2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
134 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
141 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
159 * initialise the security for the init task
161 static void cred_init_security(void)
163 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
164 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
166 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
168 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
170 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
171 cred->security = tsec;
175 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
177 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
179 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
181 tsec = cred->security;
186 * get the objective security ID of a task
188 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
193 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
199 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
201 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
203 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
208 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
210 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
212 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
213 u32 sid = current_sid();
215 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
219 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
220 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
222 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
223 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
224 isec->task_sid = sid;
225 inode->i_security = isec;
230 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
232 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
233 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
235 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
236 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
237 list_del_init(&isec->list);
238 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
240 inode->i_security = NULL;
241 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
244 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
246 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
247 u32 sid = current_sid();
249 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
254 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
255 file->f_security = fsec;
260 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
262 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
263 file->f_security = NULL;
267 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
269 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
271 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
275 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
276 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
278 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
280 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
282 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
283 sb->s_security = sbsec;
288 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
290 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
292 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
293 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
294 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
295 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
297 sb->s_security = NULL;
301 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
303 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
305 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
309 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
310 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 sk->sk_security = ssec;
313 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec);
318 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
320 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
322 sk->sk_security = NULL;
323 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
327 /* The security server must be initialized before
328 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
329 extern int ss_initialized;
331 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
333 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
335 "uses transition SIDs",
337 "uses genfs_contexts",
338 "not configured for labeling",
339 "uses mountpoint labeling",
342 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
344 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
346 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
355 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
358 static const match_table_t tokens = {
359 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
367 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
369 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
370 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
371 const struct cred *cred)
373 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
376 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
377 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
381 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
382 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
386 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
387 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
388 const struct cred *cred)
390 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
392 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
393 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
397 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
398 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
402 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
404 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
405 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
406 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
409 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
410 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
411 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
412 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
413 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
414 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
415 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
416 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
417 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
421 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
422 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
423 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
424 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
425 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
426 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
428 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
429 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
430 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
435 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
437 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
438 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
439 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
441 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
442 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
443 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
445 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
446 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
448 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
449 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
451 /* Initialize the root inode. */
452 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
454 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
455 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
456 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
458 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
460 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
461 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
462 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
463 struct inode_security_struct, list);
464 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
465 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
466 inode = igrab(inode);
468 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
472 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
473 list_del_init(&isec->list);
476 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
482 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
483 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
484 * mount options, or whatever.
486 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
487 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
490 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
491 char *context = NULL;
495 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
497 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
503 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
504 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
505 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
507 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
510 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
511 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
512 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
514 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
515 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
520 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
521 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
527 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
528 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
531 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
532 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
534 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
535 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
538 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
539 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
541 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
542 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
545 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
546 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
548 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
549 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
550 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
552 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
555 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
556 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
558 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
559 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
560 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
563 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
568 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
572 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
573 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
575 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
577 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
578 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
579 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
580 (old_sid != new_sid))
583 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
584 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
586 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
587 if (mnt_flags & flag)
593 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
594 * labeling information.
596 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
597 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
599 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
601 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
602 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
603 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
604 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
605 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
606 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
607 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
608 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
609 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
611 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
613 if (!ss_initialized) {
615 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
616 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
617 server is ready to handle calls. */
618 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
619 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
620 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
621 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
625 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
626 "before the security server is initialized\n");
631 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
632 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
633 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
634 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
636 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
637 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
638 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
639 * will be used for both mounts)
641 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
646 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
647 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
648 * than once with different security options.
650 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
653 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
655 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
656 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
658 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
659 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
660 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
667 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
669 goto out_double_mount;
671 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
676 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
678 goto out_double_mount;
680 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
682 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
683 rootcontext_sid = sid;
685 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
687 goto out_double_mount;
689 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
693 defcontext_sid = sid;
695 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
697 goto out_double_mount;
699 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
708 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
709 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
710 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
711 goto out_double_mount;
716 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
717 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
719 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
720 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
722 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
723 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
727 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
729 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
733 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
737 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
738 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
739 * the superblock context if not already set.
742 if (!fscontext_sid) {
743 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
747 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
749 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
754 if (!rootcontext_sid)
755 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
757 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
758 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
761 if (rootcontext_sid) {
762 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
767 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
768 root_isec->initialized = 1;
771 if (defcontext_sid) {
772 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
774 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
775 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
779 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
780 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
786 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
789 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
791 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
795 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
796 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
800 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
801 struct super_block *newsb)
803 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
804 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
806 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
807 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
808 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
811 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
812 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
815 if (!ss_initialized) {
816 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
817 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
818 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
819 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
823 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
824 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
826 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
827 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
830 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
832 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
834 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
835 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
836 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
839 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
843 if (!set_rootcontext) {
844 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
845 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
848 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
850 if (set_rootcontext) {
851 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
852 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
853 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
854 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
856 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
859 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
860 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
863 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
864 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
867 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
868 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
869 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
871 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
873 /* Standard string-based options. */
874 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
876 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
881 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
885 if (context || defcontext) {
887 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
890 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
900 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
903 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
910 case Opt_rootcontext:
913 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
916 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
924 if (context || defcontext) {
926 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
929 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
935 case Opt_labelsupport:
939 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
946 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
950 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
951 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
952 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
957 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
958 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
961 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
962 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
965 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
966 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
969 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
970 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
973 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
984 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
986 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
989 char *options = data;
990 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
992 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
997 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
999 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1004 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1007 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1011 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1012 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1017 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1020 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1021 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1025 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1027 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1030 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1032 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1033 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1035 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1036 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1038 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1040 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1045 /* we need a comma before each option */
1047 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1050 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1056 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1058 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1061 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1063 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1069 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1071 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1076 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1078 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1080 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1082 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1084 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1086 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1088 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1090 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1092 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1096 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1099 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1101 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1104 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1106 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1109 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1115 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1116 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1118 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1125 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1126 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1128 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1130 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1131 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1133 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1135 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1137 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1143 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1144 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1145 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1146 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1147 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1149 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1151 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1152 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1153 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1155 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1156 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1157 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1158 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1159 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1160 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1161 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1163 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1166 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1168 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1170 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1173 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1176 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1177 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1182 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1184 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1189 end = buffer+buflen;
1194 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1195 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1199 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1204 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1205 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1209 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1217 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1218 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1220 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1221 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1223 struct dentry *dentry;
1224 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1225 char *context = NULL;
1229 if (isec->initialized)
1232 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1233 if (isec->initialized)
1236 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1237 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1238 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1239 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1240 server is ready to handle calls. */
1241 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1242 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1243 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1244 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1248 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1249 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1250 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1251 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1255 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1256 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1258 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1259 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1261 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1262 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1266 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1267 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1268 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1269 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1270 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1271 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1272 * be used again by userspace.
1277 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1278 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1284 context[len] = '\0';
1285 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1287 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1290 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1291 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1298 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1304 context[len] = '\0';
1305 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1311 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1312 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1313 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1314 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1318 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1319 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1322 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1326 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1327 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1329 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1330 if (printk_ratelimit())
1331 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1332 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1333 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1335 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1336 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1337 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1340 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1348 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1349 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1351 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1352 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1353 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1355 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1356 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1357 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1365 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1366 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1369 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1370 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1372 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1373 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1375 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1376 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1387 isec->initialized = 1;
1390 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1392 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1393 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1397 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1398 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1404 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1405 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1408 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1409 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1412 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1413 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1416 /* All other signals. */
1417 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1425 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1426 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1428 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1429 const struct cred *target,
1432 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1434 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1438 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1439 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1440 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1441 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1443 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1444 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1447 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1451 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1452 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1454 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1458 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1459 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1460 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1461 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1463 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1468 sid = current_sid();
1469 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1470 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1473 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1474 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1477 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1478 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1479 const struct cred *cred,
1482 struct common_audit_data ad;
1483 struct av_decision avd;
1485 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1486 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1489 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1493 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1495 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1498 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1502 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1506 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1507 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1508 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1512 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1513 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1516 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1518 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1519 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1522 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1523 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1524 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1525 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1526 struct inode *inode,
1528 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1530 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1531 struct common_audit_data ad;
1534 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1537 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1538 isec = inode->i_security;
1542 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1543 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1546 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1549 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1550 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1551 pathname if needed. */
1552 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1553 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1554 struct dentry *dentry,
1557 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1558 struct common_audit_data ad;
1560 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1561 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1562 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1563 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1566 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1567 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1568 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1569 check a particular permission to the file.
1570 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1571 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1572 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1573 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1574 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1578 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1579 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1580 struct common_audit_data ad;
1581 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1584 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1585 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1587 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1588 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1596 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1599 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1605 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1606 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1607 struct dentry *dentry,
1610 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1611 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1612 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1613 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1615 struct common_audit_data ad;
1618 dsec = dir->i_security;
1619 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1622 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1624 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1625 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1627 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1628 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1633 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1634 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1639 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1643 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1644 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1645 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1648 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1649 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1650 struct task_struct *ctx)
1652 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1654 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1658 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1661 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1662 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1663 struct dentry *dentry,
1667 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1668 struct common_audit_data ad;
1669 u32 sid = current_sid();
1673 dsec = dir->i_security;
1674 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1676 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1677 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1680 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1681 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1696 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1701 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1705 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1706 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1707 struct inode *new_dir,
1708 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1710 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1711 struct common_audit_data ad;
1712 u32 sid = current_sid();
1714 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1717 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1718 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1719 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1720 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1722 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1724 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1725 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1726 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1729 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1730 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1733 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1734 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1735 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1740 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1741 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1742 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1743 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1744 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1747 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1748 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1749 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1750 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1752 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1760 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1761 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1762 struct super_block *sb,
1764 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1766 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1767 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1769 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1770 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1773 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1774 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1778 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1779 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1780 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1781 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1784 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1786 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1790 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1792 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1794 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1801 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1802 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1806 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1808 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1809 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1816 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1825 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1828 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1830 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1832 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1833 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1835 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1839 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1840 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1841 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1842 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1843 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1844 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1845 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1847 else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
1848 av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
1850 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1851 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1856 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1858 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1863 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1867 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1868 u32 sid = current_sid();
1869 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1870 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1873 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1876 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1880 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1884 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1887 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1888 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1892 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1896 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1899 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1900 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1901 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1902 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1906 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1907 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1911 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1915 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1916 * which was removed).
1918 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1919 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1920 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1921 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1924 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1929 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1933 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1936 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1939 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1942 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1947 end = buffer+buflen;
1953 const char *name = table->procname;
1954 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1955 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1959 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1962 table = table->parent;
1968 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1970 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1972 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1977 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1984 sid = current_sid();
1986 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1987 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1989 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1990 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1993 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1994 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1996 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1997 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
2005 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
2006 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
2012 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2014 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2026 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2031 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2034 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2040 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2042 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2044 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2047 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2051 rc = cap_syslog(type);
2056 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2057 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2058 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2060 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2061 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2062 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2063 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2065 case 0: /* Close log */
2066 case 1: /* Open log */
2067 case 2: /* Read from log */
2068 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2069 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2071 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2078 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2079 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2080 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2082 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2083 * processes that allocate mappings.
2085 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2087 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2089 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2090 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2094 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2097 /* binprm security operations */
2099 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2101 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2102 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2103 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2104 struct common_audit_data ad;
2105 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2108 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2112 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2113 * the script interpreter */
2114 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2117 old_tsec = current_security();
2118 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2119 isec = inode->i_security;
2121 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2122 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2123 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2125 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2126 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2127 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2128 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2130 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2131 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2132 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2133 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2135 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2136 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2137 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2142 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2143 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2145 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2146 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2148 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2149 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2150 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2154 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2155 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2156 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2160 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2161 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2165 /* Check for shared state */
2166 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2167 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2168 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2174 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2175 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2177 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2178 struct task_struct *tracer;
2179 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2183 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2184 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2185 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2191 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2193 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2199 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2200 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2206 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2208 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2209 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2217 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2218 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2219 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2220 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2222 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2225 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2228 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2229 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2231 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2232 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2233 struct files_struct *files)
2235 struct common_audit_data ad;
2236 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2237 struct tty_struct *tty;
2238 struct fdtable *fdt;
2242 tty = get_current_tty();
2245 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2246 struct inode *inode;
2248 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2249 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2250 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2251 file may belong to another process and we are only
2252 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2253 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2254 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2255 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2256 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2263 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2267 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2269 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2271 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2273 unsigned long set, i;
2278 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2279 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2281 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2284 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2285 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2290 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2292 file_to_av(file))) {
2294 fd = get_unused_fd();
2304 devnull = dentry_open(
2306 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2308 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2315 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2320 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2323 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2327 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2329 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2331 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2332 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2335 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2336 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2339 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2340 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2342 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2343 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2345 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2346 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2347 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2349 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2350 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2351 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2352 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2353 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2355 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2356 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2358 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2359 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2360 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2361 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2363 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2368 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2371 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2373 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2374 struct itimerval itimer;
2384 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2385 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2386 * flush and unblock signals.
2388 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2389 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2391 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2393 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2394 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2395 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2396 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2397 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2398 __flush_signals(current);
2399 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2400 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2402 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2405 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2406 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2407 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2408 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->real_parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2409 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2412 /* superblock security operations */
2414 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2416 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2419 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2421 superblock_free_security(sb);
2424 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2429 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2432 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2434 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2435 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2436 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2437 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2438 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2441 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2448 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2452 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2455 int current_size = 0;
2463 while (current_size < len) {
2473 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2475 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2476 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2477 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2483 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2491 in_save = in_end = orig;
2495 open_quote = !open_quote;
2496 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2498 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2500 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2501 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2503 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2505 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2507 } while (*in_end++);
2509 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2510 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2515 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2517 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2518 struct common_audit_data ad;
2521 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2525 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2526 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2529 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2530 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2531 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2534 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2536 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2537 struct common_audit_data ad;
2539 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2540 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2541 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2544 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2547 unsigned long flags,
2550 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2552 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2553 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2554 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2556 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2560 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2562 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2564 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2565 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2568 /* inode security operations */
2570 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2572 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2575 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2577 inode_free_security(inode);
2580 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2581 char **name, void **value,
2584 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2585 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2586 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2587 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2588 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2590 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2592 dsec = dir->i_security;
2593 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2596 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2598 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2599 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2600 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2603 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2604 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2607 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2612 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2613 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2614 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2615 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2617 isec->initialized = 1;
2620 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2624 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2631 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2643 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2645 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2648 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2650 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2653 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2655 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2658 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2660 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2663 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2665 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2668 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2670 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2673 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2675 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2678 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2679 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2681 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2684 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2686 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2688 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2691 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2693 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2695 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2698 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2700 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2703 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2707 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2708 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2711 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2713 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2714 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2716 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2717 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2718 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2724 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2725 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2726 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2728 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2731 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2733 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2735 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2738 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2740 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2742 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2743 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2744 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2745 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2747 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2748 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2749 Restrict to administrator. */
2754 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2755 ordinary setattr permission. */
2756 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2759 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2760 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2762 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2763 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2764 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2765 struct common_audit_data ad;
2766 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2769 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2770 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2772 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2773 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2776 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2779 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2780 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2782 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2783 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2787 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2788 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2789 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2791 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2796 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2797 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2801 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2806 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2808 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2809 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2813 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2814 const void *value, size_t size,
2817 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2818 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2822 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2823 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2827 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2829 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2830 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2831 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2839 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2841 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2843 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2846 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2848 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2850 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2853 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2855 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2856 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2858 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2859 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2864 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2866 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2868 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2872 char *context = NULL;
2873 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2875 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2879 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2880 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2881 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2882 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2883 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2884 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2885 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2887 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2888 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2890 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2893 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2906 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2907 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2909 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2913 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2916 if (!value || !size)
2919 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2927 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2929 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2930 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2931 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2935 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2937 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2941 /* file security operations */
2943 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2945 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2946 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2948 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2949 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2952 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2953 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2956 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2958 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2959 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2960 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2961 u32 sid = current_sid();
2964 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2967 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2968 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2969 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2972 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2975 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2977 return file_alloc_security(file);
2980 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2982 file_free_security(file);
2985 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2988 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2991 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2993 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2998 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3001 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3003 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3006 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3007 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3009 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3010 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3011 * This has an additional check.
3013 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3020 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3021 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3023 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3024 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3027 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3028 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3030 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3037 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3038 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3039 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3042 u32 sid = current_sid();
3045 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3046 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3047 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3048 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3050 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3051 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3052 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3057 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3058 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
3059 if (rc || addr_only)
3062 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3065 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3066 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3069 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3070 unsigned long reqprot,
3073 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3075 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3078 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3079 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3081 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3082 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3083 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3084 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3085 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3086 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3087 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3088 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3090 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3091 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3092 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3093 * modified content. This typically should only
3094 * occur for text relocations.
3096 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3103 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3106 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3108 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3110 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3113 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3116 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3121 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3126 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3127 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3136 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3137 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3142 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3147 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3151 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3158 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3160 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3162 fsec = file->f_security;
3163 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3168 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3169 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3172 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3174 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3176 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3177 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3179 fsec = file->f_security;
3182 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3184 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3186 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3187 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3190 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3192 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3194 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3197 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3199 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3200 struct inode *inode;
3201 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3203 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3204 fsec = file->f_security;
3205 isec = inode->i_security;
3207 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3208 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3209 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3210 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3211 * struct as its SID.
3213 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3214 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3216 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3217 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3218 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3219 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3220 * new inode label or new policy.
3221 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3223 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3226 /* task security operations */
3228 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3230 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3234 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3236 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3238 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3239 cred->security = NULL;
3244 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3246 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3249 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3250 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3252 old_tsec = old->security;
3254 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3258 new->security = tsec;
3263 * set the security data for a kernel service
3264 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3266 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3268 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3269 u32 sid = current_sid();
3272 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3273 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3274 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3278 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3279 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3280 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3286 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3287 * objective context of the specified inode
3289 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3291 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3292 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3293 u32 sid = current_sid();
3296 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3297 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3298 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3302 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3306 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(void)
3308 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST);
3311 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3313 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3316 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3318 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3321 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3323 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3326 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3328 *secid = task_sid(p);
3331 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3335 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3339 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3342 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3346 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3350 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3353 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3355 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3358 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3360 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3362 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3363 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3364 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3365 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3366 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3367 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3372 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3376 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3380 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3383 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3385 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3388 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3390 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3393 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3400 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3402 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3404 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3405 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3407 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3411 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3413 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3416 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3417 struct inode *inode)
3419 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3420 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3423 isec->initialized = 1;
3426 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3427 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3428 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3430 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3431 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3433 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3434 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3438 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3439 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3442 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3443 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3447 *proto = ih->protocol;
3449 switch (ih->protocol) {
3451 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3453 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3457 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3461 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3462 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3467 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3469 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3473 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3477 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3478 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3482 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3483 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3485 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3489 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3493 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3494 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3505 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3507 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3508 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3509 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3512 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3513 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3515 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3516 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3520 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3521 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3524 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3525 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3526 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3535 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3537 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3541 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3542 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3547 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3549 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3553 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3554 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3558 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3559 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3561 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3565 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3566 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3570 /* includes fragments */
3580 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3581 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3586 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3588 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3591 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3592 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3595 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3597 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3600 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3601 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3611 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3612 " unable to parse packet\n");
3622 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3624 * @family: protocol family
3625 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3628 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3629 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3630 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3631 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3632 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3636 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3643 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3644 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3646 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3647 if (unlikely(err)) {
3649 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3650 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3657 /* socket security operations */
3658 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3661 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3662 struct common_audit_data ad;
3666 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3668 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3670 sid = task_sid(task);
3672 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3673 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3674 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3680 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3681 int protocol, int kern)
3683 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3684 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3693 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3695 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3696 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3702 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3703 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3705 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3706 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3707 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3708 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3713 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3715 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3718 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3724 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3725 isec->initialized = 1;
3728 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3729 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3730 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3731 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3737 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3738 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3739 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3741 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3746 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3751 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3752 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3753 * check the first address now.
3755 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3756 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3758 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3759 struct common_audit_data ad;
3760 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3761 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3762 unsigned short snum;
3763 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3766 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3768 if (family == PF_INET) {
3769 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3770 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3771 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3773 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3774 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3775 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3781 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3783 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3784 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3788 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3789 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3790 ad.u.net.family = family;
3791 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3793 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3799 switch (isec->sclass) {
3800 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3801 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3804 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3805 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3808 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3809 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3813 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3817 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3821 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3822 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3823 ad.u.net.family = family;
3825 if (family == PF_INET)
3826 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3828 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3830 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3831 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3839 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3841 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3842 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3845 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3850 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3852 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3853 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3854 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3855 struct common_audit_data ad;
3856 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3857 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3858 unsigned short snum;
3861 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3862 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3863 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3865 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3867 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3868 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3870 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3873 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3877 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3878 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3880 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3881 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3882 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3883 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3888 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3894 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3896 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3899 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3902 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3903 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3905 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3909 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3911 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3912 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3913 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3914 newisec->initialized = 1;
3919 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3922 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3925 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3926 int size, int flags)
3928 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3931 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3933 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3936 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3938 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3941 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3945 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3949 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3952 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3955 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3958 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3960 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3963 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3964 struct socket *other,
3967 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3968 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3969 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3970 struct common_audit_data ad;
3973 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3974 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3976 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3977 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3979 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3981 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3985 /* connecting socket */
3986 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3987 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3989 /* server child socket */
3990 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3991 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3992 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3997 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3998 struct socket *other)
4000 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4001 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4002 struct common_audit_data ad;
4005 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4006 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4008 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4009 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4011 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4012 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4019 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4021 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4027 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4030 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4031 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4035 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4038 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4039 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4042 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4046 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4048 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4049 struct common_audit_data ad;
4052 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4053 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4054 ad.u.net.family = family;
4055 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4059 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4060 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4066 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4067 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4070 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4071 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4073 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4075 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4078 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4084 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4087 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4088 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4089 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4090 struct common_audit_data ad;
4095 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4098 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4099 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4102 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4103 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4104 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4105 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4106 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4107 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4109 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4110 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4111 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4114 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4115 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4116 ad.u.net.family = family;
4117 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4121 if (peerlbl_active) {
4124 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4127 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4130 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4133 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4136 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4139 if (secmark_active) {
4140 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4149 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4150 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4155 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4156 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4157 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4159 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4161 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4162 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4163 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4164 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4166 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4171 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4176 if (scontext_len > len) {
4181 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4185 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4193 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4195 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4198 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4200 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4203 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4207 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4208 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4210 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4213 *secid = peer_secid;
4214 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4219 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4221 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4224 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4226 sk_free_security(sk);
4229 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4231 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4232 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4234 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4235 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4236 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4238 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec);
4241 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4244 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4246 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4248 *secid = sksec->sid;
4252 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4254 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4255 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4257 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4258 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4259 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4260 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4263 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4264 struct request_sock *req)
4266 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4268 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4272 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4273 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4276 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4279 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4280 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4281 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4283 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4286 req->secid = newsid;
4287 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4290 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4293 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4294 const struct request_sock *req)
4296 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4298 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4299 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4300 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4301 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4302 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4303 time it will have been created and available. */
4305 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4306 * thread with access to newsksec */
4307 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4310 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4312 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4313 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4315 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4316 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4319 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4322 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4325 fl->secid = req->secid;
4328 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4332 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4333 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4334 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4336 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4340 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4342 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4344 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4345 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4346 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4347 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4348 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4349 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4359 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4364 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4366 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4372 struct common_audit_data ad;
4377 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4380 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4381 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4382 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4383 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4386 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4389 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4390 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4391 ad.u.net.family = family;
4392 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4395 if (peerlbl_active) {
4396 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4399 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4405 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4406 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4410 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4411 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4412 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4414 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4420 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4421 struct sk_buff *skb,
4422 const struct net_device *in,
4423 const struct net_device *out,
4424 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4426 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4429 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4430 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4431 struct sk_buff *skb,
4432 const struct net_device *in,
4433 const struct net_device *out,
4434 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4436 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4440 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4445 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4448 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4449 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4450 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4452 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4455 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4456 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4462 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4463 struct sk_buff *skb,
4464 const struct net_device *in,
4465 const struct net_device *out,
4466 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4468 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4471 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4475 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4476 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4477 struct common_audit_data ad;
4483 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4485 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4486 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4487 ad.u.net.family = family;
4488 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4491 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4492 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4493 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4496 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4497 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4503 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4509 struct common_audit_data ad;
4514 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4515 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4516 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4517 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4518 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4519 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4521 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4522 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4523 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4524 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4525 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4526 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4527 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4530 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4531 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4532 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4535 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4536 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4537 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4538 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4543 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4544 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4546 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4549 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4550 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4552 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4557 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4558 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4561 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4563 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4564 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4565 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4568 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4569 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4570 ad.u.net.family = family;
4571 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4575 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4576 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4579 if (peerlbl_active) {
4583 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4585 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4586 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4589 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4591 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4592 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4599 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4600 struct sk_buff *skb,
4601 const struct net_device *in,
4602 const struct net_device *out,
4603 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4605 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4608 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4609 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4610 struct sk_buff *skb,
4611 const struct net_device *in,
4612 const struct net_device *out,
4613 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4615 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4619 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4621 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4625 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4629 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4630 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4635 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4638 struct common_audit_data ad;
4640 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4644 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4645 ad.u.cap = capability;
4647 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4648 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4651 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4652 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4655 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4658 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4662 sid = task_sid(task);
4663 isec->sclass = sclass;
4665 perm->security = isec;
4670 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4672 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4673 perm->security = NULL;
4677 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4679 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4681 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4685 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4686 msg->security = msec;
4691 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4693 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4695 msg->security = NULL;
4699 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4702 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4703 struct common_audit_data ad;
4704 u32 sid = current_sid();
4706 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4708 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4709 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4711 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4714 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4716 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4719 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4721 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4724 /* message queue security operations */
4725 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4727 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4728 struct common_audit_data ad;
4729 u32 sid = current_sid();
4732 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4736 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4738 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4739 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4741 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4744 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4750 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4752 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4755 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4757 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4758 struct common_audit_data ad;
4759 u32 sid = current_sid();
4761 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4763 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4764 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4766 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4767 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4770 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4778 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4779 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4782 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4785 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4788 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4794 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4798 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4800 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4801 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4802 struct common_audit_data ad;
4803 u32 sid = current_sid();
4806 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4807 msec = msg->security;
4810 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4812 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4814 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4815 * message queue this message will be stored in
4817 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4823 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4824 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4826 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4827 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4830 /* Can this process send the message */
4831 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4834 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4835 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4836 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4841 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4842 struct task_struct *target,
4843 long type, int mode)
4845 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4846 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4847 struct common_audit_data ad;
4848 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4851 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4852 msec = msg->security;
4854 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4855 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4857 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4858 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4860 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4861 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4865 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4866 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4868 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4869 struct common_audit_data ad;
4870 u32 sid = current_sid();
4873 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4877 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4879 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4880 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4882 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4885 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4891 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4893 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4896 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4898 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4899 struct common_audit_data ad;
4900 u32 sid = current_sid();
4902 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4904 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4905 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4907 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4908 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4911 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4912 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4920 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4921 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4924 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4927 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4934 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4940 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4944 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4945 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4949 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4952 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4954 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4957 /* Semaphore security operations */
4958 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4960 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4961 struct common_audit_data ad;
4962 u32 sid = current_sid();
4965 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4969 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4971 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4972 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4974 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4977 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4983 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4985 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4988 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4990 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4991 struct common_audit_data ad;
4992 u32 sid = current_sid();
4994 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4996 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4997 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4999 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5000 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5003 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5004 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5012 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5013 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5017 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5028 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5031 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5035 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5041 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5045 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5046 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5051 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5055 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5058 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5064 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5066 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5071 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5074 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5076 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5080 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5083 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5086 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5087 char *name, char **value)
5089 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5095 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5101 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5103 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5105 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5107 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5108 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5109 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5110 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5111 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5112 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5113 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5114 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5122 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5132 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5133 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5135 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5136 struct task_struct *tracer;
5143 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5144 security attributes. */
5149 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5150 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5151 * above restriction is ever removed.
5153 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5154 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5155 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5156 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5157 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5158 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5159 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5160 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5161 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5162 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5168 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5169 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5170 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5174 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5175 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5176 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5178 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5185 new = prepare_creds();
5189 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5190 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5191 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5192 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5193 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5194 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5195 tsec = new->security;
5196 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5197 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5198 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5199 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5200 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5201 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5204 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5205 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5206 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5207 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5212 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5214 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5215 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5220 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5221 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5222 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5226 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5227 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5230 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5232 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5236 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5237 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5256 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5258 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5261 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5263 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5266 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5273 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5274 unsigned long flags)
5276 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5277 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5279 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5283 tsec = cred->security;
5284 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5285 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5287 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5293 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5295 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5301 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5302 const struct cred *cred,
5306 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5309 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5310 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5311 appear to be created. */
5315 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5317 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5318 ksec = key->security;
5320 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5323 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5325 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5326 char *context = NULL;
5330 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5339 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5342 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5343 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5344 .capget = selinux_capget,
5345 .capset = selinux_capset,
5346 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5347 .capable = selinux_capable,
5348 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5349 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5350 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5351 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5353 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5354 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5356 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5357 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5358 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5359 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5361 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5362 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5363 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5364 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5365 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5366 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5367 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5368 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5369 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5370 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5371 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5374 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5375 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5376 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5377 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5378 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5379 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5380 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5381 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5382 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5383 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5384 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5385 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5386 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5387 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5388 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5389 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5390 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5391 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5392 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5393 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5394 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5395 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5396 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5397 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5398 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5400 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5401 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5402 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5403 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5404 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5405 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5406 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5407 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5408 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5409 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5410 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5412 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5414 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5415 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5416 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5417 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5418 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5419 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5420 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5421 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5422 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5423 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5424 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5425 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5426 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5427 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5428 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5429 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5430 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5431 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5432 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5433 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5435 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5436 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5438 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5439 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5441 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5442 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5443 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5444 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5445 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5446 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5448 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5449 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5450 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5451 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5452 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5454 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5455 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5456 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5457 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5458 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5460 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5462 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5463 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5465 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5466 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5467 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5469 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5470 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5472 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5473 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5474 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5475 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5476 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5477 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5478 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5479 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5480 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5481 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5482 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5483 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5484 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5485 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5486 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5487 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5488 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5489 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5490 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5491 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5492 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5493 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5494 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5495 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5496 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5498 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5499 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5500 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5501 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5502 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5503 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5504 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5505 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5506 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5507 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5508 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5512 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5513 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5514 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5515 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5519 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5520 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5521 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5522 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5526 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5528 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5529 selinux_enabled = 0;
5533 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5534 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5538 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5540 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5541 cred_init_security();
5543 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5544 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5545 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5548 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5550 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5551 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5552 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5554 if (selinux_enforcing)
5555 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5557 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5562 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5564 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5566 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5567 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5568 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5569 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5571 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5572 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5573 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5574 struct superblock_security_struct,
5576 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5578 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5579 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5580 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5582 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5584 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5585 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5586 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5589 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5590 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5593 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5594 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5595 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5597 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5599 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5601 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5602 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5604 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5605 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5608 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5609 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5611 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5612 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5615 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5616 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5618 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5619 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5623 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5625 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5627 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5628 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5630 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5631 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5634 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5635 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5637 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5638 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5644 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5648 if (!selinux_enabled)
5651 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5653 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5655 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5657 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5658 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5660 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5667 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5669 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5670 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5672 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5674 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5675 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5676 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5681 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5683 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5684 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5687 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5689 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5690 static int selinux_disabled;
5692 int selinux_disable(void)
5694 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5696 if (ss_initialized) {
5697 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5701 if (selinux_disabled) {
5702 /* Only do this once. */
5706 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5708 selinux_disabled = 1;
5709 selinux_enabled = 0;
5711 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5714 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5715 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5717 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5718 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5720 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */