2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
16 * Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
19 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
20 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
23 #include <linux/module.h>
24 #include <linux/init.h>
25 #include <linux/kernel.h>
26 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
27 #include <linux/errno.h>
28 #include <linux/sched.h>
29 #include <linux/security.h>
30 #include <linux/xattr.h>
31 #include <linux/capability.h>
32 #include <linux/unistd.h>
34 #include <linux/mman.h>
35 #include <linux/slab.h>
36 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
37 #include <linux/swap.h>
38 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
39 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
40 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
41 #include <linux/file.h>
42 #include <linux/namei.h>
43 #include <linux/mount.h>
44 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
45 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
54 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
55 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
56 #include <linux/bitops.h>
57 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
58 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/tcp.h>
61 #include <linux/udp.h>
62 #include <linux/quota.h>
63 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
65 #include <linux/parser.h>
66 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
68 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
69 #include <linux/personality.h>
70 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
71 #include <linux/audit.h>
72 #include <linux/string.h>
73 #include <linux/selinux.h>
74 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include "selinux_netlabel.h"
82 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
83 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
85 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
86 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
87 extern int selinux_compat_net;
89 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
90 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
92 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
94 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
97 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
101 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
103 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
105 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
108 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
110 int selinux_enabled = 1;
113 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
114 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
116 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
117 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
118 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
119 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
120 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
122 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
123 before the policy was loaded. */
124 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
125 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
127 static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache;
129 /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
130 length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
131 static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
137 rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
141 if (!buffer || !size)
142 goto getsecurity_exit;
146 goto getsecurity_exit;
148 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
155 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
157 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
159 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
161 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
166 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
167 task->security = tsec;
172 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
174 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
175 task->security = NULL;
179 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
181 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
182 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
184 isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, SLAB_KERNEL);
188 memset(isec, 0, sizeof(*isec));
189 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
190 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
192 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
193 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
194 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
195 inode->i_security = isec;
200 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
202 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
203 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
205 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
206 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
207 list_del_init(&isec->list);
208 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
210 inode->i_security = NULL;
211 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
214 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
216 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
217 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
219 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
224 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
225 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
226 file->f_security = fsec;
231 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
233 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
234 file->f_security = NULL;
238 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
240 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
242 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
246 init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem);
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
249 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
251 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
253 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
254 sb->s_security = sbsec;
259 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
261 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
263 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
264 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
265 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
266 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
268 sb->s_security = NULL;
272 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
274 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
276 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
281 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
283 sk->sk_security = ssec;
285 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(ssec, family);
290 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
292 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
294 sk->sk_security = NULL;
298 /* The security server must be initialized before
299 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
300 extern int ss_initialized;
302 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
304 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
306 "uses transition SIDs",
308 "uses genfs_contexts",
309 "not configured for labeling",
310 "uses mountpoint labeling",
313 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
315 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
317 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
327 static match_table_t tokens = {
328 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
329 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
330 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
331 {Opt_rootcontext, "rootcontext=%s"},
334 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
336 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
337 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
338 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
342 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
343 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
347 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
348 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
352 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
353 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
354 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
357 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
358 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
362 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
363 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
367 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
369 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
370 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
373 int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
374 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
375 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
380 name = sb->s_type->name;
382 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
384 /* NFS we understand. */
385 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
386 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
388 if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
392 context = d->context;
399 /* Standard string-based options. */
400 char *p, *options = data;
402 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
404 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
409 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
413 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
415 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
418 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
429 if (seen & Opt_fscontext) {
431 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
434 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
441 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
444 case Opt_rootcontext:
445 if (seen & Opt_rootcontext) {
447 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
450 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
457 seen |= Opt_rootcontext;
461 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
463 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
464 "defcontext option is invalid "
465 "for this filesystem type\n");
468 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
470 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
473 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
480 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
485 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
496 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
498 rc = security_context_to_sid(fscontext, strlen(fscontext), &sid);
500 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
501 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
502 fscontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
506 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
514 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
515 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
516 * the superblock context if not already set.
519 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
521 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
522 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
523 context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
528 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
533 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
537 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
539 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
543 struct inode *inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
544 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
545 rc = security_context_to_sid(rootcontext, strlen(rootcontext), &sid);
547 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
548 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
549 rootcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
553 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
558 isec->initialized = 1;
562 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
564 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
565 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
566 defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
570 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
573 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
577 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
591 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
593 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
594 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
595 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
599 if (sbsec->initialized)
602 if (!ss_initialized) {
603 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
604 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
605 server is ready to handle calls. */
606 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
607 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
608 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
609 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
613 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
614 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
616 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
617 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
621 rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
625 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
626 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
627 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
628 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
629 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
630 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
631 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
632 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
633 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
637 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
638 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
639 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
640 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
641 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
642 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
644 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
645 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
646 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
651 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
654 sbsec->initialized = 1;
656 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
657 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
658 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
661 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
662 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
663 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
666 /* Initialize the root inode. */
667 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
669 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
670 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
671 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
673 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
675 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
676 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
677 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
678 struct inode_security_struct, list);
679 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
680 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
681 inode = igrab(inode);
683 if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
687 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
688 list_del_init(&isec->list);
691 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
697 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
699 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
701 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
703 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
705 return SECCLASS_FILE;
707 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
711 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
713 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
717 return SECCLASS_FILE;
720 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
722 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
725 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
727 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
730 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
737 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
739 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
746 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
747 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
749 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
751 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
752 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
754 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
756 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
762 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
763 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
764 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
765 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
766 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
768 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
770 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
771 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
772 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
774 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
776 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
777 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
778 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
779 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
780 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
782 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
785 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
787 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
789 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
792 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
795 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
796 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
801 char *buffer, *path, *end;
803 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
813 while (de && de != de->parent) {
814 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
818 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
823 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
824 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
828 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
836 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
837 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
839 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
840 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
842 struct dentry *dentry;
843 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
844 char *context = NULL;
848 if (isec->initialized)
851 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
852 if (isec->initialized)
855 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
856 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
857 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
858 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
859 server is ready to handle calls. */
860 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
861 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
862 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
863 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
867 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
868 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
869 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
870 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
874 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
875 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
877 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
878 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
880 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
881 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
884 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
885 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
890 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
891 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
897 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
900 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
901 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
909 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
915 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
921 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
922 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
923 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
924 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
928 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
929 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
932 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
935 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
936 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
937 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
938 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
940 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
948 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
949 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
951 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
952 /* Default to the fs SID. */
953 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
955 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
956 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
957 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
965 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
966 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
969 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
970 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
973 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
975 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
976 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
987 isec->initialized = 1;
990 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
992 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
993 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
997 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
998 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1004 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1005 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1008 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1009 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1012 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1013 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1016 /* All other signals. */
1017 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1024 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1025 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1026 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1027 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1030 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1032 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1033 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1034 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1035 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1038 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1039 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1042 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1043 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1045 tsec = tsk->security;
1047 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
1051 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1052 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
1055 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1056 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1059 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1061 tsec = tsk->security;
1063 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1064 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1067 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1068 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1069 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1070 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1071 struct inode *inode,
1073 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1075 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1076 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1077 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1079 tsec = tsk->security;
1080 isec = inode->i_security;
1084 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1085 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1088 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1091 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1092 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1093 pathname if needed. */
1094 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1095 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1096 struct dentry *dentry,
1099 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1100 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1101 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1103 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1104 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1107 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1108 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1109 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1110 check a particular permission to the file.
1111 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1112 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1113 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1114 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1115 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1119 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1120 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1121 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
1122 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
1123 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1124 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1127 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1129 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1131 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1132 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1140 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1142 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1147 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1148 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1149 struct dentry *dentry,
1152 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1153 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1154 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1156 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1159 tsec = current->security;
1160 dsec = dir->i_security;
1161 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1163 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1164 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1166 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1167 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1172 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1173 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1175 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1181 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1185 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1186 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1187 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1190 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1191 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1192 struct task_struct *ctx)
1194 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1196 tsec = ctx->security;
1198 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1202 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1205 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1206 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1207 struct dentry *dentry,
1211 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1212 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1213 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1217 tsec = current->security;
1218 dsec = dir->i_security;
1219 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1221 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1222 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1225 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1226 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1241 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1245 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1249 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1250 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1251 struct inode *new_dir,
1252 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1254 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1255 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1256 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1258 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1261 tsec = current->security;
1262 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1263 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1264 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1265 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1267 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1269 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1270 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1271 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1274 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1275 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1278 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1279 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1280 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1285 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1286 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1287 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1288 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1289 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1292 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1293 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1294 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1295 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1297 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1305 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1306 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1307 struct super_block *sb,
1309 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1311 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1312 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1314 tsec = tsk->security;
1315 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1316 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1320 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1321 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1325 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1326 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1327 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1328 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1331 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1333 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1337 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1339 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1341 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1348 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1349 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1353 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1355 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1356 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1365 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1367 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1369 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1370 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1373 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1377 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1378 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1379 if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
1380 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1384 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1385 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1389 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1393 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1396 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1397 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1401 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1405 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1408 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1409 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1411 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1414 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1418 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1422 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1425 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1429 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1433 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1437 tsec = current->security;
1439 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
1440 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1442 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1443 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1446 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1447 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1449 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1450 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1458 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1459 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1465 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1478 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1480 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1485 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1487 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1490 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1496 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1498 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1501 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1505 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1510 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1511 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1512 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1514 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1515 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1516 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1517 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1519 case 0: /* Close log */
1520 case 1: /* Open log */
1521 case 2: /* Read from log */
1522 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1523 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1525 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1532 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1533 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1534 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1536 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1537 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1538 * the capability is granted.
1540 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1541 * processes that allocate mappings.
1543 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1545 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1546 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1548 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1550 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1551 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1552 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1558 return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1561 /* binprm security operations */
1563 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1565 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1567 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1572 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1575 bprm->security = bsec;
1579 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1581 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1582 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1583 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1584 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1586 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1589 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1593 bsec = bprm->security;
1598 tsec = current->security;
1599 isec = inode->i_security;
1601 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1602 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1604 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1605 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1606 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1607 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1609 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1610 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1611 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1614 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1615 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1616 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1621 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1622 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
1623 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
1625 if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1628 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1629 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1630 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1634 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1635 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1636 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1640 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1641 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1645 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1646 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1648 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1656 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1658 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1662 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1664 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1667 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1668 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1669 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1670 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1671 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1673 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1676 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1679 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1681 kfree(bprm->security);
1682 bprm->security = NULL;
1685 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1686 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1688 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1689 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1691 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1692 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1693 struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty;
1694 struct fdtable *fdt;
1699 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1701 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1702 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1703 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1704 file may belong to another process and we are only
1705 interested in the inode-based check here. */
1706 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1707 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1708 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1709 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1710 current->signal->tty = NULL;
1711 current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
1717 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1719 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1721 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1723 unsigned long set, i;
1728 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
1729 if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset)
1731 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1734 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1735 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1740 if (file_has_perm(current,
1742 file_to_av(file))) {
1744 fd = get_unused_fd();
1754 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1761 fd_install(fd, devnull);
1766 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1769 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1772 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1774 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1775 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1779 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1781 tsec = current->security;
1783 bsec = bprm->security;
1786 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1788 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1789 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
1790 unchanged and kill. */
1791 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1792 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1793 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1800 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1801 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1802 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1803 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1804 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1816 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1818 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1820 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1821 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1822 struct itimerval itimer;
1823 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1826 tsec = current->security;
1827 bsec = bprm->security;
1830 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1833 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1836 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1837 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1839 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1840 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
1841 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1842 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1843 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1844 will be checked against the new SID. */
1845 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1846 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1848 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1849 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1850 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1851 flush_signals(current);
1852 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1853 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1854 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
1855 recalc_sigpending();
1856 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1859 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1860 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
1861 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1862 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
1863 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1864 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1865 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1866 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1867 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1869 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1870 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1872 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1873 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1874 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1875 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1877 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1879 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1882 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1886 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1887 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1888 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1891 /* superblock security operations */
1893 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1895 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1898 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1900 superblock_free_security(sb);
1903 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1908 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1911 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1913 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1914 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1915 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1916 match_prefix("rootcontext=", sizeof("rootcontext=")-1, option, len));
1919 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1927 memcpy(*to, from, len);
1931 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1933 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1934 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1935 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
1940 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
1941 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
1942 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
1946 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1954 in_save = in_end = orig;
1957 if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') {
1958 int len = in_end - in_curr;
1960 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
1961 take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1963 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
1965 in_curr = in_end + 1;
1967 } while (*in_end++);
1969 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
1970 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
1975 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1977 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1980 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
1984 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1985 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1986 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
1989 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
1991 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1993 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1994 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
1995 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
1998 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
1999 struct nameidata *nd,
2001 unsigned long flags,
2006 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
2010 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2011 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
2012 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2014 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
2018 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2022 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2026 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
2027 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
2030 /* inode security operations */
2032 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2034 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2037 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2039 inode_free_security(inode);
2042 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2043 char **name, void **value,
2046 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2047 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2048 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2051 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2053 tsec = current->security;
2054 dsec = dir->i_security;
2055 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2057 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2058 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2060 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2061 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2064 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2065 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2068 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2073 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2074 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2075 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2076 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2078 isec->initialized = 1;
2081 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2085 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
2092 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2104 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2106 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2109 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2113 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2116 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2119 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2123 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2126 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2129 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2131 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2134 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2136 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2139 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2141 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2144 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2148 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2152 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2155 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2156 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2158 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2161 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2163 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2166 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2170 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2173 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2176 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2177 struct nameidata *nd)
2181 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2186 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2190 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2191 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2194 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2198 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2202 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2205 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2206 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2207 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2209 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2212 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2214 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2217 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2219 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2220 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2221 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2222 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2223 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2227 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2228 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2229 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2230 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2231 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2232 Restrict to administrator. */
2236 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2237 ordinary setattr permission. */
2238 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2241 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2242 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2245 if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2248 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2249 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2251 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2252 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2256 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2260 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2261 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2265 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2270 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2272 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2273 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2277 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2278 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2280 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2281 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2285 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2286 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2290 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2292 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2293 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2301 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2303 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2306 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2308 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2311 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2313 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2314 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2315 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2316 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2317 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2318 Restrict to administrator. */
2322 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2323 ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2324 permission for removexattr. */
2325 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2328 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2329 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2333 static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
2335 return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2339 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2340 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2341 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2343 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2345 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
2347 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2349 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2352 return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
2355 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2356 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2358 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2362 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2365 if (!value || !size)
2368 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2376 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2378 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2379 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2380 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2384 /* file security operations */
2386 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2389 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
2392 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2396 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2397 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2400 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2401 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2405 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2408 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2410 return file_alloc_security(file);
2413 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2415 file_free_security(file);
2418 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2430 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2432 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2433 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2436 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2438 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2439 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2442 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2446 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2451 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2454 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2455 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2458 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2464 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2466 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2467 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2469 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2470 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2471 * This has an additional check.
2473 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2480 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2481 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2483 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2484 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2487 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2488 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2490 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2495 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2496 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2500 rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2504 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2507 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2508 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2511 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2512 unsigned long reqprot,
2517 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2521 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2524 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2525 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2527 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2528 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2529 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2531 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2532 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2533 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2534 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2535 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2537 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2538 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2539 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2540 * modified content. This typically should only
2541 * occur for text relocations.
2543 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2551 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2554 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2556 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2559 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2566 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2571 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2572 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2581 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2582 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2587 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2592 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2596 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2603 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2605 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2606 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2608 tsec = current->security;
2609 fsec = file->f_security;
2610 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2615 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2616 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2620 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2621 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2623 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2624 file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
2626 tsec = tsk->security;
2627 fsec = file->f_security;
2630 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2632 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2634 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2635 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2638 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2640 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2643 /* task security operations */
2645 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2649 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2653 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2656 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2658 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2661 tsec1 = current->security;
2663 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2666 tsec2 = tsk->security;
2668 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2669 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2671 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
2672 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2673 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2674 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
2675 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
2677 /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2678 This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2679 subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2680 tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2685 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2687 task_free_security(tsk);
2690 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2692 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2693 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2694 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2695 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
2696 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2701 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2703 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2706 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2708 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2712 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2714 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2717 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2719 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2722 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2724 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2727 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2729 selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
2732 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2734 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2738 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2742 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2746 return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2749 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2751 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2754 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2756 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2759 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2761 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2764 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2768 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2769 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2770 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2771 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2772 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2773 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2778 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2780 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2783 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2785 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2788 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2790 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2793 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2798 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2800 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
2804 if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2808 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2810 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2813 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2815 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2819 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2825 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2826 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2827 the state of the current process. */
2831 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2835 perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2837 return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2840 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2842 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2844 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2847 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2848 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2852 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2853 struct inode *inode)
2855 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2856 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2858 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2859 isec->initialized = 1;
2863 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2864 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2866 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2867 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2869 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2870 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2874 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2875 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2878 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2879 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2882 switch (ih->protocol) {
2884 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2886 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2890 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2894 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2895 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2900 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2902 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2906 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2910 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2911 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2922 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2924 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2925 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2928 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
2929 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
2931 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2932 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
2936 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
2937 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
2940 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
2941 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
2942 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
2948 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2950 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2954 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2955 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2960 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2962 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2966 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2967 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2971 /* includes fragments */
2981 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
2982 char **addrp, int *len, int src)
2986 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
2988 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
2992 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
2993 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
2996 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2998 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
3002 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3003 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3013 /* socket security operations */
3014 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3017 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3018 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3019 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3022 tsec = task->security;
3023 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3025 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3028 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3029 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3030 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3036 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3037 int protocol, int kern)
3040 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3046 tsec = current->security;
3047 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3048 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3049 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3050 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3056 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3057 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3060 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3061 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3062 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3065 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3067 tsec = current->security;
3068 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3069 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3070 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3071 isec->initialized = 1;
3074 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3075 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3076 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock,
3084 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3085 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3086 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3087 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
3088 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
3090 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3095 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3100 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3101 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3102 * check the first address now.
3104 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3105 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3107 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3108 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3109 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3110 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3111 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3112 unsigned short snum;
3113 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3114 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3116 tsec = current->security;
3117 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3119 if (family == PF_INET) {
3120 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3121 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3122 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3123 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3125 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3126 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3127 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3128 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3131 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
3132 snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
3133 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3134 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3137 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3138 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3139 ad.u.net.family = family;
3140 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3142 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3147 switch(isec->sclass) {
3148 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3149 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3152 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3153 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3157 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3161 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3165 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3166 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3167 ad.u.net.family = family;
3169 if (family == PF_INET)
3170 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3172 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3174 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3175 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3183 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3185 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3188 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3193 * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3195 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3196 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3197 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3198 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3199 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3200 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3201 unsigned short snum;
3204 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3205 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3206 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3208 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3210 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3211 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3213 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3216 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3217 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3221 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3222 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3223 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3224 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
3225 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
3234 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3236 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3239 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3242 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3243 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3245 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3249 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3251 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3252 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3253 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3254 newisec->initialized = 1;
3259 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3264 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3268 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3271 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3272 int size, int flags)
3274 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3277 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3279 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3282 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3284 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3287 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3289 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3292 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3295 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3298 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3300 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3303 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3304 struct socket *other,
3307 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3308 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3309 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3310 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3313 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3317 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3318 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3320 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3321 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3323 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3325 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3329 /* connecting socket */
3330 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3331 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3333 /* server child socket */
3334 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3335 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3336 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3341 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3342 struct socket *other)
3344 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3345 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3346 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3349 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3350 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3352 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3353 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3355 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3356 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3363 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3364 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3367 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3368 struct socket *sock;
3372 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3373 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3375 struct inode *inode;
3376 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3378 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3379 isec = inode->i_security;
3380 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3381 sock_class = isec->sclass;
3384 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3391 err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3395 switch (sock_class) {
3396 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3397 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3398 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3399 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3402 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3403 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3404 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3405 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3409 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3410 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3414 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3418 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3422 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3429 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3430 sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
3435 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3436 sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
3443 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3448 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3449 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3451 family = sk->sk_family;
3452 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3455 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3456 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
3459 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3460 ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
3461 ad.u.net.family = family;
3463 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
3467 if (selinux_compat_net)
3468 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family,
3471 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3476 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
3480 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
3485 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3486 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3491 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3492 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3495 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3497 /* if UNIX_STREAM check peer_sid, if TCP check dst for labelled sa */
3498 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
3499 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3500 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3502 else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3503 peer_sid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(sock);
3504 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
3505 peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk);
3506 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
3516 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3521 if (scontext_len > len) {
3526 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3530 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3538 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
3540 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
3543 if (sock && (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX))
3544 selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
3546 peer_secid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(skb);
3547 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
3548 peer_secid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
3551 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
3553 *secid = peer_secid;
3558 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
3560 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3563 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3565 sk_free_security(sk);
3568 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
3570 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
3571 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
3573 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
3574 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3576 selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(ssec, newssec);
3579 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
3582 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
3584 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3586 *secid = sksec->sid;
3590 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
3592 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
3593 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3595 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
3597 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
3600 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3601 struct request_sock *req)
3603 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3608 newsid = selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(skb, sksec->sid);
3609 if (newsid != SECSID_NULL) {
3610 req->secid = newsid;
3614 err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
3617 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
3618 req->secid = sksec->sid;
3622 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
3626 req->secid = newsid;
3630 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
3631 const struct request_sock *req)
3633 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
3635 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
3636 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
3637 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
3638 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
3639 time it will have been created and available. */
3641 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
3644 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
3647 fl->secid = req->secid;
3650 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3654 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3655 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3656 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3658 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3662 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
3664 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3666 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3667 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3668 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
3669 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3670 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3671 if (!selinux_enforcing)
3681 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3686 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3688 static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
3689 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3690 u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3693 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3694 struct socket *sock;
3695 struct inode *inode;
3696 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3698 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3702 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3706 isec = inode->i_security;
3708 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3712 switch (isec->sclass) {
3713 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3714 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3715 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3716 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3719 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3720 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3721 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3722 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3726 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3727 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3731 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3735 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3739 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3746 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3749 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
3754 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3761 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3762 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3763 const struct net_device *in,
3764 const struct net_device *out,
3765 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3771 struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3772 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3773 struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3774 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3780 sksec = sk->sk_security;
3782 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3783 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3784 ad.u.net.family = family;
3786 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0);
3790 if (selinux_compat_net)
3791 err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
3792 family, addrp, len);
3794 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3800 err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
3802 return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3805 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3806 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3807 const struct net_device *in,
3808 const struct net_device *out,
3809 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3811 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3814 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3816 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3817 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3818 const struct net_device *in,
3819 const struct net_device *out,
3820 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3822 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3827 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3829 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3833 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
3837 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
3838 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
3843 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
3846 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3848 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
3852 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
3853 ad.u.cap = capability;
3855 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
3856 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
3859 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
3860 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
3863 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
3864 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3866 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3870 isec->sclass = sclass;
3871 isec->ipc_perm = perm;
3872 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3873 perm->security = isec;
3878 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
3880 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
3881 perm->security = NULL;
3885 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3887 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3889 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3894 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3895 msg->security = msec;
3900 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3902 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
3904 msg->security = NULL;
3908 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
3911 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3912 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3913 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3915 tsec = current->security;
3916 isec = ipc_perms->security;
3918 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3919 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
3921 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3924 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3926 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
3929 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3931 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
3934 /* message queue security operations */
3935 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3937 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3938 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3939 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3942 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
3946 tsec = current->security;
3947 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3949 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3950 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3952 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3955 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3961 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3963 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3966 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3968 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3969 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3970 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3972 tsec = current->security;
3973 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3975 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3976 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3978 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3979 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3982 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3990 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3991 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3994 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
3997 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4000 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4006 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4010 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4012 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4013 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4014 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4015 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4018 tsec = current->security;
4019 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4020 msec = msg->security;
4023 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4025 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4027 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4028 * message queue this message will be stored in
4030 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4038 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4039 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4041 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4042 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4045 /* Can this process send the message */
4046 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4047 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4049 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4050 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4051 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4056 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4057 struct task_struct *target,
4058 long type, int mode)
4060 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4061 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4062 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4063 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4066 tsec = target->security;
4067 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4068 msec = msg->security;
4070 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4071 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4073 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4074 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4076 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4077 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4081 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4082 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4084 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4085 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4086 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4089 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4093 tsec = current->security;
4094 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4096 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4097 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4099 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4102 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4108 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4110 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4113 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4115 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4116 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4117 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4119 tsec = current->security;
4120 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4122 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4123 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4125 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4126 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4129 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4130 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4138 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4139 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4142 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4145 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4152 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4158 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4162 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4163 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4168 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4172 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4175 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4177 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4180 /* Semaphore security operations */
4181 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4183 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4184 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4185 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4188 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4192 tsec = current->security;
4193 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4195 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4196 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4198 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4201 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4207 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4209 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4212 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4214 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4215 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4216 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4218 tsec = current->security;
4219 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4221 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4222 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4224 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4225 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4228 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4229 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4237 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4238 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4242 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4253 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4256 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4260 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4266 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4270 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4271 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4276 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4280 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4283 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4289 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4291 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4296 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4299 /* module stacking operations */
4300 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4302 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4303 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security "
4304 "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4308 secondary_ops = ops;
4310 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
4317 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4319 if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4320 printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
4321 "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4325 secondary_ops = original_ops;
4330 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4333 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4336 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4337 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4339 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4344 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4351 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4353 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4355 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4356 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4357 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4358 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4359 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4360 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4361 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4362 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4369 return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size);
4372 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4373 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4375 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4381 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4382 security attributes. */
4387 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4388 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4389 * above restriction is ever removed.
4391 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4392 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4393 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4394 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4395 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4396 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
4397 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4398 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
4399 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4400 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4406 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4407 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4408 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4412 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4417 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4418 performed during the actual operation (execve,
4419 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4420 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4421 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4422 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4424 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4425 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4426 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4427 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4428 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
4429 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
4432 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
4433 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4434 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
4435 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4436 struct av_decision avd;
4441 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4442 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4443 struct task_struct *g, *t;
4444 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4445 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4446 do_each_thread(g, t)
4447 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4448 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4451 while_each_thread(g, t);
4452 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4455 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4456 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4457 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4461 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4462 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4464 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4465 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4467 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
4471 avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4472 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4486 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4488 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
4491 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
4499 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
4500 unsigned long flags)
4502 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
4503 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4505 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4510 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
4511 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4513 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
4519 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
4521 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
4527 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4528 struct task_struct *ctx,
4532 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4533 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4535 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4537 tsec = ctx->security;
4538 ksec = key->security;
4540 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
4541 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
4542 appear to be created. */
4546 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
4547 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
4552 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4553 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
4554 .capget = selinux_capget,
4555 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
4556 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
4557 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
4558 .capable = selinux_capable,
4559 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
4560 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
4561 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
4562 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4564 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
4565 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
4567 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4568 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
4569 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4570 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4571 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
4572 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
4573 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4575 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4576 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
4577 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
4578 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4579 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
4580 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
4581 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
4583 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4584 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
4585 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
4586 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
4587 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
4588 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
4589 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
4590 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
4591 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
4592 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
4593 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
4594 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
4595 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
4596 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
4597 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
4598 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
4599 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
4600 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4601 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
4602 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
4603 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
4604 .inode_xattr_getsuffix = selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
4605 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4606 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4607 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4609 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
4610 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
4611 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
4612 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
4613 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
4614 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
4615 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
4616 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
4617 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
4618 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4619 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
4621 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
4622 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
4623 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
4624 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
4625 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
4626 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
4627 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
4628 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
4629 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
4630 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
4631 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
4632 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
4633 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
4634 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
4635 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
4636 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
4637 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
4638 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
4639 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
4640 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
4641 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
4642 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4643 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
4645 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
4647 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4648 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4650 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4651 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4652 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4653 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4654 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4655 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4657 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4658 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
4659 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
4660 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
4661 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
4663 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4664 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
4665 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
4666 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
4667 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
4669 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
4670 .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security,
4672 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
4674 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
4675 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
4677 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
4678 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
4680 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4681 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4683 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
4684 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
4685 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
4686 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
4687 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
4688 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
4689 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4690 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4691 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
4692 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
4693 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4694 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4695 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
4696 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4697 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
4698 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
4699 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4700 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
4701 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
4702 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
4703 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
4704 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
4705 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
4706 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
4708 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
4709 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
4710 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
4711 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
4712 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
4713 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
4714 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
4715 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
4716 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
4717 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
4718 .xfrm_flow_state_match = selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match,
4719 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
4723 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
4724 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
4725 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
4729 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4731 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4733 if (!selinux_enabled) {
4734 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
4738 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
4740 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4741 if (task_alloc_security(current))
4742 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4743 tsec = current->security;
4744 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4746 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
4747 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
4748 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
4751 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4753 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4754 if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4755 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4757 if (selinux_enforcing) {
4758 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4760 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
4764 /* Add security information to initial keyrings */
4765 selinux_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current,
4766 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4767 selinux_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current,
4768 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4774 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4776 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
4778 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4779 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4780 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4781 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4783 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4784 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4785 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4786 struct superblock_security_struct,
4788 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4790 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4791 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4792 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4794 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4796 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4797 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4798 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4801 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4802 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4805 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4806 all processes and objects when they are created. */
4807 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4809 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4811 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4812 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4813 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4815 .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4816 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4819 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4821 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4822 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4823 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4825 .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4826 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4831 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
4835 if (!selinux_enabled)
4838 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
4840 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4842 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
4844 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4846 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4848 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
4856 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
4858 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4859 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
4861 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
4863 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4864 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4865 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4870 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4872 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4873 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
4876 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4878 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4879 int selinux_disable(void)
4881 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
4882 static int selinux_disabled = 0;
4884 if (ss_initialized) {
4885 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
4889 if (selinux_disabled) {
4890 /* Only do this once. */
4894 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
4896 selinux_disabled = 1;
4897 selinux_enabled = 0;
4899 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
4900 security_ops = secondary_ops;
4902 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
4903 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
4905 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */