.
2873          * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2874          * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2875          * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2876          * in-core context value, not a denial.
2877          */
2878         error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2879                                 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2880         if (!error)
2881                 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2882                                                       &size);
2883         else
2884                 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2885         if (error)
2886                 return error;
2887         error = size;
2888         if (alloc) {
2889                 *buffer = context;
2890                 goto out_nofree;
2891         }
2892         kfree(context);
2893 out_nofree:
2894         return error;
2895 }
2896
2897 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2898                                      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2899 {
2900         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2901         u32 newsid;
2902         int rc;
2903
2904         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2905                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2906
2907         if (!value || !size)
2908                 return -EACCES;
2909
2910         rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2911         if (rc)
2912                 return rc;
2913
2914         isec->sid = newsid;
2915         return 0;
2916 }
2917
2918 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2919 {
2920         const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2921         if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2922                 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2923         return len;
2924 }
2925
2926 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2927 {
2928         return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2929 }
2930
2931 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2932 {
2933         return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2934 }
2935
2936 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2937 {
2938         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2939         *secid = isec->sid;
2940 }
2941
2942 /* file security operations */
2943
2944 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2945 {
2946         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2947         int rc;
2948         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2949
2950         if (!mask) {
2951                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2952                 return 0;
2953         }
2954
2955         /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2956         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2957                 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2958
2959         rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2960                            file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2961         if (rc)
2962                 return rc;
2963
2964         return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2965 }
2966
2967 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2968 {
2969         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2970         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2971         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2972         u32 sid = current_sid();
2973
2974         if (!mask) {
2975                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2976                 return 0;
2977         }
2978
2979         if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2980             && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2981                 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2982
2983         return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2984 }
2985
2986 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2987 {
2988         return file_alloc_security(file);
2989 }
2990
2991 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2992 {
2993         file_free_security(file);
2994 }
2995
2996 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2997                               unsigned long arg)
2998 {
2999         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3000         u32 av = 0;
3001
3002         if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
3003                 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3004         if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
3005                 av |= FILE__READ;
3006         if (!av)
3007                 av = FILE__IOCTL;
3008
3009         return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3010 }
3011
3012 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3013 {
3014         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3015         int rc = 0;
3016
3017 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3018         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3019                 /*
3020                  * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3021                  * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3022                  * This has an additional check.
3023                  */
3024                 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3025                 if (rc)
3026                         goto error;
3027         }
3028 #endif
3029
3030         if (file) {
3031                 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3032                 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3033
3034                 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3035                 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3036                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
3037
3038                 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3039                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3040
3041                 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3042         }
3043
3044 error:
3045         return rc;
3046 }
3047
3048 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3049                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3050                              unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3051 {
3052         int rc = 0;
3053         u32 sid = current_sid();
3054
3055         if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3056                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3057                                   MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3058         if (rc || addr_only)
3059                 return rc;
3060
3061         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3062                 prot = reqprot;
3063
3064         return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3065                                    (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3066 }
3067
3068 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3069                                  unsigned long reqprot,
3070                                  unsigned long prot)
3071 {
3072         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3073         int rc;
3074
3075         rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3076         if (rc)
3077                 return rc;
3078
3079         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3080                 prot = reqprot;
3081
3082 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3083         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3084                 rc = 0;
3085                 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3086                     vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3087                         rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3088                 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3089                            vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3090                            vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3091                         rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3092                 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3093                         /*
3094                          * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3095                          * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3096                          * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3097                          * modified content.  This typically should only
3098                          * occur for text relocations.
3099                          */
3100                         rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3101                 }
3102                 if (rc)
3103                         return rc;
3104         }
3105 #endif
3106
3107         return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3108 }
3109
3110 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3111 {
3112         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3113
3114         return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3115 }
3116
3117 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3118                               unsigned long arg)
3119 {
3120         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3121         int err = 0;
3122
3123         switch (cmd) {
3124         case F_SETFL:
3125                 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3126                         err = -EINVAL;
3127                         break;
3128                 }
3129
3130                 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3131                         err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3132                         break;
3133                 }
3134                 /* fall through */
3135         case F_SETOWN:
3136         case F_SETSIG:
3137         case F_GETFL:
3138         case F_GETOWN:
3139         case F_GETSIG:
3140                 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3141                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3142                 break;
3143         case F_GETLK:
3144         case F_SETLK:
3145         case F_SETLKW:
3146 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3147         case F_GETLK64:
3148         case F_SETLK64:
3149         case F_SETLKW64:
3150 #endif
3151                 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3152                         err = -EINVAL;
3153                         break;
3154                 }
3155                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3156                 break;
3157         }
3158
3159         return err;
3160 }
3161
3162 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3163 {
3164         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3165
3166         fsec = file->f_security;
3167         fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3168
3169         return 0;
3170 }
3171
3172 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3173                                        struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3174 {
3175         struct file *file;
3176         u32 sid = current_sid();
3177         u32 perm;
3178         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3179
3180         /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3181         file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3182
3183         fsec = file->f_security;
3184
3185         if (!signum)
3186                 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3187         else
3188                 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3189
3190         return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3191                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3192 }
3193
3194 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3195 {
3196         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3197
3198         return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3199 }
3200
3201 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3202 {
3203         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3204         struct inode *inode;
3205         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3206
3207         inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3208         fsec = file->f_security;
3209         isec = inode->i_security;
3210         /*
3211          * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3212          * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3213          * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3214          * Task label is already saved in the file security
3215          * struct as its SID.
3216          */
3217         fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3218         fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3219         /*
3220          * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3221          * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3222          * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3223          * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3224          * new inode label or new policy.
3225          * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3226          */
3227         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3228 }
3229
3230 /* task security operations */
3231
3232 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3233 {
3234         int rc;
3235
3236         rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3237         if (rc)
3238                 return rc;
3239
3240         return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3241 }
3242
3243 /*
3244  * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3245  */
3246 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3247 {
3248         struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3249         cred->security = NULL;
3250         kfree(tsec);
3251 }
3252
3253 /*
3254  * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3255  */
3256 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3257                                 gfp_t gfp)
3258 {
3259         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3260         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3261
3262         old_tsec = old->security;
3263
3264         tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3265         if (!tsec)
3266                 return -ENOMEM;
3267
3268         new->security = tsec;
3269         return 0;
3270 }
3271
3272 /*
3273  * commit new credentials
3274  */
3275 static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3276 {
3277         secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
3278 }
3279
3280 /*
3281  * set the security data for a kernel service
3282  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3283  */
3284 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3285 {
3286         struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3287         u32 sid = current_sid();
3288         int ret;
3289
3290         ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3291                            SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3292                            KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3293                            NULL);
3294         if (ret == 0) {
3295                 tsec->sid = secid;
3296                 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3297                 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3298                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3299         }
3300         return ret;
3301 }
3302
3303 /*
3304  * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3305  * objective context of the specified inode
3306  */
3307 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3308 {
3309         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3310         struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3311         u32 sid = current_sid();
3312         int ret;
3313
3314         ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3315                            SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3316                            KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3317                            NULL);
3318
3319         if (ret == 0)
3320                 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3321         return 0;
3322 }
3323
3324 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3325 {
3326         /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3327            since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3328            identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3329            this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use
3330            of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3331            capable hook. */
3332         return 0;
3333 }
3334
3335 static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3336                                    int flags)
3337 {
3338         return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
3339 }
3340
3341 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3342 {
3343         /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3344         return 0;
3345 }
3346
3347 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3348 {
3349         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3350 }
3351
3352 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3353 {
3354         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3355 }
3356
3357 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3358 {
3359         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3360 }
3361
3362 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3363 {
3364         *secid = task_sid(p);
3365 }
3366
3367 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3368 {
3369         /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3370         return 0;
3371 }
3372
3373 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3374 {
3375         int rc;
3376
3377         rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3378         if (rc)
3379                 return rc;
3380
3381         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3382 }
3383
3384 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3385 {
3386         int rc;
3387
3388         rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3389         if (rc)
3390                 return rc;
3391
3392         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3393 }
3394
3395 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3396 {
3397         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3398 }
3399
3400 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3401 {
3402         struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3403         int rc;
3404
3405         rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3406         if (rc)
3407                 return rc;
3408
3409         /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3410            lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3411            later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3412            upon context transitions.  See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3413         if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3414                 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3415
3416         return 0;
3417 }
3418
3419 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3420 {
3421         int rc;
3422
3423         rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3424         if (rc)
3425                 return rc;
3426
3427         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3428 }
3429
3430 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3431 {
3432         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3433 }
3434
3435 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3436 {
3437         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3438 }
3439
3440 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3441                                 int sig, u32 secid)
3442 {
3443         u32 perm;
3444         int rc;
3445
3446         rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3447         if (rc)
3448                 return rc;
3449
3450         if (!sig)
3451                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3452         else
3453                 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3454         if (secid)
3455                 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3456                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3457         else
3458                 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3459         return rc;
3460 }
3461
3462 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3463                               unsigned long arg2,
3464                               unsigned long arg3,
3465                               unsigned long arg4,
3466                               unsigned long arg5)
3467 {
3468         /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3469            any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3470            the state of the current process. */
3471         return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
3472 }
3473
3474 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3475 {
3476         return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3477 }
3478
3479 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3480                                   struct inode *inode)
3481 {
3482         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3483         u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3484
3485         isec->sid = sid;
3486         isec->initialized = 1;
3487 }
3488
3489 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3490 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3491                         struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3492 {
3493         int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3494         struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3495
3496         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3497         ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3498         if (ih == NULL)
3499                 goto out;
3500
3501         ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3502         if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3503                 goto out;
3504
3505         ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3506         ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3507         ret = 0;
3508
3509         if (proto)
3510                 *proto = ih->protocol;
3511
3512         switch (ih->protocol) {
3513         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3514                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3515
3516                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3517                         break;
3518
3519                 offset += ihlen;
3520                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3521                 if (th == NULL)
3522                         break;
3523
3524                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3525                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3526                 break;
3527         }
3528
3529         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3530                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3531
3532                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3533                         break;
3534
3535                 offset += ihlen;
3536                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3537                 if (uh == NULL)
3538                         break;
3539
3540                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3541                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3542                 break;
3543         }
3544
3545         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3546                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3547
3548                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3549                         break;
3550
3551                 offset += ihlen;
3552                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3553                 if (dh == NULL)
3554                         break;
3555
3556                 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3557                 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3558                 break;
3559         }
3560
3561         default:
3562                 break;
3563         }
3564 out:
3565         return ret;
3566 }
3567
3568 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3569
3570 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3571 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3572                         struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3573 {
3574         u8 nexthdr;
3575         int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3576         struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3577
3578         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3579         ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3580         if (ip6 == NULL)
3581                 goto out;
3582
3583         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3584         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3585         ret = 0;
3586
3587         nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3588         offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3589         offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3590         if (offset < 0)
3591                 goto out;
3592
3593         if (proto)
3594                 *proto = nexthdr;
3595
3596         switch (nexthdr) {
3597         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3598                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3599
3600                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3601                 if (th == NULL)
3602                         break;
3603
3604                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3605                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3606                 break;
3607         }
3608
3609         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3610                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3611
3612                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3613                 if (uh == NULL)
3614                         break;
3615
3616                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3617                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3618                 break;
3619         }
3620
3621         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3622                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3623
3624                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3625                 if (dh == NULL)
3626                         break;
3627
3628                 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3629                 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3630                 break;
3631         }
3632
3633         /* includes fragments */
3634         default:
3635                 break;
3636         }
3637 out:
3638         return ret;
3639 }
3640
3641 #endif /* IPV6 */
3642
3643 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3644                              char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3645 {
3646         char *addrp;
3647         int ret;
3648
3649         switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3650         case PF_INET:
3651                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3652                 if (ret)
3653                         goto parse_error;
3654                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3655                                        &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3656                 goto okay;
3657
3658 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3659         case PF_INET6:
3660                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3661                 if (ret)
3662                         goto parse_error;
3663                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3664                                        &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3665                 goto okay;
3666 #endif  /* IPV6 */
3667         default:
3668                 addrp = NULL;
3669                 goto okay;
3670         }
3671
3672 parse_error:
3673         printk(KERN_WARNING
3674                "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3675                " unable to parse packet\n");
3676         return ret;
3677
3678 okay:
3679         if (_addrp)
3680                 *_addrp = addrp;
3681         return 0;
3682 }
3683
3684 /**
3685  * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3686  * @skb: the packet
3687  * @family: protocol family
3688  * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3689  *
3690  * Description:
3691  * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3692  * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3693  * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp().  The function
3694  * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3695  * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3696  * peer labels.
3697  *
3698  */
3699 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3700 {
3701         int err;
3702         u32 xfrm_sid;
3703         u32 nlbl_sid;
3704         u32 nlbl_type;
3705
3706         selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3707         selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3708
3709         err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3710         if (unlikely(err)) {
3711                 printk(KERN_WARNING
3712                        "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3713                        " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3714                 return -EACCES;
3715         }
3716
3717         return 0;
3718 }
3719
3720 /* socket security operations */
3721 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3722                            u32 perms)
3723 {
3724         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3725         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3726         u32 sid;
3727         int err = 0;
3728
3729         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3730
3731         if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3732                 goto out;
3733         sid = task_sid(task);
3734
3735         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3736         ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3737         err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3738
3739 out:
3740         return err;
3741 }
3742
3743 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3744                                  int protocol, int kern)
3745 {
3746         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3747         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3748         u32 sid, newsid;
3749         u16 secclass;
3750         int err = 0;
3751
3752         if (kern)
3753                 goto out;
3754
3755         sid = tsec->sid;
3756         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3757
3758         secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3759         err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3760
3761 out:
3762         return err;
3763 }
3764
3765 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3766                                       int type, int protocol, int kern)
3767 {
3768         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3769         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3770         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3771         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3772         u32 sid, newsid;
3773         int err = 0;
3774
3775         sid = tsec->sid;
3776         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3777
3778         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3779
3780         if (kern)
3781                 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3782         else if (newsid)
3783                 isec->sid = newsid;
3784         else
3785                 isec->sid = sid;
3786
3787         isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3788         isec->initialized = 1;
3789
3790         if (sock->sk) {
3791                 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3792                 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3793                 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3794                 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3795         }
3796
3797         return err;
3798 }
3799
3800 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3801    Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3802    permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3803
3804 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3805 {
3806         u16 family;
3807         int err;
3808
3809         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3810         if (err)
3811                 goto out;
3812
3813         /*
3814          * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3815          * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3816          * check the first address now.
3817          */
3818         family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3819         if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3820                 char *addrp;
3821                 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3822                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3823                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3824                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3825                 unsigned short snum;
3826                 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3827                 u32 sid, node_perm;
3828
3829                 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3830
3831                 if (family == PF_INET) {
3832                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3833                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3834                         addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3835                 } else {
3836                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3837                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3838                         addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3839                 }
3840
3841                 if (snum) {
3842                         int low, high;
3843
3844                         inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3845
3846                         if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3847                                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3848                                                       snum, &sid);
3849                                 if (err)
3850                                         goto out;
3851                                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3852                                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3853                                 ad.u.net.family = family;
3854                                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3855                                                    isec->sclass,
3856                                                    SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3857                                 if (err)
3858                                         goto out;
3859                         }
3860                 }
3861
3862                 switch (isec->sclass) {
3863                 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3864                         node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3865                         break;
3866
3867                 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3868                         node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3869                         break;
3870
3871                 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3872                         node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3873                         break;
3874
3875                 default:
3876                         node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3877                         break;
3878                 }
3879
3880                 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3881                 if (err)
3882                         goto out;
3883
3884                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3885                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3886                 ad.u.net.family = family;
3887
3888                 if (family == PF_INET)
3889                         ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3890                 else
3891                         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3892
3893                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3894                                    isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3895                 if (err)
3896                         goto out;
3897         }
3898 out:
3899         return err;
3900 }
3901
3902 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3903 {
3904         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3905         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3906         int err;
3907
3908         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3909         if (err)
3910                 return err;
3911
3912         /*
3913          * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3914          */
3915         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3916         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3917             isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3918                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3919                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3920                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3921                 unsigned short snum;
3922                 u32 sid, perm;
3923
3924                 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3925                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3926                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3927                                 return -EINVAL;
3928                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3929                 } else {
3930                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3931                         if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3932                                 return -EINVAL;
3933                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3934                 }
3935
3936                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3937                 if (err)
3938                         goto out;
3939
3940                 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3941                        TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3942
3943                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3944                 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3945                 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3946                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3947                 if (err)
3948                         goto out;
3949         }
3950
3951         err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3952
3953 out:
3954         return err;
3955 }
3956
3957 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3958 {
3959         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3960 }
3961
3962 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3963 {
3964         int err;
3965         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3966         struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3967
3968         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3969         if (err)
3970                 return err;
3971
3972         newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3973
3974         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3975         newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3976         newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3977         newisec->initialized = 1;
3978
3979         return 0;
3980 }
3981
3982 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3983                                   int size)
3984 {
3985         int rc;
3986
3987         rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3988         if (rc)
3989                 return rc;
3990
3991         return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3992 }
3993
3994 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3995                                   int size, int flags)
3996 {
3997         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3998 }
3999
4000 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4001 {
4002         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4003 }
4004
4005 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4006 {
4007         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4008 }
4009
4010 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4011 {
4012         int err;
4013
4014         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4015         if (err)
4016                 return err;
4017
4018         return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4019 }
4020
4021 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4022                                      int optname)
4023 {
4024         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4025 }
4026
4027 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4028 {
4029         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4030 }
4031
4032 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
4033                                               struct socket *other,
4034                                               struct sock *newsk)
4035 {
4036         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4037         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4038         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4039         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4040         int err;
4041
4042         err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
4043         if (err)
4044                 return err;
4045
4046         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4047         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4048
4049         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4050         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4051
4052         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4053                            isec->sclass,
4054                            UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4055         if (err)
4056                 return err;
4057
4058         /* connecting socket */
4059         ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4060         ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
4061
4062         /* server child socket */
4063         ssec = newsk->sk_security;
4064         ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
4065         err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
4066
4067         return err;
4068 }
4069
4070 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4071                                         struct socket *other)
4072 {
4073         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4074         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4075         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4076         int err;
4077
4078         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4079         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4080
4081         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4082         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4083
4084         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4085                            isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4086         if (err)
4087                 return err;
4088
4089         return 0;
4090 }
4091
4092 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4093                                     u32 peer_sid,
4094                                     struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4095 {
4096         int err;
4097         u32 if_sid;
4098         u32 node_sid;
4099
4100         err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4101         if (err)
4102                 return err;
4103         err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4104                            SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4105         if (err)
4106                 return err;
4107
4108         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4109         if (err)
4110                 return err;
4111         return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4112                             SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4113 }
4114
4115 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4116                                                 struct sk_buff *skb,
4117                                                 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4118                                                 u16 family,
4119                                                 char *addrp)
4120 {
4121         int err;
4122         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4123         u16 sk_class;
4124         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4125         u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4126
4127         sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4128         sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4129
4130         switch (sk_class) {
4131         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4132                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4133                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4134                 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4135                 break;
4136         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4137                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4138                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4139                 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4140                 break;
4141         case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4142                 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4143                 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4144                 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4145                 break;
4146         default:
4147                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4148                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4149                 recv_perm = 0;
4150                 break;
4151         }
4152
4153         err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4154         if (err)
4155                 return err;
4156         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4157         if (err)
4158                 return err;
4159
4160         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4161         if (err)
4162                 return err;
4163         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4164         if (err)
4165                 return err;
4166
4167         if (!recv_perm)
4168                 return 0;
4169         err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4170                               ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4171         if (unlikely(err)) {
4172                 printk(KERN_WARNING
4173                        "SELinux: failure in"
4174                        " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4175                        " network port label not found\n");
4176                 return err;
4177         }
4178         return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4179 }
4180
4181 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4182                                        u16 family)
4183 {
4184         int err = 0;
4185         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4186         u32 peer_sid;
4187         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4188         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4189         char *addrp;
4190
4191         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4192         ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4193         ad.u.net.family = family;
4194         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4195         if (err)
4196                 return err;
4197
4198         if (selinux_compat_net)
4199                 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4200                                                            family, addrp);
4201         else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4202                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4203                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4204         if (err)
4205                 return err;
4206
4207         if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4208                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4209                 if (err)
4210                         return err;
4211                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4212                                    SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4213                 if (err)
4214                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4215         } else {
4216                 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4217                 if (err)
4218                         return err;
4219                 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4220         }
4221
4222         return err;
4223 }
4224
4225 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4226 {
4227         int err;
4228         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4229         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4230         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4231         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4232         char *addrp;
4233         u8 secmark_active;
4234         u8 peerlbl_active;
4235
4236         if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4237                 return 0;
4238
4239         /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4240         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4241                 family = PF_INET;
4242
4243         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4244          * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4245          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4246          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4247         if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4248                 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4249
4250         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4251         peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4252         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4253                 return 0;
4254
4255         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4256         ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4257         ad.u.net.family = family;
4258         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4259         if (err)
4260                 return err;
4261
4262         if (peerlbl_active) {
4263                 u32 peer_sid;
4264
4265                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4266                 if (err)
4267                         return err;
4268                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4269                                                peer_sid, &ad);
4270                 if (err) {
4271                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4272                         return err;
4273                 }
4274                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4275                                    PEER__RECV, &ad);
4276                 if (err)
4277                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4278         }
4279
4280         if (secmark_active) {
4281                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4282                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4283                 if (err)
4284                         return err;
4285         }
4286
4287         return err;
4288 }
4289
4290 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4291                                             int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4292 {
4293         int err = 0;
4294         char *scontext;
4295         u32 scontext_len;
4296         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4297         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4298         u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4299
4300         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4301
4302         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4303             isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4304                 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4305                 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4306         }
4307         if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4308                 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
4309                 goto out;
4310         }
4311
4312         err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4313
4314         if (err)
4315                 goto out;
4316
4317         if (scontext_len > len) {
4318                 err = -ERANGE;
4319                 goto out_len;
4320         }
4321
4322         if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4323                 err = -EFAULT;
4324
4325 out_len:
4326         if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4327                 err = -EFAULT;
4328
4329         kfree(scontext);
4330 out:
4331         return err;
4332 }
4333
4334 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4335 {
4336         u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4337         u16 family;
4338
4339         if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4340                 family = PF_INET;
4341         else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4342                 family = PF_INET6;
4343         else if (sock)
4344                 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4345         else
4346                 goto out;
4347
4348         if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4349                 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4350         else if (skb)
4351                 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4352
4353 out:
4354         *secid = peer_secid;
4355         if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4356                 return -EINVAL;
4357         return 0;
4358 }
4359
4360 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4361 {
4362         return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4363 }
4364
4365 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4366 {
4367         sk_free_security(sk);
4368 }
4369
4370 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4371 {
4372         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4373         struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4374
4375         newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4376         newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4377         newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4378
4379         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4380 }
4381
4382 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4383 {
4384         if (!sk)
4385                 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4386         else {
4387                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4388
4389                 *secid = sksec->sid;
4390         }
4391 }
4392
4393 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4394 {
4395         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4396         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4397
4398         if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4399             sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4400                 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4401         sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4402 }
4403
4404 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4405                                      struct request_sock *req)
4406 {
4407         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4408         int err;
4409         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4410         u32 newsid;
4411         u32 peersid;
4412
4413         /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4414         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4415                 family = PF_INET;
4416
4417         err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4418         if (err)
4419                 return err;
4420         if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4421                 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4422                 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4423                 return 0;
4424         }
4425
4426         err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4427         if (err)
4428                 return err;
4429
4430         req->secid = newsid;
4431         req->peer_secid = peersid;
4432         return 0;
4433 }
4434
4435 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4436                                    const struct request_sock *req)
4437 {
4438         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4439
4440         newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4441         newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4442         /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4443            new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4444            So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4445            time it will have been created and available. */
4446
4447         /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4448          * thread with access to newsksec */
4449         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4450 }
4451
4452 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4453 {
4454         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4455         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4456
4457         /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4458         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4459                 family = PF_INET;
4460
4461         selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4462
4463         selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4464 }
4465
4466 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4467                                       struct flowi *fl)
4468 {
4469         fl->secid = req->secid;
4470 }
4471
4472 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4473 {
4474         int err = 0;
4475         u32 perm;
4476         struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4477         struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4478         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4479
4480         if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4481                 err = -EINVAL;
4482                 goto out;
4483         }
4484         nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4485
4486         err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4487         if (err) {
4488                 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4489                         audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4490                                   "SELinux:  unrecognized netlink message"
4491                                   " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4492                                   nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4493                         if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4494                                 err = 0;
4495                 }
4496
4497                 /* Ignore */
4498                 if (err == -ENOENT)
4499                         err = 0;
4500                 goto out;
4501         }
4502
4503         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4504 out:
4505         return err;
4506 }
4507
4508 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4509
4510 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4511                                        u16 family)
4512 {
4513         int err;
4514         char *addrp;
4515         u32 peer_sid;
4516         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4517         u8 secmark_active;
4518         u8 netlbl_active;
4519         u8 peerlbl_active;
4520
4521         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4522                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4523
4524         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4525         netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4526         peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4527         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4528                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4529
4530         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4531                 return NF_DROP;
4532
4533         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4534         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4535         ad.u.net.family = family;
4536         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4537                 return NF_DROP;
4538
4539         if (peerlbl_active) {
4540                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4541                                                peer_sid, &ad);
4542                 if (err) {
4543                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4544                         return NF_DROP;
4545                 }
4546         }
4547
4548         if (secmark_active)
4549                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4550                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4551                         return NF_DROP;
4552
4553         if (netlbl_active)
4554                 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4555                  * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4556                  * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4557                  * protection */
4558                 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4559                         return NF_DROP;
4560
4561         return NF_ACCEPT;
4562 }
4563
4564 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4565                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
4566                                          const struct net_device *in,
4567                                          const struct net_device *out,
4568                                          int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4569 {
4570         return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4571 }
4572
4573 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4574 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4575                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
4576                                          const struct net_device *in,
4577                                          const struct net_device *out,
4578                                          int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4579 {
4580         return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4581 }
4582 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4583
4584 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4585                                       u16 family)
4586 {
4587         u32 sid;
4588
4589         if (!netlbl_enabled())
4590                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4591
4592         /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4593          * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4594          * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4595         if (skb->sk) {
4596                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4597                 sid = sksec->sid;
4598         } else
4599                 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4600         if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4601                 return NF_DROP;
4602
4603         return NF_ACCEPT;
4604 }
4605
4606 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4607                                         struct sk_buff *skb,
4608                                         const struct net_device *in,
4609                                         const struct net_device *out,
4610                                         int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4611 {
4612         return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4613 }
4614
4615 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4616                                                 int ifindex,
4617                                                 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4618                                                 u16 family, char *addrp)
4619 {
4620         int err;
4621         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4622         u16 sk_class;
4623         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4624         u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4625
4626         sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4627         sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4628
4629         switch (sk_class) {
4630         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4631                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4632                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4633                 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4634                 break;
4635         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4636                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4637                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4638                 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4639                 break;
4640         case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4641                 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4642                 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4643                 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4644                 break;
4645         default:
4646                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4647                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4648                 send_perm = 0;
4649                 break;
4650         }
4651
4652         err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4653         if (err)
4654                 return err;
4655         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4656                 return err;
4657
4658         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4659         if (err)
4660                 return err;
4661         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4662         if (err)
4663                 return err;
4664
4665         if (send_perm != 0)
4666                 return 0;
4667
4668         err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4669                               ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4670         if (unlikely(err)) {
4671                 printk(KERN_WARNING
4672                        "SELinux: failure in"
4673                        " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4674                        " network port label not found\n");
4675                 return err;
4676         }
4677         return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4678 }
4679
4680 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4681                                                 int ifindex,
4682                                                 u16 family)
4683 {
4684         struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4685         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4686         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4687         char *addrp;
4688         u8 proto;
4689
4690         if (sk == NULL)
4691                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4692         sksec = sk->sk_security;
4693
4694         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4695         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4696         ad.u.net.family = family;
4697         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4698                 return NF_DROP;
4699
4700         if (selinux_compat_net) {
4701                 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4702                                                          &ad, family, addrp))
4703                         return NF_DROP;
4704         } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4705                 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4706                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4707                         return NF_DROP;
4708         }
4709
4710         if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4711                 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4712                         return NF_DROP;
4713
4714         return NF_ACCEPT;
4715 }
4716
4717 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4718                                          u16 family)
4719 {
4720         u32 secmark_perm;
4721         u32 peer_sid;
4722         struct sock *sk;
4723         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4724         char *addrp;
4725         u8 secmark_active;
4726         u8 peerlbl_active;
4727
4728         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4729          * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4730          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4731          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4732         if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4733                 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4734 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
4735         /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4736          * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4737          * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4738          * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4739          * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4740          *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4741         if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4742                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4743 #endif
4744         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4745         peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4746         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4747                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4748
4749         /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4750          * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4751          * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4752          * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4753         sk = skb->sk;
4754         if (sk == NULL) {
4755                 switch (family) {
4756                 case PF_INET:
4757                         if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4758                                 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4759                         else
4760                                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4761                         break;
4762                 case PF_INET6:
4763                         if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4764                                 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4765                         else
4766                                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4767                         break;
4768                 default:
4769                         return NF_DROP;
4770                 }
4771                 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4772                         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4773                                 return NF_DROP;
4774                 } else
4775                         peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4776         } else {
4777                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4778                 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4779                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4780         }
4781
4782         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4783         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4784         ad.u.net.family = family;
4785         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4786                 return NF_DROP;
4787
4788         if (secmark_active)
4789                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4790                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4791                         return NF_DROP;
4792
4793         if (peerlbl_active) {
4794                 u32 if_sid;
4795                 u32 node_sid;
4796
4797                 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4798                         return NF_DROP;
4799                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4800                                  SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4801                         return NF_DROP;
4802
4803                 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4804                         return NF_DROP;
4805                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4806                                  SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4807                         return NF_DROP;
4808         }
4809
4810         return NF_ACCEPT;
4811 }
4812
4813 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4814                                            struct sk_buff *skb,
4815                                            const struct net_device *in,
4816                                            const struct net_device *out,
4817                                            int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4818 {
4819         return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4820 }
4821
4822 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4823 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4824                                            struct sk_buff *skb,
4825                                            const struct net_device *in,
4826                                            const struct net_device *out,
4827                                            int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4828 {
4829         return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4830 }
4831 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4832
4833 #endif  /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4834
4835 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4836 {
4837         int err;
4838
4839         err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4840         if (err)
4841                 return err;
4842
4843         if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4844                 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4845
4846         return err;
4847 }
4848
4849 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4850 {
4851         int err;
4852         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4853
4854         err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4855         if (err)
4856                 return err;
4857
4858         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4859         ad.u.cap = capability;
4860
4861         return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4862                             SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4863 }
4864
4865 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4866                               struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4867                               u16 sclass)
4868 {
4869         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4870         u32 sid;
4871
4872         isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4873         if (!isec)
4874                 return -ENOMEM;
4875
4876         sid = task_sid(task);
4877         isec->sclass = sclass;
4878         isec->sid = sid;
4879         perm->security = isec;
4880
4881         return 0;
4882 }
4883
4884 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4885 {
4886         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4887         perm->security = NULL;
4888         kfree(isec);
4889 }
4890
4891 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4892 {
4893         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4894
4895         msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4896         if (!msec)
4897                 return -ENOMEM;
4898
4899         msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4900         msg->security = msec;
4901
4902         return 0;
4903 }
4904
4905 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4906 {
4907         struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4908
4909         msg->security = NULL;
4910         kfree(msec);
4911 }
4912
4913 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4914                         u32 perms)
4915 {
4916         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4917         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4918         u32 sid = current_sid();
4919
4920         isec = ipc_perms->security;
4921
4922         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4923         ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4924
4925         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4926 }
4927
4928 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4929 {
4930         return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4931 }
4932
4933 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4934 {
4935         msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4936 }
4937
4938 /* message queue security operations */
4939 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4940 {
4941         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4942         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4943         u32 sid = current_sid();
4944         int rc;
4945
4946         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4947         if (rc)
4948                 return rc;
4949
4950         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4951
4952         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4953         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4954
4955         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4956                           MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4957         if (rc) {
4958                 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4959                 return rc;
4960         }
4961         return 0;
4962 }
4963
4964 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4965 {
4966         ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4967 }
4968
4969 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4970 {
4971         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4972         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4973         u32 sid = current_sid();
4974
4975         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4976
4977         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4978         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4979
4980         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4981                             MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4982 }
4983
4984 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4985 {
4986         int err;
4987         int perms;
4988
4989         switch (cmd) {
4990         case IPC_INFO:
4991         case MSG_INFO:
4992                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4993                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4994         case IPC_STAT:
4995         case MSG_STAT:
4996                 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4997                 break;
4998         case IPC_SET:
4999                 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5000                 break;
5001         case IPC_RMID:
5002                 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5003                 break;
5004         default:
5005                 return 0;
5006         }
5007
5008         err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5009         return err;
5010 }
5011
5012 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5013 {
5014         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5015         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5016         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5017         u32 sid = current_sid();
5018         int rc;
5019
5020         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5021         msec = msg->security;
5022
5023         /*
5024          * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5025          */
5026         if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5027                 /*
5028                  * Compute new sid based on current process and
5029                  * message queue this message will be stored in
5030                  */
5031                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5032                                              &msec->sid);
5033                 if (rc)
5034                         return rc;
5035         }
5036
5037         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5038         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5039
5040         /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5041         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5042                           MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
5043         if (!rc)
5044                 /* Can this process send the message */
5045                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5046                                   MSG__SEND, &ad);
5047         if (!rc)
5048                 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5049                 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5050                                   MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5051
5052         return rc;
5053 }
5054
5055 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5056                                     struct task_struct *target,
5057                                     long type, int mode)
5058 {
5059         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5060         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5061         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5062         u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5063         int rc;
5064
5065         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5066         msec = msg->security;
5067
5068         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5069         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5070
5071         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5072                           SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5073         if (!rc)
5074                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5075                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5076         return rc;
5077 }
5078
5079 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5080 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5081 {
5082         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5083         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5084         u32 sid = current_sid();
5085         int rc;
5086
5087         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5088         if (rc)
5089                 return rc;
5090
5091         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5092
5093         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5094         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5095
5096         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5097                           SHM__CREATE, &ad);
5098         if (rc) {
5099                 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5100                 return rc;
5101         }
5102         return 0;
5103 }
5104
5105 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5106 {
5107         ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5108 }
5109
5110 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5111 {
5112         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5113         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5114         u32 sid = current_sid();
5115
5116         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5117
5118         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5119         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5120
5121         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5122                             SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5123 }
5124
5125 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5126 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5127 {
5128         int perms;
5129         int err;
5130
5131         switch (cmd) {
5132         case IPC_INFO:
5133         case SHM_INFO:
5134                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5135                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5136         case IPC_STAT:
5137         case SHM_STAT:
5138                 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5139                 break;
5140         case IPC_SET:
5141                 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5142                 break;
5143         case SHM_LOCK:
5144         case SHM_UNLOCK:
5145                 perms = SHM__LOCK;
5146                 break;
5147         case IPC_RMID:
5148                 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5149                 break;
5150         default:
5151                 return 0;
5152         }
5153
5154         err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5155         return err;
5156 }
5157
5158 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5159                              char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5160 {
5161         u32 perms;
5162         int rc;
5163
5164         rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5165         if (rc)
5166                 return rc;
5167
5168         if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5169                 perms = SHM__READ;
5170         else
5171                 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5172
5173         return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5174 }
5175
5176 /* Semaphore security operations */
5177 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5178 {
5179         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5180         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5181         u32 sid = current_sid();
5182         int rc;
5183
5184         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5185         if (rc)
5186                 return rc;
5187
5188         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5189
5190         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5191         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5192
5193         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5194                           SEM__CREATE, &ad);
5195         if (rc) {
5196                 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5197                 return rc;
5198         }
5199         return 0;
5200 }
5201
5202 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5203 {
5204         ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5205 }
5206
5207 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5208 {
5209         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5210         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5211         u32 sid = current_sid();
5212
5213         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5214
5215         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5216         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5217
5218         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5219                             SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5220 }
5221
5222 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5223 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5224 {
5225         int err;
5226         u32 perms;
5227
5228         switch (cmd) {
5229         case IPC_INFO:
5230         case SEM_INFO:
5231                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5232                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5233         case GETPID:
5234         case GETNCNT:
5235         case GETZCNT:
5236                 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5237                 break;
5238         case GETVAL:
5239         case GETALL:
5240                 perms = SEM__READ;
5241                 break;
5242         case SETVAL:
5243         case SETALL:
5244                 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5245                 break;
5246         case IPC_RMID:
5247                 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5248                 break;
5249         case IPC_SET:
5250                 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5251                 break;
5252         case IPC_STAT:
5253         case SEM_STAT:
5254                 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5255                 break;
5256         default:
5257                 return 0;
5258         }
5259
5260         err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5261         return err;
5262 }
5263
5264 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5265                              struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5266 {
5267         u32 perms;
5268
5269         if (alter)
5270                 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5271         else
5272                 perms = SEM__READ;
5273
5274         return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5275 }
5276
5277 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5278 {
5279         u32 av = 0;
5280
5281         av = 0;
5282         if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5283                 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5284         if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5285                 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5286
5287         if (av == 0)
5288                 return 0;
5289
5290         return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5291 }
5292
5293 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5294 {
5295         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5296         *secid = isec->sid;
5297 }
5298
5299 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5300 {
5301         if (inode)
5302                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5303 }
5304
5305 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5306                                char *name, char **value)
5307 {
5308         const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5309         u32 sid;
5310         int error;
5311         unsigned len;
5312
5313         if (current != p) {
5314                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5315                 if (error)
5316                         return error;
5317         }
5318
5319         rcu_read_lock();
5320         __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5321
5322         if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5323                 sid = __tsec->sid;
5324         else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5325                 sid = __tsec->osid;
5326         else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5327                 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5328         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5329                 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5330         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5331                 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5332         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5333                 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5334         else
5335                 goto invalid;
5336         rcu_read_unlock();
5337
5338         if (!sid)
5339                 return 0;
5340
5341         error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5342         if (error)
5343                 return error;
5344         return len;
5345
5346 invalid:
5347         rcu_read_unlock();
5348         return -EINVAL;
5349 }
5350
5351 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5352                                char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5353 {
5354         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5355         struct task_struct *tracer;
5356         struct cred *new;
5357         u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
5358         int error;
5359         char *str = value;
5360
5361         if (current != p) {
5362                 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5363                    security attributes. */
5364                 return -EACCES;
5365         }
5366
5367         /*
5368          * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5369          * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5370          * above restriction is ever removed.
5371          */
5372         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5373                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5374         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5375                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5376         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5377                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5378         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5379                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5380         else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5381                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5382         else
5383                 error = -EINVAL;
5384         if (error)
5385                 return error;
5386
5387         /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5388         if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5389                 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5390                         str[size-1] = 0;
5391                         size--;
5392                 }
5393                 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5394                 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5395                         if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5396                                 return error;
5397                         error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5398                                                               &sid);
5399                 }
5400                 if (error)
5401                         return error;
5402         }
5403
5404         new = prepare_creds();
5405         if (!new)
5406                 return -ENOMEM;
5407
5408         /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5409            performed during the actual operation (execve,
5410            open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5411            operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5412            checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5413            operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5414         tsec = new->security;
5415         if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5416                 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5417         } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5418                 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5419         } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5420                 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5421                 if (error)
5422                         goto abort_change;
5423                 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5424         } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5425                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5426         } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5427                 error = -EINVAL;
5428                 if (sid == 0)
5429                         goto abort_change;
5430
5431                 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5432                 error = -EPERM;
5433                 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5434                         error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5435                         if (error)
5436                                 goto abort_change;
5437                 }
5438
5439                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5440                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5441                                      PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5442                 if (error)
5443                         goto abort_change;
5444
5445                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5446                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5447                 ptsid = 0;
5448                 task_lock(p);
5449                 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5450                 if (tracer)
5451                         ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5452                 task_unlock(p);
5453
5454                 if (tracer) {
5455                         error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5456                                              PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5457                         if (error)
5458                                 goto abort_change;
5459                 }
5460
5461                 tsec->sid = sid;
5462         } else {
5463                 error = -EINVAL;
5464                 goto abort_change;
5465         }
5466
5467         commit_creds(new);
5468         return size;
5469
5470 abort_change:
5471         abort_creds(new);
5472         return error;
5473 }
5474
5475 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5476 {
5477         return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5478 }
5479
5480 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5481 {
5482         return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5483 }
5484
5485 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5486 {
5487         kfree(secdata);
5488 }
5489
5490 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5491
5492 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5493                              unsigned long flags)
5494 {
5495         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5496         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5497
5498         ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5499         if (!ksec)
5500                 return -ENOMEM;
5501
5502         tsec = cred->security;
5503         if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5504                 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5505         else
5506                 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5507
5508         k->security = ksec;
5509         return 0;
5510 }
5511
5512 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5513 {
5514         struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5515
5516         k->security = NULL;
5517         kfree(ksec);
5518 }
5519
5520 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5521                                   const struct cred *cred,
5522                                   key_perm_t perm)
5523 {
5524         struct key *key;
5525         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5526         u32 sid;
5527
5528         /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5529            permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5530            appear to be created. */
5531         if (perm == 0)
5532                 return 0;
5533
5534         sid = cred_sid(cred);
5535
5536         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5537         ksec = key->security;
5538
5539         return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5540 }
5541
5542 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5543 {
5544         struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5545         char *context = NULL;
5546         unsigned len;
5547         int rc;
5548
5549         rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5550         if (!rc)
5551                 rc = len;
5552         *_buffer = context;
5553         return rc;
5554 }
5555
5556 #endif
5557
5558 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5559         .name =                         "selinux",
5560
5561         .ptrace_may_access =            selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5562         .ptrace_traceme =               selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5563         .capget =                       selinux_capget,
5564         .capset =                       selinux_capset,
5565         .sysctl =                       selinux_sysctl,
5566         .capable =                      selinux_capable,
5567         .quotactl =                     selinux_quotactl,
5568         .quota_on =                     selinux_quota_on,
5569         .syslog =                       selinux_syslog,
5570         .vm_enough_memory =             selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5571
5572         .netlink_send =                 selinux_netlink_send,
5573         .netlink_recv =                 selinux_netlink_recv,
5574
5575         .bprm_set_creds =               selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5576         .bprm_committing_creds =        selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5577         .bprm_committed_creds =         selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5578         .bprm_secureexec =              selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5579
5580         .sb_alloc_security =            selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5581         .sb_free_security =             selinux_sb_free_security,
5582         .sb_copy_data =                 selinux_sb_copy_data,
5583         .sb_kern_mount =                selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5584         .sb_show_options =              selinux_sb_show_options,
5585         .sb_statfs =                    selinux_sb_statfs,
5586         .sb_mount =                     selinux_mount,
5587         .sb_umount =                    selinux_umount,
5588         .sb_set_mnt_opts =              selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5589         .sb_clone_mnt_opts =            selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5590         .sb_parse_opts_str =            selinux_parse_opts_str,
5591
5592
5593         .inode_alloc_security =         selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5594         .inode_free_security =          selinux_inode_free_security,
5595         .inode_init_security =          selinux_inode_init_security,
5596         .inode_create =                 selinux_inode_create,
5597         .inode_link =                   selinux_inode_link,
5598         .inode_unlink =                 selinux_inode_unlink,
5599         .inode_symlink =                selinux_inode_symlink,
5600         .inode_mkdir =                  selinux_inode_mkdir,
5601         .inode_rmdir =                  selinux_inode_rmdir,
5602         .inode_mknod =                  selinux_inode_mknod,
5603         .inode_rename =                 selinux_inode_rename,
5604         .inode_readlink =               selinux_inode_readlink,
5605         .inode_follow_link =            selinux_inode_follow_link,
5606         .inode_permission =             selinux_inode_permission,
5607         .inode_setattr =                selinux_inode_setattr,
5608         .inode_getattr =                selinux_inode_getattr,
5609         .inode_setxattr =               selinux_inode_setxattr,
5610         .inode_post_setxattr =          selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5611         .inode_getxattr =               selinux_inode_getxattr,
5612         .inode_listxattr =              selinux_inode_listxattr,
5613         .inode_removexattr =            selinux_inode_removexattr,
5614         .inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5615         .inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5616         .inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5617         .inode_need_killpriv =          selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5618         .inode_killpriv =               selinux_inode_killpriv,
5619         .inode_getsecid =               selinux_inode_getsecid,
5620
5621         .file_permission =              selinux_file_permission,
5622         .file_alloc_security =          selinux_file_alloc_security,
5623         .file_free_security =           selinux_file_free_security,
5624         .file_ioctl =                   selinux_file_ioctl,
5625         .file_mmap =                    selinux_file_mmap,
5626         .file_mprotect =                selinux_file_mprotect,
5627         .file_lock =                    selinux_file_lock,
5628         .file_fcntl =                   selinux_file_fcntl,
5629         .file_set_fowner =              selinux_file_set_fowner,
5630         .file_send_sigiotask =          selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5631         .file_receive =                 selinux_file_receive,
5632
5633         .dentry_open =                  selinux_dentry_open,
5634
5635         .task_create =                  selinux_task_create,
5636         .cred_free =                    selinux_cred_free,
5637         .cred_prepare =                 selinux_cred_prepare,
5638         .cred_commit =                  selinux_cred_commit,
5639         .kernel_act_as =                selinux_kernel_act_as,
5640         .kernel_create_files_as =       selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5641         .task_setuid =                  selinux_task_setuid,
5642         .task_fix_setuid =              selinux_task_fix_setuid,
5643         .task_setgid =                  selinux_task_setgid,
5644         .task_setpgid =                 selinux_task_setpgid,
5645         .task_getpgid =                 selinux_task_getpgid,
5646         .task_getsid =                  selinux_task_getsid,
5647         .task_getsecid =                selinux_task_getsecid,
5648         .task_setgroups =               selinux_task_setgroups,
5649         .task_setnice =                 selinux_task_setnice,
5650         .task_setioprio =               selinux_task_setioprio,
5651         .task_getioprio =               selinux_task_getioprio,
5652         .task_setrlimit =               selinux_task_setrlimit,
5653         .task_setscheduler =            selinux_task_setscheduler,
5654         .task_getscheduler =            selinux_task_getscheduler,
5655         .task_movememory =              selinux_task_movememory,
5656         .task_kill =                    selinux_task_kill,
5657         .task_wait =                    selinux_task_wait,
5658         .task_prctl =                   selinux_task_prctl,
5659         .task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
5660
5661         .ipc_permission =               selinux_ipc_permission,
5662         .ipc_getsecid =                 selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5663
5664         .msg_msg_alloc_security =       selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5665         .msg_msg_free_security =        selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5666
5667         .msg_queue_alloc_security =     selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5668         .msg_queue_free_security =      selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5669         .msg_queue_associate =          selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5670         .msg_queue_msgctl =             selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5671         .msg_queue_msgsnd =             selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5672         .msg_queue_msgrcv =             selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5673
5674         .shm_alloc_security =           selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5675         .shm_free_security =            selinux_shm_free_security,
5676         .shm_associate =                selinux_shm_associate,
5677         .shm_shmctl =                   selinux_shm_shmctl,
5678         .shm_shmat =                    selinux_shm_shmat,
5679
5680         .sem_alloc_security =           selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5681         .sem_free_security =            selinux_sem_free_security,
5682         .sem_associate =                selinux_sem_associate,
5683         .sem_semctl =                   selinux_sem_semctl,
5684         .sem_semop =                    selinux_sem_semop,
5685
5686         .d_instantiate =                selinux_d_instantiate,
5687
5688         .getprocattr =                  selinux_getprocattr,
5689         .setprocattr =                  selinux_setprocattr,
5690
5691         .secid_to_secctx =              selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5692         .secctx_to_secid =              selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5693         .release_secctx =               selinux_release_secctx,
5694
5695         .unix_stream_connect =          selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5696         .unix_may_send =                selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5697
5698         .socket_create =                selinux_socket_create,
5699         .socket_post_create =           selinux_socket_post_create,
5700         .socket_bind =                  selinux_socket_bind,
5701         .socket_connect =               selinux_socket_connect,
5702         .socket_listen =                selinux_socket_listen,
5703         .socket_accept =                selinux_socket_accept,
5704         .socket_sendmsg =               selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5705         .socket_recvmsg =               selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5706         .socket_getsockname =           selinux_socket_getsockname,
5707         .socket_getpeername =           selinux_socket_getpeername,
5708         .socket_getsockopt =            selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5709         .socket_setsockopt =            selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5710         .socket_shutdown =              selinux_socket_shutdown,
5711         .socket_sock_rcv_skb =          selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5712         .socket_getpeersec_stream =     selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5713         .socket_getpeersec_dgram =      selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5714         .sk_alloc_security =            selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5715         .sk_free_security =             selinux_sk_free_security,
5716         .sk_clone_security =            selinux_sk_clone_security,
5717         .sk_getsecid =                  selinux_sk_getsecid,
5718         .sock_graft =                   selinux_sock_graft,
5719         .inet_conn_request =            selinux_inet_conn_request,
5720         .inet_csk_clone =               selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5721         .inet_conn_established =        selinux_inet_conn_established,
5722         .req_classify_flow =            selinux_req_classify_flow,
5723
5724 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5725         .xfrm_policy_alloc_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5726         .xfrm_policy_clone_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5727         .xfrm_policy_free_security =    selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5728         .xfrm_policy_delete_security =  selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5729         .xfrm_state_alloc_security =    selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5730         .xfrm_state_free_security =     selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5731         .xfrm_state_delete_security =   selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5732         .xfrm_policy_lookup =           selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5733         .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match =    selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5734         .xfrm_decode_session =          selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5735 #endif
5736
5737 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5738         .key_alloc =                    selinux_key_alloc,
5739         .key_free =                     selinux_key_free,
5740         .key_permission =               selinux_key_permission,
5741         .key_getsecurity =              selinux_key_getsecurity,
5742 #endif
5743
5744 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
5745         .audit_rule_init =              selinux_audit_rule_init,
5746         .audit_rule_known =             selinux_audit_rule_known,
5747         .audit_rule_match =             selinux_audit_rule_match,
5748         .audit_rule_free =              selinux_audit_rule_free,
5749 #endif
5750 };
5751
5752 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5753 {
5754         if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5755                 selinux_enabled = 0;
5756                 return 0;
5757         }
5758
5759         if (!selinux_enabled) {
5760                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at boot.\n");
5761                 return 0;
5762         }
5763
5764         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
5765
5766         /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5767         cred_init_security();
5768
5769         sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5770                                             sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5771                                             0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5772         avc_init();
5773
5774         secondary_ops = security_ops;
5775         if (!secondary_ops)
5776                 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5777         if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5778                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5779
5780         if (selinux_enforcing)
5781                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5782         else
5783                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
5784
5785         return 0;
5786 }
5787
5788 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5789 {
5790         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
5791
5792         /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5793         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5794         spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5795         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5796 next_sb:
5797         if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5798                 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5799                                 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5800                                            struct superblock_security_struct,
5801                                            list);
5802                 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5803                 sb->s_count++;
5804                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5805                 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5806                 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5807                 if (sb->s_root)
5808                         superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5809                 drop_super(sb);
5810                 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5811                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5812                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5813                 goto next_sb;
5814         }
5815         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5816         spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5817 }
5818
5819 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5820    all processes and objects when they are created. */
5821 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5822
5823 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5824
5825 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5826         {
5827                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5828                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5829                 .pf =           PF_INET,
5830                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5831                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5832         },
5833         {
5834                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_forward,
5835                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5836                 .pf =           PF_INET,
5837                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
5838                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5839         },
5840         {
5841                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_output,
5842                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5843                 .pf =           PF_INET,
5844                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5845                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5846         }
5847 };
5848
5849 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5850
5851 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5852         {
5853                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5854                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5855                 .pf =           PF_INET6,
5856                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5857                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5858         },
5859         {
5860                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_forward,
5861                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5862                 .pf =           PF_INET6,
5863                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
5864                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5865         }
5866 };
5867
5868 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5869
5870 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5871 {
5872         int err = 0;
5873
5874         if (!selinux_enabled)
5875                 goto out;
5876
5877         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5878
5879         err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5880         if (err)
5881                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5882
5883 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5884         err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5885         if (err)
5886                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5887 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5888
5889 out:
5890         return err;
5891 }
5892
5893 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5894
5895 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5896 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5897 {
5898         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5899
5900         nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5901 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5902         nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5903 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5904 }
5905 #endif
5906
5907 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5908
5909 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5910 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5911 #endif
5912
5913 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5914
5915 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5916 static int selinux_disabled;
5917
5918 int selinux_disable(void)
5919 {
5920         extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5921
5922         if (ss_initialized) {
5923                 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5924                 return -EINVAL;
5925         }
5926
5927         if (selinux_disabled) {
5928                 /* Only do this once. */
5929                 return -EINVAL;
5930         }
5931
5932         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
5933
5934         selinux_disabled = 1;
5935         selinux_enabled = 0;
5936
5937         /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5938         security_ops = secondary_ops;
5939
5940         /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5941         selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5942
5943         /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5944         exit_sel_fs();
5945
5946         return 0;
5947 }
5948 #endif