2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
88 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
89 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
91 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
93 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
94 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
95 extern int selinux_compat_net;
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
134 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
141 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
158 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
160 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
162 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
164 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
168 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
169 task->security = tsec;
174 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
176 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
177 task->security = NULL;
181 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
183 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
184 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
186 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
190 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
191 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
193 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
194 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
195 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
196 inode->i_security = isec;
201 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
203 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
204 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
206 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
207 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
208 list_del_init(&isec->list);
209 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
211 inode->i_security = NULL;
212 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
215 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
217 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
218 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
220 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
224 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
225 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
226 file->f_security = fsec;
231 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
233 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
234 file->f_security = NULL;
238 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
240 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
242 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
246 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
249 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
251 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
253 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
254 sb->s_security = sbsec;
259 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
261 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
263 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
264 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
265 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
266 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
268 sb->s_security = NULL;
272 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
274 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
276 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
280 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sk->sk_security = ssec;
284 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
289 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
291 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
293 sk->sk_security = NULL;
294 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
298 /* The security server must be initialized before
299 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
300 extern int ss_initialized;
302 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
304 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
306 "uses transition SIDs",
308 "uses genfs_contexts",
309 "not configured for labeling",
310 "uses mountpoint labeling",
313 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
315 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
317 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
328 static match_table_t tokens = {
329 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
331 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
332 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
336 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
338 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
340 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
344 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
345 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
349 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
350 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
354 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
355 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
356 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
359 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
360 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
364 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
365 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
369 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
372 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
373 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
376 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
377 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
378 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
379 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
380 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
381 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
382 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
383 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
384 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
388 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
389 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
390 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
391 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
392 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
393 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
395 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
396 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
397 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
402 sbsec->initialized = 1;
404 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
405 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
406 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
408 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
409 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
410 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
412 /* Initialize the root inode. */
413 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
415 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
416 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
417 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
419 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
421 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
422 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
423 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
424 struct inode_security_struct, list);
425 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
426 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
427 inode = igrab(inode);
429 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
433 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
434 list_del_init(&isec->list);
437 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
443 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
444 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
445 * mount options, or whatever.
447 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
448 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
451 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
452 char *context = NULL;
456 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
458 if (!sbsec->initialized)
465 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
466 * settings this is going to need a mask
469 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
470 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
472 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
476 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
477 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
482 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
483 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
489 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
490 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
493 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
494 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
496 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
497 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
500 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
501 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
503 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
504 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
507 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
508 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
510 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
511 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
512 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
514 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
517 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
518 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
521 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
526 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
530 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
531 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
533 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
534 if (sbsec->initialized)
535 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
536 (old_sid != new_sid))
539 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
540 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
542 if (!sbsec->initialized)
543 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
549 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
550 * labeling information.
552 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
553 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
556 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
557 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
558 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
559 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
560 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
561 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
562 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
563 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
564 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
565 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
567 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
569 if (!ss_initialized) {
571 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
572 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
573 server is ready to handle calls. */
574 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
575 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
576 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
577 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
581 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
582 "before the security server is initialized\n");
587 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
588 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
589 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
590 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
592 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
593 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
594 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
595 * will be used for both mounts)
597 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
602 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
603 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
604 * than once with different security options.
606 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
608 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
609 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
611 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
620 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
622 goto out_double_mount;
624 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
629 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
631 goto out_double_mount;
633 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
636 rootcontext_sid = sid;
638 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
640 goto out_double_mount;
642 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
646 defcontext_sid = sid;
648 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
650 goto out_double_mount;
652 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (sbsec->initialized) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
664 goto out_double_mount;
669 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
675 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
683 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
687 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
691 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
692 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
693 * the superblock context if not already set.
696 if (!fscontext_sid) {
697 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
700 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
702 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
706 if (!rootcontext_sid)
707 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
709 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
713 if (rootcontext_sid) {
714 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
718 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
719 root_isec->initialized = 1;
722 if (defcontext_sid) {
723 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
725 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
726 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
730 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
731 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
737 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
740 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
742 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
746 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
747 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
751 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
752 struct super_block *newsb)
754 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
755 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
757 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
758 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
759 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
762 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
763 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
766 if (!ss_initialized) {
767 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
768 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
769 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
770 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
774 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
775 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
777 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
778 if (newsbsec->initialized)
781 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
783 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
785 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
786 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
787 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
790 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
794 if (!set_rootcontext) {
795 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
796 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
799 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
801 if (set_rootcontext) {
802 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
803 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
804 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
805 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
807 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
810 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
811 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
814 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
815 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
818 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
819 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
820 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
822 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
824 /* Standard string-based options. */
825 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
827 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
832 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
836 if (context || defcontext) {
838 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
841 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
851 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
854 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
861 case Opt_rootcontext:
864 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
867 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
875 if (context || defcontext) {
877 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
880 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
889 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
896 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
900 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
901 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
902 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
907 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
908 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
911 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
912 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
915 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
916 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
919 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
920 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
923 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
934 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
936 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
939 char *options = data;
940 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
942 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
947 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
949 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
954 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
957 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
961 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
962 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
967 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
968 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
970 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
972 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
975 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
977 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
978 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
981 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
986 /* we need a comma before each option */
991 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
997 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
999 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1002 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1004 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1010 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1012 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1017 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1019 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1021 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1023 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1025 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1027 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1029 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1031 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1033 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1037 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1040 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1042 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1045 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1047 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1050 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1056 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1057 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1059 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1066 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1067 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1069 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1071 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1072 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1074 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1076 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1078 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1084 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1085 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1086 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1087 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1088 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1090 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1092 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1093 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1094 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1096 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1097 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1098 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1099 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1100 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1101 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1102 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1104 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1107 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1109 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1111 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1114 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1117 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1118 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1123 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1125 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1130 end = buffer+buflen;
1135 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1136 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1140 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1145 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1146 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1150 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1158 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1159 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1161 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1162 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1164 struct dentry *dentry;
1165 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1166 char *context = NULL;
1170 if (isec->initialized)
1173 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1174 if (isec->initialized)
1177 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1178 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1179 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1180 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1181 server is ready to handle calls. */
1182 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1183 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1184 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1185 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1189 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1190 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1191 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1192 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1196 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1197 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1199 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1200 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1202 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1203 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1206 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1207 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1212 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1213 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1219 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1221 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1222 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1223 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1231 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1237 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1243 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1244 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1245 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1246 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1250 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1251 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1254 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1258 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1259 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1260 __func__, context, -rc,
1261 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1263 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1271 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1272 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1274 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1275 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1276 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1278 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1279 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1280 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1288 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1289 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1292 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1293 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1295 if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1296 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1298 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1299 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1310 isec->initialized = 1;
1313 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1315 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1316 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1320 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1321 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1327 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1328 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1331 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1332 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1335 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1336 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1339 /* All other signals. */
1340 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1347 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1348 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1349 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1350 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1353 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1355 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1356 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1357 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1358 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1361 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1362 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1365 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1366 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1369 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1370 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1372 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1374 tsec = tsk->security;
1376 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1380 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1382 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1385 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1389 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1392 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1395 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1396 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1399 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1401 tsec = tsk->security;
1403 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1404 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1407 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1408 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1409 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1410 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1411 struct inode *inode,
1413 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1415 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1416 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1417 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1419 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1422 tsec = tsk->security;
1423 isec = inode->i_security;
1427 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1428 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1431 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1434 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1435 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1436 pathname if needed. */
1437 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1438 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1439 struct dentry *dentry,
1442 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1443 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1444 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1445 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1446 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1447 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1450 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1451 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1452 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1453 check a particular permission to the file.
1454 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1455 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1456 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1457 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1458 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1462 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1463 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1464 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1465 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1468 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1469 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1471 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1472 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1480 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1482 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1487 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1488 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1489 struct dentry *dentry,
1492 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1493 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1494 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1496 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1499 tsec = current->security;
1500 dsec = dir->i_security;
1501 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1503 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1504 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1506 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1507 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1512 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1513 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1515 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1521 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1525 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1526 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1527 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1530 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1531 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1532 struct task_struct *ctx)
1534 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1536 tsec = ctx->security;
1538 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1542 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1545 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1546 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1547 struct dentry *dentry,
1551 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1552 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1553 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1557 tsec = current->security;
1558 dsec = dir->i_security;
1559 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1561 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1562 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1565 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1566 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1581 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1586 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1590 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1591 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1592 struct inode *new_dir,
1593 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1595 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1596 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1597 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1599 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1602 tsec = current->security;
1603 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1604 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1605 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1606 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1608 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1610 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1611 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1612 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1615 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1616 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1619 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1620 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1621 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1626 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1627 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1628 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1629 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1630 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1633 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1634 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1635 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1636 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1638 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1646 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1647 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1648 struct super_block *sb,
1650 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1652 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1653 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1655 tsec = tsk->security;
1656 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1657 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1661 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1662 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1666 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1667 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1668 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1669 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1672 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1674 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1678 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1680 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1682 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1689 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1690 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1694 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1696 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1697 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1704 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1713 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1716 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1718 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1720 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1721 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1723 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1727 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1728 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1729 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1730 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1731 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1732 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1733 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1736 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1737 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1742 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1744 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1749 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1753 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1754 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1755 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1756 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
1757 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1760 return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1763 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1767 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1771 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1774 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1775 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1779 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1783 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1786 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1787 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1791 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1795 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1798 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1799 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1801 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1804 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1808 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1812 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1815 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1818 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1821 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1826 end = buffer+buflen;
1832 const char *name = table->procname;
1833 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1834 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1838 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1841 table = table->parent;
1847 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1849 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1851 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1856 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1860 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1864 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1868 tsec = current->security;
1870 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1871 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1873 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1874 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1877 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1878 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1880 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1881 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1889 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1890 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1896 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1909 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1915 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1919 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1925 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1927 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1930 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1934 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1939 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1940 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1941 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1943 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1944 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1945 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1946 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1948 case 0: /* Close log */
1949 case 1: /* Open log */
1950 case 2: /* Read from log */
1951 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1952 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1954 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1961 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1962 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1963 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1965 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1966 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1967 * the capability is granted.
1969 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1970 * processes that allocate mappings.
1972 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1974 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1975 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1977 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1979 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1980 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1981 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1988 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1991 /* binprm security operations */
1993 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1995 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1997 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
2001 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2004 bprm->security = bsec;
2008 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2010 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2011 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2012 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2013 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2015 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2018 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
2022 bsec = bprm->security;
2027 tsec = current->security;
2028 isec = inode->i_security;
2030 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2031 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
2033 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2034 tsec->create_sid = 0;
2035 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2036 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2038 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
2039 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
2040 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2043 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2044 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2045 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
2050 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2051 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2053 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2056 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2057 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2058 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2062 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2063 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2064 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2068 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2069 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2073 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2074 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2076 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2084 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2086 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2090 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2092 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2095 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2096 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2097 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2098 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2099 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2101 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2104 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2107 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2109 kfree(bprm->security);
2110 bprm->security = NULL;
2113 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2114 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2116 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2117 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2119 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2120 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2121 struct tty_struct *tty;
2122 struct fdtable *fdt;
2126 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
2127 tty = get_current_tty();
2130 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
2132 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2133 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2134 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2135 file may belong to another process and we are only
2136 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2137 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2138 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2139 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2145 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
2146 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2150 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2152 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2154 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2156 unsigned long set, i;
2161 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2162 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2164 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2167 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2168 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2173 if (file_has_perm(current,
2175 file_to_av(file))) {
2177 fd = get_unused_fd();
2187 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2188 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2195 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2200 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2203 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2206 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2208 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2209 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2213 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2215 tsec = current->security;
2217 bsec = bprm->security;
2220 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2222 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2223 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2224 unchanged and kill. */
2225 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2226 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2227 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2234 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2235 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2236 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2237 struct task_struct *tracer;
2238 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2242 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2243 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2244 sec = tracer->security;
2250 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2251 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2263 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2265 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2267 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2268 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2269 struct itimerval itimer;
2270 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2271 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2273 unsigned long flags;
2275 tsec = current->security;
2276 bsec = bprm->security;
2279 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2282 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2285 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2286 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2288 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2289 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2290 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2291 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2292 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2293 will be checked against the new SID. */
2294 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2295 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2297 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2298 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2299 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2300 flush_signals(current);
2301 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2302 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2303 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2304 recalc_sigpending();
2305 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2308 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2309 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2311 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2312 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2313 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2314 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2315 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2316 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2317 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2318 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2319 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2321 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2322 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2324 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2325 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2326 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2327 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2329 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2331 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2334 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2338 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2339 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2340 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2341 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2342 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2343 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2344 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2345 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2348 /* superblock security operations */
2350 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2352 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2355 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2357 superblock_free_security(sb);
2360 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2365 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2368 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2370 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2371 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2372 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2373 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2376 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2383 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2387 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2390 int current_size = 0;
2398 while (current_size < len) {
2408 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2410 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2411 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2412 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2418 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2426 in_save = in_end = orig;
2430 open_quote = !open_quote;
2431 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2433 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2435 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2436 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2438 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2440 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2442 } while (*in_end++);
2444 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2445 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2450 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2452 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2455 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2459 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2460 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2461 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2464 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2466 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2468 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2469 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2470 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2473 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2476 unsigned long flags,
2481 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2485 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2486 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2487 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2489 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2493 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2497 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2501 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2502 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2505 /* inode security operations */
2507 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2509 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2512 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2514 inode_free_security(inode);
2517 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2518 char **name, void **value,
2521 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2522 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2523 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2526 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2528 tsec = current->security;
2529 dsec = dir->i_security;
2530 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2532 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2533 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2535 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2536 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2539 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2540 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2543 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2548 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2549 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2550 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2551 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2553 isec->initialized = 1;
2556 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2560 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2567 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2579 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2581 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2584 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2588 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2591 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2594 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2598 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2601 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2604 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2606 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2609 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2611 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2614 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2616 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2619 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2623 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2627 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2630 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2631 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2633 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2636 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2638 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2641 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2645 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2648 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2651 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2655 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2660 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2664 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2665 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2668 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2672 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2676 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2679 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2680 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2681 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2683 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2686 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2688 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2691 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2693 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2694 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2695 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2696 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2698 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2699 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2700 Restrict to administrator. */
2705 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2706 ordinary setattr permission. */
2707 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2710 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2711 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2713 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2714 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2715 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2716 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2717 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2721 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2722 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2724 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2725 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2728 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2731 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2732 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2734 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2735 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2739 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2740 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2741 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2743 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2748 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2749 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2753 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2758 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2760 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2761 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2765 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2766 const void *value, size_t size,
2769 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2770 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2774 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2775 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2779 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2781 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2782 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2783 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2791 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2793 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2796 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2798 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2801 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2803 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2804 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2806 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2807 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2812 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2814 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2816 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2820 char *context = NULL;
2821 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2822 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2824 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2828 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2829 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2830 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2831 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2832 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2833 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2834 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2836 error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
2838 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2839 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
2840 CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
2844 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2847 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2860 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2861 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2863 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2867 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2870 if (!value || !size)
2873 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2881 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2883 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2884 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2885 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2889 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2891 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2894 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2896 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2899 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2901 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2905 /* file security operations */
2907 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2910 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2913 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2917 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2918 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2921 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2922 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2926 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2929 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2931 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2932 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2933 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2934 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2937 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2941 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2942 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2943 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2945 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2948 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2950 return file_alloc_security(file);
2953 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2955 file_free_security(file);
2958 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2963 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2965 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2970 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2973 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2975 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2976 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2978 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2979 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2980 * This has an additional check.
2982 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2989 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2990 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2992 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2993 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2996 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2997 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2999 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
3004 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3005 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3006 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3009 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
3011 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3012 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3013 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3014 if (rc || addr_only)
3017 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3020 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3021 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3024 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3025 unsigned long reqprot,
3030 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3034 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3037 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3038 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3040 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3041 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3042 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
3044 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3045 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3046 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3047 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3048 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3050 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3051 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3052 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3053 * modified content. This typically should only
3054 * occur for text relocations.
3056 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3064 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3067 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3069 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3072 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3079 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3084 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3085 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3094 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3095 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3100 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3105 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3109 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3116 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3118 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3119 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3121 tsec = current->security;
3122 fsec = file->f_security;
3123 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3128 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3129 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3133 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3134 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3136 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3137 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3139 tsec = tsk->security;
3140 fsec = file->f_security;
3143 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3145 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3147 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3148 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3151 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3153 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3156 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3158 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3159 struct inode *inode;
3160 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3161 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3162 fsec = file->f_security;
3163 isec = inode->i_security;
3165 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3166 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3167 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3168 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3169 * struct as its SID.
3171 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3172 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3174 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3175 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3176 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3177 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3178 * new inode label or new policy.
3179 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3181 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3184 /* task security operations */
3186 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3190 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3194 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3197 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3199 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3202 tsec1 = current->security;
3204 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3207 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3209 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3210 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3212 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3213 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3214 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3215 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3216 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3221 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3223 task_free_security(tsk);
3226 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3228 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3229 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3230 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3231 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3232 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3237 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3239 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3242 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3244 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3248 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3250 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3253 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3255 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3258 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3260 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3263 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3265 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3269 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3271 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3275 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3279 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3283 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3286 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3290 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3294 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3297 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3299 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3302 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3304 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3307 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3311 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3312 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3313 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3314 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3315 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3316 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3321 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3325 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3329 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3332 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3334 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3337 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3339 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3342 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3347 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3349 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3354 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3356 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3359 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3361 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3365 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3372 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3373 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3374 the state of the current process. */
3375 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3378 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3380 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3383 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3385 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3387 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3390 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3391 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3395 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3396 struct inode *inode)
3398 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3399 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3401 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3402 isec->initialized = 1;
3406 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3407 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3408 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3410 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3411 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3413 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3414 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3418 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3419 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3422 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3423 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3427 *proto = ih->protocol;
3429 switch (ih->protocol) {
3431 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3433 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3437 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3441 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3442 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3447 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3449 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3453 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3457 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3458 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3462 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3463 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3465 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3469 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3473 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3474 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3485 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3487 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3488 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3489 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3492 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3493 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3495 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3496 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3500 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3501 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3504 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3505 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3506 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3515 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3517 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3521 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3522 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3527 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3529 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3533 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3534 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3538 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3539 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3541 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3545 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3546 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3550 /* includes fragments */
3560 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3561 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3566 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3568 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3571 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3572 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3575 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3577 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3580 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3581 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3591 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3592 " unable to parse packet\n");
3602 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3604 * @family: protocol family
3605 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3608 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3609 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3610 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3611 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3612 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3616 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3623 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3624 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3626 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3627 if (unlikely(err)) {
3629 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3630 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3637 /* socket security operations */
3638 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3641 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3642 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3643 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3646 tsec = task->security;
3647 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3649 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3652 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3653 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3654 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3660 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3661 int protocol, int kern)
3664 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3670 tsec = current->security;
3671 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3672 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3673 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3674 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3680 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3681 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3684 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3685 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3686 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3689 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3691 tsec = current->security;
3692 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3693 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3694 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3695 isec->initialized = 1;
3698 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3699 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3700 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3701 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3707 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3708 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3709 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3711 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3716 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3721 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3722 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3723 * check the first address now.
3725 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3726 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3728 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3729 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3730 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3731 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3732 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3733 unsigned short snum;
3734 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3737 tsec = current->security;
3738 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3740 if (family == PF_INET) {
3741 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3742 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3743 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3745 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3746 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3747 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3753 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3755 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3756 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3760 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3761 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3762 ad.u.net.family = family;
3763 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3765 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3771 switch (isec->sclass) {
3772 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3773 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3776 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3777 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3780 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3781 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3785 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3789 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3793 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3794 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3795 ad.u.net.family = family;
3797 if (family == PF_INET)
3798 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3800 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3802 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3803 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3811 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3813 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3814 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3817 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3822 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3824 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3825 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3826 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3827 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3828 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3829 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3830 unsigned short snum;
3833 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3834 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3835 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3837 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3839 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3840 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3842 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3845 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3849 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3850 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3852 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3853 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3854 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3855 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3860 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3866 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3868 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3871 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3874 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3875 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3877 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3881 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3883 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3884 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3885 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3886 newisec->initialized = 1;
3891 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3896 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3900 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3903 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3904 int size, int flags)
3906 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3909 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3911 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3914 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3916 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3919 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3923 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3927 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3930 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3933 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3936 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3938 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3941 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3942 struct socket *other,
3945 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3946 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3947 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3948 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3951 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3955 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3956 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3958 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3959 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3961 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3963 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3967 /* connecting socket */
3968 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3969 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3971 /* server child socket */
3972 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3973 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3974 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3979 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3980 struct socket *other)
3982 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3983 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3984 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3987 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3988 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3990 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3991 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3993 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3994 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4001 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4003 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4009 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4012 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4013 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4017 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4020 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4021 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4024 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4025 struct sk_buff *skb,
4026 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4031 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4033 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4034 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4036 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4037 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4040 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4041 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4042 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4043 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4045 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4046 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4047 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4048 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4050 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4051 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4052 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4053 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4056 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4057 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4062 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4065 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4069 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4072 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4078 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4079 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4080 if (unlikely(err)) {
4082 "SELinux: failure in"
4083 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4084 " network port label not found\n");
4087 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4090 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4094 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4096 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4097 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4100 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4101 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4102 ad.u.net.family = family;
4103 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4107 if (selinux_compat_net)
4108 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4111 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4116 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4117 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4120 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4121 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4123 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4125 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4128 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4134 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4137 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4138 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4139 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4140 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4145 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4148 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4149 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4152 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4153 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4154 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4155 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4156 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4157 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4159 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4160 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4161 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4164 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4165 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4166 ad.u.net.family = family;
4167 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4171 if (peerlbl_active) {
4174 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4177 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4180 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4183 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4186 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4189 if (secmark_active) {
4190 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4199 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4200 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4205 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4206 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4207 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4209 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4211 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4212 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4213 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4214 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4216 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4221 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4226 if (scontext_len > len) {
4231 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4235 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4243 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4245 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4248 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4250 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4253 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4257 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4258 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4260 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4263 *secid = peer_secid;
4264 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4269 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4271 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4274 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4276 sk_free_security(sk);
4279 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4281 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4282 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4284 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4285 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4286 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4288 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4291 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4294 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4296 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4298 *secid = sksec->sid;
4302 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4304 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4305 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4307 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4308 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4309 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4310 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4313 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4314 struct request_sock *req)
4316 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4318 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4322 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4323 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4326 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4329 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4330 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4331 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4335 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4339 req->secid = newsid;
4340 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4344 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4345 const struct request_sock *req)
4347 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4349 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4350 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4351 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4352 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4353 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4354 time it will have been created and available. */
4356 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4357 * thread with access to newsksec */
4358 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4361 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4363 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4364 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4366 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4367 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4370 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4372 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4375 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4378 fl->secid = req->secid;
4381 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4385 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4386 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4387 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4389 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4393 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4395 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4397 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4398 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4399 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4400 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4401 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4402 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4412 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4417 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4419 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4425 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4430 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4433 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4434 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4435 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4436 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4439 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4442 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4443 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4444 ad.u.net.family = family;
4445 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4448 if (peerlbl_active) {
4449 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4452 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4458 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4459 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4463 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4464 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4465 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4467 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4473 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4474 struct sk_buff *skb,
4475 const struct net_device *in,
4476 const struct net_device *out,
4477 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4479 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4482 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4483 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4484 struct sk_buff *skb,
4485 const struct net_device *in,
4486 const struct net_device *out,
4487 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4489 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4493 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4498 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4501 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4502 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4503 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4505 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4508 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4509 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4515 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4516 struct sk_buff *skb,
4517 const struct net_device *in,
4518 const struct net_device *out,
4519 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4521 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4524 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4526 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4527 u16 family, char *addrp)
4530 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4532 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4533 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4535 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4536 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4539 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4540 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4541 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4542 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4544 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4545 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4546 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4547 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4549 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4550 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4551 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4552 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4555 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4556 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4561 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4564 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4567 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4570 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4577 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4578 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4579 if (unlikely(err)) {
4581 "SELinux: failure in"
4582 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4583 " network port label not found\n");
4586 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4589 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4593 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4594 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4595 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4601 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4603 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4604 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4605 ad.u.net.family = family;
4606 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4609 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4610 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4611 &ad, family, addrp))
4614 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4615 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4619 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4620 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4626 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4632 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4637 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4638 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4639 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4640 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4641 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4642 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4644 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4645 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4646 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4647 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4648 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4649 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4650 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4653 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4654 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4655 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4658 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4659 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4660 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4661 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4666 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4667 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4669 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4672 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4673 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4675 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4680 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4681 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4684 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4686 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4687 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4688 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4691 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4692 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4693 ad.u.net.family = family;
4694 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4698 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4699 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4702 if (peerlbl_active) {
4706 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4708 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4709 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4712 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4714 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4715 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4722 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4723 struct sk_buff *skb,
4724 const struct net_device *in,
4725 const struct net_device *out,
4726 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4728 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4731 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4732 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4733 struct sk_buff *skb,
4734 const struct net_device *in,
4735 const struct net_device *out,
4736 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4738 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4742 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4744 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4748 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4752 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4753 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4758 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4761 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4763 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4767 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4768 ad.u.cap = capability;
4770 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4771 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4774 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4775 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4778 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4779 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4781 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4785 isec->sclass = sclass;
4786 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4787 perm->security = isec;
4792 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4794 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4795 perm->security = NULL;
4799 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4801 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4803 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4807 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4808 msg->security = msec;
4813 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4815 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4817 msg->security = NULL;
4821 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4824 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4825 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4826 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4828 tsec = current->security;
4829 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4831 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4832 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4834 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4837 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4839 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4842 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4844 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4847 /* message queue security operations */
4848 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4850 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4851 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4852 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4855 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4859 tsec = current->security;
4860 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4862 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4863 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4865 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4868 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4874 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4876 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4879 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4881 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4882 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4883 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4885 tsec = current->security;
4886 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4888 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4889 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4891 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4892 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4895 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4903 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4904 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4907 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4910 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4913 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4919 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4923 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4925 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4926 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4927 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4928 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4931 tsec = current->security;
4932 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4933 msec = msg->security;
4936 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4938 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4940 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4941 * message queue this message will be stored in
4943 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4951 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4952 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4954 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4955 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4958 /* Can this process send the message */
4959 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4960 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4962 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4963 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4964 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4969 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4970 struct task_struct *target,
4971 long type, int mode)
4973 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4974 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4975 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4976 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4979 tsec = target->security;
4980 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4981 msec = msg->security;
4983 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4984 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4986 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4987 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4989 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4990 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4994 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4995 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4997 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4998 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4999 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5002 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5006 tsec = current->security;
5007 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5009 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5010 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5012 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5015 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5021 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5023 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5026 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5028 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5029 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5030 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5032 tsec = current->security;
5033 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5035 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5036 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5038 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5039 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5042 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5043 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5051 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5052 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5055 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5058 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5065 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5071 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5075 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5076 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5081 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5085 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5088 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5090 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5093 /* Semaphore security operations */
5094 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5096 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5097 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5098 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5101 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5105 tsec = current->security;
5106 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5108 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5109 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5111 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5114 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5120 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5122 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5125 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5127 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5128 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5129 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5131 tsec = current->security;
5132 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5134 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5135 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5137 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5138 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5141 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5142 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5150 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5151 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5155 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5166 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5169 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5173 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5179 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5183 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5184 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5189 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5193 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5196 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5202 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5204 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5209 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5212 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5214 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5218 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5221 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5224 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5225 char *name, char **value)
5227 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5233 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5240 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5242 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5244 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5245 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5246 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5247 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5248 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5249 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5250 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5251 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5258 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5264 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5265 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5267 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5268 struct task_struct *tracer;
5274 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5275 security attributes. */
5280 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5281 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5282 * above restriction is ever removed.
5284 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5285 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5286 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5287 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5288 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5289 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5290 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5291 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5292 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5293 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5299 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5300 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5301 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5305 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5306 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5307 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5309 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5316 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5317 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5318 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5319 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5320 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5321 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5323 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5324 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5325 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5326 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5327 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5328 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5331 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5332 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5333 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5334 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5335 struct av_decision avd;
5340 * SELinux allows to change context in the following case only.
5341 * - Single threaded processes.
5342 * - Multi threaded processes intend to change its context into
5343 * more restricted domain (defined by TYPEBOUNDS statement).
5345 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5346 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5347 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5348 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5349 do_each_thread(g, t) {
5350 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5351 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5352 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5358 } while_each_thread(g, t);
5359 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5363 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5364 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5365 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5369 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5370 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5373 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5374 if (tracer != NULL) {
5375 struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5376 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5378 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5380 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5384 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5385 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5399 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5401 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5404 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5406 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5409 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5416 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5417 unsigned long flags)
5419 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5420 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5422 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5426 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5427 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5429 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5435 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5437 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5443 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5444 struct task_struct *ctx,
5448 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5449 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5451 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5453 tsec = ctx->security;
5454 ksec = key->security;
5456 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5457 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5458 appear to be created. */
5462 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5463 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5466 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5468 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5469 char *context = NULL;
5473 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5482 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5485 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5486 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5487 .capget = selinux_capget,
5488 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5489 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5490 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5491 .capable = selinux_capable,
5492 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5493 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5494 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5495 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5497 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5498 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5500 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5501 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5502 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5503 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5504 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5505 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5506 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5508 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5509 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5510 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5511 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5512 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5513 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5514 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5515 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5516 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5517 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5518 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5521 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5522 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5523 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5524 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5525 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5526 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5527 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5528 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5529 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5530 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5531 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5532 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5533 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5534 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5535 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5536 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5537 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5538 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5539 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5540 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5541 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5542 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5543 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5544 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5545 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5546 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5547 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5549 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5550 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5551 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5552 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5553 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5554 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5555 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5556 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5557 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5558 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5559 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5561 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5563 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5564 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5565 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5566 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5567 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5568 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5569 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5570 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5571 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5572 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5573 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5574 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5575 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5576 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5577 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5578 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5579 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5580 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5581 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5582 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5583 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5584 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5585 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5587 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5588 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5590 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5591 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5593 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5594 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5595 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5596 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5597 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5598 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5600 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5601 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5602 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5603 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5604 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5606 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5607 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5608 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5609 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5610 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5612 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5614 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5615 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5617 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5618 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5619 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5621 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5622 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5624 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5625 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5626 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5627 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5628 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5629 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5630 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5631 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5632 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5633 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5634 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5635 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5636 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5637 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5638 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5639 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5640 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5641 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5642 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5643 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5644 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5645 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5646 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5647 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5648 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5650 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5651 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5652 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5653 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5654 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5655 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5656 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5657 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5658 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5659 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5660 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5664 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5665 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5666 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5667 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5671 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5672 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5673 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5674 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5678 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5680 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5682 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5683 selinux_enabled = 0;
5687 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5688 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5692 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5694 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5695 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5696 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5697 tsec = current->security;
5698 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5700 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5701 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5702 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5705 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5707 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5708 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5709 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5711 if (selinux_enforcing)
5712 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5714 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5719 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5721 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5723 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5724 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5725 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5726 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5728 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5729 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5730 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5731 struct superblock_security_struct,
5733 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5735 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5736 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5737 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5739 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5741 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5742 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5743 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5746 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5747 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5750 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5751 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5752 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5754 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5756 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5758 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5759 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5761 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5762 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5765 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5766 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5768 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5769 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5772 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5773 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5775 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5776 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5780 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5782 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5784 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5785 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5787 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5788 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5791 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5792 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5794 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5795 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5801 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5805 if (!selinux_enabled)
5808 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5810 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5812 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5814 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5815 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5817 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5824 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5826 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5827 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5829 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5831 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5832 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5833 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5838 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5840 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5841 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5844 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5846 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5847 static int selinux_disabled;
5849 int selinux_disable(void)
5851 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5853 if (ss_initialized) {
5854 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5858 if (selinux_disabled) {
5859 /* Only do this once. */
5863 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5865 selinux_disabled = 1;
5866 selinux_enabled = 0;
5868 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5869 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5871 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5872 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5874 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */