2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
160 * initialise the security for the init task
162 static void cred_init_security(void)
164 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
167 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
171 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
172 cred->security = tsec;
176 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
180 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
182 tsec = cred->security;
187 * get the objective security ID of a task
189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
194 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
200 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
204 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
213 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
214 u32 sid = current_sid();
216 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
220 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
221 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
223 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
224 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
225 isec->task_sid = sid;
226 inode->i_security = isec;
231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
233 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
234 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
236 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
237 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
238 list_del_init(&isec->list);
239 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
241 inode->i_security = NULL;
242 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
248 u32 sid = current_sid();
250 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
255 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
256 file->f_security = fsec;
261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
263 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
264 file->f_security = NULL;
268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
270 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
272 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
276 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
278 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
279 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
281 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
283 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
284 sb->s_security = sbsec;
289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
291 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
293 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
294 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
295 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
296 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
298 sb->s_security = NULL;
302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
304 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
306 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
310 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sk->sk_security = ssec;
314 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
321 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
323 sk->sk_security = NULL;
324 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
328 /* The security server must be initialized before
329 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
330 extern int ss_initialized;
332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
336 "uses transition SIDs",
338 "uses genfs_contexts",
339 "not configured for labeling",
340 "uses mountpoint labeling",
343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
347 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
356 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
359 static const match_table_t tokens = {
360 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
364 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
368 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
370 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
372 const struct cred *cred)
374 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
377 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
378 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
382 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
383 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
387 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
388 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
389 const struct cred *cred)
391 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
393 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
394 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
398 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
399 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
403 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
405 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
406 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
407 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
410 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
411 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
412 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
413 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
414 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
415 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
416 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
417 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
418 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
422 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
423 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
424 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
425 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
426 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
427 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
429 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
430 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
431 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
436 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
438 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
439 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
440 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
442 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
443 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
444 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
446 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
448 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
449 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
450 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
452 /* Initialize the root inode. */
453 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
455 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
456 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
457 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
459 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
461 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
462 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
463 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
464 struct inode_security_struct, list);
465 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
466 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
467 inode = igrab(inode);
469 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
473 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
474 list_del_init(&isec->list);
477 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
483 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
484 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
485 * mount options, or whatever.
487 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
488 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
491 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
492 char *context = NULL;
496 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
498 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
504 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
505 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
506 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
508 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
511 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
512 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
513 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
515 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
516 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
521 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
522 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
528 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
529 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
532 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
533 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
535 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
536 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
539 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
540 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
542 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
543 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
546 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
547 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
549 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
550 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
551 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
553 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
556 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
557 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
559 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
560 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
561 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
564 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
569 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
573 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
574 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
576 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
578 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
579 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
580 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
581 (old_sid != new_sid))
584 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
585 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
587 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
588 if (mnt_flags & flag)
594 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
595 * labeling information.
597 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
598 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
600 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
602 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
603 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
604 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
605 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
606 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
607 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
608 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
609 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
610 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
612 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
614 if (!ss_initialized) {
616 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
617 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
618 server is ready to handle calls. */
619 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
620 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
621 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
622 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
626 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
627 "before the security server is initialized\n");
632 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
633 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
634 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
635 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
637 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
638 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
639 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
640 * will be used for both mounts)
642 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
647 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
648 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
649 * than once with different security options.
651 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
654 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
656 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
657 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
659 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
660 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
661 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
668 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
670 goto out_double_mount;
672 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
677 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
679 goto out_double_mount;
681 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
683 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
684 rootcontext_sid = sid;
686 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
688 goto out_double_mount;
690 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
694 defcontext_sid = sid;
696 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
698 goto out_double_mount;
700 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
709 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
710 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
711 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
712 goto out_double_mount;
717 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
718 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
720 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
721 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
723 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
724 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
728 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
730 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
734 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
738 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
739 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
740 * the superblock context if not already set.
743 if (!fscontext_sid) {
744 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
748 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
750 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
755 if (!rootcontext_sid)
756 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
758 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
759 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
762 if (rootcontext_sid) {
763 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
768 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
769 root_isec->initialized = 1;
772 if (defcontext_sid) {
773 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
775 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
776 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
780 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
781 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
787 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
790 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
792 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
796 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
797 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
801 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
802 struct super_block *newsb)
804 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
805 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
807 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
808 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
809 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
812 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
813 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
816 if (!ss_initialized) {
817 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
818 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
819 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
820 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
824 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
825 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
827 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
828 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
831 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
833 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
835 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
836 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
837 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
840 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
844 if (!set_rootcontext) {
845 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
846 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
849 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
851 if (set_rootcontext) {
852 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
853 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
854 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
855 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
857 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
860 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
861 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
864 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
865 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
868 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
869 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
870 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
872 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
874 /* Standard string-based options. */
875 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
877 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
882 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
886 if (context || defcontext) {
888 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
891 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
901 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
904 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
911 case Opt_rootcontext:
914 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
917 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
925 if (context || defcontext) {
927 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
930 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
936 case Opt_labelsupport:
940 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
947 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
951 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
952 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
953 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
958 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
959 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
962 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
963 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
966 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
967 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
970 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
971 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
974 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
985 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
987 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
990 char *options = data;
991 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
993 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
998 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1000 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1005 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1008 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1012 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1013 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1018 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1021 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1022 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1026 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1028 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1031 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1033 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1034 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1036 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1037 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1039 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1041 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1046 /* we need a comma before each option */
1048 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1051 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1057 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1059 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1062 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1064 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1070 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1072 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1077 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1079 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1081 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1083 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1085 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1087 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1089 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1091 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1093 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1097 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1100 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1102 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1105 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1107 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1110 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1116 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1117 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1119 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1126 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1127 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1129 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1131 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1132 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1134 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1136 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1138 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1144 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1145 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1146 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1147 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1148 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1150 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1152 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1153 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1154 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1156 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1157 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1158 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1159 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1160 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1161 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1162 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1164 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1167 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1169 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1171 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1174 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1177 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1178 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1183 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1185 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1190 end = buffer+buflen;
1195 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1196 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1200 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1205 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1206 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1210 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1218 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1219 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1221 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1224 struct dentry *dentry;
1225 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1226 char *context = NULL;
1230 if (isec->initialized)
1233 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1234 if (isec->initialized)
1237 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1238 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1239 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1240 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1241 server is ready to handle calls. */
1242 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1243 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1244 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1245 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1249 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1250 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1251 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1252 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1256 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1257 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1259 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1260 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1262 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1263 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1266 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1267 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1272 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1273 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1279 context[len] = '\0';
1280 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1282 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1283 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1284 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1292 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1298 context[len] = '\0';
1299 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1305 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1306 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1307 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1308 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1312 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1313 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1316 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1320 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1321 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1323 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1324 if (printk_ratelimit())
1325 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1326 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1327 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1329 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1330 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1331 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1334 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1342 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1343 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1345 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1346 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1347 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1349 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1350 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1351 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1359 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1360 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1363 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1364 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1366 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1367 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1369 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1370 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1381 isec->initialized = 1;
1384 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1386 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1387 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1391 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1392 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1398 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1399 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1402 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1403 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1406 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1407 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1410 /* All other signals. */
1411 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1419 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1420 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1422 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1423 const struct cred *target,
1426 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1428 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1432 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1433 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1434 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1435 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1437 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1438 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1441 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1445 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1446 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1448 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1452 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1453 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1454 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1455 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1457 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1462 sid = current_sid();
1463 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1464 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1467 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1468 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1471 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1472 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1473 const struct cred *cred,
1476 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1477 struct av_decision avd;
1479 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1480 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1483 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1487 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1489 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1492 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1496 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1500 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1501 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1502 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1506 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1507 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1510 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1512 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1513 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1516 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1517 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1518 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1519 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1520 struct inode *inode,
1522 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1524 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1525 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1528 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1531 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1532 isec = inode->i_security;
1536 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1537 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1540 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1543 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1544 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1545 pathname if needed. */
1546 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1547 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1548 struct dentry *dentry,
1551 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1552 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1554 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1555 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1556 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1557 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1560 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1561 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1562 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1563 check a particular permission to the file.
1564 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1565 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1566 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1567 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1568 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1572 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1573 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1574 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1575 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1578 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1579 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1581 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1582 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1590 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1593 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1599 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1600 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1601 struct dentry *dentry,
1604 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1605 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1606 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1607 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1609 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1612 dsec = dir->i_security;
1613 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1616 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1618 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1619 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1621 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1622 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1627 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1628 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1633 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1637 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1638 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1639 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1642 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1643 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1644 struct task_struct *ctx)
1646 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1648 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1652 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1655 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1656 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1657 struct dentry *dentry,
1661 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1662 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1663 u32 sid = current_sid();
1667 dsec = dir->i_security;
1668 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1670 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1671 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1674 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1675 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1690 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1695 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1699 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1700 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1701 struct inode *new_dir,
1702 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1704 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1705 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1706 u32 sid = current_sid();
1708 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1711 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1712 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1713 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1714 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1716 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1718 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1719 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1720 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1723 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1724 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1727 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1728 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1729 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1734 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1735 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1736 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1737 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1738 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1741 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1742 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1743 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1744 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1746 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1754 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1755 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1756 struct super_block *sb,
1758 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1760 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1761 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1763 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1764 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1767 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1768 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1772 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1773 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1774 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1775 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1778 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1780 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1784 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1786 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1788 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1795 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1796 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1800 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1802 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1803 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1810 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1819 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1822 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1824 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1826 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1827 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1829 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1833 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1834 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1835 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1836 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1837 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1838 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1839 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1841 else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
1842 av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
1844 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1845 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1850 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1852 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1857 rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1861 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1862 u32 sid = current_sid();
1863 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1864 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1867 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1870 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1874 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1878 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1881 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1882 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1886 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1890 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1893 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1894 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1895 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1896 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1900 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1901 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1905 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1909 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1910 * which was removed).
1912 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1913 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1914 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1915 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1918 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1923 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1927 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1930 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1933 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1936 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1941 end = buffer+buflen;
1947 const char *name = table->procname;
1948 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1949 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1953 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1956 table = table->parent;
1962 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1964 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1966 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1971 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1978 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1982 sid = current_sid();
1984 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1985 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1987 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1988 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1991 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1992 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1994 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1995 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
2003 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
2004 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
2010 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2012 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2024 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2029 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2032 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2038 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2040 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2042 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2045 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2049 rc = cap_syslog(type);
2054 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2055 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2056 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2058 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2059 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2060 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2061 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2063 case 0: /* Close log */
2064 case 1: /* Open log */
2065 case 2: /* Read from log */
2066 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2067 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2069 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2076 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2077 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2078 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2080 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2081 * processes that allocate mappings.
2083 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2085 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2087 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2088 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2092 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2095 /* binprm security operations */
2097 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2099 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2100 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2101 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2102 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2103 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2106 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2110 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2111 * the script interpreter */
2112 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2115 old_tsec = current_security();
2116 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2117 isec = inode->i_security;
2119 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2120 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2121 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2123 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2124 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2125 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2126 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2128 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2129 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2130 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2131 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2133 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2134 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2135 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2140 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2141 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2143 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2144 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2146 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2147 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2148 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2152 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2153 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2154 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2158 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2159 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2163 /* Check for shared state */
2164 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2165 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2166 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2172 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2173 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2175 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2176 struct task_struct *tracer;
2177 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2181 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2182 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2183 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2189 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2191 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2197 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2198 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2204 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2206 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2207 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2215 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2216 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2217 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2218 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2220 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2223 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2226 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2227 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2229 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2230 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2231 struct files_struct *files)
2233 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2234 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2235 struct tty_struct *tty;
2236 struct fdtable *fdt;
2240 tty = get_current_tty();
2243 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2244 struct inode *inode;
2246 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2247 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2248 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2249 file may belong to another process and we are only
2250 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2251 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2252 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2253 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2254 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2261 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2265 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2267 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2269 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2271 unsigned long set, i;
2276 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2277 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2279 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2282 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2283 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2288 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2290 file_to_av(file))) {
2292 fd = get_unused_fd();
2302 devnull = dentry_open(
2304 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2306 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2313 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2318 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2321 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2325 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2327 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2329 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2330 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2333 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2334 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2337 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2338 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2340 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2341 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2343 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2344 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2345 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2347 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2348 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2349 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2350 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2351 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2353 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2354 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2356 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2357 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2358 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2359 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2361 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2366 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2369 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2371 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2372 struct itimerval itimer;
2373 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2376 unsigned long flags;
2384 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2385 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2386 * flush and unblock signals.
2388 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2389 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2391 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2393 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2394 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2395 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2396 flush_signals(current);
2397 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2398 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2399 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2400 recalc_sigpending();
2401 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2404 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2405 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2406 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2407 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2408 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2409 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2410 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2411 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2414 /* superblock security operations */
2416 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2418 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2421 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2423 superblock_free_security(sb);
2426 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2431 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2434 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2436 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2437 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2438 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2439 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2440 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2443 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2450 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2454 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2457 int current_size = 0;
2465 while (current_size < len) {
2475 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2477 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2478 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2479 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2485 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2493 in_save = in_end = orig;
2497 open_quote = !open_quote;
2498 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2500 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2502 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2503 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2505 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2507 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2509 } while (*in_end++);
2511 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2512 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2517 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2519 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2520 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2523 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2527 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2528 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2531 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2532 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2533 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2536 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2538 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2539 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2541 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2542 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2543 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2546 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2549 unsigned long flags,
2552 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2554 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2555 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2556 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2558 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2562 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2564 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2566 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2567 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2570 /* inode security operations */
2572 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2574 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2577 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2579 inode_free_security(inode);
2582 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2583 char **name, void **value,
2586 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2587 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2588 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2589 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2590 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2592 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2594 dsec = dir->i_security;
2595 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2598 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2600 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2601 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2602 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2605 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2606 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2609 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2614 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2615 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2616 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2617 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2619 isec->initialized = 1;
2622 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2626 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2633 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2645 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2647 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2650 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2652 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2655 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2657 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2660 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2662 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2665 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2667 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2670 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2672 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2675 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2677 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2680 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2681 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2683 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2686 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2688 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2690 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2693 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2695 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2697 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2700 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2702 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2705 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2709 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2710 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2713 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2715 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2717 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2720 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2721 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2722 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2724 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2727 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2729 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2731 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2734 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2736 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2738 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2739 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2740 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2741 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2743 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2744 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2745 Restrict to administrator. */
2750 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2751 ordinary setattr permission. */
2752 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2755 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2756 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2758 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2759 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2760 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2761 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2762 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2765 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2766 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2768 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2769 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2772 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2775 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2776 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2778 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2779 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2783 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2784 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2785 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2787 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2792 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2793 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2797 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2802 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2804 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2805 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2809 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2810 const void *value, size_t size,
2813 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2814 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2818 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2819 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2823 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2825 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2826 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2827 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2835 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2837 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2839 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2842 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2844 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2846 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2849 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2851 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2852 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2854 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2855 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2860 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2862 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2864 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2868 char *context = NULL;
2869 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2871 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2875 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2876 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2877 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2878 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2879 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2880 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2881 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2883 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2884 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2886 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2889 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2902 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2903 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2905 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2909 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2912 if (!value || !size)
2915 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2923 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2925 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2926 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2927 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2931 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2933 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2937 /* file security operations */
2939 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2941 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2943 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2946 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2950 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2951 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2954 rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2955 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2959 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2962 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2964 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2965 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2966 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2967 u32 sid = current_sid();
2970 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2974 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2975 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2976 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2978 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2981 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2983 return file_alloc_security(file);
2986 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2988 file_free_security(file);
2991 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2994 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2997 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2999 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
3004 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3007 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3009 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3012 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3013 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3015 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3016 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3017 * This has an additional check.
3019 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3026 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3027 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3029 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3030 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3033 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3034 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3036 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3043 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3044 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3045 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3048 u32 sid = current_sid();
3050 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3051 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3052 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3053 if (rc || addr_only)
3056 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3059 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3060 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3063 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3064 unsigned long reqprot,
3067 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3069 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3072 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3073 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3075 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3076 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3077 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3078 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3079 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3080 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3081 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3082 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3084 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3085 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3086 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3087 * modified content. This typically should only
3088 * occur for text relocations.
3090 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3097 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3100 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3102 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3104 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3107 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3110 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3115 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3120 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3121 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3130 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3131 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3136 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3141 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3145 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3152 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3154 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3156 fsec = file->f_security;
3157 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3162 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3163 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3166 u32 sid = current_sid();
3168 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3170 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3171 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3173 fsec = file->f_security;
3176 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3178 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3180 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3181 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3184 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3186 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3188 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3191 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3193 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3194 struct inode *inode;
3195 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3197 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3198 fsec = file->f_security;
3199 isec = inode->i_security;
3201 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3202 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3203 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3204 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3205 * struct as its SID.
3207 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3208 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3210 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3211 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3212 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3213 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3214 * new inode label or new policy.
3215 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3217 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3220 /* task security operations */
3222 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3224 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3228 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3230 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3232 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3233 cred->security = NULL;
3238 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3240 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3243 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3244 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3246 old_tsec = old->security;
3248 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3252 new->security = tsec;
3257 * set the security data for a kernel service
3258 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3260 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3262 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3263 u32 sid = current_sid();
3266 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3267 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3268 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3272 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3273 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3274 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3280 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3281 * objective context of the specified inode
3283 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3285 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3286 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3287 u32 sid = current_sid();
3290 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3291 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3292 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3296 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3300 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3302 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3305 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3307 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3310 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3312 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3315 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3317 *secid = task_sid(p);
3320 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3324 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3328 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3331 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3335 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3339 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3342 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3344 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3347 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3349 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3351 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3352 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3353 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3354 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3355 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3356 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3361 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3365 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3369 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3372 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3374 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3377 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3379 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3382 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3389 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3391 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3393 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3394 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3396 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3400 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3402 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3405 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3406 struct inode *inode)
3408 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3409 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3412 isec->initialized = 1;
3415 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3416 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3417 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3419 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3420 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3422 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3423 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3427 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3428 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3431 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3432 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3436 *proto = ih->protocol;
3438 switch (ih->protocol) {
3440 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3442 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3446 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3450 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3451 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3456 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3458 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3462 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3466 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3467 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3471 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3472 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3474 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3478 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3482 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3483 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3494 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3496 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3497 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3498 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3501 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3502 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3504 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3505 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3509 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3510 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3513 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3514 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3515 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3524 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3526 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3530 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3531 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3536 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3538 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3542 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3543 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3547 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3548 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3550 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3554 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3555 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3559 /* includes fragments */
3569 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3570 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3575 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3577 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3580 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3581 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3584 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3586 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3589 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3590 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3600 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3601 " unable to parse packet\n");
3611 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3613 * @family: protocol family
3614 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3617 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3618 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3619 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3620 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3621 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3625 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3632 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3633 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3635 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3636 if (unlikely(err)) {
3638 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3639 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3646 /* socket security operations */
3647 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3650 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3651 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3655 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3657 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3659 sid = task_sid(task);
3661 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3662 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3663 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3669 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3670 int protocol, int kern)
3672 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3673 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3682 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3684 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3685 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3691 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3692 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3694 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3695 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3696 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3697 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3702 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3704 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3707 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3713 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3714 isec->initialized = 1;
3717 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3718 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3719 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3720 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3726 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3727 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3728 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3730 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3735 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3740 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3741 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3742 * check the first address now.
3744 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3745 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3747 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3748 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3749 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3750 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3751 unsigned short snum;
3752 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3755 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3757 if (family == PF_INET) {
3758 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3759 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3760 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3762 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3763 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3764 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3770 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3772 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3773 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3777 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3778 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3779 ad.u.net.family = family;
3780 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3782 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3788 switch (isec->sclass) {
3789 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3790 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3793 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3794 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3797 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3798 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3802 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3806 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3810 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3811 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3812 ad.u.net.family = family;
3814 if (family == PF_INET)
3815 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3817 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3819 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3820 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3828 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3830 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3831 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3834 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3839 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3841 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3842 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3843 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3844 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3845 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3846 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3847 unsigned short snum;
3850 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3851 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3852 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3854 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3856 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3857 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3859 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3862 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3866 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3867 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3869 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3870 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3871 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3872 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3877 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3883 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3885 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3888 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3891 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3892 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3894 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3898 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3900 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3901 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3902 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3903 newisec->initialized = 1;
3908 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3913 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3917 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3920 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3921 int size, int flags)
3923 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3926 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3928 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3931 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3933 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3936 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3940 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3944 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3947 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3950 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3953 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3955 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3958 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3959 struct socket *other,
3962 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3963 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3964 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3965 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3968 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3969 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3971 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3972 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3974 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3976 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3980 /* connecting socket */
3981 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3982 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3984 /* server child socket */
3985 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3986 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3987 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3992 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3993 struct socket *other)
3995 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3996 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3997 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4000 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4001 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4003 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4004 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4006 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4007 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4014 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4016 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4022 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4025 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4026 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4030 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4033 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4034 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4037 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4038 struct sk_buff *skb,
4039 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4044 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4046 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4047 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4049 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4050 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4053 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4054 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4055 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4056 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4058 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4059 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4060 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4061 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4063 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4064 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4065 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4066 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4069 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4070 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4075 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4078 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4082 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4085 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4091 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4092 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4093 if (unlikely(err)) {
4095 "SELinux: failure in"
4096 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4097 " network port label not found\n");
4100 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4103 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4107 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4109 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4110 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4113 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4114 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4115 ad.u.net.family = family;
4116 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4120 if (selinux_compat_net)
4121 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4123 else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4124 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4129 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4130 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4133 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4134 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4136 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4138 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4141 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4147 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4150 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4151 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4152 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4153 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4158 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4161 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4162 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4165 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4166 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4167 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4168 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4169 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4170 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4172 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4173 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4174 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4177 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4178 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4179 ad.u.net.family = family;
4180 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4184 if (peerlbl_active) {
4187 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4190 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4193 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4196 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4199 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4202 if (secmark_active) {
4203 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4212 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4213 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4218 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4219 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4220 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4222 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4224 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4225 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4226 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4227 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4229 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4234 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4239 if (scontext_len > len) {
4244 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4248 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4256 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4258 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4261 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4263 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4266 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4270 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4271 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4273 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4276 *secid = peer_secid;
4277 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4282 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4284 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4287 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4289 sk_free_security(sk);
4292 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4294 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4295 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4297 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4298 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4299 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4301 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4304 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4307 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4309 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4311 *secid = sksec->sid;
4315 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4317 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4318 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4320 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4321 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4322 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4323 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4326 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4327 struct request_sock *req)
4329 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4331 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4335 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4336 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4339 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4342 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4343 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4344 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4348 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4352 req->secid = newsid;
4353 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4357 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4358 const struct request_sock *req)
4360 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4362 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4363 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4364 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4365 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4366 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4367 time it will have been created and available. */
4369 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4370 * thread with access to newsksec */
4371 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4374 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4376 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4377 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4379 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4380 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4383 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4385 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4388 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4391 fl->secid = req->secid;
4394 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4398 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4399 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4400 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4402 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4406 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4408 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4410 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4411 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4412 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4413 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4414 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4415 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4425 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4430 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4432 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4438 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4443 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4446 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4447 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4448 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4449 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4452 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4455 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4456 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4457 ad.u.net.family = family;
4458 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4461 if (peerlbl_active) {
4462 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4465 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4471 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4472 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4476 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4477 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4478 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4480 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4486 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4487 struct sk_buff *skb,
4488 const struct net_device *in,
4489 const struct net_device *out,
4490 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4492 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4495 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4496 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4497 struct sk_buff *skb,
4498 const struct net_device *in,
4499 const struct net_device *out,
4500 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4502 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4506 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4511 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4514 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4515 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4516 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4518 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4521 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4522 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4528 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4529 struct sk_buff *skb,
4530 const struct net_device *in,
4531 const struct net_device *out,
4532 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4534 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4537 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4539 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4540 u16 family, char *addrp)
4543 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4545 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4546 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4548 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4549 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4552 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4553 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4554 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4555 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4557 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4558 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4559 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4560 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4562 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4563 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4564 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4565 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4568 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4569 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4574 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4577 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4580 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4583 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4590 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4591 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4592 if (unlikely(err)) {
4594 "SELinux: failure in"
4595 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4596 " network port label not found\n");
4599 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4602 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4606 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4607 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4608 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4614 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4616 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4617 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4618 ad.u.net.family = family;
4619 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4622 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4623 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4624 &ad, family, addrp))
4626 } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4627 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4628 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4632 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4633 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4639 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4645 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4650 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4651 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4652 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4653 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4654 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4655 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4657 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4658 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4659 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4660 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4661 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4662 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4663 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4666 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4667 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4668 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4671 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4672 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4673 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4674 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4679 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4680 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4682 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4685 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4686 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4688 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4693 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4694 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4697 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4699 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4700 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4701 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4704 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4705 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4706 ad.u.net.family = family;
4707 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4711 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4712 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4715 if (peerlbl_active) {
4719 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4721 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4722 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4725 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4727 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4728 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4735 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4736 struct sk_buff *skb,
4737 const struct net_device *in,
4738 const struct net_device *out,
4739 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4741 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4744 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4745 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4746 struct sk_buff *skb,
4747 const struct net_device *in,
4748 const struct net_device *out,
4749 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4751 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4755 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4757 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4761 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4765 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4766 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4771 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4774 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4776 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4780 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4781 ad.u.cap = capability;
4783 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4784 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4787 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4788 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4791 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4794 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4798 sid = task_sid(task);
4799 isec->sclass = sclass;
4801 perm->security = isec;
4806 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4808 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4809 perm->security = NULL;
4813 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4815 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4817 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4821 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4822 msg->security = msec;
4827 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4829 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4831 msg->security = NULL;
4835 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4838 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4839 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4840 u32 sid = current_sid();
4842 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4844 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4845 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4847 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4850 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4852 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4855 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4857 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4860 /* message queue security operations */
4861 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4863 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4864 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4865 u32 sid = current_sid();
4868 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4872 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4874 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4875 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4877 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4880 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4886 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4888 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4891 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4893 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4894 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4895 u32 sid = current_sid();
4897 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4899 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4900 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4902 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4903 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4906 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4914 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4915 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4918 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4921 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4924 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4930 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4934 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4936 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4937 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4938 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4939 u32 sid = current_sid();
4942 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4943 msec = msg->security;
4946 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4948 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4950 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4951 * message queue this message will be stored in
4953 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4959 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4960 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4962 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4963 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4966 /* Can this process send the message */
4967 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4970 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4971 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4972 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4977 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4978 struct task_struct *target,
4979 long type, int mode)
4981 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4982 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4983 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4984 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4987 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4988 msec = msg->security;
4990 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4991 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4993 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4994 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4996 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4997 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5001 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5002 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5004 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5005 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5006 u32 sid = current_sid();
5009 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5013 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5015 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5016 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5018 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5021 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5027 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5029 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5032 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5034 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5035 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5036 u32 sid = current_sid();
5038 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5040 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5041 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5043 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5044 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5047 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5048 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5056 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5057 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5060 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5063 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5070 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5076 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5080 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5081 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5085 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5088 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5090 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5093 /* Semaphore security operations */
5094 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5096 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5097 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5098 u32 sid = current_sid();
5101 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5105 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5107 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5108 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5110 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5113 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5119 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5121 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5124 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5126 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5127 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5128 u32 sid = current_sid();
5130 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5132 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5133 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5135 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5136 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5139 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5140 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5148 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5149 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5153 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5164 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5167 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5171 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5177 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5181 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5182 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5187 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5191 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5194 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5200 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5202 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5207 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5210 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5212 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5216 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5219 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5222 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5223 char *name, char **value)
5225 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5231 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5237 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5239 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5241 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5243 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5244 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5245 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5246 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5247 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5248 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5249 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5250 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5258 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5268 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5269 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5271 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5272 struct task_struct *tracer;
5279 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5280 security attributes. */
5285 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5286 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5287 * above restriction is ever removed.
5289 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5290 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5291 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5292 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5293 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5294 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5295 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5296 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5297 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5298 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5304 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5305 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5306 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5310 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5311 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5312 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5314 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5321 new = prepare_creds();
5325 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5326 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5327 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5328 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5329 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5330 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5331 tsec = new->security;
5332 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5333 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5334 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5335 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5336 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5337 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5340 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5341 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5342 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5343 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5348 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5350 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5351 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5356 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5357 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5358 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5362 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5363 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5366 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5368 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5372 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5373 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5392 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5394 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5397 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5399 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5402 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5409 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5410 unsigned long flags)
5412 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5413 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5415 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5419 tsec = cred->security;
5420 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5421 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5423 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5429 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5431 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5437 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5438 const struct cred *cred,
5442 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5445 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5446 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5447 appear to be created. */
5451 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5453 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5454 ksec = key->security;
5456 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5459 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5461 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5462 char *context = NULL;
5466 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5475 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5478 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5479 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5480 .capget = selinux_capget,
5481 .capset = selinux_capset,
5482 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5483 .capable = selinux_capable,
5484 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5485 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5486 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5487 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5489 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5490 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5492 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5493 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5494 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5495 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5497 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5498 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5499 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5500 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5501 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5502 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5503 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5504 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5505 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5506 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5507 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5510 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5511 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5512 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5513 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5514 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5515 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5516 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5517 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5518 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5519 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5520 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5521 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5522 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5523 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5524 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5525 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5526 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5527 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5528 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5529 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5530 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5531 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5532 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5533 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5534 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5536 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5537 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5538 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5539 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5540 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5541 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5542 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5543 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5544 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5545 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5546 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5548 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5550 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5551 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5552 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5553 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5554 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5555 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5556 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5557 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5558 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5559 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5560 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5561 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5562 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5563 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5564 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5565 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5566 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5567 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5568 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5570 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5571 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5573 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5574 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5576 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5577 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5578 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5579 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5580 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5581 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5583 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5584 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5585 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5586 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5587 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5589 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5590 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5591 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5592 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5593 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5595 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5597 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5598 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5600 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5601 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5602 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5604 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5605 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5607 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5608 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5609 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5610 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5611 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5612 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5613 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5614 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5615 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5616 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5617 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5618 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5619 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5620 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5621 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5622 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5623 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5624 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5625 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5626 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5627 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5628 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5629 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5630 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5631 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5633 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5634 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5635 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5636 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5637 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5638 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5639 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5640 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5641 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5642 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5643 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5647 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5648 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5649 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5650 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5654 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5655 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5656 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5657 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5661 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5663 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5664 selinux_enabled = 0;
5668 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5669 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5673 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5675 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5676 cred_init_security();
5678 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5679 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5680 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5683 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5685 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5686 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5687 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5689 if (selinux_enforcing)
5690 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5692 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5697 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5699 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5701 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5702 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5703 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5704 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5706 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5707 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5708 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5709 struct superblock_security_struct,
5711 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5713 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5714 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5715 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5717 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5719 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5720 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5721 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5724 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5725 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5728 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5729 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5730 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5732 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5734 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5736 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5737 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5739 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5740 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5743 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5744 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5746 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5747 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5750 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5751 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5753 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5754 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5758 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5760 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5762 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5763 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5765 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5766 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5769 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5770 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5772 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5773 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5779 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5783 if (!selinux_enabled)
5786 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5788 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5790 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5792 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5793 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5795 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5802 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5804 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5805 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5807 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5809 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5810 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5811 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5816 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5818 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5819 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5822 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5824 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5825 static int selinux_disabled;
5827 int selinux_disable(void)
5829 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5831 if (ss_initialized) {
5832 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5836 if (selinux_disabled) {
5837 /* Only do this once. */
5841 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5843 selinux_disabled = 1;
5844 selinux_enabled = 0;
5846 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5847 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5849 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5850 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5852 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */