2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
88 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
89 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
91 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
93 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
94 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
95 extern int selinux_compat_net;
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
134 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
141 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
158 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
160 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
162 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
164 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
168 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
169 task->security = tsec;
174 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
176 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
177 task->security = NULL;
181 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
183 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
184 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
186 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
190 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
191 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
193 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
194 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
195 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
196 inode->i_security = isec;
201 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
203 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
204 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
206 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
207 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
208 list_del_init(&isec->list);
209 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
211 inode->i_security = NULL;
212 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
215 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
217 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
218 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
220 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
224 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
225 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
226 file->f_security = fsec;
231 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
233 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
234 file->f_security = NULL;
238 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
240 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
242 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
246 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
249 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
251 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
253 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
254 sb->s_security = sbsec;
259 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
261 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
263 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
264 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
265 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
266 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
268 sb->s_security = NULL;
272 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
274 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
276 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
280 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sk->sk_security = ssec;
284 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
289 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
291 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
293 sk->sk_security = NULL;
297 /* The security server must be initialized before
298 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
299 extern int ss_initialized;
301 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
303 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
305 "uses transition SIDs",
307 "uses genfs_contexts",
308 "not configured for labeling",
309 "uses mountpoint labeling",
312 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
314 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
316 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
327 static match_table_t tokens = {
328 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
329 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
331 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
335 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
337 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
338 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
339 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
343 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
344 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
348 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
349 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
353 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
354 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
355 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
358 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
359 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
363 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
364 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
368 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
370 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
371 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
372 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
375 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
376 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
377 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
378 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
379 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
380 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
381 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
382 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
383 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
387 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
388 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
389 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
390 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
391 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
392 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
394 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
395 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
396 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
401 sbsec->initialized = 1;
403 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
404 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
405 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
407 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
408 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
409 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
411 /* Initialize the root inode. */
412 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
414 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
415 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
416 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
418 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
420 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
421 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
422 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
423 struct inode_security_struct, list);
424 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
425 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
426 inode = igrab(inode);
428 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
432 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
433 list_del_init(&isec->list);
436 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
442 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
443 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
444 * mount options, or whatever.
446 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
447 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
450 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
451 char *context = NULL;
455 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
457 if (!sbsec->initialized)
464 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
465 * settings this is going to need a mask
468 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
469 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
471 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
475 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
476 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
481 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
482 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
488 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
489 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
492 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
493 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
495 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
496 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
499 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
500 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
502 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
503 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
506 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
507 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
509 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
510 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
511 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
513 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
516 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
517 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
520 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
525 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
529 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
530 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
532 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
533 if (sbsec->initialized)
534 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
535 (old_sid != new_sid))
538 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
539 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
541 if (!sbsec->initialized)
542 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
548 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
549 * labeling information.
551 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
552 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
555 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
556 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
557 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
558 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
559 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
560 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
561 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
562 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
563 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
564 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
566 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
568 if (!ss_initialized) {
570 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
571 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
572 server is ready to handle calls. */
573 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
574 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
575 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
576 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
580 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
581 "before the security server is initialized\n");
586 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
587 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
588 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
589 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
591 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
592 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
593 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
594 * will be used for both mounts)
596 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
601 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
602 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
603 * than once with different security options.
605 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
607 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
608 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
610 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
611 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
612 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
619 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
621 goto out_double_mount;
623 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
628 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
630 goto out_double_mount;
632 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
634 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
635 rootcontext_sid = sid;
637 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
639 goto out_double_mount;
641 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
645 defcontext_sid = sid;
647 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
649 goto out_double_mount;
651 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
660 if (sbsec->initialized) {
661 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
662 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
663 goto out_double_mount;
668 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
671 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
672 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
674 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
675 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
679 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
682 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
686 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
690 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
691 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
692 * the superblock context if not already set.
695 if (!fscontext_sid) {
696 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
699 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
701 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
705 if (!rootcontext_sid)
706 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
708 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
709 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
712 if (rootcontext_sid) {
713 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
717 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
718 root_isec->initialized = 1;
721 if (defcontext_sid) {
722 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
724 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
725 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
729 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
730 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
736 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
739 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
741 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
745 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
746 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
750 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
751 struct super_block *newsb)
753 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
754 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
756 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
757 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
758 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
761 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
762 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
765 if (!ss_initialized) {
766 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
767 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
768 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
769 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
773 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
774 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
776 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
777 if (newsbsec->initialized)
780 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
782 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
784 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
785 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
786 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
789 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
793 if (!set_rootcontext) {
794 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
795 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
798 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
800 if (set_rootcontext) {
801 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
802 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
803 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
804 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
806 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
809 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
810 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
813 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
814 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
817 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
818 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
819 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
821 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
823 /* Standard string-based options. */
824 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
826 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
831 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
835 if (context || defcontext) {
837 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
840 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
850 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
853 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
860 case Opt_rootcontext:
863 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
866 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
874 if (context || defcontext) {
876 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
879 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
888 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
895 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
899 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
900 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
901 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
906 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
907 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
910 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
911 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
914 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
915 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
918 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
919 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
922 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
933 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
935 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
938 char *options = data;
939 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
941 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
946 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
948 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
953 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
956 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
960 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
961 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
966 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
967 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
969 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
971 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
974 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
976 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
977 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
980 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
985 /* we need a comma before each option */
990 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
996 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
998 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1001 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1003 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1009 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1011 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1016 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1018 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1020 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1022 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1024 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1026 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1028 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1030 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1032 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1036 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1039 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1041 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1044 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1046 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1049 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1055 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1056 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1058 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1065 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1066 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1068 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1070 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1071 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1073 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1075 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1077 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1083 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1084 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1085 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1086 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1087 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1089 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1092 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1096 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1098 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1106 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1108 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1110 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1113 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1116 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1117 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1122 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1124 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1129 end = buffer+buflen;
1134 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1135 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1139 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1144 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1145 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1149 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1157 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1158 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1160 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1161 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1163 struct dentry *dentry;
1164 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1165 char *context = NULL;
1169 if (isec->initialized)
1172 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1173 if (isec->initialized)
1176 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1177 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1178 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1179 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1180 server is ready to handle calls. */
1181 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1182 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1183 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1184 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1188 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1189 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1190 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1191 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1195 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1196 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1198 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1199 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1201 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1202 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1205 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1206 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1211 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1212 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1218 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1220 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1221 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1222 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1230 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1236 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1242 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1243 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1244 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1245 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1249 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1250 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1253 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1257 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1258 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1259 __func__, context, -rc,
1260 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1262 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1270 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1271 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1273 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1274 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1275 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1277 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1278 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1279 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1287 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1288 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1291 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1292 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1295 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1297 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1298 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1309 isec->initialized = 1;
1312 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1314 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1315 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1319 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1320 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1326 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1327 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1330 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1331 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1334 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1335 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1338 /* All other signals. */
1339 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1346 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1347 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1348 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1349 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1352 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1354 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1355 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1356 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1357 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1360 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1361 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1364 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1365 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1368 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1369 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1371 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1373 tsec = tsk->security;
1375 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1379 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1381 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1384 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1388 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1391 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1394 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1395 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1398 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1400 tsec = tsk->security;
1402 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1403 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1406 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1407 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1408 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1409 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1410 struct inode *inode,
1412 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1414 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1415 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1416 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1418 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1421 tsec = tsk->security;
1422 isec = inode->i_security;
1426 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1427 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1430 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1433 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1434 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1435 pathname if needed. */
1436 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1437 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1438 struct dentry *dentry,
1441 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1442 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1443 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1444 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1445 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1446 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1449 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1450 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1451 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1452 check a particular permission to the file.
1453 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1454 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1455 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1456 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1457 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1461 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1462 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1463 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1464 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1467 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1468 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1470 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1471 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1479 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1481 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1486 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1487 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1488 struct dentry *dentry,
1491 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1492 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1493 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1495 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1498 tsec = current->security;
1499 dsec = dir->i_security;
1500 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1502 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1503 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1505 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1506 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1511 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1512 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1514 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1520 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1524 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1525 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1526 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1529 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1530 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1531 struct task_struct *ctx)
1533 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1535 tsec = ctx->security;
1537 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1541 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1544 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1545 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1546 struct dentry *dentry,
1550 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1551 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1552 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1556 tsec = current->security;
1557 dsec = dir->i_security;
1558 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1560 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1561 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1564 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1565 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1580 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1585 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1589 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1590 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1591 struct inode *new_dir,
1592 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1594 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1595 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1596 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1598 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1601 tsec = current->security;
1602 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1603 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1604 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1605 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1607 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1609 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1610 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1611 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1614 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1615 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1618 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1619 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1620 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1625 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1626 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1627 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1628 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1629 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1632 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1633 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1634 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1635 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1637 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1645 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1646 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1647 struct super_block *sb,
1649 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1651 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1652 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1654 tsec = tsk->security;
1655 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1656 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1660 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1661 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1665 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1666 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1667 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1668 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1671 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1673 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1677 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1679 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1681 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1689 * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1692 static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1694 u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
1696 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1698 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1702 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1703 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1704 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1705 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1706 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1707 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1708 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1711 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1712 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
1717 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1718 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1722 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1724 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1725 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1732 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1740 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1742 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent,
1743 struct task_struct *child,
1748 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent, child, mode);
1752 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1753 struct task_security_struct *tsec = parent->security;
1754 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1755 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
1756 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1759 return task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1762 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1763 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1767 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1771 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1774 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1775 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1779 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1783 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1786 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1787 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1789 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1792 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1796 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1800 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1803 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1806 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1809 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1814 end = buffer+buflen;
1820 const char *name = table->procname;
1821 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1822 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1826 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1829 table = table->parent;
1835 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1837 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1839 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1844 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1848 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1852 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1856 tsec = current->security;
1858 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1859 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1861 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1862 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1865 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1866 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1868 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1869 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1877 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1878 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1884 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1897 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1903 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1907 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1913 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1915 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1918 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1922 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1927 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1928 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1929 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1931 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1932 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1933 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1934 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1936 case 0: /* Close log */
1937 case 1: /* Open log */
1938 case 2: /* Read from log */
1939 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1940 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1942 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1949 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1950 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1951 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1953 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1954 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1955 * the capability is granted.
1957 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1958 * processes that allocate mappings.
1960 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1962 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1963 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1965 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1967 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1968 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1969 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1976 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1979 /* binprm security operations */
1981 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1983 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1985 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1989 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1992 bprm->security = bsec;
1996 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1998 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1999 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2000 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2001 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2003 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2006 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
2010 bsec = bprm->security;
2015 tsec = current->security;
2016 isec = inode->i_security;
2018 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2019 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
2021 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2022 tsec->create_sid = 0;
2023 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2024 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2026 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
2027 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
2028 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2031 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2032 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2033 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
2038 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2039 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2041 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2044 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2045 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2046 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2050 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2051 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2052 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2056 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2057 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2061 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2062 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2064 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2072 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2074 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2078 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2080 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2083 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2084 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2085 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2086 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2087 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2089 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2092 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2095 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2097 kfree(bprm->security);
2098 bprm->security = NULL;
2101 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2102 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2104 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2105 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2107 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2108 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2109 struct tty_struct *tty;
2110 struct fdtable *fdt;
2114 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
2115 tty = get_current_tty();
2118 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
2120 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2121 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2122 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2123 file may belong to another process and we are only
2124 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2125 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2126 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2127 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2133 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
2134 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2138 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2140 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2142 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2144 unsigned long set, i;
2149 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2150 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2152 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2155 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2156 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2161 if (file_has_perm(current,
2163 file_to_av(file))) {
2165 fd = get_unused_fd();
2175 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2176 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2183 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2188 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2191 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2194 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2196 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2197 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2201 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2203 tsec = current->security;
2205 bsec = bprm->security;
2208 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2210 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2211 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2212 unchanged and kill. */
2213 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2214 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2215 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2222 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2223 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2224 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2225 struct task_struct *tracer;
2226 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2230 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2231 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2232 sec = tracer->security;
2238 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2239 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2251 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2253 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2255 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2256 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2257 struct itimerval itimer;
2258 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2261 tsec = current->security;
2262 bsec = bprm->security;
2265 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2268 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2271 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2272 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2274 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2275 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2276 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2277 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2278 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2279 will be checked against the new SID. */
2280 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2281 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2283 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2284 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2285 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2286 flush_signals(current);
2287 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2288 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2289 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2290 recalc_sigpending();
2291 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2294 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2295 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2297 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2298 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2299 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2300 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2301 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2302 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2303 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2304 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2305 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2307 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2308 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2310 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2311 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2312 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2313 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2315 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2317 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2320 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2324 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2325 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2326 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2329 /* superblock security operations */
2331 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2333 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2336 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2338 superblock_free_security(sb);
2341 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2346 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2349 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2351 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2352 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2353 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2354 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2357 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2364 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2368 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2371 int current_size = 0;
2379 while (current_size < len) {
2389 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2391 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2392 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2393 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2399 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2407 in_save = in_end = orig;
2411 open_quote = !open_quote;
2412 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2414 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2416 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2417 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2419 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2421 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2423 } while (*in_end++);
2425 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2426 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2431 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2433 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2436 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2440 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2441 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2442 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2445 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2447 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2449 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2450 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2451 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2454 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2457 unsigned long flags,
2462 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2466 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2467 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2468 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2470 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2474 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2478 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2482 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2483 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2486 /* inode security operations */
2488 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2490 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2493 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2495 inode_free_security(inode);
2498 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2499 char **name, void **value,
2502 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2503 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2504 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2507 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2509 tsec = current->security;
2510 dsec = dir->i_security;
2511 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2513 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2514 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2516 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2517 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2520 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2521 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2524 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2529 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2530 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2531 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2532 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2534 isec->initialized = 1;
2537 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2541 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2548 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2560 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2562 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2565 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2569 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2572 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2575 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2579 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2582 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2585 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2587 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2590 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2592 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2595 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2597 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2600 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2604 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2608 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2611 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2612 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2614 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2617 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2619 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2622 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2626 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2629 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2632 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2636 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2641 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2645 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2646 open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2649 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2653 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2657 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2660 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2661 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2662 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2664 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2667 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2669 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2672 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2674 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2675 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2676 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2677 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2679 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2680 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2681 Restrict to administrator. */
2686 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2687 ordinary setattr permission. */
2688 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2691 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2692 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2694 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2695 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2696 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2697 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2698 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2702 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2703 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2705 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2706 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2709 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2712 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2713 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2715 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2716 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2720 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2721 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2722 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2724 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2729 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2730 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2734 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2739 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2741 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2742 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2746 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2747 const void *value, size_t size,
2750 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2751 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2755 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2756 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2760 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2762 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2763 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2764 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2772 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2774 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2777 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2779 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2782 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2784 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2785 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2787 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2788 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2793 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2795 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2797 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2801 char *context = NULL;
2802 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2803 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2805 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2809 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2810 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2811 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2812 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2813 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2814 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2815 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2817 error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
2819 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2820 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
2821 CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
2825 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2828 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2841 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2842 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2844 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2848 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2851 if (!value || !size)
2854 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2862 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2864 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2865 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2866 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2870 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2872 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2875 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2877 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2880 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2882 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2886 /* file security operations */
2888 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2891 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2894 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2898 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2899 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2902 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2903 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2907 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2910 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2912 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2913 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2914 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2915 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2918 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2922 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2923 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2924 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2926 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2929 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2931 return file_alloc_security(file);
2934 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2936 file_free_security(file);
2939 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2944 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2946 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2951 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2954 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2956 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2957 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2959 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2960 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2961 * This has an additional check.
2963 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2970 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2971 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2973 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2974 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2977 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2978 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2980 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2985 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2986 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2987 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2990 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
2992 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
2993 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
2994 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
2995 if (rc || addr_only)
2998 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3001 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3002 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3005 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3006 unsigned long reqprot,
3011 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3015 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3018 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3019 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3021 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3022 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3023 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
3025 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3026 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3027 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3028 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3029 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3031 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3032 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3033 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3034 * modified content. This typically should only
3035 * occur for text relocations.
3037 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3045 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3048 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3050 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3053 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3060 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3065 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3066 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3075 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3076 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3081 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3086 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3090 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3097 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3099 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3100 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3102 tsec = current->security;
3103 fsec = file->f_security;
3104 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3109 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3110 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3114 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3115 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3117 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3118 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3120 tsec = tsk->security;
3121 fsec = file->f_security;
3124 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3126 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3128 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3129 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3132 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3134 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3137 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3139 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3140 struct inode *inode;
3141 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3142 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3143 fsec = file->f_security;
3144 isec = inode->i_security;
3146 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3147 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3148 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3149 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3150 * struct as its SID.
3152 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3153 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3155 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3156 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3157 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3158 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3159 * new inode label or new policy.
3160 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3162 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
3165 /* task security operations */
3167 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3171 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3175 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3178 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3180 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3183 tsec1 = current->security;
3185 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3188 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3190 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3191 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3193 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3194 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3195 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3196 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3197 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3202 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3204 task_free_security(tsk);
3207 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3209 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3210 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3211 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3212 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3213 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3218 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3220 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3223 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3225 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3229 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3231 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3234 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3236 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3239 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3241 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3244 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3246 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3250 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3252 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3256 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3260 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3264 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3267 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3271 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3275 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3278 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3280 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3283 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3285 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3288 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3292 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3293 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3294 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3295 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3296 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3297 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3302 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3306 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3310 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3313 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3315 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3318 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3320 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3323 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3328 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3330 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3335 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3337 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3340 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3342 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3346 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3353 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3354 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3355 the state of the current process. */
3356 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3359 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3361 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3364 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3366 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3368 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3371 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3372 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3376 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3377 struct inode *inode)
3379 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3380 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3382 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3383 isec->initialized = 1;
3387 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3388 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3389 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3391 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3392 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3394 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3395 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3399 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3400 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3403 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3404 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3408 *proto = ih->protocol;
3410 switch (ih->protocol) {
3412 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3414 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3418 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3422 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3423 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3428 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3430 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3434 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3438 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3439 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3443 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3444 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3446 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3450 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3454 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3455 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3466 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3468 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3469 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3470 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3473 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3474 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3476 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3477 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3481 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3482 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3485 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3486 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3487 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3496 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3498 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3502 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3503 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3508 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3510 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3514 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3515 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3519 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3520 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3522 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3526 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3527 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3531 /* includes fragments */
3541 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3542 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3547 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3549 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3552 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3553 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3556 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3558 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3561 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3562 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3572 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3573 " unable to parse packet\n");
3583 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3585 * @family: protocol family
3586 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3589 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3590 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3591 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3592 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3593 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3597 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3604 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3605 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3607 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3608 if (unlikely(err)) {
3610 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3611 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3618 /* socket security operations */
3619 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3622 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3623 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3624 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3627 tsec = task->security;
3628 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3630 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3633 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3634 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3635 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3641 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3642 int protocol, int kern)
3645 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3651 tsec = current->security;
3652 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3653 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3654 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3655 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3661 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3662 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3665 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3666 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3667 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3670 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3672 tsec = current->security;
3673 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3674 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3675 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3676 isec->initialized = 1;
3679 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3680 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3681 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3682 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3688 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3689 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3690 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3692 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3697 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3702 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3703 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3704 * check the first address now.
3706 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3707 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3709 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3710 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3711 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3712 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3713 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3714 unsigned short snum;
3715 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3718 tsec = current->security;
3719 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3721 if (family == PF_INET) {
3722 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3723 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3724 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3726 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3727 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3728 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3734 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3736 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3737 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3741 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3742 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3743 ad.u.net.family = family;
3744 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3746 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3752 switch (isec->sclass) {
3753 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3754 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3757 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3758 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3761 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3762 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3766 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3770 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3774 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3775 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3776 ad.u.net.family = family;
3778 if (family == PF_INET)
3779 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3781 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3783 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3784 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3792 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3794 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3797 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3802 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3804 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3805 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3806 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3807 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3808 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3809 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3810 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3811 unsigned short snum;
3814 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3815 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3816 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3818 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3820 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3821 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3823 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3826 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3830 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3831 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3833 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3834 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3835 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3836 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3845 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3847 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3850 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3853 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3854 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3856 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3860 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3862 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3863 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3864 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3865 newisec->initialized = 1;
3870 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3875 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3879 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3882 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3883 int size, int flags)
3885 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3888 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3890 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3893 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3895 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3898 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3902 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3906 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3909 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3912 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3915 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3917 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3920 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3921 struct socket *other,
3924 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3925 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3926 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3927 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3930 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3934 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3935 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3937 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3938 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3940 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3942 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3946 /* connecting socket */
3947 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3948 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3950 /* server child socket */
3951 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3952 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3953 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3958 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3959 struct socket *other)
3961 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3962 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3963 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3966 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3967 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3969 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3970 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3972 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3973 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3980 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3982 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3988 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
3991 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
3992 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
3996 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
3999 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4000 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4003 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4004 struct sk_buff *skb,
4005 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4010 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4012 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4013 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4015 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4016 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4019 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4020 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4021 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4022 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4024 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4025 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4026 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4027 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4029 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4030 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4031 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4032 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4035 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4036 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4041 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4044 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4048 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4051 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4057 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4058 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4059 if (unlikely(err)) {
4061 "SELinux: failure in"
4062 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4063 " network port label not found\n");
4066 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4069 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4070 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4071 u16 family, char *addrp)
4074 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4076 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4078 if (selinux_compat_net)
4079 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
4082 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4087 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4088 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4091 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4092 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
4094 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
4097 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
4103 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4106 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4107 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4108 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4109 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4112 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4115 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4116 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4119 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4120 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4121 ad.u.net.family = family;
4122 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4126 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4127 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4128 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4129 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4130 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4131 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4134 if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
4137 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4140 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4144 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4148 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4149 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4158 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4159 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4164 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4165 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4166 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4168 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4170 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4171 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4172 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4173 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4175 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4180 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4185 if (scontext_len > len) {
4190 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4194 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4202 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4204 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4208 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4209 else if (skb && skb->sk)
4210 family = skb->sk->sk_family;
4214 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4215 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4217 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4220 *secid = peer_secid;
4221 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4226 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4228 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4231 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4233 sk_free_security(sk);
4236 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4238 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4239 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4241 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4242 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4243 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4245 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4248 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4251 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4253 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4255 *secid = sksec->sid;
4259 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4261 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4262 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4264 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4265 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4266 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4267 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4269 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
4272 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4273 struct request_sock *req)
4275 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4280 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
4283 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4284 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4285 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4289 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4293 req->secid = newsid;
4294 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4298 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4299 const struct request_sock *req)
4301 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4303 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4304 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4305 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4306 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4307 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4308 time it will have been created and available. */
4310 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4311 * thread with access to newsksec */
4312 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4315 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
4316 struct sk_buff *skb)
4318 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4320 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4323 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4326 fl->secid = req->secid;
4329 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4333 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4334 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4335 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4337 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4341 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4343 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4345 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4346 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4347 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4348 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4349 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4350 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4360 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4365 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4367 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4372 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4376 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4379 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4380 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4381 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4384 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4385 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4386 ad.u.net.family = family;
4387 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4390 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4394 if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4395 peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
4399 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4400 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4406 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4407 struct sk_buff *skb,
4408 const struct net_device *in,
4409 const struct net_device *out,
4410 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4412 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4415 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4416 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4417 struct sk_buff *skb,
4418 const struct net_device *in,
4419 const struct net_device *out,
4420 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4422 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4426 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4428 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4429 u16 family, char *addrp)
4432 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4434 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4435 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4437 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4438 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4441 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4442 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4443 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4444 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4446 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4447 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4448 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4449 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4451 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4452 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4453 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4454 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4457 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4458 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4463 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4466 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4469 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4472 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4479 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4480 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4481 if (unlikely(err)) {
4483 "SELinux: failure in"
4484 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4485 " network port label not found\n");
4488 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4491 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4493 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4498 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4499 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4503 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4505 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4506 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4510 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4511 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad))
4515 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4516 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto))
4522 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4528 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4534 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4535 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4536 ad.u.net.family = family;
4537 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4540 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4541 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4542 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4543 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4544 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4545 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad,
4546 family, addrp, proto);
4548 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4549 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4550 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4551 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4552 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4553 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4554 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4557 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4558 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4559 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4562 /* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the
4563 * socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being
4564 * forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label
4565 * directly from the packet */
4568 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4569 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4570 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4572 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4574 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4578 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4579 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4582 if (peerlbl_active) {
4586 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4588 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4589 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4592 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4594 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4595 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4602 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4603 struct sk_buff *skb,
4604 const struct net_device *in,
4605 const struct net_device *out,
4606 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4608 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4611 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4612 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4613 struct sk_buff *skb,
4614 const struct net_device *in,
4615 const struct net_device *out,
4616 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4618 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4622 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4624 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4628 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4632 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4633 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4638 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4641 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4643 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4647 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4648 ad.u.cap = capability;
4650 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4651 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4654 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4655 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4658 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4659 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4661 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4665 isec->sclass = sclass;
4666 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4667 perm->security = isec;
4672 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4674 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4675 perm->security = NULL;
4679 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4681 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4683 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4687 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4688 msg->security = msec;
4693 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4695 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4697 msg->security = NULL;
4701 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4704 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4705 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4706 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4708 tsec = current->security;
4709 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4711 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4712 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4714 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4717 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4719 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4722 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4724 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4727 /* message queue security operations */
4728 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4730 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4731 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4732 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4735 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4739 tsec = current->security;
4740 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4742 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4743 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4745 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4748 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4754 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4756 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4759 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4761 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4762 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4763 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4765 tsec = current->security;
4766 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4768 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4769 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4771 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4772 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4775 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4783 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4784 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4787 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4790 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4793 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4799 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4803 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4805 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4806 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4807 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4808 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4811 tsec = current->security;
4812 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4813 msec = msg->security;
4816 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4818 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4820 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4821 * message queue this message will be stored in
4823 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4831 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4832 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4834 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4835 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4838 /* Can this process send the message */
4839 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4840 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4842 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4843 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4844 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4849 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4850 struct task_struct *target,
4851 long type, int mode)
4853 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4854 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4855 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4856 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4859 tsec = target->security;
4860 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4861 msec = msg->security;
4863 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4864 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4866 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4867 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4869 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4870 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4874 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4875 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4877 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4878 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4879 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4882 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4886 tsec = current->security;
4887 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4889 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4890 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4892 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4895 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4901 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4903 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4906 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4908 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4909 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4910 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4912 tsec = current->security;
4913 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4915 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4916 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4918 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4919 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4922 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4923 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4931 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4932 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4935 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4938 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4945 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4951 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4955 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4956 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4961 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4965 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4968 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4970 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4973 /* Semaphore security operations */
4974 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4976 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4977 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4978 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4981 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4985 tsec = current->security;
4986 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4988 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4989 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4991 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4994 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5000 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5002 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5005 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5007 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5008 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5009 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5011 tsec = current->security;
5012 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5014 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5015 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5017 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5018 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5021 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5022 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5030 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5031 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5035 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5046 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5049 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5053 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5059 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5063 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5064 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5069 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5073 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5076 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5082 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5084 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5089 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5092 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5094 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5098 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5101 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5104 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5105 char *name, char **value)
5107 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5113 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5120 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5122 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5124 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5125 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5126 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5127 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5128 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5129 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5130 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5131 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5138 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5144 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5145 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5147 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5148 struct task_struct *tracer;
5154 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5155 security attributes. */
5160 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5161 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5162 * above restriction is ever removed.
5164 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5165 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5166 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5167 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5168 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5169 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5170 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5171 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5172 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5173 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5179 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5180 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5181 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5185 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5186 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5187 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5189 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5196 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5197 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5198 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5199 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5200 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5201 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5203 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5204 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5205 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5206 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5207 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5208 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5211 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5212 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5213 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5214 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5215 struct av_decision avd;
5220 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5221 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5222 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5223 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5224 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5225 do_each_thread(g, t) {
5226 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5227 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5230 } while_each_thread(g, t);
5231 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5234 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5235 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5236 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5240 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5241 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5244 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5245 if (tracer != NULL) {
5246 struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5247 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5249 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5251 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5255 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5256 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5270 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5272 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5275 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5277 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5280 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5287 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5288 unsigned long flags)
5290 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5291 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5293 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5297 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5298 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5300 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5306 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5308 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5314 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5315 struct task_struct *ctx,
5319 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5320 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5322 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5324 tsec = ctx->security;
5325 ksec = key->security;
5327 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5328 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5329 appear to be created. */
5333 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5334 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5337 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5339 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5340 char *context = NULL;
5344 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5353 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5356 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
5357 .capget = selinux_capget,
5358 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5359 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5360 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5361 .capable = selinux_capable,
5362 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5363 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5364 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5365 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5367 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5368 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5370 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5371 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5372 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5373 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5374 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5375 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5376 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5378 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5379 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5380 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5381 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5382 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5383 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5384 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5385 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5386 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5387 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5388 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5391 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5392 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5393 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5394 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5395 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5396 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5397 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5398 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5399 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5400 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5401 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5402 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5403 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5404 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5405 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5406 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5407 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5408 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5409 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5410 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5411 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5412 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5413 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5414 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5415 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5416 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5417 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5419 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5420 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5421 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5422 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5423 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5424 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5425 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5426 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5427 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5428 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5429 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5431 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5433 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5434 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5435 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5436 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5437 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5438 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5439 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5440 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5441 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5442 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5443 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5444 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5445 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5446 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5447 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5448 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5449 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5450 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5451 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5452 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5453 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5454 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5455 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5457 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5458 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5460 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5461 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5463 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5464 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5465 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5466 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5467 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5468 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5470 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5471 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5472 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5473 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5474 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5476 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5477 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5478 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5479 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5480 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5482 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5484 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5485 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5487 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5488 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5489 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5491 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5492 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5494 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5495 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5496 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5497 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5498 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5499 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5500 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5501 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5502 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5503 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5504 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5505 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5506 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5507 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5508 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5509 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5510 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5511 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5512 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5513 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5514 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5515 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5516 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5517 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5518 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5520 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5521 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5522 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5523 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5524 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5525 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5526 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5527 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5528 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5529 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5530 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5534 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5535 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5536 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5537 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5541 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5542 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5543 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5544 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5548 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5550 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5552 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5553 selinux_enabled = 0;
5557 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5558 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5562 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5564 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5565 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5566 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5567 tsec = current->security;
5568 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5570 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5571 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5572 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5575 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5577 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5578 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5579 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5581 if (selinux_enforcing)
5582 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5584 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5589 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5591 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5593 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5594 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5595 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5596 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5598 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5599 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5600 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5601 struct superblock_security_struct,
5603 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5605 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5606 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5607 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5609 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5611 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5612 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5613 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5616 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5617 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5620 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5621 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5622 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5624 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5626 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5628 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5629 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5631 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5632 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5635 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5636 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5638 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5639 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5643 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5645 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5647 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5648 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5650 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5651 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5654 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5655 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5657 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5658 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5664 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5668 if (!selinux_enabled)
5671 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5673 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5675 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5677 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5678 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5680 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5687 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5689 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5690 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5692 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5694 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5695 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5696 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5701 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5703 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5704 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5707 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5709 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5710 static int selinux_disabled;
5712 int selinux_disable(void)
5714 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5716 if (ss_initialized) {
5717 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5721 if (selinux_disabled) {
5722 /* Only do this once. */
5726 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5728 selinux_disabled = 1;
5729 selinux_enabled = 0;
5731 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5732 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5734 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5735 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5737 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */